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ELEMENTS OF LOGIC; 



TOGETHER WITH AN 




mTRODUCTOEY VIEW S^ 



OF 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL, 



AND A 

PKELIMfflMT VIEW OF THE REASON. 



BY 



HENRY P. TAPPAN, D.D., LL.D., 

CWEKE3PONDING MEMBER OF THE IKSTITXITE OF FEAKCE, AND CHANCELLOP OB" TUB 
TJNIVEKSITr OF MICHIGAN. 



E^EW YOPvK: 
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY 

54 9 & 55 1 BROADWAY. 
1871. 






Entered, according to Act of Congress, In the year 1S55, by 
D. APPLETON A COMPANY, 
In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the TTnited States for the Soutbers 



District of New York. 



' /O ^ . PEEFACE. 



The work here undertaken differs somewliat in its 
scope and design from systems of Logic wMcli kave 
hitherto been given to the world. The Aristotelian 
Logic is simply the method of deduction ; and, as 
such, it is complete. Subsequent works, in so far 
as .they have been strictly Ic^gical, have closely 
cojDied thcr great master, and have confined them- 
selves to an exhibition of the deductive principles 
and processes. Now, the deductive method com- 
prehends merely the laws which goverii inferences 
or conclusions from premises previously established. 
These premises may, in their turn, be inferences 
from other premises, and so on, to a certain extent ; 
and just so far this inethod is all sufficient. But it 
is evident that the evolution of premises and con- 
clusions, and conclusions and premises, must have a 
limit. There must be premises which are not con- 
clusions from other premises, but which arise in 
some other way. Now, a complete and adequate 



PREFACE. 



Logic ouglit to exliibit tMs other way likewise : it 
ougM to inform us liow tlie most original premises 
arise, and upon wliat basis they rest. 

Other methods, indeed, have been abroad in the 
world, but without being systematically propounded 
as parts of Logic. Thus, the Platonic philosophy 
really contains a Logical development of the most 
original forms of human thought, springing out of 
the intuitive faculty. And the Novum Organum 
of Bacon contains a logical exposition of the method 
of establishing first principles through the observa- 
tion of phenomena. 

Both Plato and Bacon have had many able dis- 
ciples and expounders ; and both are daily coming 
out into a broader and clearer light, not as oppo- 
nents, but — ^to adopt the thought of Coleridge — as 
the opposite poles of one great and harmonious 
system. 

The present attempt, therefore, is to make out 
the system of Logic under its several departments ; 
and to present it not merely as a method of obtain- 
ing inferences from truths, but also as a method of 
establishing those first truths and general principles 
which must precede all deduction. 

"With all humility, I acknowledge my indebted- 
ness to the great thinkers who have preceded me. 
I have of course read as well as thought ; and my 
thinking and reading are naturally blended together. 
With this acknowledgment, may I be permitted to 
go on with my work, without stopping to note nar- 



PREFACE. 5 

rowly in my own mmd, or to remark to my reader, 
when I am drawing from original, and wlien from 
other sources ? I ought, perhaps, in justice to my- 
self, to remark, that the entire plan of this work 
was struck out several years since, and different 
portions of it written before Professor Whewell's 
and Mr. Mills' elaborate and suggestive works had 
fallen under my eye. 

That Logic really embraces all the parts which 
I have assigned to it, I think will fully appear in 
the sequel. It is that branch of philosophy which 
expounds the laws of the Reason as the faculty of 
truth and reality. 

The view which I have taken of Logic, will jus- 
tify the 'prolegomena. I give the Introduction to 
Philosophy in General, in order to point out the 
relative position and importance of Logic in a philo- 
sophical system. And I give the Preliminary View 
of the Reason, because, since this is the faculty 
which reasons, or logicizes^ I deemed that such a 
view, if given both clearly and briefly, would be 
satisfactory in this place. 



CONTENTS. 



PART I. 

INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 

PAGE 

Section I. — Definition of Philosophy 15 

II. — Distinction between the Phenomenal and the Metaphe- 

nomenal 23 

III. — Of the Reality of the Metaphenomenal 27 

IV.— The Objective and the Subjective 32 

V. — Reason and Sense 39 

VI. — Sensualism and Transcendentalism 42 

VII. — Ideas and Laws 50 

VIII. — Primary and Secondary Phenomena 58 

IX. — ^Antecedence in Time and in Necessary Existence 60 

X. — ^Ideas the last Authority of all Judgments or Knowledges .... 64: 

XI. — Divisions of Philosophy 

I. Metaphysics ". 70 

Comprehending 

Psychology 71 

Dynamics 73 

Anthropology 74 

Ontology 75 

II. Nomology; comprehending 

The Morale 80 

Esthetics ib. 

Somatology 82 

Logic. 83 



8 CONTENTS. 

PAUP 

Sect. XII. — Of the Relations between Philosophy and the Sciences and 

Arts 86 

Geometry 89 

Sciences of Discrete Quantity 91 

Natural Science 92 

Conditional and Unconditional Science 95 

Art 99 

XIII. — Reason, the Organ of Philosophy 103 

XrV.— Criteria of a True Philosophy 108 



PAET II. 

PRELIMINARY VIEW OF THE REASON. 

Section I. — General Introductory Considerations respecting the Reason... 123 

II. — Outline of the Ideas and Functions of the Reason 129 

III. — ^Explication of Ideas.. 138 

IV. — Explication of the Functions of the Reason 143 

V. — Does Logic comprehend all the Functions of the Reason?.... 144 



PART III. 

LOGIC PROPER. 

BOOK I. 

PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

Sectpon I. — General Laws of the Evolution of Ideas 148 

II. Metaphysical Ideas ; comprehending 

I. Subject and Objective Exteriority 155 

II. Time and Space 156 

in. The Infinite and the Finite 159 

IV. Quantity ib. 

V. Quality. 165 

VI. Relation 167 

Vn. Modality 172 

III. — Nomological Ideas; comprehending 

L Law 177 



CONTENTS. 9 

PAGE 

II. Matter and Spirit 178 

III. Perfection ib. 

IV. Right and Wrong 180 

V. Freedom and Responsibility 182 

VI. Personalldentity 183 

VII. Immortality 184 

VIII. The Beautiful, comprehending 

Symmetry 187 

Grace 183 

Regularity, Uniformity, Variety ib. 

Determinate Form 189 

The SubHme 190 

Melody 191 

Harmony ib. 

IX. The Useful 196 

X. Centralization and Diffusion 198 

XI. Affinity and Repulsion 199 

XII. Life ib. 

XIII. Polarity 200 

XIV. Instinct 201 

XV. Regularity, Uniformity, Variety, Symmetry, and 

Determinate Form 202 

XVI. Identity, Difference, Resemblance 203 

XVII. Design, Final Cause, Means and End 205 

XVIII. Truth 207 

XIX. The PMlosophical Idea , 209 

XX. Intuition 210 

XXI. Involution and Evolution 211 

XXII. Analysis and Synthesis 213 

rV. — Primary Sensuous Cognitions, or Cognitions of the Exterior 

Consciousness <. 219 

V. — Primary Subjective Cognitions, or Cognitions of the Interior 

Consciousness 222 

VI. — Axioms 224 

Metaphysical Axioms 226 

Nomological Axioms 228 

VII. — Of the Characteristics of Axioms in general 235 

VIII. — General Relations of Axioms 240 

IX.— Definitions 243 



1* 



10 CONTENTS. 

BOOK II. 

INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

PAGE 

Section I. — Introduction 249 

11. — Causes and Laws 252 

III. — The Human Reason, as related to the Objective "World........ 259 

IV. — General View of Classification 262 

V. — ^Principles determining the Induction of Phenomena in Clas- 
sification 265 

VI. — Distinction between a General Fact and an Absolute and 

Fixed Law 276 

VII.— The Logic of General Facts 283 

Principles of Elimination : 

I. General Difference with Uniform Agreement in One 

Point 288 

II. General Agreement with Uniform Difference in Ona 

Point 289 

III. Elimination by Corresponding Quantities and Inten- 

sities > 291 

IV. Elimination of the Terms of a Sequence, in order to 

determine which is the Antecedent and which the 

Consequent 294 

VIII. — Inductive Logic of Universal and Necessary Laws..... 303 

IX.— The Logic of Art , 315 

BOOK m. 

DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

Section I. — Introduction 318 

II. — Analysis of Propositions 320 

. III. — Of Propositions, as opposed to each other 325 

IV. — Of the Conversion of Propositions 328 

V. — ^Propositions constructed into Syllogisms 332 

VI.— Of Mood^ and Figures 347 

VII.— Of the Reduction of Syllogisms 351 

VIII. — Of Modal, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive Propositions 354 

IX. — Hypothetical Reasoning 357 

X.— Of the Dilemma 362 

XL— Of the Sorites 365 

XII.— Application of the Deductive Formula 368 



CONTENTS. 



11 



PAGE 

Sec. XIII.— Of FaUacies. 

Fallacies of Deduction ^'^'^ 

Compreliending 

I. Fallacies in the Formula ^'^^ 

II. FaUacies in the Matter 380 

1. Amhiguous Middle *^- 

2. Fallacies relating to the Connection between the 

Matter of the Premises and that of the Conclusion. 383 
Fallacies of Induction ; comprehending 

I. Fallacies of Observation ^^^ 

II. Fallacies in Determining General Facts 396 

III. Fallacies in Inducting Laws 398 

FaUacies in respect to Intuition 399 

BOOK IV. 

DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

Section L— Nature of Proof. ^^^ 

lI._The different kinds of d priori and a posteriori Proof. 408 

ITT —Of the Nature of the Rel.ation between Antecedents and Con- 

. 413 

sequents 

IV. — Of Degrees of Evidence ^^° 

v.— Of Testimony *^^ 

VI. — Circumstantial Evidence ^36 

VII. — Argument from Progressive Approach 443 

VIII.— Proving by Example 

IX. — Reasoning from Experience *^1 

X.— Reasoning from Resemblance and Analogy 454 

XL— Demonstrative Proof. •' ^^^ 

XII.— Calculation of Probabilities and Chances 463 



PAET I. 

INTEODUCTOEY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY 
m GENEEAL. 



-^ 



PART L 

INTEODUDTORY VIEW OF PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 



SECTION I. 

DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The term Philosophy in common usage has obtained an 
indefinite and often an improper application. When em- 
ployed alone, and without relation to any specific subject, 
it is generally supposed to refer to natural science : and 
thus a Treatise, or Essay, or Lecture, on Philosophy, would 
be expected to embrace something relating to Mechanics, 
Astronomy, Chemistry, Electricity, or Magnetism. 

Some undoubtedly would go beyond this ; and regard 
the term in its higher applications, as expressing something 
in relation to the doctrines of the intellectual and moral 
powers : or they would simply identify it with 3Ietap7iysics, 
a term no less vague and obscure to common apprehension. 

It is to be expected that the affirmation will at first 
appear to many paradoxical, that Mechanics, Astronomy, 
Chemistry, &c., are not branches of Philosophy : but in the 
end it wiU appear perfectly just. Philosophy indeed holds 
a close and most important relation to these sciences : they 
are grand results of philosophy ; but they are not philoso- 
phy itself And even Metaphysics, general and compre- 



16 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

hensive as it is^ does not compreliend all pliilosopliy— it 
only forms one of its important divisions. 

In defining pMosoplij, we may go on to say, that it is 
tlie Scientia Scientiarum—^' the Science of Sciences; as 
its object is to explain the principles and causes of all tilings 
existing ; and to supply the defects of inferior sciences, 
which do not demonstrate, or sufficiently explain their 
principles/' * Or we may call it the ^' Science of the Uni- 
versal and the Absolute/' But this is not enough. It 
would be hke defining Astronomy as the " Science of the 
Heavens." A definition may be just, and yet by reason 
of its dry, general, technical, and elaborate form of expres- 
sion, may fall short of the true end of all definition, viz., 
to lead the intelligence to a clearer insight and a more per- 
fect comprehension. 

Philosophy is a word formed from the Greek ^lXocto- 
(pia. It primarily expresses a mental affection — a love of 
knowledge or of wisdom. 

It cannot be questioned that such an affection is in- 
herent in the human mind. It appears in feeble infancy- — 
it stimulates the activities of the busy prattHng child — it 
forms the wakeful earnestness and joy of youth — it stirs 
nobly in manhood — it decays not with the decay of age. 
It is a moving spirit even in savage life, and shows man, 
when lowest, as still above the brute. This impulse to 
KNOW, this restless CURIOSITY, is connected with the whole 
development of humanity in Science, Arts, Grovernment, 
and Keligion. Co-existent with this love of knowledge is 
the love of external action. Hence, the development of 
humanity appears not only in the cultivation of the intel- 
ligence and the consequent unfolding of the sciences ; but 
also in the construction of implements and machinery, and 

* Ed. Ency. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENEKAL. 17 

in tlie changes and improvements wrouglit upon the face 
of Nature. The eager love of knowledgCj and the no less 
eager love of action — the impulse to know, and the im- 
pulse TO DO — these are elements spontaneously at work in 
human nature, and may he appropriately termed pliilo" 
sopMcal elements. 

Let us conceive of that period when the Heavens and 
the Earth were finished, and man was created and placed 
in the Earth its inhabitant and lord. Then he had the 
same faculties which he now possesses ; and the Earth was 
under the government of the same physical laws which 
govern it now ; hut his faculties were undeveloped, and 
science and art had not yet appeared ; and the Earth, 
whatever modifications it might he capable of, stood as it 
came from the hand of the Creator, in uncultivated beauty. 
But man, as he walks abroad upon the Earth, with all the 
endowments of intelligence and feeling, observes the Hea- 
vens and the Earth, exercises thought, generalises, and 
forms conclusions. What is working within him, im- 
presses its form upon all outward things : — the forest is 
levelled, and cultivated fields appear ; the mountain and 
the valley feel the touch of his hand, and put on new ap- 
pearances ; he opens a way across rivers, and covers the 
ocean with fleets ; where rivers are wanting, he creates 
them ; he digs into the crust of the Earth, and brings up 
minerals and appropriates them ; he calls into being a 
thousand useful arts ; he scatters over the face of the 
Earth convenient habitations, and crowds them together 
into cities. But not only does he change the face of the 
Earth, and put to his uses its various materials — he also 
establishes government, administers law, and awards jus- 
tice : he speaks eloquence into being ; poetry born in his 
heart, is expressed in flowing numbers ; he j^eifects sound 



18 INTEODUCTOKY VIEW OF 

into music ; lie takes the cMsel, and from the marble 
quarry spring up forms whose beauty is divine, and ma- 
jestic temples, which seem born with them as their fit 
habitation ; he takes the pencil, and dipping it in the 
colors of heaven, imitates every form of life, and advances 
beyond Nature herself : he affirms, reasons, and believes ; 
draws out pure abstractions from his thought ; advances 
into IsTature, and searches out laws for her phenomena ; 
and thus builds up systems of science : he invents a method 
of analysis, and, in the laboratory, compels Nature to re- 
veal her more secret processes ; and, not content with this 
world, the light of heaven, which has lighted him to his 
labors here, he seizes upon as his minister, and makes it 
reveal to him the worlds from whence it has travelled. 
Still more — from these finite forms, he ascends up to the 
Infinite ; he is a worshipper of God, and an expectant 
of immortality. 

" Imagine a being who had been present at the earliest 
days of the universe, and of human Hfe ; who had seen the 
external surface of the Earth, as it came forth from the 
hands of Nature, and looked upon all the beauty of those 
ancient times ; who had seen the beautiful forms which 
Nature presented, and heard the melodious sounds which 
she then uttered ; in a word, a being who had been a spec- 
tator of the first exhibition of the primitive world, and 
who should return at the present day amidst the prodigies 
of our industry, our institutions, and our arts; would it 
not seem to him in his astonishment as if he no longer 
recognized the ancient dwelling-place of man ; as if beings 
of a superior order had transferred their abode to the 
Earth and had metamorphosed it ? '' * Or contemplate an 

* Introduction Generale k I'Histoire dc la Philosophic, par M. Cousin, 
Lee. I. — Linberg's Translation. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 19 

epitome of the whole mighty development of mind in a 
single individual, appearing first on the shore of this world 
a feeble infant, and in less than a century assuming the 
character of a Newton, a Leibnitz, a Milton : and as an 
illustration of the changes made in the condition of the 
world by human invention and sMU, take the history of 
Mechanics, of the Needle and the Telescope. 

In contemplating these developments and changes, 
what enquiry springs up, yea, irresistibly springs up, in 
the mind ? Do we not ask, lioio aU this came to pass, and 
loliy the developments and changes came up under these 
particular forms ? Do we not ask, why did man change 
the face of the Earth ? Why did he create government ? 
Why did he give birth to science and art ? Where and 
how did the development of his mind begin ; and how did 
it proceed? What are the laws of his thought, the 
ground of his knowledges and beliefs, the forms of his rea- 
sonings, and the methods of his investigations ? What 
are the laws of his emotions and passions ? What are the 
capacity and force, and what the laws of his will ? 

Enquiries like these evince the workings of the philo- 
sophic spirit ; they are found under some form, in some 
degree, in every human mind. Few, indeed, take in that 
whole field of enquiry, which embraces the complete de- 
velopment of humanity ; but whether in the child, or in 
the adult, in the savage, or in cultivated man, you perceive 
questionings after the origin and reason of things — after 
efficient and final causes — an earnest prying of the mind 
into something beyond mere visible and tangible forms, 
you there perceive the workings of the philosophic impulse 
—the ^t\oao(f)La. This is the dawn of philosophy. The 
impulse to know and to do, the elements of philosophy 
spontaneously at work in the mind, lead forth the develop- 



20 INTEODUCTOKY TIEW OF 

ments and clianges above mentioned. The enquiry aftei 
the causes and reasons of these developments and changes, 
after they have in any degree taken place, is the higher 
form of the ^iXoa-ocpla, and leads forth the mind to the 
construction of philosophy as a system. Under the first 
form, the mind appears intent upon its objects, thinking, 
feeling, doing, and making its inherent energies to appear 
in external effects. Under the second form, it turns back 
upon itself, — that is, makes itself its own object by an act 
of reflection, and finds out its own reach and limits, its 
own aims and laws. 

^i\oao(f)ia, from expressing the impulse to know and 
the consequent causal activity of man, and from express- 
ing, after the development of humanity has taken place, 
the impulse to seek after the laws and principles which 
have governed this development, comes to express these 
laws and principles themselves. These laws and princi- 
ples, like the simple desire of knowledge, act spontaneously 
in the development of humanity. They are in the highest 
sense philosophical elements of our being, inseparable from 
it, and energizing as a plastic power within, and as such 
distinguishable from philosophy as an expressed system 
without, laid down in books, or in the lectures of the 
schools. The first, of course, gives birth to the second, as 
thought gives birth to language. 

In that early period of humanity to which we have ad- 
verted, it could not exist as a developed system : it was 
then in man as a light and a power, under which he thought 
and acted, but upon which he did not reflect : Thus the 
idea of the %seful, led him to change the face of nature 
and to originate the ordinary arts : The idea of justice, 
led him to constitute government and law : The idea of 
the beautiful, led him to the creations of painting, sculp- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 21 

ture, music, and poetry : The inherent laios of Ms intelli- 
gence, guided him in his reasonings ; he believed, because 
lie could not disbelieve, and faith appeared in him like a 
sublime and divine instinct : When he looked out upon 
the phenomena of the world, he assigned them causes, 
because he could not think of them without this relation : 
And from finite being, his mind necessarily rose up to the 
conception of the Infinite Being — he became a worshipper 
under the energy of a spontaneous and irresistible idea. 

At length reflection began— when it began we know 
not, but its beginning was the birth of philosophy as a 
system developed and recognized. By the act of reflection, 
or self-consciousness, the mind turns back upon itself, and 
makes itself the object of its own contemplations. All the 
phenomena of the mind, are presented in the field of its 
consciousness ; — the sensations which are caused by the 
external world — the affirmations of the reason — the voli- 
tions — must all alike appear there, in order to be known. 
There is an ordinary consciousness which belongs neces- 
sarily to every man ; but reflection is a special and volun- 
tary consciousness, and thence called a philosophic con- 
sciousness, which appears only when the mind becomes the 
object of its own observation by an act of self-determina- 
tion. 

Now in the exercise of this philosophic consciousness, 
the mind questions itself respecting the grounds of its 
knowledge and its faith — respecting the forms of its think- 
ing, and the modes of its investigation — respecting the 
grounds of its decisions in arts, morals, government, and 
religion : it makes those very enquiries which we recog- 
nize in ourselves, when, reviewing the progressive develoj)- 
ment of humanity, we are struck with wonder and admira- 
tion at what man has accomplished, and at what man has 



22 . INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

himself become. The results of these enquhies form sys- 
tematic philosophy. 



Let us sum up here the preceding observations, so as 
to present a succinct definition. 

1. Philosophy, from ^cXoaocpla, expresses the inherent 
desire of knowledge in the human mind ; and as closely 
connected with this, the desire of action. Under the im- 
pulse of these desires man begins to acquire knowledge ; 
and to exert his causality in appropriating the materials 
supplied him from the earth — in working in various arts, 
and in modifying the face of nature. 

2. After a time he begins to reflect upon the develop- 
ment of his mind, the facts he has observed, and the 
works of his own power and skill : and now the ^iXoao^iaj 
or love of knowing, takes a new direction, and impels him 
to search out the causes, laws, and forms of the various de- 
velopment of his own being. 

3. These causes, laws and forms really existed subjec- 
tively, inseparable from himself, before he began to make 
them the object of his thought and curious inquiry : and 
they, as the first principles of his being, and as governing 
its manifestations, are the substantial elements of philo- 
sophy, 

4. These first principles of his being are known through 
reflection, or self-consciousness ; and when stated methodi- 
cally, under proper divisions, and with clear definitions 
and expositions, form Didactic Philosophy. 

The term ^ikoao^ia, which at first expressed only the 
desire of knowledge, or love of truth spontaneously work- 
ing in the human mind, is thus employed to express all the 
grand results of this high and glorious impulse. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENEKAL. 23 



SECTION II. 

DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PHENOMENAL AND THE 
METAPHENOMENAL. 

Consciousness is tlie common field of aU our mental 
activity. AU our sensations, our perceptions, thinking, 
and reasoning, our imaginations and fancies, our emotions, 
passions, determinations, and volitions, alike appear, and 
are recognized here. These affections of our being are not 
the movements of an insensate mechanism : we know them 
in their going on, and we know ourselves as the subjects 
of them. 

Now there is an important distinction to be drawn here. 
The distinction between the immediate objects of conscious- 
ness, and those objects which, although known, or at least 
supposed to be known, yet lie without the sphere of con- 
sciousness. The immediate objects of our consciousness^ / 
^YQ phenomena, and these only are pJienomena ; while those 
objects which, by supposition, lie beyond immediate con- 
sciousness, are metaphenomenal. 

What are the immediate objects of consciousness, or of 
what are we immediately conscious ? This is the first 
enquiry. 

Let us begin with our sensations. The sensations are 
affections of our inner being, and unquestionably are the 
immediate objects of consciousness. But there are many 
perceptions and judgments which come up to view in con- 
nection with the sensations, which, together with their 



24 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

objects, are entirely distinct from the sensations. The 
bare sensations are those of color, of sound, of fragrance, 
of taste, of touch, of heat and cold, of titillation, and of 
pain and pleasure. In these are contained what are com- 
monly called the secondary qualities of matter : but this 
designation cannot be made from the bare sensations. 
We have in the sensations mere internal experiences, or 
movements of our own inner being. We are not conscious 
of matter, distance, space, substance, or cause ; — we are 
conscious of sensations only. We may be conscious of the 
action of other faculties of our being, affirming or perceiv- 
ing the existence of body, distance, space, substance, and 
cause ; but the bare sensations are no such affirmation, or 
perception. I think it must be plain to every mind that 
will reflect a little, that if we had only the sensations 
above mentioned, we should have no knowledge of an ex- 
ternal world whatever. 

The same conclusion must be drawn with respect to 
the primary qualities of matter. These are extension and 
resistance. But resistance to immediate consciousness is 
only an internal experience, and extension only a repetition 
of this experience. There is nothing in this experience to 
give us a knowledge of any thing external : time, space, 
substance, and cause, are not contained in a mere inward 
experience, a mere modification of our own being. In the 
primary qualities, therefore, we have no immediate con- 
sciousness of an external world. It thus appears, in gen- 
eral, that we have an immediate consciousness only of cer- 
tain affections or modifications of our own being. What 
immediately appears to us, what we immediately know, 
are these affections. These are truly the phenomenal. If 
there be an external world,— if there be substance, space, 
time, and cause,— they are not phenomenal, or immediately 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 25 

recognized in the consciousness; nor do they come directly 
from the sensations. 

Let us suppose, then, that we have faculties by which 
we can know an external world, and by which we can 
know substance, time, space, body, and cause, either 
through the sensations, or independently of them ; then, 
with respect to these faculties, the enquiry arises also, what 
are the immediate objects of consciousness ? 

The faculties themselves are not the immediate objects ; 
nor are the objects perceived, and the truths affirmed, the 
immediate objects : simply the acts of these faculties are 
the immediate objects of consciousness. Thus in perceiv- 
ing any external object, as a house or a tree, I am not im- 
mediately conscious of the house or the tree, but of sensa- 
tions of color, and of the act of perceiving. The external 
object does not come into my consciousness, but only the 
sensations and perceptions, and these are simply movements 
of my own being. Indeed, my own being, as a substance 
andowed with faculties of feeling, knowing and willing, is 
not immediately presented to my consciousness : I am con- 
scious only of certain phenomena, and of acts of judgment 
connecting the phenomena with external objects and inter- 
nal faculties. 

In processes of deep thinking and reasoning, the same 
holds true. In studying out some mathematical theorem, 
for example, the recondite mathematical relations, — the 
necessary and absolute truths are not immediate objects of 
consciousness ; — but the acts of attention, the acts of 
tliinking and reasoning — the modifications of my own be- 
ing in order to know and comprehend, and in knowing and 
comprehending. The mathematical relations, the necessary 
and absolute truths, do not come into consciousness as 
phenomena, — the acts and modifications of my own being 
2 



26 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

' are the phenomena^ while the relations and truths are 
metaphenomenal. 

Again, God is invisible : He is neither as a substance 
addressed to the senses, nor is he manifested to the con- 
sciousness as a modification of our interior being ; but still, 
if known at all, he must be known by these modifications : 
He is not the phenomena of consciousness, but known 
througli them. 

f Here, then, we have the broad and clear distinction be- 
tween the pJienomenal and the metaplienomenal. Sensa- 
tions, emotions and passions, acts of perceiving, judging, 
reasoning and imagining, acts of choice and volition — 
these, as the immediate objects of consciousness, are phe- 
nomenal ; but the causes of sensation, emotion, and pas- 
sion, the ob jects andj^uihs perceived, affirmed, or deduced, 
the objects of the imagination, of choice and voHtion — 
these, not being the immediate objects of consciousness, 
are metaphenomenal. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 27 



SECTION III. 

OF THE REALITY OF THE METAPHENOMENAL. 

The reality of the phenomenal is not questioned. That I 
have certain sensations, perceptions, emotionSj passions, 
and Yolitions, this is immediate knowledge and conscious- 
ness : hut whether the ohjects of these acts and experiences 
of my being have a real, positive, and independent exist- 
ence, this may be and has been questioned, and even de- 
nied : The reahty of the metaphenomenal has been ques- 
tioned and denied. 

It will be readily granted by aU, that by the imagina- 
tion we can create objects which are unreal ; and that in 
our actual perceptions we are often mistaken, and seem to 
perceive what we afterwards discover to have no reality, or 
to be a very different object from what we thought it to be. 
But, beyond all this, it has been contended that there is no 
objective reality whatever ; — that the tree and the house 
which I now see, and which everybody sees, have no exist- 
ence out of, and independently of, the perception of which 
I and everybody are immediately conscious ; and the same 
of all objects, whether external things, or internal truths. 

It is undeniable that men generally beheve in the re- 
ality of the metaphenomenal ; nay, that only a few specu- 
lative philosophers, have ever denied it. 

Now, the aim of philosophy is to explain the actual 
development of our being, of all that man has thought 



28 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

and done. Hence even the errors of man must be ex- 
plained. If, therefore, men have erred in their behef in 
the reahty of the metaphenomenal, it must be shown both 
that it cannot exist, and liow men have come to entertain 
this universal but erroneous belief. 

Those who believe in the reality of the metaphenomenal 
are indeed required, as philosophers, to show, how it is le- 
gitimately attained : but, on the other hand, those who 
deny this reality, in opposition to a common sentiment, 
are justly required to explain this common sentiment. 

The denial of the metaphenomenal had its origin in a 
mode of explaining the attainment of it. Its reality was 
at first assumed as uaquestionable ; but the explanation 
given, finally developed the denial as a legitimate conse- 
quence. 

The cardinal principle of this mode, was the assump- 
tion that the mind could perceive only by coming in contact 
with the object of perception, in accordance with a sup- 
posed axiom, nihil agit, nisi cum, et ubi est, nothing can act 
except when and where it is. This principle was suggested 
by an apparent law in physics, viz. : that one body can act 
upon another only by actual contact. The truth of this 
law is now disputed, and even the impossibility of an actual 
contact between the particles of bodies firmly beheved. 
But if the law were unquestionable in respect to physics, 
on what legitimate grounds can it be taken as a law of 
equal appropriateness and validity in explaining the per- 
ceptions of the mind ? That the mind can perceive only 
by coming in contact with the objects of perception, must 
be a mere assumption. Besides, by the physical analogy, 
the mind perceiving as well as the object perceived must 
be material. 

Having assumed the law, however, the great aim now 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 29 

naturally became to explain how the contact between 
mind and its objects takes place. 

In the first place, it was plain that mind and the ex- 
ternal material objects do not immediately coine in contact. 
The mind perceives, therefore, not the material objects 
themselves, but certain representations of these objects, 
wliich were variously called species, forms, images, and 
ideas. But what are these representative forms ? Various 
were the explications. The old Aristotelians held that 
they are made up of fine material particles which enter 
the different organs of sense, and form themselves into the 
required image in the brain, and that there the mind 
comes in contact with them. 

After the age of Des Cartes, this theory was abandoned ; 
and the image or idea was spoken of as an impression 
made upon the brain like that made upon wax by a seal. 
Here no material particles were received into the brain 
through the organs of sense ; but, impressions being made 
upon the organs from without, images were shaped upon 
the brain corresponding to the external objects. 

It is evident that the representative image once ad- 
mitted, must become a fruitful subject of speculation. 
These speculations, however, all tended to one result — a 
result proclaimed in part by Berkley, and fully by Hume 
— namely, that above mentioned, the denial of the meta- 
phenomenal. 

If we know only the representative images affirmed to 
be in the mind, then we can have no legitimate knowledge 
of any thing out of the mind ; for, as in all our attempts 
to approach exteriority, we are met merely by these images, 
they are all that we can possibly attain to. Hence, 
Berkley, on this principle, cannot be confuted, when he 
affirms, " The existence of a body out of a mind percciv- 



30 INTEODUCTORY VIEW OF 

ing it, is not only impossible, and a contradiction in terms, 
but, were it possible, and even real, it were impossible tliat 
the mind sbould ever know it/' — ^Hume is equally consist- 
ent in bis sweeping affirmation : " Now, since no tiling is 
ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all 
ideas are derived from sometbing antecedently present to 
tbe mind, it follows tbat 'tis impossible for us so mucb as 
to conceive or form an idea of any tbing specifically differ- 
ent from ideas and impressions. Let us fix our attention 
out of ourselves as mucb as possible ; let us cbase our 
imaginations to tbe beavens, or to tbe utmost limits of tbe 
universe ; we never really advance a step beyond ourselves, 
nor can we conceive any kind of existence but tbose per-" 
ceptions wbicb bave appeared in tbat narrow compass. 
Tbis is tbe universe of tbe imagination ; nor bave we any 
idea but wbat is tbere produced."' 

Tbe denial of tbe metapbenomenal appeared under two 
forms : — ^Tirst, tbat of Idealism. Here tbe facts of imme- 
diate consciousness were taken as tbe only universe, " tbe 
universe of tbe imagination." Secondly, tbat of Material- 
ism. Here tbe representative images were merely con- 
sidered as arising from material objects, and impinging 
upon material organs, and tbence afiecting tbe brain, or 
sensorium. Wbat now is tbe soul wbicb receives tbe next 
impression but a finer form of matter, and wbat are its 
sensations and ideas but a movement of tbe internal or- 
ganism ? 

Tbere is a class of pbilosopbers, and Eeid may be placed 
at tbeir bead, wbo endeavor to dissipate tbe dogmas of 
botb Idealism and Materialism by tbe stern voice of Com- 
mon Sense. Every man believes in tbe metapbenomenal — 
in objective reality and trutb ; tberefore, it exists for every 
man. Here common sense pauses : but tbe pbilosopbical 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 31 

impulse still urges to the enquiry, Is there not reality in 
opposition to Idealism and Materialism ? Is there not re- 
ality independently of a mere subjective persuasion ? The 
first are forms of a philosophy which, on its received prin- 
ciples, demonstrates conclusions in opposition to general 
belief. And is the general belief incapable of explaining 
itself by demonstrating the reality of its objects ? Must it 
merely doggedly affirm itself in opposition to the philoso- 
phical diagrams paraded before it ? And shall the united 
efforts of the human mind end in the birth of two great 
parties, both occupying absurd positions — the one affirm- 
ing, " I prove, although I do not believe ; " and the other, 
" I believe, although I cannot prove ? " May we not prove 
and believe, and believe and prove ? 

It is now evident, I think, that the cardinal aim of 
philosophy must be to reach the metaphenomenal. If the 
existence of the metaphenomenal can be demonstrated, 
then the facts of consciousness, the phenomenal, are ac- 
counted for 



32 INTRODUCTOKY VIEW OF 



SECTION IV. 

THE OBJECTIVE AND THE SUBJECTIVE. 

In determining the actual development of our being, in 
its various relations, we find ourselves at once introduced 
to two forms of being : the subjective, and the objec- 
tive. The subjective, under its simplest and most unique 
form, is myself ; and the objective, under its most general 
form, comprehends whatever is not expressed in the term 
me J or myself. Again, the simple subjective, myself, be- 
comes objective, when, in an act of self-consciousness, I 
make it the object of my thought. And again, the objec- 
tive general, or whatever is not myself, must be subdivided 
into the purely objective and the subjective general. The 
purely objective is that which is not only not myself, but 
totally unlike myself — different in kind — having no proper- 
ties in common. The subjective general is that which, 
embracing myself, is like myself — the same in kind — having 
properties in common : a distinction of personalities, of 
laws, causalities, and sympathies — ^but yet agreeing in be- 
ing connected with personalities, in implying the presence 
of mind, and in being capable of being referred in kind to 
the finite and the infinite mind. 

I will explain : I have developed to my own conscious- 
ness a thinking principle, a wiU or fi:ee causality, and va- 
rious emotions and passions ; and these, either as consti- 
tuting or as being inseparable from my own personality, 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 33 

constitute the simple subjective. Now, I conceive of otlier 
personalities like my own, each being to itself the simple 
subjective ; — and of these distinct personalities I conceive 
of one as the Eternal and the Infinite, while all the others 
are finite of various degrees. 

Now, all these personalities come under the denomina- 
tion of the subjective general. They are all of one kind, 
and each one is capable, by an act of self-consciousness, of 
making itself the simple subjective, and of considering all 
else in relation to itself as objective ; and capable of even 
making itself an object to itself. 

Besides these distinct personalities, which are dhectly 
li.ke myself, and palpably of the same kind, there are other 
forms of the subjective, which, however, are ultimately re- 
solvable into the former. The vegetable and animal life 
— the forces and laws of the material creation, chemical 
affinities — the informing power of animal and vegetable 
physiology, that power by which every animal and every 
plant is produced invariably after its own kind, from the 
vitalized seed ; — these forces, laws, affinities, and informing 
powers — these busy workers and co-workers — these wise 
and exact regulators of the whole natural world — what are 
they ? There is design and causality here which cannot 
be conceived of without mind : Whether the mind be in 
the material masses, formative and governing by direct in- 
fluence and immediate presence ; or whether it have invisi- 
ble, unconscious, and incomprehensible agents, makes not ; 
mind is here as the seat of power, and the fountain of law. 
If all that is persona] belong to the subjective general, 
then must these law^ and forces belong to the subjec- 
tive general likewise ; for, although they do not directly 
appear as personalities, because giving us no manifesta- 
tion of self-conscious determination, still they cannot 



34 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

JDut be involved in some way in sucli personalities, since 
their explication and conception is impossible in any other 
way. 

But what is then the pure objective, or that wMcL. can 
in no sense be subjective ? "Whatever is directly known by 
the senses, or by the muscular organism, is purely objective. 
I see and smell a flower — that is, J have certain sensa- 
tions, which arise from the correlation between my senses 
and a certain substance lying in space and exterior to 
myself. ISTow, I say not that I could form the judgment 
Here expressed, without subjective principles ; but the ex- 
terior substance which I name a flower in expressing this 
judgment, I conceive of not as life, but as a product of 
life, and upheld by life ; not as a formative power, a 
forma formans, but as a substance informed, a forma 
formata. Again, a ball is tossed towards me, and I catch 
it in my hands. In doing this, I have the sensation of 
hardness, or, in other words, I experience a muscular re- 
sistance. Now, here again, I do not say that I could 
have formed this judgment without subjective principles ; 
but the ball, or body, I conceive of not as itself a resisting 
cause, or as a gravitating power, but as that in v/hich such 
a cause and power are habitant ; and while cause and 
power belong to the subjective, I cannot but assign the 
gross material phenomena to the purely objective. They 
are not me, nor lil^e me : they are not life, or formative 
power : they are not a force or a law. ^' In the material 
sense of the word Nature, we mean by it the sum total of 
all things, as far as they are objects of our senses, and con- 
sequently of possible experience — the aggregate of phe- 
nomena." ^''" All that is exterior to me, and phenomenal 

* Colerido-e. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 35 

to the outer senses^ and wHch does not account for and 
explain itself— as, for example, effects require causes to 
explain tliem, — is purely objective. 

But not only are all material phenomena purely objec- 
tive ; all phenomena of consciousness which are known ^ 
merely as acts or movements of the thinking, wilhng, and 
sensitive faculties— that is, all which comes into the con- 
sciousness through the outer senses, and thence caUed sen- 
sations ; and all which is presented in the activities of the 
internal faculties, the perceptions, reasonmgs and imagina- 
tions, the acts of memory and fancy, and the vohtions, 
emotions, and passions, are objective hkewise. 

• The distinction between the subjective general, there- 
fore, and the pure objective, is co-extensive with the meta- 
phenomenal and the x^henomenal.— But in this point of 
view, it is a distinction in the kind or nature of the par-- 
ticulars compared. The metaphenomenal is subjective, 
because it is that upon which the development of our being 
ultimately rests : the phenomenal is objective, because it 
is that in which the development of our being appears ac- 
tually taking place. 

The development of the Intelligence must ultimately 
rest upon ideas, principles, or first truths. In the process 
of this development, appear its perceptions, reasonings, 
imaginations, and so on. 

The development of the Will must ultimately rest 
upon the laws of the Eeason. In the process of this de- 
velopment appear choices and volitions. 

The development of the Sensitivity must ultimately 
rest upon the laws of the Keason, hkewise. In the pro- 
cess of this development appear the various sensations, 
emotions, and passions. When the subjective is fuUy 
attained,— that is, when all principles are known, all laws^ 



36 INTRODUCTOET VIEW OF 

obeyed, all fitting sensations, emotions, and passions 
brought out and regulated by reason, then the develop- 
ment of our being is complete. While this developmeni 
is going on, the phenomenal, or the purely objective, is 
thrown out. 

But, although the phenomenal is always and only 
objective, we have seen that the subjective can also be- 
come objective ; but this last distinction does not, Hke the 
former, arise from a difference in kind, but merely from a 
change of position or relation. Every intelligent personal 
subject can make all else objective to itself — nay, can make 
itself objective to itself, by an act of reflection. 

To sum up the preceding distinctions, we have all pos- 
sible forms of being embraced under the subjective and 
the objective, as follows : 

1. The subjective simple, or myself ; 

2. The subjective simple, taken as objective to my- 
self; 

3. The objective general, or whatever is not myself; 

4. The objective general, divided into the subjective 
general and the pure objective ; — the first comprising 
whatever is metaphenomenal — the second whatever is phe- 
nomenal. 

The distinctions made and explained above, give us 
the leading philosophical conception, and enable us clearly 
and succinctly to state the leading problems. The lead- 
ing philosophical conception is that of explaining the 
development of my being. Now this development pre- 
sents me, 

First, the phenomenal, or what appears to my imme- 
diate consciousness. This consciousness I can divide into 
the exterior y or that which contains mere sensations ; and 
the interior^ or that which contains the movements of mv 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 37 

own faculties. Now, all these phenomena, whether of the 
exterior or interior consciousness, constitute the pure 06- 
jective/'' because they lie before the reflective power. 

Secondly, I have the metaphenomenal, or that which 
lies beyond the phenomena : and this admits hkewise of a 
twofold division. The metaphenomenal in the world 
without, which is to account for the sensations ; and the 
metaphenomenal within, which is to account for the acts 
which take place upon the sensations. ITow, the meta- 
phenomenal without and within, constitutes the subjective f 
general, because it lies under and sustains the phenomenal 
as the ground of its possibility. 

Hence we announce a main problem in philosophy, 
namely : To determine the validity and the forms of the 
subjective, and to show its relations to the objective. 

Again, in the development of my being, the earhest 
conviction at which I arrive is the Ego sum, I am. Now, 
starting with this conviction, I find that alf which I know, 
I know not only in the field of my consciousness, but also 
in the determination and activity of my personality. I find 
thus, that I am a simple, unique subject, lying in some 
sort under all being whatever, determining the mode and 
extent of its cognizance, and even its reahty. 

Hence we announce another problem in philosophy, *no 
less important than the preceding, namely : To determine 
objective reahty ; or the reahty of the objective general, — 
of that which is not myself. 

The first problem is disputed by the sensuahsts, or 
those who derive the materials of all cognition from expe- 
rience. The second is disputed by the ideahsts, or those 
who, hke Berkley and Hume, deny the possibihty of know- 
ing an external world. 

* Ob and jaceo. f Sub and jaceo. 



38 INTEODUCTOEY VIEW OF 

Once more : The subjective simple whicli attempts to 
reach, the objective general, attempts also to reach itself. 
This it can do only by making itself an object to itself. 
Hence arises a new and unique form of knowledge through 
the power of reflection or self-consciousness ; and thus we 
have the problem : To determine the faculties and laws of 
the simple subjective. 

These three problems cover the whole field of Philoso- 
phy, as will be apparent when we come to consider its 
cardinal divisions. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERA.L. 39 



SECTION V. 

SEASON AND SENSE. 

In the present developed state of my faculties^ I know my- 
self as Body and Spirit. Spirit is tlie subjectivity witMn, 
whicli tMnks, feels^ and wills. The body, the material ta- 
bernacle of the spirit, is a part of the great system of ex- 
ternal nature : it is the same, mechanically and chemi- 
cally ; and it lives and decays like aU other living things- 
What is its relation to the spirit ? It is the curious and 
wonderful mediator between matter and spirit. Thimigh 
the nerves, distributed into five external senses, and 
through, the muscular organism sometimes called the 
"sixth sense'' and the sense of resistance, nature reaches 
the spirit. What is the product of this union ? Sensa- 
tions, and nothing more: Ko thought, no knowledge— 
simply an experience of sound, color, sapidness, fragrance, 
touch, and resistance. But the cognitive faculty within 
is not unfurnished. It is prepared to know the world, 
from whence the sensations arise ; and it is prepared to 
know itself Sensation conditionates the reason -in two 
ways : — 

First— In sensation, in common with all the subjective 
faculties, it wakes to self-conscious activity. It here be- 
gins to live its knowing and thoughtful life. 

Secondly — Sensation furnishes materials of cognition ; 



40 INTKODUCTORY VIEW OF 

or signs whicL. tlie reason appropriates readily and fa- 
miliarlyj in reading the external world. 

The lower faculty, as it were, sings a joyful matin song 
under the window of the reason ; then this glorious power 
awakes, and looking out, recognizes the reality, beauty, and 
laws of God's works, and the Great Maker himself ; and 
then, turning back upon itself, sees there the image of the 
Divine wisdom and love. In knowing the world, the mind 
is developed, and all its faculties brought into exercise ; 
and as consciousness necessarily accompanies every internal 
movement, the mind is likewise revealed to itself. 

The first knowledge of both spirit and nature is spon- 
taneous. Afterwards, comes the period for philosophical 
reflection upon the one, and philosophical observation 
upon the other ; and then, psychology and natural science 
are born. 

As our faculties become unfolded in their relations 
with nature, important changes take place. The sensa- 
tions and muscular resistance, wHch originally could di- 
rectly of themselves give us no knowledge, are now 
transformed into apt and familiar signs of all external 
bodies, forms and qualities. The different shades of light 
and color, now associated with bodies, forms and qualities, 
readily represent them, and we seem to know every thing 
by the eye. It is now almost an universal sense. So also 
the different sounds received by the ear, enable us to dis- 
tinguish persons, things, places, and distances. The same 
principle applies to aU the senses. The reason has appro- 
priated them all, and made them such quick and familiar 
servitors of knowledge, that we now seem to have an im- 
mediate perception of the outer world. On the other 
hand, Keason, having from the first activity of the sense 
which opened the play of the mental powers, entered upon 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 41 

its career and unfolded itself to itself^ is now no longer de- 
pendent upon sensuous experience as occasions of intellec- 
tion. It can now retire within itself, and tliink with closed 
senses. Memory and Imagination now wait upon it, to 
supply it with facts and images ; and within its own 
depths it has opened fountains of pure, ahsolute, and neces- 
sary truth. 

As the body is thus the mediator through which the 
outer world reaches the spirit, so also it is the mediator 
and instrumentality through which the spirit reaches the 
external world, and impresses itself upon it. One set of 
nerves ohey nature, and give sensations to the spirit. 
Another set of nerves obey the spirit, and move the mus- 
cular organism. The tongue and the hand are the two 
great instruments by which the mind does its work with- 
out. The arts of industry and beauty — all the changes — 
all the improvements which the spirit hath made in the 
great field of nature, it hath made by the tongue and the 
hand. 

What, then, is humanity, but spirit conditionated on 
the one hand in its incipient activity, and in its knowledge 
of an external world, by sensuous impressions ? And con- 
ditionated on the other hand, in the exertion of its causality 
and plastic power, by an apt material instrumentality ? 



42 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 



SECTION YI. 

SENSUALISM AND TRANSCENDENTALISM. 

We now arrive at tlie point of departure of two great sys- 
tems of philosoptiy. Taken under their modern develop- 
ments, Locke may be said to represent tlie one, and Kant 
tlie other. 

Sensualism, concentrating its thought in the sensuous 
conditions of knowledge, loses sight of the truth that they 
are merely conditions ; and goes on to expound them as 
the primary and radical elements of knowledge itself. 
Hence the utmost development of the human intelligence 
presents us only the combination and expansion of these 
elements. The reason is absolutely incapable of arriving 
at any truth whose generating or constitutive elements 
have not first entered the senses. The senses thus be- 
come the sources and measure of all knowledge. 

Transcendentalism begins with sensation no. less than 
sensualism. Kant opens his great work with the affirma- 
tion, " That all our knowledge begins with experience, 
does not admit of a doubt.'' But then transcendentalism 
does not make the sensations, the radical, generating and 
constitutive elements of knowledge ; but conditions, under 
which the cognitive faculty begins to act, and suggestions, 
upon which, by its own force, and according to its own 
Ideas and laws, it forms cognitions. 

The views which the two systems entertain respecting 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 43 

the primordial state of the mind, differ widely. Locke re- 
presents the state of mind before sensation takes place by 
a sheet of white paper, and Hobbes by a slate, in which 
there is no idea or element of knowledge, but merely a 
susceptibility of being written upon. To this view all the 
adherents of this system conform. 

Transcendentalism represents the mind as having the 
possibility, the scope, the law and the form of all know- 
ledge within itself Whatever the mind be, whatever its 
faculty of knowing, and with whatever elements it be 
primordially furnished, it is easily conceivable that in the 
act of knowing it brings this faculty and these elements to 
bear. Now, in order to determine the reach of the cos;- 
nitive faculty, and whether the mind really have primordial 
elements of knowledge, we need only examine our actual 
knowledges. The sensations can easily be analyzed : and 
if they be the primary elements of knowledge, they will 
apjpear every where in the composition and deduction of 
thought : for every mere composition must preserve the 
original elements, and can show nothing absolutely new ; 
and every deduction must keep within the measure and 
kind of the starting points. 

But if in our actual knowledges, there be found ele- 
ments which, so far from belonging to the sense, appear 
in their nature and characteristics to transcend the utmost 
capacity of the sense, then these elements unquestionably 
lay claim to a higher origin. And if these elements, when 
disintegrated from our complex knowledges and held uj) 
before the reason, are readily recognized and reaffirmed by 
this faculty as necessary, universal and absolute, then may 
they legitimately be claimed as the product of this faculty 
alone. 

Now the sensations arc those of the eye, consisting of 



44 INTRODUCTOKY VIEW OF 

light and color ; of the ear, consisting of the various 
sounds ; of smelling and tasting, consisting of odor and 
sapidness in their endless varieties ; of touch, consisting 
of simple and uniform impressions upon the nerves wher- 
ever they are distributed ; of muscular resistance, consist- 
ing of hardness and softness, smoothness and roughness ; 
and, in the last place, the sensations of pleasure and pain, 
and of titillation. 

But our actual knowledges bring to view substance, 
cause, time, space, truth, justice, and many other ideas of 
similar characteristics — ideas which no analysis of the mere 
sensations can ever unfold. And while these ideas can be 
brought under the observation of the senses, even now that 
they are known, no more than they could at the first be 
evolved out of them, to the reason itself they are intui- 
tively true, universal, and necessary. 

When we speak, therefore, of transcendental truth in 
the just philosophical sense, we speak of nothing doubtful, 
but of that which both in itself is most certainly known, 
and in its relations makes all other knowledge possible. 

The application of the term transcendental is con- 
venient and appropriate, because it is descriptive. It 
tells the simple fact, that the human mind, while it is 
susceptible of impressions from without by means of the 
•organs of sense — impressions which cohditionate its first 
development, and afford materials for an important de- 
partment of its knowledge, — nevertheless contains within 
itself those elements of truth, those forms of knowledge, 
those first principles of all thought and reasoning, which 
transcend the reach of the senses. The lower faculty is 
connected with that corporeal organism, through which 
spirit communes with nature. It occupies the sphere ap- 
propriated to it, and does its work well. The higher 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 45 

faculty of tlie pure Keason lias its sphere also ; and is just 
as capable in its sphere of announcing primordial truths, 
the forms of perception, and the laws of reasoning, as the 
sense in its sphere is of giving forth sensations. 

From this it is evident that the metaphenomenal and 
subjective identify themselves with the transcendental. 

Locke is a great and venerable name ; and no one may 
speak lightly of him. But an excessive veneration has led 
some who disclaim sensualism, to claim for his doctrines 
certain saving clauses in those passages where he speaks 
of Eeflection as one of the sources of ideas. 

There is no school of philosophy that might not be am- 
bitious of retaining, as an authority, such a man as Locke ; 
and one cannot well conceive how any thing less than a 
supreme and honest love of truth could influence any one 
to dispense with his authority. 

For my part, I can say from my heart that I admire 
and love Locke. His clear and penetrating intellect, his 
good sense and manly candour ; his strong English heart, 
his pure English style ; and his decided moral and rehgious 
principles, always quietly about him like the coat he wears, 
like the air he breathes, like the familiar tones of his com- 
mon discourse, and the prevailing expression of his honest 
face, — altogether I admire and love him. And notwith- 
standing the errors of his system, I shall continue to read 
and admire and love him. 

Locke refers all our knowledge to two sources. Sensa- 
tion and Eeflection. The latter, as he defines it,* is un- 
doubtedly the interior consciousness, — it embraces the 
operations of the mental faculties : and the former is 
equivalent to the exterior consciousness. AU'that appears 

* Book II., cli. 1, § 4, 



46 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

to US, therefore, appears in the consciousness ; and all 
which there appears, consists of the simple sensations, and 
the operations of the mind, and whatever is revealed in or 
by the operations of the mind. Now so far the Transcen- 
dentalist will go with Locke ; so far there is no difference 
whatever. But when we come to consider the mental 
operations themselves, we find the great point of departure 
of the two systems. According to Locke, the mental facul- 
ties, when they go into action, not only begin conditionally 
and in point of time with sensation, but they also derive 
all the materials and elements upon which their activity 
is expended, from sensation, and the conscious experiences 
of the mental activity itself. The sensations, together 
with the acts of ''' perception, thinking, doubting, believ- 
ing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different act- 
ings of our own minds,'' are the first radical elements from 
which all possible knowledges are formed. 

Now, the introduction here of the ideas of reflection or 
the interior consciousness, by no means changes the charac- 
ter of the system ; for these, no less than the sensations, 
are merely phenomenal. The operations *of the mind, as 
well as the sensations, are conditions of knowing the tran- 
scendental truths. Thus the succession of thought, as well 
as the succession of sensations, is a condition of knowing 
time. Indeed, the most important truths are revealed 
upon condition of the experiences of the interior conscious- 
ness. But recollect that the contents of sensation and re- 
flection, while to the transcendentalist they are mere con- 
ditions of conceiving time, space, substance, power, and so 
on ; to Locke and his school they are the simple ideas or 
elements out of which these, and all the most abstruse 
truths are compounded, or drawn."''' 

* Book XL, ch. 12, § 1 and § 8. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 47 

The transcendentalist can say that sensation and re- 
flection, or the exterior and interior consciousness, are the 
only sources of our knowledge ; understanding by this that 
all that we know we know either upon the experience of 
sensations, or in the acts of knowing, of which we are con- 
scious ; but this is a very different thing from making the 
sensations and the acts of knowing the materials or ele- 
. ments out of which all that we know is compounded. I 
have already distinguished between the mere act of know- 
ing and that which is known, calling the first the phenom- 
enal, and the second the metaphenomenal ; and just as 
broadly as that distinction are the two systems to be dis- 
tinguished. Sensualism merges every thing into the phe- 
nomenal : Transcendentalism transcends or passes beyond 
the phenomenal, and reaches the universal and necessary 
truth, the substantial and real being ; — that which is the 
rational ground of all phenomena, without which they 
could have had no existence, and without which, now that 
they exist, they cannot be explained and accounted for. 

Merj. generally, and even most philosophers, in daily 
thought and occupation, are more with the phenomenal 
than the metaphenomenal, and thus from the familiarity 
of use, the phenomenal comes to be regarded as more un- 
questionable and certain than truths of pure reason. I 
think, however, that a little quiet thinking must dissi|)atG 
this illusion from every mind. How do we reach the phe- 
nomenal, that is, our sensations and the operations of our 
mental faculties ? Is it not simply by a form of knowing, 
— namely, consciousness? Now, if there be a form of 
knowing adapted to the metaphenomenal, why do we not 
know tliis as well as the phenomenal ? But there is such 
a form of knowing, namely, Intuition, or the direct per- 
ception and insight of Eeason ; and we are conscious of 



48 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

the exercise of the function implied in tliis form — we are 
conscious of knowing by intuition. Is not the act of in- 
tuition, of which we are conscious, as valid as the sensa- 
tion of which we are conscious ? Nay, more, is not , the 
truth, which we are conscious of knowing in the exercise 
of the intuitive function, as valid as the conscious act by 
which it is known? To immediate consciousness, as a 
form of knowing, we refer sensation and the operations of 
the mental faculties. To the intuition of reason, as 
another form of knowing, we refer the transcendental 
truths. This is the whole account of the matter. The 
sensualistic school will insist upon it that the objects of 
immediate consciousness alone are the elements of know- 
ledge — while the transcendental school affirm that the 
fundamental elements are found beyond immediate con- 
sciousness. 

But the principles on which transcendental truths are 
denied, involve the denial of all objective reality whatever, 
beyond immediate consciousness. It is not merely the 
ideas of pure reason, which lie beyond immediate con- 
sciousness ; aU the pure mathematics transcend it like- 
wise. Nay, the entire outer world transcends it ; for all 
must allow, that not the received objects of the external 
world are immediate objects of consciousness, but only 
the sensations supposed to arise from these objects. In- 
deed, in this very way were Berkley and Hume led to 
deny all objective reality, out of consciousness. It is 
plain that they deduced their doctrines legitimately from 
the system of Locke. 

I conclude here by remarking, that the denial of the 
metaphenomenal as that which transcends immediate 
consciousness must involve the destruction of all philosophy. 
If we are shut up to mere phenomena, we can account for 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 49 

nothing. We have only to observe, classify, and name ; 
to mark a ceaseless involution and evolution, where nothing 
absolutely begins, and nothing can be truly finished. 
Thus the whole field of human thought becomes a pan- 
orama of shadows. 



50 INTEODUCTOKY VIEW OF 



SECTION YII. 

IDEAS AND LAWS. 

The word "idea," according to the usage of Locke, ex- 
presses whatever we are immediately conscious of. The 
word "idea/' according to the usage of Plato, expresses 
what we cannot be immediately conscious of. In the 
usage of Plato, however, "idea'' does not express any 
thiQg transcendental of consciousness in the external 
world, but only the metaphenomenal, lying in the mind 
itself. And here we see at once the fallacy of all that 
Locte has said respecting innate ideas. Taking the word 
in his usage, that ideas cannot be innate, is a truism ; for 
nothing is more evident, than that mere sensations and 
acts of the mind, that is, mere phenomena, cannot 'be 
innate — they exist only as they appear in the conscious- 
ness. His reasoning, therefore, does not reach the point 
in debate. On the other hand, "ideas," in the Platonic 
usage, cannot but be innate, since the word expresses 
those primordial laws of knowing, thinking and reasoning, 
and those necessary and absolute elementary truths which 
are inseparable from the mind itself. 

In order to form a clear conception of ideas in the 
Platonic, or transcendental sense, let us recui to the dis- 
tinction of the subjective and the objective. The sub- 
jective simple, or mind, is directly ojDposed to all supposed 
forms of being, lying out of mind, and comprised in the 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 51 

plienomena of sensation, and whatever in the exterior 
world is connected with their production. It is the op- 
position of the spiritual subjective, myself, and the un- 
spiritual objective, exterior to myself. Kow, the true 
Platonist or transcendent alist views every thing existing 
beside mind, as made by mind, after the laws of mind, 
and primarily for mind. 

It is a kindly doctrine, and to be heartily received, 
that one design of the great Creator, in forming the 
countless tribes of animals, was to multiply the forms of 
enjoyment. Every sensitive creature hath its sphere of 
Kfe, its bountiful provisions, and its term of happiness. 
But irrational creatures comprekend neither the world in 
which they subsist, nor the curious workmanship of their 
own organism. The world, in its wise designs, its exact 
order, and its beautiful forms, is not made for them. It 
is made for them only in respect to the gratification of 
their mere animal wants. But under all these higher 
points of view, it is obviously made for rational beings. 
Our physical constitution, indeed, finds its fitting pro- 
visions and accommodations in the world ; but we are not 
confined to these. To us, the world is a vast and sublime 
exhibition of design, skill, causative and regulative force, 
harmonious relations, and beautiful forms. 

We can conceive of a period when there was as yet 
no creation, and the Creator dwelt alone in the immensity 
of his being. ITow we cannot but believe there was 
arrayed before his mind, every possible form of being, 
every possible constitution of a universe, every possible 
variety of life ; and there, also, lay the map of the worlds 
which were ordained actually to be. In his mind was all 
the science and art, according to which, the Universe was 
to be bodied forth*, and there, too, was that creative 



52 INTRODUCTOEY VIEW OF 

energy, whicli had but to exert itself, and Creation would 
stand forth in all its glory and magnificence. Now the 
preconceived laws, forms and relations of the universe, as 
they lay in the Divine mind, are a part of the Divine 
ideas. Viewed in relation to the Eternal Keason, as giving 
the original thought and law, they are ideas simply. 
Viewed in relation to the Divine imagination, as giving 
forth definite forms and relations, they become ideals, 
models, or archetypes. Divine ideas, as the originating 
thoughts and archetypes of worlds, cannot be exhausted 
in the actual creation, for Grod is infinite. Again, there 
must be in the Divine mind thoughts and conceptions 
which do not take their embodiment in material forms. 
Such are those which relate to pure science and moral gov- 
ernment. Whatever thus lies in the Divine mind, consti- 
tutes the Divine ideas. 

Suppose the infinite mind to constitute another mind 
like itself. This mind, of course, must be finite ; but 
inasmuch as it is mind, it must have the same ideas, accord- 
ing to its measure, which are found in the Divine original. 
These ideas, perhaps, could not be. given in a fully 
developed state, that is, drawn out into all their conse- 
quences and applications, for this would appear to border 
upon the infinite ; but given in their elementary state, to 
be unfolded by the active and free thought of the being 
thus gloriously constituted. Such a being may be con- 
ceived of, as existing without a body and organs of sense 
— a pure spirit ; and although thus without sensation, and 
supposed even to have no knowledge of a real world, in 
its pure thoughts and imaginations it might have, not only 
mental activity, but emotions of beauty and grandeur ex- 
quisitely delightful. For such emotions even now arc 
awakened in our minds, without calling in the aid of im- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENEEAL. 53 

mediate sensation^ when in dreamSj and esthetical efforts 
of the imagination, we are entertained with forms of great- 
ness and beauty beyond the power of mere sense to reveal. 
But now, suppose this being to be introduced to the actual 
creation, — ^would not the possibility of its knowing and 
comprehending it, arise from the correspondence between 
the outward reahty and the ideas within 7 Would it not 
understand the real world, just so far as it had the pre- 
conceived law and archetype within? At least, to a being 
destitute of sensation, no other possible way could exist. 
Let us, then, make another supposition, namely: — That 
a being be constituted hke the Divine mind ; but instead 
of existing as a pure spirit, that it be connected with a 
material body, with organs of sense — this body itself 
forming a part of the system of things without ; and 
that its relations to this body are such that it cannot 
become conscious of existence, nor begin the play of its 
powers until sensations are produced within, by corporeal 
impressions without. Shall the law of perception and the 
forms of knowledge now be changed, because sensuous 
conditions are demanded for their development ? It is 
impossible and inconceivable. The originating power and 
law of thought must still remain in the spirit, to which 
they of necessity belong. This last new form of being, is 
new only in respect to the conditions of its beginning to 
act, and the mode and conditions of its communication 
with the external world ; while the possibility, and the 
determinate form of its knowing, still lie in its inherent 
spiritual faculties, and its necessary and constitutive'ideas. 
The universe represents the Divine thought ; and now it 
cannot but represent the thought given likewise to this 
highly endowed creature, whom we recognise as man him- 
self. 



54 INTEODUCTORY VIEW OF 

When man^ therefore, was placed upon the smiling 
outspread earth, and beneath the bright starry heavens, 
he did not find himself a stranger and out of place. His 
mind and heart responded to the works of his Creator. 
His sjDirit drank in the living beauty of all things, because 
he was formed to know the beautiful. He saw the wise 
design of Creation, because he himself was endowed with 
a designing mind. He searched and found out the order 
of the heavens and the earth, and the great and all-regu- 
lating laws, because the principles of science, the founda- 
tions of law, were laid in his own intelligence. We have 
a striking illustration of this mutual adaptation and har- 
mony in the science of mathematics. This science is 
drawn directly from the reason of man. By this science 
he is enabled to measure the planets. The Great and 
Divine Mathematician made the universe according to 
these lofty and exact principles. He then gave his crea- 
ture the capacity to construct this pure and unerring 
science ; and thus man has a ladder by which he can 
mount from earth to heaven. 

If ideas of the reason are embodied in the external 
world, determining its forms, relations, and movements, 
what do they become when thus embodied? The answer 
is given in one word — Laws. Force or power has its origin 
in the Divine causality; but that which appropriates, 
compounds, directs, and governs force, is Law, answering 
to the Divine idea. All ideas do not become laws, re^-u- 
lating Force in the exterior sphere of their manifestations. 
Some ideas give the law to perception, and determine our 
knowledges : — others give the law to the fine arts, and 
determine the forms of the beautiful : others, again, give 
the law to the free casuality or the responsible will, and 
determine moral rectitude. But these all go out into 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 55 

some form of law. Law and idea are thus tlie same. 
Viewed in respect to the reason^ originating, conceiving, 
and projecting, we speak of the idea : viewed in respect 
to the sphere of determinate movement and action, we 
speak of the law. 

Now, if the object of science be to ascertain the laws 
of the universe, we see how it depends upon, and must 
grow out of, philosophy. 

There is a period in the development of mind in rela- 
tion to external nature, when observation and thought first 
awake. It is a period of spontaneous communication 
between the soul and nature, springing up from the rela- 
tion between the ideas within and their embodiment with- 
out. A voice from without calls to the soul within, and 
the soul joyfully answers back. In the very impressions 
made upon the sensitivity by nature, the occasion appears 
when the ideas are required, in order to know and compre- 
hend. The reason is noticing carefully, and struggling to 
comprehend : in the very effort of earnest thought it per- 
ceives ideas, vaguely, perhaps, at first, and immediately 
carries them out to nature as a tentative law. The first 
efforts to assign laws to nature, and to expound her great 
system, may be crude and imperfect, wild and imaginative, 
because observation is limited, and reason only partially 
developed ; but the process is the same in kind, at the 
dawn of science, and at its glorious noontide. It is the 
union of ideas and observation. This first period may be 
called the Time of Awakening. 

The second period is the Time of Prophecy. The 
mind now realizes in clear and decided reflection, what it 
wants. It proceeds, therefore, to make out the system of 
nature by mapping out the related bodies, their forms, 
magnitudes, and relations, and assigning them forces and 



56 INTEODUCTOEY VIEW OF 

laws. In this work the mind is prone to become intoxi- 
cated by its first glimpses of the grand mechanism of the 
world, and to imagine that the great discovery is com- 
pleted : here, then, it pauses, and gives itself up to dog- 
matizing. In reality it has only arrived at a theory, or a 
tentative system of nature : it has made prophecies more 
or less clear, but nothing yet is established. 

The third period is The Time of Elaboeate Obsee- 

VATION, EXPEEIMENT, AND CALCULATION. Dissatisficd 

with preceding results, and yet taking advantage of them, 
the mind now sets itself at work afresh. It endeavors to 
think more profoundly, to reason more logically, and thus 
to escape from empty conjectures and fallacies. JSTow it 
aims to observe more extensively and accurately, at the 
same time reducing its observations to an exact and con- 
venient classification : and not content with the facts of 
nature as they present themselves of their own accord, by 
ingeniously contrived experiments it forces out new and 
more curious facts from the hitherto silent and veiled 
bosom of nature. Now, too, it diligently cultivates pure 
science, that it may construct formulee for the solution of 
the problems which come thronging in. 

The fourth period is the Time of Deteeminate Sci- 
ence. Now imaginary conceptions, and the ideas of 
merely possible systems, are set aside, and the true idea 
finds its correspondiQg law. 

Thales belongs to the first period ; Pythagoras and 
Ptolemy to the second ; Copernicus, Kepler, and Tycho 
Brahe to the third ; Newton and La Place to the fourth. 

In the amazing advance which has been made in de- 
terminate science, and in perfecting methods of investiga- 
tion, the four periods in respect to any new subject may be 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 57 

said to be passed througli in one generation and in tlie life- 
time of one philosoplier. 

Natural science will then only be completed wben all 
the phenomena of nature shall be reduced under a univer- 
sal causality, and assigned to fitting laws known in their 
conformity to ideas. Then the ideas and the laws will, as 
it were, stand face to face, and the phenomena be the in- 
telligible words which pass between them. 

The Mathematical, Moral, and ^sthetical Sciences are 
formed in the same way. The ideas of the reason project 
the forms and relations, and give the laws. The perfec- 
tion of these sciences lies in their conformity to the abso- 
lute ideas. 



d8 introductory view of 



SECTION YIII. 

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY PHENOMENA. 

We shall begin with the exterior consciousness. The jpri-^ 
mary 'phenomena are the simple sensations. These are in 
themselves incapable of projecting themselves beyond, the 
sphere of consciousness. But when the ideas are added to 
them, moulding and appropriating them by the laws of 
perception, then they become merged into positive judg- 
ments respecting bodies in space, with forms, qualities, 
distances, magnitudes, and movements. The sensations 
now habitually are not thought of as simple affections of 
the sensitivity ; but whenever they arise, the mind is busy 
in noticing the goings on of the world in space. Hence, 
when we speak of phenomena in this developed state of 
perception, we mean not the mere sensations, but the ac- 
tual appearances and changes of bodies, of which the sen- 
sations have now become such apt and familiar signs that 
we lose sight of their -original simplicity and bareness. 
Just as in language, when we hear the familiar and appro- 
priate sounds, or see the familiar symbols, we seem at 
once to be present to the world of thought and imagination. 

Now the phenomena transferred from the sensitivity, 
and characterized and classified as the phenomena of an 
outward world, constitute the secondary jpTienomena of the 
exterior consciousness. 

A similar transformation takes place in the interior 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 59 

consciousness. Here tlie primary pJienomena are simple 
acts, or movements. But the ideas here also add them- 
selyes to the phenomena, and we come to know a subject 
— a personality, endowed with power, intelligence and 
freedom. The mere phenomena could not carry them- 
selves back into spiritual reality, but of themselves would 
remain a bare flow of appearances through the field of the 
consciousness, without telling the fountain from whence 
they came, or whither they were tending. But in the very 
giving forth of the phenomena in the consciousness, the 
ideas make their appearance under the form of an intuitive 
perception and affirmation ; and then the mind knows it- 
self as spirit endowed with reason, power and freedom, 
and perceives design and law in every niovement. Thence- 
forward there are no more bare phenomena ; but it is the 
reason, knowing, designing, and commanding ; the will 
exerting causality ; the sensitivity alive with emotion and 
passion ; the glorious mind exerting itself in its proper 
sphere. The acts and affections of definite powers are the 
secondary phenomena of the interior consciousness. 

The above distinction is an important one ; for men 
generally think of phenomena under their secondary form 
m the developed state of the mind: many, therefore, 
might fall into some confusion when the phenomenal is 
represented as lying wholly in the field of consciousness, 
under its primary presentation. 



60 INTRODUCTOKY VIEW OF 



SECTION IX 

ANTECEDENCE IN TIME^ AND IN NECESSAEY EXISTENCE. 

This is what Cousin styles Chronological, and Logical 
Antecedence. 

The first is the antecedence of the primary phenomena ; 
the second, the antecedence of ideas. 

To a mind not placed nnder sensuous conditions, the 
phenomena of the interior consciousness would alone claim 
antecedence in time. To man, who is mind under these 
conditions, the phenomena of the exterior, as well as of the 
interior consciousness, claim this antecedence. Did the 
phenomena alone exist, no question respecting necessary 
existence could arise ; hut in the actual manifestation of 
ideas within the sphere of thought, this question cannot be 
avoided. 

The distinction here held up to view is very important, 
and really not difficult to comprehend. In the actual de- 
velopment of our being, the primary phenomena obviously 
must first appear in the order of time } for sensation is the 
first awakening of conscious existence, phenomena are the 
immediate objects of consciousness, and consciousness is 
the first form of knowledge. The knowledges to which we 
attain through the consciousness of phenomena, are pre- 
sented under the form of judgments of affirmations made 
by the Eeason. But these judgments, as acts of the Rea- 
son, are phenomena of the interior consciousness ; as phe- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENEEAL. 61 

nomena tliey must rest upon something antecedent ; but 
tMs sometliing antecedent is not sensation, for sensation 
stands only in tlie relation of a condition, and does not 
contain the elements of the judgments. Upon analysis, 
these elements are found to be ideas. Ideas, then, must 
have the antecedence of necessary existence. Mere sensa- 
tion, in a particular form of being, may exist without in- 
volving antecedent ideas in the sphere of that being ; but 
judgments or knowledges formed upon the basis of ideas, 
necessarily involve their prior existence ; and as ideas 
can be traced to nothing higher, their antecedence must be 
that of necessary existence. 

Sensations demand a previous necessary existence, only 
as all phenomena demand antecedent causality. But the 
phenomena of the interior consciousness, in addition to 
this, demand a constructive reason. 

Sensations are known before cause is known ; and yet 
as without an antecedent cause they could not have ex- 
isted, so neither could they have been known under the 
causal relation, without the antecedent idea of cause. 
Affirmations of the reason appear, before the reason and its 
ideas come into the field of reflection ; and. yet, had not 
these had a necessary prior existence, the affirmations 
would not have been possible. . 

Experience is the conditionating starting point in the 
order of time. Ideas are the determining starting point in 
the order of rational judgments. 

Experience marks the time when the knowledges begin. 
Ideas alone make the knowledges possible. Experience is 
the dial-hand which tells the hour of the mind's morning 
when it awakes to thought. Ideas necessitate the move- 
ment of the dial-hand itself 

Again : As the sensuous experiences of the exterior 



62 INTEODUCTORY VIEW OF 

consciousness conditionate the reason in the order of tmie 
in the development of those ideas by which it knows the 
external world ; and as the experiences of the interior 
consciousness conditionate it in the order of time in the 
development of those ideas by which it knows the intel- 
lectual world : while, on the other hand, in the order of 
necessary prior existence, ideas determine all the know- 
ledges arrived at : so, likewise, the particular judgments 
formed respecting objects in either world, conditionate . the 
universal truths in the order of time ; while these truths, 
in the order of necessary prior existence, determine the 
particular judgments. For example : in the external 
world the particular judgment that a given body is in 
space, precedes in time the universal judgment that every 
body must be in space ; while the universal judgment 
comprehended in the ideas of space and substance, must 
have had a prior necessary existence in order to make the 
other possible. And in the interior and intellectual sphere, 
although the affirmation that all phenomena must be as- 
signed to causality, would not have been formed until a 
particular instance of causahty had appeared ; still, in the 
order of necessary prior existence, the universal truth must 
have been embraced in the inherent idea of causality, or 
the particular judgment assigning a particular phenomenon 
to an appropriate cause, would have been impossible, as 
having no basis on which to make its apjoearance. 

To sum up the whole in brief : In the development of 
our being, the phenomenal as to time precedes the meta- 
phenomenal ; in necessary existence, the latter precedes 
the former. The phenomenal is first known, but it could 
not be known at all in its actual state, unless the meta- 
phenomenal had had a prior existence : and as the univer- 
sal belongs only to the metaphenomenal, the universal and 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 63 

particular come into the same conditionating relations. 
Tlie particular is first known, and yet it could not be 
known at all unless there had been a necessary prior exist- 
ence of the universal. The phenomenal, are first appear- 
ances in time : the metaphenomenalj cause them by a 
necessary spontaneous power. The metaphenomenal ex- 
isted out of the relation of time, and independently of it ; 
when the phenomena were given in this relation, then the 
condition was supj)lied, under which, the nietaphenomenal 
could be apprehended by an act of knowing standing in 
this relation also. 



64 INTEODUCTORY VIEW OF 



SECTION X. 

IDEAS THE LAST AUTHORITY OF ALL JUDGMENTS OR 

KNOWLEDGES. 

A JUDGMENT or knowledge is an affirmation of the reason. 
When expressed in language, it hecomes a proposition ; 
because, it then passes beyond the sphere of the individual 
consciousness, and is propounded to general thought. 

Every j^i'oposition consists of a subject and predicate. 
The subject is that of which the affirmation is made. The 
predicate is that which is affirmed of the subject. The 
affirmation is either positive or negative ; that is, an affirma- 
tion of agreement or disagreement. 

Fixing the mind upon the question of agreement or 
disagreement, it^ is evident that there are only two ways in 
which it can be determined, — namely, by deduction or by 
intuition. If by deduction, then the subject and predicate 
are compared by means of a third or middle term, with 
which they both agree ; or with which one disagrees, and 
the other agrees. This forms the syllogism, which will be 
analysed hereafter. But a question arises, respecting the 
agreement of the two terms with the third, respectively : — 
Is this known by deduction or by intuition .^ If by deduc- 
tion, then we have had a previous comparison subsidiary 
to the one in hand. But, again, how was the agreement 
seen in this previous comparison, — by deduction, or by in- 
tuition .^ If by deduction, then there must have been a 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 65 

comparison still more remote. Tlius^ A agrees with B^ 
because they respectively agree with C. But A agrees 
with C, because A and C respectively agree with X. And 
B agrees with 0, because they resjDectively agree with Y. 
Again, B agrees with Y, because they respectively agree 
with Z ; and so on. 

It is manifest that this series of retrogressive deductions 
cannot be continued ad infinitum. We must at last ar- 
rive at a point where the agreement is seen, without a 
middle term, by direct insight or intuition. We thus 
arrive at what is generally called a piest truth, — a truth 
which neither admits of nor requires a demonstration. 
Such are the axioms of geometry. Here, then, is a rest- 
ing-place of thought — here is an absolute authority. The 
axiom is authoritative, because it is drawn out of the pure 
reason, and permeated with its ideas. For, plainly, the 
axiom could not be formed, if the reason were not furnished 
with the ideas of relation, eqahty, and identity. The rea- 
son, out of its own thought, and by its own authority, 
forms the axiom. A succession of comparisons thus con- 
ducts us upward to the idea as the last authority. 

Let us next view the subject and predicate separately. 
The subject can be thought of without the predicate ; and 
the predicate without the subject ; — each being a distinct 
cognition. ITow the question may be started. How do we 
come by each distinct cognition introduced into the com- 
parison ? And here it may appear upon analysis, that 
each is the result of a previous comparison ; and still fur- 
ther, the terms which enter into this previous comparison, 
may themselves be drawn from a comparison lying still 
farther back. But, as in the former case, the series of 
comparisons must at length come to an end, and we must 
arrive at cognitions which are obtained without a compari- 



66 INTRODUCTOKY VIEW OF 

BOD of foregoing cognitions. Take, for example, the proj)o- 
sition, Every body is in space. "We have here the cogni- 
tion of body, and that of sj)ace : Now, if it were granted 
that body is derived from a preceding comparison, it is' 
plainly impossible that space could be thus derived. In 
space, then, we have a simple original cognition. The 
same must appear in tracing back every cognition. These 
first elements of thought, whatever they be, must be the 
foundations of all the subsequent cognitions. If, according 
to Locke, these first elements were merely the phenomena 
which form the immediate objects of consciousness, they 
undoubtedly would be the foundations of all the subsequent 
knowledges, as he has represented them. 

According to the transcendental system, however, the 
original elements are ideas or simple intuitions of the pure 
reason, given upon sensuous conditions, but not formed out 
of them. The truth of the latter system appears upon 
the last analysis of our knowledges, since this analysis 
does not give us bare phenomena of the interior and exte- 
rior consciousness, but ideas, as the constitutive elements. 

We may next view the subject and the predicate in 
their particular relation to each other. Here propositions 
take a two-fold designation. They are either Analytical 
or Synthetical. 

First, the Analytical.* Here the subject contains the 
predicate ; and, in the form of the proposition, the predi- 
cate is wound out of it. Nothing more is reaUy said in 
the predicate than what is implied in the enunciation of 
the subject ; but for the purpose of definition or explana- 
tion, that which is implied in the subject, is stated fuUy 
and clearly. For example : when we say. Body is ex- 

* Aj/aAvo.', to unwind or unravel. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 67 

tended, the predicate extended affirms notliing more than 
what is im23ned in Body, for body is inconceivahle without 
extension. The immediate basis of every analytical propo- 
sition must, therefore, be the cognition expressed in the 
subject. Then the question comes up next, What is the 
basis of the cognition itself ? And here, as before, we are 
carried back to some original element lying in the reason, 
or in the sense, or in both. But as the sense cannot sup- 
ply the constitutive elements of the cognition, but only its 
condition, we are inevitably led to assign the idea of reason 
as the last authority and basis of all propositions of this 
class. 

Secondly, the Synthetical.* Here the subject does not 
contain the predicate, but the latter contains a distinct 
cognition, which is added to the former for the enlargement 
of the thought. For example : when we say, every body 
gravitates, or has weight, the predicate is not contained 
or necessarily implied in the subject, for body, as a resist- 
ing and extended substance, is a possible cognition before 
the knowledge of gravity is attained ; and this gravity is 
a new cognition, attained and joined to the former, in 
some other way. Now, there are but two ways by which 
the new cognition can be attained, viz. : by observation, 
or by intuition. Hence arises the distinction of synthetical 
propositions into a posteriori and a priori. 

That every body gravitates is a synthetical proposition 
a posteriori, because we gain the cognition contained in 
the predicate by observation, or sensuous experience pro- 
jected into the outer world, and revealing the secondary 
phenomena. But even this predicate does not find its ul- 
timate authority in the observation itself, since the obser- 

* ^vuTidrjfjii, to put together. 



68 INTEODUCTORY VIEW OF 

vation could not haye been moulded witliout the a priori 
cognitions of space, cause, and substance. Tbe a posteriori 
only gives us tbe sensuous fact wbicli appears first in a 
succession in tbe relation of time; wMle the a priori g\\Q?> 
us the constitutive idea. 

Synthetical propositions a priori are those whose pre- 
dicates are attained by direct intuitions, and without the 
intervention of any sensuous experience. For example ; 
Every plienomenon must have a cause. Here, not only is 
the predicate not unwound from the subject, but no obser- 
vation of phenomena in any succession whatever can afford 
any suggestion or type of it. The phenomena reveal only 
phenomena to observation : but these being given, the 
reason supervenes and reveals the idea of cause by its own 
insight and authority, Hume, indeed, very consistently 
affirms that there is no cause demanded or really existent, 
because he admits no elements of thought beyond the phe- 
nomena themselves. But unless we adopt this bare state- 
ment — for philosophy it cannot be called — we must make 
the synthesis of cause in the above axiom, by intuition of 
reason alone — that is, either the predicate is nothing, and 
the proposition absurd, or the basis is an a priori principle. 

It appears, then, from the preceding analysis of propo- 
sitions, that whether we consider them in the comparison 
of the subject and predicate, of which they are composed, 
or in the deduction of the terms taken separately, or in 
the particular and interdependent relations of the two 
terms, we are inevitably in the last result led to the ideas 
of the reason as the last authority on which they rest. 
But inasmuch as every form of knowledge and belief, when 
expressed in language, takes the form of a proposition, it 
must follow that the ultimate basis of all knowledge and 
behef must be the ideas of tlie reason. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 69 

In making our last appeal to Eeason^ we are not want- 
in2: in reverence to the Great Grod our Maker. On the 
contrary, we are bowing before liim with the profoundest 
homage : for the ideas revealed in our reason, are there 
implanted by Him — are his own voice within us. And 
when by holy prophets he sends us a special revelation be- 
yond and above that which is given naturally in the con- 
stitution of our reason, we receive it, both because it 
claims to come from the Infinite Keason by attending 
signs and wonders addressed to the sense, and because it 
contains everywhere, in its great truths, provisions and du- 
ties, the resplendent marks by which we cannot but recog- 
nize its source. It is as if, seeing with a clear vision the 
whole pathway up to the vestibule of Heaven, when the 
gate of Heaven itself is opened upon us we know that we 
are witnessing no illusion, for although new visions burst 
upon us, we feel assured they are those to which such a 
pathway must lead us. 



70 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 



SECTION XL 

DIVISIONS OF PHILOSOPHY. 

The pure objective depends upon the subjective — tlie phe- 
nomenal upon the metaphenomenal. Hence the latter, as 
sustaining and accounting for the former, becomes the ma- 
terial of philosoiDhy. 

Now, in the most general conceptions which we form 
of the subjective and metaphenomenal, we have. 

First : Substance, endowed with faculties or functions, 
and causes or forces. 

Secondly : Laws, or that which determines and regu- 
lates the manifestations and movements of the first. 

Philosophy in relation to the first, in accordance with 
old usage, we shall call Metaphysics.* 

The second, — if we may venture to frame a term — we 
shall call NoMOLOOY.f 

I.— METAPHYSICS. 

Metaphysics treats of that which, as actually existent 
and productive or creative, lies beyond the physical, or the 
merely phenomenal. I think, feel, and wiU : What is 
that which thinks, feels, and wills ? What is that wliich 

* Mera ^vcnicr], i. e., Leyond the physical. 
+ Nofxos \oyos, i. e., the doctrine of law. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 7l 

lies beyond tlie mere -phenomena of tlie tliouglits, feelingSj 
and volitions ? Again : througli my senses, and my mus- 
cular organism, I attain to an exterior world, wliose forms 
I call material. What lies under or beyond these primary 
and secondary qualities, and these various forces ? What 
accounts for these changes — these perpetual modifications? 
In the development of my being, I am presented with the 
physical or pJienomenal ; and the enquiry is, What is the 
metaphysical or the metap)henomenal, which is to account 
for my development in this direction 1 

The answer to these enquiries is given by Psychology, 
Dynamics, Anthropology, and Ontology. These may 
be considered as the divisions of metaphysics, and subdi- 
visions of philosophy. 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

Psychology ''"' is that part of metaphysics which accounts 
for all the phenomena of consciousness, in so far as they are 
modifications or manifestations of the subjective simple. 

In Psychology, we have the whole being of man given 
in its inherent powers and faculties, and in its relations to 
God and the world. In Psychology, we effect the analysis 
of the reason, and arrive at its eternal and absolute ideas. 
In Psychology, therefore, we find the basis of Logic, Es- 
thetics, Morals, Politics, and Religion, and of Science 
generally. That the above is strictly true, any one may 
realise to himself by reflecting upon the operations of his 
mind, when endeavoring to attain to any knowledge what- 
ever, or when endeavoring to execute any thing, or when 
disciplining himself to any state or condition of the pas- 

* "VvxT] Koyos, the doctrine of the soul. 



72 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

sions. All Ms thinking, purposing, and willing, and all 
his discipline of the passions, lie within his consciousness, 
and are inseparable from himself. Whatever he may at- 
tain to as really exterior to himself, becomes his, only by 
some modification of himself in relation to it. 

What is the psychological method ? It is to examine 
the facts of consciousness, and by these to arrive at the 
faculties and compass of our being. It is by facts of con- 
sciousness that we arrive at every thing ; and yet there 
can be no facts of consciousness without bringing to view 
the simple subjective. My aim may be to arrive at some- 
thing belonging to the subjective general, or at something 
belonging to the purely objective, but still, I, the simple 
subjective, am there permeating the whole — I am there 
thinking, imagining, remembering, comparing, general- 
izing, reasoning, determining, exerting causality, or put- 
ting forth emotions and desires : and whatever else I may 
arrive at, I do not arrive at it without a further develop- 
ment of my own faculties, without knowing something 
more about myself. Indeed, I do not only in this way 
perpetually see myself, however I may be engaged, but 
my own faculties assume to me the importance of measur- 
ing to me the universe : I can know only upon condition 
that I have the faculty of knowledge ; and however 
abundant may be the objects of knowledge, the number 
and perfection of the cognitions must depend upon the 
capacity and vigor of the cognitive faculty. 

But although Psychology, as embracing the science of 
our mental constitution and its faculties, embraces in some 
sort all sdence, since whatever is known, is known by these 
faculties, and since in every act of knowing, feeling, or 
doing, these faculties are brought to light, — still it is 
clearly distinguishable, as a particular branch of Philoso- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. . 73 

phy. It is strictly the doctrine of the mind as a distinct 
entity — the doctrine of the simple subjective : — in fine, it 
is self-knowledge. 

When through the phenomena of the mind we have 
arrived at a knowledge of the faculties of the mind, to- 
gether with their characteristics, their distinction, their 
relations, and their unity, we have arrived at Psychology. 

DYNAMICS. 

Dynamic '"^ Philosophy treats of the life and working 
powers of nature. On every side we see the forms of a 
universal life — ^in the myriads of the animal and the vege- 
table tribes. Everywhere, also, powers and energies are at 
work, in large masses and in small, as presented in the 
vast forms of astronomy, in the winds and tides, in mag- 
netism and electricity ; and in the minute forms of chemi- 
cal affinities. It is impossible for us to reflect upon the 
productive life of nature, and the forces at work in nature, 
without enquiring after their origin, their dependency, 
their centre. In this enquiry the mind is irresistibly led 
upward to the infinite and absolute Kfe, and the infinite 
and absolute power. Dynamic philosophy ends its enquiry 
in God, who filleth all in all. 

We have before us the distinction between the plieno- 
menal or purely objective, and the meta;plienomenal or sub- 
jective. We have also the subjective as embracing the 
energies of thought, wiU, and feeling, as found in myself, 
and in other beings like myself, both of the finite and in- 
finite degree ; — and the energies, life, and forces at work 
in material masses, those masses which are extraneous to 

* Avi^a/.us, energy or force. 



74 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

me, and known to me by tlieir correlations with the sensi- 
tivity as given through the ^yq senses, and by muscular 
resistance. 

Now it is plain from this, that Dynamics expresses in 
relation to this life and energy working in extraneous ma- 
terial masses, what psychology expresses in relation to the 
faculties working within the substance of the mind. As- 
suming here the distinction between material and imma- 
terial substance, we may say of Psychology that it treats 
of the faculties or powers which produce or develope the 
phenomena given in connexion with immaterial substance ; 
and of Dynamics, that it treats of the faculties or powers 
which produce or develope the phenomena given in con- 
nexion with material substance. In both we begin with 
the phenomenal, and arrive at the subjective as account- 
ing for the phenomenal. We may sum up the whole by 
saying, that Psychology respects the subjective faculties 
of the mind ; Dynamics respects the subjective powers of 
matter. 

ANTHROPOLOGY. 

Anthropology * takes up man in the union of his spirit- 
ual and simple subjective being, with a physical and ani- 
mal life and organism. 

View man in his mere animal nature and functions, 
and he appears different from all other animals. The 
spirit within, modifies, enlarges and ennobles the animal 
without — he is the most glorious and interesting of all 
animals. 

This animal nature is also affected variously by the 
external world with which it is linked, and, indeed, of 

* AvOpwiTos and Aoyos, the doctrine of humanity. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 75 

whicli it forms a part : climate, natural scenery, food, and 
employment, all act upon it. It is thus modified at the 
same time by the spirit within, and by influences from 
without. 

On the other hand, the animal thus closely commun- 
ing with spirit, reacts upon the spiritual sphere. The 
most susceptible point of this reaction is the sensitivity, 
through which the emotions and passions become strikingly 
modified. In every theatre, therefore, of human passion 
— ^in social Hfe, in government, in war, in commerce, in 
the arts of beauty, you may see the influences of the ex- 
ternal nature. But inasmuch as man is a unity, this 
modifying action cannot be exerted upon his sensitivity, 
without reaching in some form and degree his entire being ; 
so that his thinking and reasoning, his free activity, and 
even his moral character, gain a tone from the objects 
which surround him, and show the complexion of the sun 
which shines, and the atmosphere which breathes upon 
him. 

Anthropology is thus a union of Psychology and that 
part of Dynamics which informs the science of physiology. 
Indeed, as actually cultivated, it is hardly a pure philoso- 
phy, but rather a mixture of philosophy, physiology and 
natural history. In its determining elements, however, 
it is strictly philosophical. 

ONTOLOGY. 

After having considered the life and forces belonging 
to the pure subjectivity of being, as distinguished from 
the phenomenal or the pure objective, — ^we come next to 
consider the substance of being. The idea of substance, 
like the ideas of time and space, of cause, and of right and 
wrong, is intuitively given in the reason. 



76 . INTKODUCTORY VIEW OF 

Upon the observation of phenomena, we not only as- 
sign them causes and laws, we also assign them suhstance. 
Substance is therefore metaphenomenal, and belongs to 
subjectivity in general ; and hence the consideration of 
substance forms a part of philosophical speculation. 

Metaphysics, as relating to substance, is Ontology. * 

To Ontology belong such questions as the following : 
— What is substance ? Is substance distinguishable from 
its properties ? Do substance and properties necessarily 
imply each other ? Is the relation between substance and 
properties to be distinguished from the relation between 
cause and effect? What are the distinctions and rela- 
tions of spiritual and material substance? Is the soul 
material? Is God in his substance identified with the 
world, or is he extra-mundane ? What are the relations 
between infinite and finite substance ? Is space substance 
or attribute ? Is it to be referred to matter or spirit, or 
is it independent of both ? Does the omnipresence of God 
suppose his essence or substance to be diffused through all 
space? 

Questions of Ontology do, undoubtedly, exist in the 
human mind ; and because they exist, they require an 
answer. No question of the mind is to be arbitrarily set 
aside. If its aim be an impossibility, it must be proved 
to be so, but as long as a hope of its solution remains, it 
must remain as a question. Now, a great many vain and 
idle questions have come up in Ontology, but it was phi- 
losophy itself that exposed them, and set them aside. On 
the other hand, many questions of the very last impor- 
tance are presented here. Whether the soul be material 
or immaterial ; whether God be identified with the world, 

* OvTos and Aoyos, the doctrine of essential being. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 77 

or be extra-mundane, are not trifling questions, as the 
history of philosophy abundantly shows. If Ontology 
could arrive at nothing positive, its negative decisions 
would for ever give it an important j)lace in philosophy. 



We have distinguished the subjective and the objec- 
tive ; the latter the phenomenal, the secondary and de- 
pendent^ — that which consciousness directly recognizes, and 
which requires to be accounted for, by referring it to some- 
thing antecedent : The former, the metaphenomenal, pri- 
mary, independent, ••' not directly recognized by the con- 
sciousness, and which does not in like manner require to 
be accounted for. 

The subjective general is that which accounts for the 
pure objective. This is their relation. Thus the will ac- 
counts for all choices and volitions ; and is subjective in 
relation to them taken as the objective. Thus the sensi- 
tivity, in connexion with its external correlates, accounts 
for all the sensations ; and is subjective to them taken as 
the objective. Thus the reason accounts for all acts of 
perception, knowing, and reasoning ; and is subjective to 
them taken as objective. Thus the extraneous physical 
powers account for all the phenomena of matter ; and are 
subjective to them taken as the objective. 

In considering the relation of the subjective to the ob- 
jective, we say generally as above, the former accounts for 
the latter. But the enquiry may still come up, How, or 

* I do not mean here to exclude the fact, that both the powers of our own 
minds, and the extraneous physical powers, require and are dependent upon the 
First and the Infinite : I mean only the inherent and constituted sufficiency of 
tliese in relation to their proper phenomena. 



78 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

under what forms, does tlie former account for the latter 1 
Is it sufficient to say it accounts for the latter simply as 
the subjective? May not the subjective itself be pre- 
sented under different relations to the objective? Un- 
questionably, there are two different relations which may 
be named and distinguished, viz. the relation of substance 
AND PROPERTIES, and the relation of cause and efeect. 
The subjective may be taken as either substance or cause ; 
the objective maybe taken as either property or effect. 
Cause is self-determined, creative, and contingent activity. 
Substance is fixed, and, relatively at least, necessary ex- 
istence. Cause can be thought of as having potentiality 
to a variety of effects, without being connected with any 
particular effects as its necessary manifestations. Sub- 
stance cannot be thought of without implying certain pro- 
perties as its necessary and fixed manifestations. Effect 
begins to be after cause exists. Property is co-existent 
with substance from its beginning. Effect is related to 
cause contingently. Property is related to substance 
necessarily. 

Again : Substance cannot be given without involving 
in some way the idea of cause. If it be finite substance, 
it is caused. If it be infinite substance, causality is con- 
ceived of as inseparable from its unity. Universally, im- 
material substance or mind involves c ausality. Material 
substance, besides being itself caused, is the vehicle or 
medium of the manifestations of causality, either directly 
or indirectly : directly, if physical powers be taken as 
proper causality ; indirectly, if they be taken as the pro- 
perties of substance. On the former hypothesis, the 
Divine causality absorbs the supposed physical, and is all- 
pervading and omnipresent. On the latter hypothesis, 
the Divine causality is taken as having produced a certain 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 79 

form of substance^ that is, material, different from the 
Divine substance, and constituted with these physical 
forces, as fixed and inseparable properties. On the former 
hypothesis, matter is re]Dresented as inert until permeated 
by activities ; on the latter, it is inseparable from activities. 
For example : on the former, gravity is distinct from mat- 
ter as a cause, and interfused by special constitution ; 
on the latter, matter cannot be conceived of without 
gravity, nor gravity without matter. But not only does 
substance involve the idea of cause ; cause also involves 
the idea of substance. Cause cannot be separated from 
mind, and mind cannot be conceived of without substance. 
This is true both of Will, directly recognized as such, and 
of physical powers, when taken as causes proper. 

Taking the Subjective, then, as divided into Cause and 
Substance ; and the Objective, as divided into Effects and 
Properties, the latter springing from the former, and being 
accounted for as existent, by being referred to the former, 
the enquiry arises, Hoio do the latter spring from the 
former, or ivTiat regulates the action of cause, and the 
development of substance ? 



IL— HOMOLOGY. 

This at once introduces us to the Doctrine of Law, or 
NoMOLOGY, which is the second grand division of philoso- 
phy. Nomology treats of the laws, according to which 
the subjective ouglit to cause effects and develope proper- 
ties. It also explains the possible violations of these laws. 

Nomology is divided into the Morale ; Esthetics ; 
Somatology ; and Logic. 



80 INTEODUCTOEY VIEW OF 

THE MOEALE. 

This comprises the laws which ought to govern the 
Will — the laws of duty, the laws which command what is 
due — ^what ought to he done in moral relations. If all 
causality is resolvahle into Will/^ then the Moeale is re- 
lated to all creations^ whether hy the infinite cause, or by 
finite causes. 

The laws of duty, however, must be distinguished from 
the rules of art. The first enjoin upon us what ought to 
be done in our moral relations, or in our relations to mind, 
embracing what is due to ourselves, to others, and to God. 
The second,- point out how any rational, ingenious, useful, 
or esthetical design is to be effected. 

ESTHETICS. . 

Esthetics f may be briefly defined the ' Fhilosojphy of 
the Beautiful! As the Morale relates to the will, so this 
relates to the sensitivity. As the Morale determines what 
ought to be done in the moral relations ; so this determines 
what ought to please, or what is really agreeable to the 
sensitivity in its unperverted and rightly developed con- 
dition. 

There is in some sort an interchange between the 
Morale and Esthetics, Esthetics lays down the rules of 
the fine arts to the executive will. The Morale enjoins 
upon the sensitivity the proper moral emotions and desires. 

Esthetics comprises the principles and laws of the 
beautiful, or of the agreeable, or of taste, (for all this 
variety of designation has obtained,) not only in relation 

* Doctrine of the WiU, p. 294. 

t Aicr^Tjo'ts, perception or sensibility. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 81 

to the actual, but also in relation to the possible. That 
which may he is known, and the influence of its beauty- 
felt, as well as that which is. 

When man awakes to existence, his eye beholds the 
beautiful, the sublime, the graceful, the proportionate, 
the congruous ; and his ear perceives melody and harmony, 
with the joy, the ecstasy of one recognizing the thoughts 
of his own spirit, the reflected forms of his own being. 
The splendors of the heavens above him — the scenery of 
the earth around him, are not strange to him ; he knows 
them in himself, and he knows himself in them. But he 
cannot rest in these delightful contemplations. The foun- 
tains of his thought open and enlarge beyond the world 
which his senses have recognized. It would seem as if 
this world were presented him to call out the activities of 
a being, of which it cannot be the measure. 

Hence, man creates : he creates in statuary, painting, 
music, architecture, gardening, poetry, and' romance. He 
does not confine himself to imitations — he creates. His 
creations are not only of that which is possible in this 
world, but of that also which it requires a more perfect 
constitution, both physical and moral, to realize ; and thus 
in his thought he knows other worlds. Salvator Eosa gives 
us nature as she is, with only finishing touches of the 
ideal; but Milton, in his "delicious Paradise," introduces 
us to a creation not indeed opposed to nature, but requir- 
ing nature under a more genial clime, in more glorious 
worlds.* * 

In poetry, and in the fine arts, generally, the ideal of 
the mind is indeed never perfectly expressed. The poet 
and the artist labor to make visible the thought upon 

* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 130 and 131. 



52 ■ INTRODUCTOEY VIEW OF 

which they dwell in rapture ; but they never satisfy their 
own earnest aspirations, — they have a vision which they 
cannot reveal to others ; and they find that the world, as 
presented them, not only is not the measure of their being, 
but also that all the efforts of art cannot make its forms 
and materials even truly representative of that being; 
and the perfectly beautiful remains with them as a pure 
idea, of which they have only been enabled to give a dim 
reflection. 

In Esthetics the human mind seeks to solve the mys- 
tery of the arts ; it enquires after their origin, their laws, 
and their method ; and seeks to comprehend their reach, 
and the grounds of their limitations. 

This is that beautiful philosophy wliich leads us far 
back into the spirit of man, there to find the true Cas- 
talian spring, and there to converse with the "Sacred 
Nine'^ as living and real inspirations. 

SOMATOLOGY. 

Somatology '•'•" holds a relation to Dynamics similar to 
that which the Morale, Esthetics, and Logic hold to 
Psychology ; it comj)rises the necessary laws which govern 
the changes and motions of bodies, as the former do the 
necessary laws which govern the mental activities. 

It is difficult, however, in its present development, to 
represent Somatology as a branch of pure philosophy, and 
to distinguish it clearly froni the Science of Nature. In 
the Morale, there are necessary and absolute laws of the 
good ; in Esthetics, of the beautiful ; in Logic, of intuition 
and ratiocination : but can we say with the same positive- 

* 1,(afj.aTa and \oyos, the doctrine or law of bodies. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 83 

ness, that there are necessary and absolute laws for deter- 
mining the relations and changes of bodies'? The appli- 
cation of the pure mathematics in solving the problems 
which arise respecting bodies ; the hmitations which are 
fixed to the possible laws of forces now existing — for 
example, the necessity that the centripetal force should 
vary inversely as the square, and not inversely as the cube 
or any higher pow^ of the distance ; the fact that great 
minds, hke I^ewton's, preconceived before they calculated 
— indeed, that all minds must preconceive before they 
calculate ; and the necessary conception that, amid indefi- 
nite variety there still must exist fixed laws, go to show 
that absolute and necessary laws must somewhei-e exist 
in respect to bodies, and that of course Somatology must 
be a possible and real philosophy. 

The difficulty in the way of determining with exact- 
ness this branch of philosophy, arises from the vast com- 
pass of nature, and the indefinite diversity admissible. 
It cannot be doubted, however, that Somatological ideas 
in the form of prophetic suggestions, direct the investiga- 
tions of science. These ideas unite with phenomena in 
the inductive process through which science is determined. 
These were the preconceptions of Newton in determining 
the law of gravitation ; and of Davy in inventing the 
safety-lamp. 

LOGIC. 

In the Greek, ^070? expresses the faculty of reason 
or intelligence. Ao^i^o^ial and ^vXXoyt^o/jLai, are the verbs 
expressing the action of this faculty ; the latter being 
particularly appropriated to express this action in draw- 
ing conclusions from premises, that is, syllogizing or pro- 
ceeding according to the law and formula of the ^vWoyia- 



84 introductory" view of 

fjLo^y the Syllogism. AoyiKr) (jexv^i or eTTicnriixri, under- 
stood)^ expresses the science and art of Reasoning, oi 
Logic. 

AojL/cr], or Logic, has, indeed, been represented as a 
mere art, or at least limited to such forms of representa- 
tion as to convey the impression of a mere art. It is 
plain, however, that under its highest acceptation, it must 
refer to philosophical principles ; for if in relation to any 
part of our being we are stimulated by the ^iXoao^ia to 
enquire after the laws and the method of its action and 
development, we are thus stimulated in relation to the 
Xoyoi^j or reason. 

The Eeason is the faculty of knowledge in general. 
Logic expresses in relation to the Beason, what the Morale 
expresses in relation to the Will, and what Esthetics ex- 
presses in relation to the Sensitivity. Reason perceives 
and knows ; seeks and arrives at truth. But what are 
the laws which regulate its perceptions ? What are the 
methods which it pursues in seeking after truth ? What 
are the ultimate grounds of its knowledges and beliefs 1 
When we have answered these questions, we have Logic 
completed as a branch of philosophy. 

Logic takes precedence of all the other branches of 
Nomology. The others are all dependent upon it. Laws, 
whether belonging to the morale, esthetics, or somatology, 
are all based upon ideas of the reason. But Logic deter- 
mines the legitimate processes and characteristics of ideas 
themselves. Again, wherever the reason acts, there must 
be laws to determine and regulate its action. Logic, 
therefore, is co-extensive with these laws, for the province 
of logic is the laws of the reason. But as reason acta 
wherever there is intellection, it acts in every department 
of philosophy ; and hence logic permeates the whole. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 85 

Logic permeates, but does not absorb tbe whole. 
Logic is present to give laws to thought, investigation, 
and ratiocination ; but these laws are universal and irre- 
spective of the particular subjects. Each subject, there- 
fore, still retains its distinctive position, characteristics and 
aims. Psychology still aims to determine the faculties of 
the mind ; Dynamics, the forces of nature ; Anthropology, 
the union of man and nature ; Ontology, the reality and 
distinctions of substance ; the Morale, the laws of duty ; 
Esthetics, the laws of the beautiful; Somatology, the 
laws of bodies. These do not sink into Logic ; but as 
Eeason is the universal organ of philosophical construction, 
Logic is everywhere present as the light and atmosphere 
of thought. 



86 INTKODUCTOKY VIEW OF 



SECTION XII. 

OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY, AND THE 
SCIENCES AND ARTS. 

Philosophy and Science are often employed as identical 
terms. Philosophy, indeed, is science ; and science, if not 
pure philosophy, is closely connected with it. The word 
science is strictly used in the sense of systematic know- 
ledge in relation to a given and defined subject.; and as 
in every such system, particular phenomena are accounted 
for and explained, the science puts on very much of the 
air of philosophy. But what, then, marks the distinc- 
tion ? 

One obvious distinction is this, that philosophy is con- 
versant simply with principles ; while in a science, princi- 
ples are applied to a particular subject. In the science of 
nature, for example, the philosophical ideas of cause and 
effect, of substance and properties, and general somatologi- 
cal laws, are applied to a particular class of phenomena. 

The science begins with the phenomena, as the condi- 
tions of its development : and when the phenomena are 
reduced under common causes and laws, then the science 
is determined and fixed. But philosophy is taken, to ac- 
count for the phenomena in the general. First : by 
affirming that there must be causes and laws : Secondly, 
by laying down in logic the principles of induction, inves- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 87 

tigation, and deduction : Thirdly^ by conceiving somato- 
logical causes and laws, and applying them tentatively to 
the phenomena. 

The subjective and the objective make up the sum of 
all knowledge, actual or possible. Philosophy finds its 
elements in the subjective, so that the determination of the 
subjective is the determination of philosophy. Science is 
conversant directly with the objective ; but it proceeds by 
the aid of the subjective. Its aim is to distinguish and 
generalize the objective into particular spheres, under par- 
ticular causes and laws. 

We will suppose the subjective to have been deter- 
mined — we will suppose the mind to know its own facul- 
ties, substance, and laws — and to know the external world 
in its substance, forces, and laws. In making this suppo- 
sition, we do not mean to imply that the subjective is thus 
antecedently and primarily completed before science begins. 
On the contrary, the developments of philosophy, the con- 
structions of science, and the inventions and workings of 
art, all go on together. But for distinctness of conception, 
and in order to show forth clearly the relations as well as 
the differences of the two, we may make this supposition. 
In making this supposition, I bring myself into possession 
of Psychology, Dynamics, Anthropology, Ontology, Es- 
thetics, the Morale, Somatology, and Logic. I have 
named my reason, will, and affections — I have distin-- 
ffuished material and immaterial substance — I have con- 
ceived of the universal life in nature — of powers and forces 
— and of laws regulating their action. I have in the 
Morale distinguished the just, the benevolent, and the 
true ; in Esthetics, I have conceived of the absolute laws 
of beauty, proportion, and sublimity ; in Somatology, I 
have determined the necessary laws of bodies ; and in re- 



88 INTKODUCTOEY VIEW OF 

lation to the Eeasoiij I have laid down the formulas of a 
rigid logic. 

Now, what is the passage from the purely subjective to 
the objective ? We shall endeavor to give the answer. 

Science is divided into the pure, exact, universal, 
and absolute, and the mixed, contingent, limited, and 
variable. 

The first embraces the pure mathematics. The 
mathematical sciences are pure, because incapable of being 
formed out of sensible representations. They are exact, 
because never falling short of, and never transcending the 
principles and axioms on which they are based. They are 
universal, because never admitting of exceptions. They 
are absolute, because it is inconceivable that, in any rela- 
tion, or by any power, they are capable of being changed. 

Natural science, on the contrary, is mixed, because, 
although admitting, nay, demanding the application of 
the principles of exact and pure science, still it has such 
material properties, and properties so foreign to the pure 
science, as to prevent the strict application of these prin- 
ciples. Body is in space, and assumes forms in its con- 
formations, and moves through lines in performing its 
revolutions, which, in the way of analogy, may be called 
geometrical ; and these forms and lines may be taken as 
grounds of many important conclusions deduced by means 
of geometrical principles ; but the mathematical astrono- 
mer knows full well, and takes care not to neglect the dif- 
ference, between the pure and absolute geometry of his 
mind, and the rough sphericity of the planets, and the 
jagged lines of their orbits. If geometry were a philoso- 
phy, then its difference from, and its relations to, natural 
science, would form an intelligible illustration of the dis- 
tinctions and relations of philosophy and science. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 89 



GEOMETRY. 



Geometry^ however, is a science, and our first aim is to 
distinguish, it from philosophy, as well as to show its rela- 
tions to philosophy. The philosophy upon which geometry 
is constructed, comprises ontology and logic. But ontology 
enters, into it only so far as space is concerned. That 
space is not body, that it is infinite and necessary ; the 
definitions of the point, of lines, surfaces, and solids, all 
belong to ontology in the determination of their absolute 
separation from substance, and their independent and un- 
changeable verity. 

The point is a conception of absolute and indivisible 
unity. But although a unity, perfect and absolute, it 
cannot be called a quantity ; it is, on the contrary, the 
absolute negation of all quantity ; it is not length — it is 
not breadth — it is not thickness ; but; it is where quantity 
begins. We assume this point in space, by our thought, 
and then quantity is supposed to be formed in one direc- 
tion ; and the least departure from the point, in one 
direction, forms the line or simple extension. This line 
must of necessity be curved or straight. Then quantity is 
supposed to be formed in two directions ; and the least 
departure from the point in two directions forms length 
and breadth, or surface. Surface, likewise, must of neces- 
sity be either plane or curved. Then, again, quantity is 
supposed to be formed in tJiree directions ; and the least 
departure from the point, in three directions, forms length, 
breadth, and thickness, or the solid. Solid, again, must 
of necessity be composed of plane or curved surfaces. 
Quantity, as thus conceived of, is exact quantity, because 
it has absolute limitations. 

This conception of quantity is a pure ontological con- 



90 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

ception of the reason— not ontological positively as defin- 
ing a particular substance, but negatively as defining a 
quantity absolutely independent of substance. 

Having tlie pure quantity thus given, we may now be- 
gin to use it for the purpose of scientific construction. 
And now come in the other philosophical elements, viz. : 
— those belonging to Logic. These are, 1. The axioms — 
the conceptions of agreement and difference — of equality 
and inequality — of a whole and its parts — of measure and 
proportion. 2. The deductive formula. 

As far as the conception of space, of the point, of the 
pure quantity, and of the logical elements goes, we have 
simply philosophy. But when we proceed to construct 
out of this pure quantity a variety of definite figures, and 
to consider their particular relations, and to apply to them 
the logical axioms and formula, for the purpose of eliciting 
particular conclusions in the form of regular propositions 
or theorems, we give birth to determinate science. It is 
true, indeed, that the conclusions of geometry are univer- 
sal and absolute, and therefore it cannot be questioned 
that geometry is a most philosophical science ; but, never- 
theless, it is justly considered a science, inasmuch as ante- 
cedent principles are applied to a particular material or 
subject, which principles are true, wholly independently 
of the subject to which they are applied. All the axioms 
and the logical formula, are manifestly of this character ; 
and the conceptions of a point, and of pure quantity be- 
ginning there, although more immediately connected with 
the geometrical constructions, are, nevertheless, indepen- 
dent and general : — A point— a line— a surface— a solid, 
may be thought of independently of all particular forms, 
relations, and propositions. 

While thus the philosophy and the science arc distinct, 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENEKAL. 91 

tlie relation between the two is most intimate and impor- 
tant. The philosophy may exist without the development 
of the science ; but the science cannot be formed without 
the philosophy. The philosophy does not require the 
science, either to account for it, or to make it more plain ; 
but the science refers directly back to the philosophy as 
its only basis, and affording the only means of its expli- 
cation. 

SCIENCES or DISCRETE QUANTITY. 

Arithmetic and algebra, in like manner, have their 
philosophical basis. They do not begin with absolute 
unity in forming their quantities ; the idea of unity as a 
philosophical idea, is antecedent to, and independent of, 
these quantities ; but although their unit, always assumed 
and ever variable, cannot represent the absolute and in- 
variable unit, still it has its origin as a conception of u.nity 
in the absolute and pure idea. Here, also, we have uni- 
versal axioms, conceptions of abstract quantity, of equality, 
difference, measure and proportion, and logical formulae. 
When we come to apply these antecedent and independent 
elements of thought, and primary conceptions, to the re- 
lations of a particular class of quantity — to discrete quan- 
tity, for the purpose of arriving at particular solutions and 
theorems, we construct a science ; and, indeed, we may 
be almost said to invent an art — an art of representing 
quantities and relations, of giving deductions in detail, and 
of solving problems. 

Here, again, the distinction between the philosophy 
and the science is clear, as well as the intimate and im- 
jDortant relations between the two. It must be evident, 
also, that the same philosophical ideas and principles, 
give birth to distinct sciences, as in the case of geometry 



92 INTRODUCTOEY VIEW OF 

and arithmetic. The distinction of these sciences is 
grounded upon the distinction of their subject matter. 
The subject matter in both is quantity ; but in one it is 
continued quantity ; and in the other, discrete quantity ; 
or the one is quantity, beginning at an absolute limit, and 
increasing itself by extension in space ; the other is quan- 
tity beginning with any assumed unit, and increasing or 
diminishing itself indefinitely, by addition and division. 
In the one, we consider the relations of figures formed of 
lines and surfaces ; in the other, the relations of numbers, 
as abstract and universal quantities, capable of represent- 
ing any real quantities whatever, on condition that these 
quantities be divisible into units. In respect of both, we 
have the same general ideas, axioms and logic. 

NATUEAL SCIENCE. 

I shall take this as a general designation, embracing 
Mechanics, Astronomy, Magnetism, Hydrostatics, Physi- 
cal Dynamics in general, Chemistry, and so on. 

I do not intend to convey the idea, that every thing 
thus embraced under this designation, is strictly scien- 
tific ; there is much that is still theoretic. I comprise them 
all under this designation, because they refer to phenomena, 
which in their psychological relations are of one kind. All 
these phenomena, are phenomena of sensation, or of mus- 
cular resistance, which is closely connected with sensation. 
The quantities of geometry and arithmetic, and of the 
pure mathematics generally, have an existence wholly in- 
dependently of the senses ; but all the forms, movements, 
and phenomena generally, of natural science, are made 
loiown in the consciousness by the correlations of external 
substance with the senses, or by a resistance to the mus- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 93 

cular organism. By careful and repeated observations, 
that iS; by addressing our senses to tlieir correlative ob- 
jects without, — ^by investigations and experiments, — we 
acquaint ourselves with the various sensuous phenomena, 
and their characteristics. These phenomena are next 
classified by resemblances and differences, and by common 
relations ; and are attempted to be explained by the as- 
signment of causes and laws. In making this assignment 
we may at first merely hypothesise the causes and laws : 
the system built up in this way is merely a theory, and 
not demonstrated science. A theory is taken up for the 
time being, with the understanding that it is subject 
either to be confirmed, or to be wholly set aside, accord- 
ingly as more extended experiments and observations shall 
enable us to decide. A science has for its basis, not mere 
hypothetical causes and laws, but causes and laws de- 
monstrated and fixed. 

Now, in constructing a natural science, we have re- 
course both to philosophy and to pure science. 

1. "We have recourse to philosophy. Ideas of time and 
space y — of substance and attributes ; — of cause and ef- 
fect ; — of law ; — of quantity, relation, measure, and pro- 
portion ; ideas of distributed life and distributed causality ; 
of central, and diffusive movement ; distinctions of the sub- 
jective and the objective, and of personal and impersonal 
manifestations ; the conception of generic wholes, and 
specific differences ; ideas of unity, multiplicity, and to- 
tahty ; the relations and distinctions of the finite and the 
infinite ; a knowledge of logical formulae ; a knowledge of 
mind, as the seat of all power, wisdom, design, and gov- 
ernment — all work together in the scientific construction. 
It is impossible to step forth into this wide field of natural 
phenomena, without having metaioTiysical and nomologi- 



94 INTRODUCTOEY VIEW OF 

cat questions crowded into the mind ; and every attempt, 
whether to build up a theory or a science, is made upon 
the basis, and in the light of philosophy. These first 
ideas, principles, and distinctions, are presumed by every 
one ; — the mind elaborates science under their spontaneous 
influence, even where they are not defined and compre- 
hended in known, philosophical systems. 

2. "We have recourse to pure science, or the mathema- 
tics. The mathematics are the science of pure quantity 
— of simple extension from the absolute point ; and of" 
abstract number. But physical bodies take upon them- 
selves forms analogous to geometrical forms ; and move in 
lines analogous to geometrical lines : their distances, mag- 
nitudes, densities, temperatures, attractions, velocities, 
times, &c., are capable, also, of being represented com- 
paratively by numbers. It is evident, therefore, that 
mathematical principles may be employed in the deter- 
mination of physical relations and laws. But still, should 
conclusions drawn on mathematical principles respecting 
bodies, assume the perfect geometrical form of bodies, or 
regard them as pure and exact quantities, there would, 
of necessity, be error in the conclusions. The mathema- 
tics are conversant with pure space and abstract number; 
but body has properties entirely foreign and peculiar. 
Hence, in the determination of physical science, there is 
not an absolute, but a conditional application of mathe- 
matical principles. It is thus that the mixed mathema- 
tics are produced. 

It thus appears, in natural science, that the material 
of the construction is that part of the objective, embracing 
the sensuous phenomena ; that the ultimMe grounds oi 
the construction lie in pure subjectivity or philosophy ; 
that the preparations for the construction are experiment, 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 95 

observation, and classification ; and that tlie immediate 
organon of tlie construction is tlie mathematics. Deduc- 
tive and inductive logic are, indeed, employed in the con- 
struction, but not as an immediate organon ; they are a 
part of the all-penetrating and governing philosophy — the 
deductive logic pervading the mathematics throughout, 
and the inductive appearing in the determination of every 
general principle from particular observations. 

Let us now sum up the preceding observations. Phi- 
losophy is the knowledge of the subjective, the absolute, 
the primary, and the universal ; — science is the know- 
ledge of the objective within particular spheres, under 
philosophical conceptions, and with laws determined in 
relation to particular phenomena. Philosophy is com- 
plete without phenomena: Science must be constructed 
out of phenomena. Philosophy comprehends : Science is 
comprehended. 

conditional and unconditional science. 

Geonaetry can have no relation to phenomena of the 
exterior consciousness — it cannot be constructed out of 
these phenomena. But to the phenomena of the interior 
consciousness it is related — it is constructed out of these 
phenomena. We have seen that after the formulae of 
logic, the idea of space, and the conceptions of a point, 
and of quantity, in one, two, and three directions are 
given, as the necessary and the absolute ; — the mind pro- 
ceeds to construct certain definite figures in space, and to 
consider their relations in the light of the principles al- 
ready developed ; and so, also, with respect to discrete 
quantities, it proceeds to the formation of signs and sym- 
bols as representatives of these quantities and their general 



96 INTKODUCTOEY VIEW OF 

relations ; and proposes to itself various problems for so- 
lution. Tkis particular and definite action of the intelli- 
gence presents us the phenomenal of the interior con- 
sciousness. 

The principles and conceptions above referred to, are 
independent, primary, and necessary ; and the action of 
the intelligence in comprehending them as knowledges, is 
accounted for only in the fact that they are essential and 
inseparable elements of thought. The intelligence cannot 
think without logic : it cannot form cognitions upon sen- 
sation, without space — and the very idea of space involves 
the point absolute, and extension in three directions ; 
number — as the one — the many — -the total — ^is no less a 
necessary element. The intelligence within its actual re- 
lations and conditions cannot go into action without them. 
But it is not necessary that it should go on to form the 
triangle, the circle, the sphere, the polyhedron, and pro- 
blems in discrete quantity ; when it does so, it presents 
phenomena to the interior consciousness which demand to 
be accounted for by something antecedent ; and when the 
antecedent principles are appealed to, these phenomena 
become a material out of which exact and pure sciences 
are constructed. 

Keflection will show the analogy between this case and 
that of natural science, in its relation to the exterior con- 
sciousness. Cause and effect, substance and attributes, 
space, law, designing and governing mind — we cannot 
suppress the ideas of these amid the phenomena of nature, 
the intelligence cannot form its simplest cognitions inde- 
pendently of them. Neither could the objects of our cog- 
nitions be supposed to exist without these. But these 
primary ideas and principles can be. supposed to exist 
without our particular cognitions and their objects. Now, 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 97 

our cognitions of tlie external world, by our sensations, 
are the phenomena* which, by philosophical principles, 
and the organon of the mathematics, we form into natural 
science. In the same way, by philosophical principles, 
and by logic in particular, do we form pure and exact 
science from our cognitions of these forms of space, and 
numerical problems. The science in both cases lies in 
the determination of particular laws governing particular 
relations. 

In the case of the pure and exact science, the law is 
absolute and unalterable : but this arises from the nature 
of the object of the cognition : — forms in space, generated 
from the absolute point, and abstract numbers, are objects 
given in the pure reason, and are, therefore, as absolute 
and unchangeable as the reason itself : but bodies in space 
are objects given in sensation, and because contingent, are 
capable of indefinite changes. While, however, the pre- 
sent constitution of bodies remains, the laws demonstrated 
of their particular relations must remain. In the one 
case, the law determined is universal in the particular re- 
lations of the quantities, unconditionally, because the quan- 
tities themselves are absolute : in the other case, the law 
determined, in the particular relations of the quantities, 
is universal, conditionally, because the quantities them- 
selves are contingent. 

This, obviously, lays a ground for a distinction of the 
sciences. 

I.— UNCONDITIONAL AND ABSOLUTE SCIENCE. 

This embraces, as we have seen, the pure mathe- 
matics. 

* The secondary phenomena : vide Sec. VIII. 
5 



98 INTEODUCTOKY VIEW OF 

To this may be added tlie science of etMcs, or the 
determination of particular laws for the particular rela- 
tions which moral and responsible beings stand in to God, 
to each other, and to inferior beings. As these relations 
are immutable, so the science formed by the application 
of general philosophical principles to the phenomena 
appearing in them, must be immutable likewise. 

The science of the civil law, or jurisprudence, is also 
to be ranked among unconditional sciences, because, based 
upon immutable moral relations. The distinction between 
ethics and jurisprudence is simply this ; Ethics is the sci- 
ence of right and wrong, in its application to the relations 
of moral beings universally ; jurisprudence, in its applica- 
tion to these relations as they appear under a particular 
government, in a particular state. The laws of ethics 
belong to man as man ; the laws of jurisprudence belong 
to man as the citizen of an organized commonwealth. In 
the constitution of government, man cannot lose his in- 
herent nature, and, consequently, cannot be lawfully com- 
pelled to violate any principle of necessary rectitude ; but, 
stiU, in the constitution of government, he, as a moral 
being, comes into peculiar and marked relations. It is, 
indeed, true, that in the utmost scope of ethics, juris- 
prudence would be comprehended within its definition. 
The usage which has distinguished the two sciences, has 
not separated or opposed the cardinal principles. 



II.— CONDITIONAL SCIENCE. 

This exists on condition that the relations of the phe- 
nomena remain unchanged. All the natural or physical 
sciences are of this description. The great laws of As- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENEKAL. 99 

tronomy, for example, accurately determined as they are, 
and forming a stupendous and glorious body of science, are, 
nevertheless, science, only while the constitution of the 
universe remains as it is. Let the relations of the pheno- 
mena be changed, and the present science is destroyed. 
Now, it is plainly conceivable that changes might take 
place, to an indefinite extent. We can set no bounds to 
Omnipotence in modifying the forms of physical being 
and the constitution of planetary systems. The distinc- 
tions of right and wrong, the nature of truth, justice, and 
benevolence, can be changed no more than God himself 
can be changed; but our thought does not attach the 
same immutabilitv and necessity to natural forces and laws. 

ART. 

We have defined Philosophy — ^we have defined Science 
— and shown the relation of the former to the latter ; 
but it remains to define Art, and to show the relation 
which the first two hold to it. 

Art, in common usage, is confined to express the exer- 
tion of human causality for the modification of bodies ac- 
cording to principles and rules. 

The most enlarged idea of art is given in the work 
of creation itself, by the Almighty and Allwise Creator. 
The creation everywhere exhibits design, law, and skill. 
We may^ therefore, without any figure of speech, call God 
the first and Great Artist and Mechanician. He created, 
arranged, and finished, according to principles and rules 
which his own exhaustless intelligence supplied. The 
variety, the number, the nice and elaborate perfection, the 
beauty, benignity, and glory of his works, exceed not only 
our actual knowledge, but the utmost flight of our im- 



100 INTEODUCTOEY VIEW OF 

agination. From tlie glimpses which, astronomy furnishes 
of the extent and the continual advance of creation, we 
are irresistibly led to the conviction, that the mind will 
find new objects to observe and admire, throughout its 
immortality. 

Human art is comparatively a feeble, yet a beaLtiful 
copy of the Divine. God formed the substances together 
with their properties, upon which human skill is exercised. 
He fixed the laws under which this skill must accomphsh 
its ends. We imitate the beauty of nature, or improve 
upon it, only by observing these properties and laws. If 
we attempt to do violence to them, we are not long wait- 
ing for a rebuke of our folly, and a demonstration of our 
weakness. But if we fall in with the suggestions of nature, 
and work according to the principles and rules on which 
she has been constituted, then the arts of utility and 
beauty will appear, rich and manifold, and the human will 
become both a co-worker with the Divine, and an instru- 
ment of completing its projections. 

Now, in analyzing human a-rt, we are led to perceive 
its connexion with both philosophy and science. 

1. With philosophy. This appears in the ideas under 
which it works. There is, in the mechanical or useful 
arts, generally, the idea of utility itself — the idea of im- 
proving upon the actual forms and arrangements of nature, 
and, of adapting them more perfectly to our wants, actual 
or fanciful. This idea is the forecasting thought, and the 
propelling energy of the reason itself, and hence is an ele- 
ment of pure philosophy. 

In the fine arts appear the ideas of proportion, grace, 
symmetry, congruity, and harmony — forming the complex 
idea of beauty. This idea leading to all improvements 
upon the beauty of the existing forms of nature, as in 



i 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 10] 

landscape gardening, for example ; and to tlie creation of 
new forms of beauty, as in statuary, architecture, paint- 
ing, music, and poetry, has its origin also in the pure 
reason, and is, therefore, a philosophic element. 

2. With science. Science being the determination of 
the laws governing the relations of phenomena, as they 
spring forth in succession from causality, the artist, when 
he undertakes a work, either of imitation or creation, is 
bound, in the use of materials, and in the arrangement 
of parts, to observe these laws. He not only works under 
the inspiration of pure ideas, or, in other words, the con- 
ception of the ideal, but working in the field of nature, 
he works in obedience to her material constitution — her 
fixed properties and laws. In architecture, he works under 
ideas of proportion, congruity, grace, and dignity; but, 
at the same time, he must regard the properties of his 
materials, and pay the utmost respect to mechanical laws. 
In musical composition, he is, indeed, led on by the ideas 
of melody and harmony ; but in producing and arranging 
the sounds which form the material of the art, he cannot 
dispense with physical laws. Similar illustrations may be 
given in relation to the other fine arts. 

That the mechanician, and the inventor of arts of 
utility, base their operations upon scientific laws, requires 
no illustrations. 

KuLES OF Aet are explicit specifications, expressed 
clearly in language, and by diagrams, and numbers, with 
respect to form, measure, proportion, combination, and 
adjustment. They lay down in simple terms Jiow the 
causality must execute a given work. They direct the 
application of physical skill. 

An individual may be a crude philosopher, and raw 
and uninstructed in science ; but still, he may, by long 



102 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

practice^ acquire tlie skill of obeying rules of art. The 
philosophy and the science implied in the rules^ and from 
which the rules were deduced, he is incompetent to ex- 
plain, and does not even comprehend ; but skilfully and 
readily adjusting his physical instrumentality under the 
simple directions of the rules, he rears the stately temple, 
or fashions and arranges the curious machinery of the 
watch. Such men are mere copyists or mechanics. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 103 



SECTION XIII. 

REASON, THE ORGAN OF PHILOSOPHY. 

Philosophy is the knowledge of mind and nature in their 
faculties, forces, substances, and laws ; and the knowledge 
of truth conceived of as independent of all being. 

Science is the knowledge of phenomena, as accounted 
for, reduced under, and regulated by, these faculties, forces, 
substances, and laws. Art is reproduction, imitation, and 
creation, by human causality and skill, under the light and 
authority of philosophy and science. 

Phenomena, or the purely objective, are the immediate 
experiences or objects of consciousness ; and are either ex- 
periences of the action of pure reason, and simple choice 
and volition, or of sensations depending upon correlative 
objects without. 

The metaphenomenal, or the subjective general, are 
the reahties of being and truth, which do not form the 
immediate experiences of consciousness, but are known 
mediately through these experiences. 

Philosophy relates to our whole being : but in con- 
structing philosophy as a system, our whole being does 
not form the organ of this construction. Philosophy is 
not a creation of the will : nor is it an outflow of the 
emotions and jjassions. There is but one faculty which 
can claim to be the organ of philosophy, and that is the 
Eeason. 



104 INTEODUCTORY VIEW OF 

. The Keason is tlie faculty of all perception, wlietliei 
by immediate intuition, or by mediate representation or 
deduction ; wbetber of the interior or the exterior con- 
sciousness; whether of the past, the present, or the future; 
whether of the actual or the possible, or of the probable 
or the impossible ; whether of phenomena, or of being and 
truth ; whether of cause or law. All perception and all 
knowledge belong to this one faculty. 

Now that the Eeason should perceive the movements 
or phenomena of the other faculties, and assign them their 
laws in the Esthetics and the Morale; and that it should 
perceive all forms of being and truth taken as objective to 
itself, seems to present no difficulties. But how does the 
reason, while perceiving all else, perceive likewise its own 
acts or phenomena ; and while giving out the laws of the 
other faculties, give out, likewise, its own laws, thereb}'' 
constructing Logic ? 

The difficulty here presented, it will be perceived, 
consists in the fact that the reason must perceive its 
own phenomena, while, in order to develope phenomena 
itself, it is engaged in perceiving something objective to 
itself; it must give out the laws which regulate its own 
movements, while, in order to develope these laws, it is 
engaged in determining laws for some other faculty, or in 
some similar exercise upon that which lies without its own 
immediate subjectivity. How can I observe my own per- 
ceptions and thoughts, and the laws which regulate my 
perception and thinking, when the acts of perceiving and 
thinking imply that the reason is intent upon objects? 
And if the reason be supposed to withdraw itself from 
objects for the purpose of examining itself, then, again, 
how can the reason examine itself without calling itself 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 105 

into action by fixing itself upon objects — which is a re- 
currence of the same difficulty? 

The difficulty is to be answered by simply appealing to 
the fact — -the fact of consciousness. In the very act of 
thinking or perceiving, and when I am drawing conclu- 
sionSj or forming cognitions, I am conscious of these acts. 
The reason has this tw6fold capacity of knowing phe- 
nomena, and being, and truth, external to its own subjec- 
tivity; and of knowing, at the same time, its own acts 
and its own subjectivity in these acts. This is spontaneous 
and necessary self-knowledge. . 

The deduction of the laws of its own operations, and 
the construction of logic, can be effected only by reflection 
or philosophical consciousness. 

The reason, when it perceives, thinks, or ratiocinates, 
does so under the consciousness of its own acts, and under 
convictions of the reality and truth of its operations. Its 
development begins and goes on to an indefinite extent 
spontaneously, before it pauses to look back upon its 
course, in order to trace out the laws of its own movement. 
In this way, not only had cognitions of an outward world 
been formed, and many admirable principles in morals, 
law, and government, been determined, but even geometry 
itself had been carried to a high degree of perfection, 
before logical investigation had become ripe. It is, there- 
fore, not merely by attending to our thinking and reason- 
ing in their going on, that we arrive at the laws of logic: 
In the actual developments of the reason appearing in 
works of science and art, and in all the institutions of 
society, there are, as it were, diagrams and charts wliicli 
the reason can inspect for the purpose of ascertaining its 
own laws. But, then, even in inspecting these, it renews 
in the consciousness the original processes ; and does not 

5* 



106 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

really intermit the exercise of its reiaarkable function, of 
knowing the laws of its own movements, while these move- 
ments are actually going on in reference to that which is 
objective to itself. These diagrams and charts are of the 
utmost importance, because they render reflection more 
easy, by presenting the work of investigation and deduc- 
tion as already completed. Uilder these circumstances, 
the renewal in the consciousness of the original processes 
is effected with no great effort, and thus the reason is en- 
abled to bend its strength to acts of reflection and philo- 
sophical insight. The difference may easily be conceived 
of, by supposing Euchd to have engaged in determining 
the abstract and universal laws of deduction during his 
first efforts at geometrical construction ; or to have com- 
pleted his geometrical construction under the spontaneity 
of the reason, and then to have reflected upon the opera- 
tions of his reason in this construction, for the purpose of 
eliciting universal laws of deduction. 

Taking the reason, then, as the organ of philosophy, 
how are we to decide when we have attained a genuine 
philosophy ? This question, undoubtedly, is of the highest 
importance, for a great many spurious philosophies have 
appeared. In these prolegomena to my main purpose, I 
have no opportunity to enter into minute elucidations ; I 
am only indicating thoughts. It would be no ordinary 
undertaking, by itself, to determine the criteria of a true 
philosophy : — What, then, can be accomplished in a few 
pages ! — But as an artist, where he is not in a condition 
to give a finished work, can still, by a few lines and 
touches, give an intelligible and striking outline, so at 
least as to attract contemplation, to stir up thought, and 
to make the beholder desire a perfect picture, or rather to 
go and examine the original, — be it a quiet scene of hills 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 107 

and plains and flowing rivers, or of wild rocks and woods 
and cataracts, or the noble ruins of an old and mysterious 
temple ; so liere, a few hints and rough-hewn thoughts 
thrown out may serve a good end, by leading ingenious 
readers to put forth their thoughts afresh, and perhaps to 
correct their past conclusions. 



108 INTRODUGTOEY VIEW OF 



SECTION XIV. 

THE CRITERIA OF A TRUE PHILOSOPHY. 

All that is secondary to pliilogoi:>]iyj and dependent upon 
it, of course requires no other ground. Philosophy accounts 
for and explains every thing beside itself — it is the final 
authority. 

HencCj there is an empirical way of testing a philoso- 
phy. There are a multitude of knowledges abroad among 
men, generally received and believed — nay, received and 
believed so confidently, that he who should question their 
reality, would be regarded as destitute of common sense, 
and unfit for the duties and responsibilities of society. A 
philosophy which appears to uphold these favorite convic- 
tions — to be the ultimate and unquestionable ground of 
them, is taken as a well-attested philosophy. 

Now, I would not utterly reject these empirical criteria. 
They have their use, an eminently practical use, and one 
adapted to the people at large. There are, for example, 
certain convictions of a moral and religious nature, which 
widely pervade the human mind, and are the very life of 
the common social system. Men are tenacious of these, 
and that for the best of reasons, viz., the close connexion 
in which they stand to all that is most dear and valuable. 
It is just and worthy in human nature to chng to any phi- 
losophy which clearly appears to sustain high and invalu- 
able beliefs. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 109 

But, while making these admissions; we must still insist 
upon other criteria, lying farther back, and which, indeed, 
are implied in those which we have above adverted to ; . 
and that for two plain reasons : First, The empirical cri- 
teria can have no legitimate authority in themselves. This 
is evident, since the secondary knowledges are assumed to 
establish that„ without which they could have no reality. 
The secondary knowledges by hypothesis require an ulti- 
mate basis — they are not self-evident, they are not neces- 
sarily true ; but their ultimate basis consists of philosophical 
principles, and the very principles which they are employed 
to establish. Now, we may not prove an antecedent by a 
consequent, and that, too, when it is granted that this 
consequent requires for its own basis the very antecedent 
wluch it is taken to prove. 

And if it be admitted that those irrepressible and firm 
spontaneous convictions to which we have alluded, are an 
authority and basis in themselves, it will be found upon an 
accurate analysis that the spontaneous convictions do not 
arise from the phenomenal and secondary, but from the 
absolute and primary, which penetrates and sustains the 
phenomenal and the secondary. For example : One man 
is observed giving another man a purse of money, and the 
observer has an irrepressible and firm conviction that the 
act is right. By why has he this conviction ? Because, 
by supposition, he knows that it is given in benevolence, 
or in payment of a just debt. Now, the payment of a 
debt cannot be taken to prove the principle of justice, nor 
the giving of money to prove the principle of benevolence ; 
but the principle of justice commands the payment of the 
debt, and the principle of benevolence, the relief of the 
needy. From observing the benign influences of certain 
acts, I may commend that philosophy which elevates them 



110 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

into immutable moral principles ; but then these benign 
effects require the existence of such principles in order to 
account for their manifestation. By inducting phenomena 
we may arrive at a principle, but the principle arrived at 
must have had a pre-existence in order to render the phe- 
nomena possible. It must not be forgotten that philoso- 
phy is incorporated with our proper being ; and enlightens, 
guides, and determines us even when we do not recognize 
it by reflection, and are too unlearned to name it as for- 
mally laid down in systems. 

To one untaught in systematic philosophy, a very 
natural prejudice would spring up in favour of some phi- 
losophy named to him, if he were informed that it lay at 
the bottom of his warmest and noblest feehngs and beliefs ; 
but it is perfectly plain that this philosophy, if, in reality, 
lying at the bottom of these mental phenomena of the in- 
dividual in question, would really be that which gave rise 
to these phenomena. This individual may be satisfied 
with it, from its supposed connexion with his beliefs and 
sentiments ; but it could never be legitimately determined 
by such criteria. We must determine independently of 
the individual, whether his beliefs have a true basis ; that 
is, whether they are philosophical or unphilosophical : 
hence the proper criteria must be independent of the phe- 
nomenal of the individual mind. 

Secondly, The empirical criteria cannot be legitimate 
in determining the truth of a philosophy, because, in them- 
selves they do not, in the first place, sufficiently provide 
against the introduction of error ; and in the second place, 
it is a matter of history that errors have actually been in- 
troduced in this way. 

In the first place, they do not in themselves sufficiently 
provide against the introduction of error. Opinions and 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. Ill 

beliefs may be connected in the human mind with many 
other particulars besides an innate philosophy. They may 
be connected with prejudices of nation, family, and sect ; 
with pride, ambition, favorite pursuits and pleasures. If 
an innate philosophy always governed our opinions and 
behefs, then they would always rise above, and be inde- 
pendent of, these other connexions. But so far from this 
being the case, these other connexions do often exclusively 
determine them, and in spite of the innate philosophy. 
It is plain, therefore, that if actual opinions and beliefs are 
to settle our philosophy, it will not only have an ultimate 
basis beyond itself, which is absurd in the very enunciation, 
but this ultimate basis also, will be just as various, muta- 
ble, conflicting, and impure, as human passions them- 
selves. It is impossible, then, in this way, to settle what 
is a true philosophy. 

But, in the second place, it is a matter of history, that 
errors have been introduced in this way. The instances 
of Galileo and Abelard, may be taken as types of a multi- 
tude that might be sought out and adduced. Both were 
severely persecuted for resisting philosophies which had 
their origin in the prejudices of a learned unthinkingness ; 
and in the pride and ambition of a corrupt hierarchy. 
The current opinions demanded different philosophies from 
those broached and expounded by these great apostles of 
freedom of investigation and thought. 

Every man holds certain opinions in common with his 
nation, his family, his political party, or his rehgious sect. 
Are these opinions aU based upon sound philosophy ? No 
one would contend for such an absurdity. These opinions 
conflict with each other ; they cannot, therefore, all be true. 
But if the mere strength of an opinion, and the zeal in ad- 
vancing it, are to be taken as among the sure criteria of 



112 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

philosopliy, then we shall establish a multitiide of philoso- 
phies at war with each other, and all upon an equally 
secure basis. Philosophy is a word of such awful and mo- 
mentous import and authority, that hoth he who advocates 
old opinions, and he who attempts to introduce new ones ; 
both the venerator of unchanging institutions, and the re- 
former and revolutionist ; both orthodoxy and heresy ; 
both bigotry and liberalism, will be ambitious of its titles, 
and of marching under its banners. 

From this Babel-like confusion of tongues — from this 
light rendered murky by the dust and steam of furious 
conflicts, we must retire to a calm and elevated- region, 
where quiet thought has its home ; and where the " light " 
is " dry" and pure.* 

In introducing the criteria of a true philosophy, I will 
name one thing — not, perhaps, really ranking among the 
criteria strictly defined, but yet, the invariable attendant 
of such a philosophy : — It is the quality which character- 
izes the spirit of the philosophy. Philosophy is truth, 
nothing but truth, and truth immutable, arrayed in the 
glory and majesty of her own eternity. Now, that phi- 
losophy, which has developed itself in a mind wliich loves, 
fears, and adores truth, with a filial spirit ; which takes 
up its cross and follows truth with an entire devotion ; 
which counts all things else, whether they be the preju- 
dices of family, sect, or nation — or old titles of honor won 
in the service of powerful and honored creeds and dogmas 
of the church or of the schools, — but loss, for the excel- 
lency of the knowledge of truth — counting truth all gain, 
•and confiding in her with heartiness, fearing no evils — 
willing to endure all trials, and joyfully and certainly ex- 

• " Lumen siccum." — Bacon. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 113 

pecting a satisfactory and peaceful end, — tliat philosopliy 
recommends itself at once to respectful and earnest atten- 
tion, and gives promises which cannot well deceive us. For 
as God hath made the mind for the apprehension of truth, 
and hath set forth before it a world of glorious truths for 
it to apprehend, so we cannot but hope, nay, feel a strong 
confidence, that an ingenuous spirit, looking out after the 
marks of truth, humbly, purely, and freely, as the eye, 
tired of the darkness, looks out for the morning light, will, 
according to the harmonious constitution given it, find her 
resplendent presence, and be accepted as her oracle, to 
make known her laws. 

It is worthy of remark, also, that a preparation of 
mind is necessary, as well for the study of philosophical 
principles announced, as for undertaking an announcement 
of them. A genuine philosophical spirit is the pre-requi- 
site of good learners, as well as of good teachers. The 
want of this, indeed, has been the great obstacle to the 
inculcation of truth in all ages of the world. 

There always hav£ been men of ingenuous and honest 
minds, -and designed by Heaven to be the lights of their 
age, whose teachings, if the multitude had listened to, 
there would have been a wide diffusion of wholesome know- 
ledge and pure morality. Thus would the philosophy and 
ethics of Socrates, as an example among the heathen, and 
the sublime revelations of prophets and apostles among 
the chosen people, have revolutionized society, by destroying 
old, stagnant errors, and bringing in rational and heavenly 
truths. But it hath ever been the folly of men, that al- 
though having eyes to see, and ears to hear, and under- 
standings to perceive, they have chosen old traditions, and 
familiar errors, before new instructions, simply because 
these instructions demand at the first an honest confession 



114 INTEODUCTOKY VIEW OF 

of ignorance, or impose new labors, ot are opposed to 
dearly clierislied prejudices and passions. Bacon, in his 
great work, has exposed these enemies of new investiga- 
tions, and revolutionizing truths, where they lie in the 
human heart. The " Idols of the Tribe," or those preju- 
dices which belong to infirm human nature generally ; the 
" Idols of the Den,'' or individual prejudices — the idiosyn- 
cracies of the man ; the " Idols of the Market-place," or 
the prejudices connected with set forms of speech in the 
announcement of opinions and dogmas — where venerable 
phrases are mistaken for grave truths ; the " Idols of the 
Theatre," or prejudices connected with wild and startling, 
but idle theories. When these "Idols" are worshipped 
by the philosopher, he can make no new discoveries, unless 
by accident, and then he will be prone to distort them. 
When they prevail among the people, — that is, the read- 
ing people, those who are seeking for information in differ- 
ent ways, and with different degrees of interest, — solid 
and rational truths can gain friends but slowly, and are 
liable to be silenced by the authority .of public opinion, the 
rebukes of the church, or even by the force of civil law. 

It holds true in philosophy, as well as in religion, that 
the sower may go forth to sow, and sow none but good 
seed, and yet if the hearers be impracticable, the labor 
wiU be in vain, and the precious seed will be lost ; and it 
is only in the good and honest heart that truth finds a 
proper soil, in whose rich depth she sends forth her roots, 
and sx3rings up an immortal fruit. 

In proceeding to the direct enquiries respecting the 
criteria of a true philosophy, we cannot well avoid adopt- 
ing as a leading thought, the subject of the preceding sec- 
tion, " Eeason the Organ of Philosophy." If reason con- 
Btruct philosophy, she must be immediately conversant 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 115 

with these criteria ; and as she is the faculty of aU know- 
ledges, she must be the last authority in determining them. 

But where shall these criteria be sought for? We 
have shown that they cannot be empirical. Experience 
may be the condition of their development — may suggest 
them ; but they, in themselves, must be subjective. Phi- 
losophy is subjective and metaphenomenal. The criteria 
of a true philosophy must be subjective and metapheno- 
menal likewise. It is evident, therefore, the criteria must 
be sought for in the pure Keason itself. 

I will begin with Logic as an illustration. Logic gives 
the laws of aU. ratiocination. But how do I know when I 
have, in this respect, attained a true philosophy ? I do 
not go to the common, concrete reasonings of men on vari- 
ous subjects. They may confidently believe their current 
conclusions — they may deem them of the utmost impor- 
tance : but the aim of Logic being to test the legitimacy 
of these conclusions, it cannot go to them as criteria. 
AYhat, then, is my only remaining resource ? Why, to go 
to the Reason itself, and ask it whether these principles 
can be otherwise than true — whether their falsity is con- 
ceivable, or possible ? The Reason gives the answer, from 
its perfect insight or intuition ; and beyond this, there 
can be no appeal. Is there any other way of determining 
the truth of the " dictum de omni et nullo V Whatever 
be the philosophical conception — w^hether substance, cause, 
proportion, harmony, space, or time ; — whatever be the 
philosophical law— whether of Esthetics or the Morale, or 
belonging to Logic, — its reality and truth can evidently 
be settled only by an appeal to the Reason. What the 
Reason intuitively perceives, and undoubtingly affirms, 
must be reahty and truth. The only legitimate way of 
arriving at philosophy, is to question the Reason : and so, 



116 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

Hkewise^ tlie only true metliod of testing any system 
claiming to be joliilosopliy, is to bring it in its parts, its 
relations, and in its constituted wholeness, under the re- 
view of the Eeason, as the faculty of intuition — of original 
insight. 

I may remark here, that we are claiming in the deter- 
mination of philosophy, no more than what the mathema- 
tician claims in the determination of his science. How 
shall we test the definitions and axioms of Geometry — ex- 
cept by a direct appeal to the intuition of Keason? Nay, 
in every step of the long chains of reasoning drawn out 
from these definitions and axioms, the exact relations and 
dependencies defy the possibility of error, by submitting 
themselves to the intuition of Keason. 

There is such a thing, then, as appealing directly to 
Keason, and receiving a reply of more authority than the 
hearing of our ears, or the seeing of our eyes ; since what 
is generally received as the most exact and unquestionable 
of all the sciences, continually holds it up to our view. 
If it belong to the mathematics, much more must it be- 
long to philosophy, which furnishes the ultimate grounds 
even of this science. 

Philosophy, when taken up according to a true method, 
becomes rigid, exact, authoritative. It is only when wan- 
dering from this method, that vague and mutable theories 
and fancies, which belong neither to heaven nor earth, but 
which seem grotesquely to partake of both, become phi- 
losophies, falsely so called. Indeed, so rife has this tribe 
of vain and fanciful theorists ever been, that we might ad- 
duce in illustration of the emptiness which may belong to 
a current opinion, the very general opinion, that philoso- 
phy is but an ever-changing mysticism, which every new 
adept may mould to his peculiar fancies. 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 117 

There have been two classes of men, called philosophers, 
in all ages. The one, very numerous, and composed of 
these vain theorists. The other, generally embracing the 
few, and plainly distinguishable from the former, first, by 
elevating philosophy from a mere deduction from experi- 
ence, or a mere expedient created to answer an end, to 
the dignity and permanency of a system formed out of the 
primary and intuitive perceptions of pure Keason ; and, 
secondly, by the identity of the system itself, exhibiting 
clearly that the same conception of philosophy, and the 
same method, were transmitted from age to age, if not in 
books, yet in the elemental working of the human mind 
itself; and showing the true philosopher to be a most 
natm-al and genuine, although a rare manifestation of hu- 
manity. 

The criteria are all embraced in the fact of the Kea- 
son's authoritative affirmation. They are ca23able, how- 
ever, of receiving a specific enunciation. 

I. A philosophical truth, in its very nature, is incapa- 
ble of being defined and demonstrated by any thing going 
before. The aim of philosophy is, as the ultimate ground 
of knowledge, to define, demonstrate, and account for that 
which in its nature is incapable of standing alone, and re- 
quires something antecedent to define, demonstrate, and 
account for it. There must be such primary truths, for 
if there were not, there would be an infinite retrogressus 
of thought in the labor of defining and proving ; there 
would be no ultimate ground for the repose of enquiry. 

II. A philosophical truth must be perfectly clear, and 
attended with no doubtfulness. It is incapable of being 
defined and demonstrated, both because it is primitive, 
and because there really is nothing clearer than itself by 
which to define and demonstrate it. For example, the 



118 INTRODUCTORY VIEW OF 

idea of space is incaj)able of being defined and demon- 
strated, not only because there is nothing before it, which 
comprehends it, and therefore adequate to defining it, but 
also because it is in itself eminently clear and certain. 
That space exists, I afiS.rm with the utmost confidence. 
If I attempt to represent space by body, or to attain to its 
utmost stretch by the multiplication or enlargement of 
bodies, my mind soon becomes confused ; but this confu- 
sion arises, not from any obscurity inherent in the idea of 
space, but from the absurd attempt to represent that un- 
der the phenomena of the senses, which is not attained by 
sensation, and is indeed antecedent to, and independent 
of, all phenomena. 

III. A philosophical truth is a pure intuition of the 
Keason. It must be seen without doubtfulness — it must 
be affirmed with a positiveness which admits of no 
rational questioning in the mind in which it . developes 
itself. But these characteristics belong only to intuitive 
truth. 

IV. Philosophical truths being in a high and peculiar 
sense, elements of thought, cannot remain unproductive 
where thought is going on. Hence, a philosophical truth 
must make its appearance somewhere in the development 
of humanity. If we seek for it, we shall find it. This 
cannot well be confounded with the empirical criteria, 
against which objections have already been urged. These 
criteria suppose us to begin with phenomena as the basis 
of the philosophical construction. Here, on the contrary, 
we begin with the truth as an affirmation of the Eeason, 
and seek for its manifestations. This criterion is es- 
pecially useful to those who seize a truth because it fills 
the mind with a sort of inexpressible delight, and kindles 
it into a lofty enthusiasm, without calmly bringing it un- 



PHILOSOPHY IN GENERAL. 119 

der the eye of the Reason. It will serve to dissipate this 
enthusiasm and dehght, and to bring about a sober-mind- 
edness, to call upon such, to search for the manifestations 
of the supposed truth in the actual phenomena of con- 
sciousness. 

Y. Philosophy cannot legitimately present itself under 
the form of isolated truths. Eeason is one ; and hence it 
developes its truths woven into a system, and constituting 
Unity. That construction, therefore, cannot be received 
as legitimate, which does not exhibit the most perfect 
agreement with itself It will be faulty if its parts ap- 
pear confused, so that there is manifest difficulty in de- 
termining whether any system is aimed to be constituted ; 
or if the parts being clearly brought out and arranged, 
they fail to work together, and are incoherent. 

YI. Philosophy accounts for all phenomena ; it ac- 
counts even for error. Not that the error is the birth of 
the Reason, for this is manifestly absurd ; but that. Phi- 
losophy is adequate to giving an explanation of the 
grounds, the possibilities, the causes, and the modes of 
error. A true philosophy, therefore, as a system, will ac- 
count for the universe as a system. Of course, the rea- 
son alone can judge whether the one accounts for the 
other. We are thus brought back to its simple authority. 

The criteria above given must speak for themselves. 
I believe a careful reflection will lead to their approval in 
the mind of every genuine and candid philosopher. If all 
who have engaged in the work of philosophical construc- 
tion, had governed themselves by these criteria, there 
would have been little difference among them ; and the 
world, long ere this, would have witnessed philosophy 
taking her stand as the Scientia Scientiarum, and pos- 
Bessing at least all the clearness and exactness which are 



120 INTEODUCTOEY VIEW, ETC. 

claimed by many sciences dependent upon lier. But wlien 
men are determined to preserve their "Idols" at all 
events ; they are prepared either to discard philosophy 
altogether, or to make her the mere tire-woman of their 
prejudices and accidental and floating opinions. A theory 
in physics, a dogma in speculation, a creed in religion, a 
name or a degree in a mutable world, are permitted to 
give the leading thought ; and hence they seek not for 
philosophy herself, but only to 'philosophise ingeniously 
and speciously, in order to satisfy the forms of truth while 
they preserve the body of error. They are willing to im- 
pose upon themselves, — ^why, then, should they scruple to 
impose upon others 1 



PART II. 
PKELIMINAKY VIEW OF THE KEASON. 



PART II. 

PEELIMINAEY VIEW OF THE EEASOK 



SECTION I. 

GENERAL INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS RESPECTING 

THE REASON. 

The Keason can be compreliended only by a being en- 
dowed with reason. That which knows all things else, 
must know itself likewise. The very idea of objective 
knowledge implies self-knowledge. 

The faculty of knowledge can be known only through 
acts of knowing in the consciousness. What are these 
acts? The answer is easy, for there is nothing more fa- 
miliar to consciousness. You Tcnoiu this book, this chair, 
this table ; you hnoio this mathematical demonstration ; 
you Icnoio this law of nature — the gravitation of bodies ; 
you Tcnow this rule of morals — love thy neighbor as thy- 
self; you hnow what happened yesterday — that the sun 
rose and set ; you hnoio what will happen to-morrow — 
that the sun will rise and set ; you Tcnow the ideal 
beauty of a statue or a landscape ; you know axioms, 
first principles, and generalizations ; you hnow space and 
eternity. If you ask, What is it to Icnoio ? I reply, Look 



124 PKELIMINARY VIEW OF 

within yourself — yon read there directly what it is. Whai 
other answer can you desire — ^what other answer can you 
obtain ? 

If you ask, What is the Keason ? I reply, it is that 
which knows — the knowing substance, if you please ; or, 
it is yourself, as far as you are a knowing being. In all 
this, it is evident that we do not advance beyond the fact 
of knowing J and the conception of the faculty of know- 
ledge in general. 

But what, then, is the aim of psychological investiga- 
tions with respect to the Keason ? Does not the whole 
enquiry end in the simplicity and obviousness of the fact 
of knowing? 

It is, indeed, true, that whenever, and in whatever 
relations, the Keason is exercised, there is a perpetual re- 
currence of this fact : a perception is a knowledge ; an 
axiom is a knowledge ; a demonstration is a series of 
knowledges ; and all the relations of the parts in the 
making up of the whole' ratiocination, are knowledges. 
But there must arise, upon the general fact of knowing, 
many enquiries respecting the various forms, the condi- 
tions, the limits, the relations, the characteristics, and the 
certainty of knowledge ; the knowledge of the actual, as 
distinguished from the knowledge of the possible; the 
relative determination of knowledge by the inherent 
powers and forms of the reason, and by the objects of 
knowledge themselves ; knowledge, primitive and intui- 
tive, and knowledge secondary and deductive. All these 
and the like enquiries must be related to the psychology 
of the Keason. 

The Keason may be regarded in certain points of view, 
as the cardinal feculty of the mind. It is by knowledge 
and in knowledge that we live and move and have our 



THE KEASON. 125 

being. That I am — that there is any being whatever — 
and all the interests, relations, aims, and laws of being, 
can be possible determinations, only on the supposition 
that this faculty exists. 

Hence men generally are prone, in representing mind, 
to speak of it simply as an intelligence. Let Keason be 
supposed to be extinct, and all other faculties are virtually 
extinct likewise. Emotions and passions are dependent 
upon perceptions for their existence. The Will, although 
a cause, and self-determined, could not go into action 
without objects and aims of action.'-' But the Reason, 
on the contrary, can be supposed to exist without emotions, 
passions, and volitions. Intelligence, like a pure "dry 
light," is conceivable without consequential emotions and 
volitions ; but emotions and volitions, w^ithout intelligence, 
are inconceivable. 

The Eeason, in its full development, presents us 
various forms or offices, which by some philosophers are 
represented as distinct mental faculties. Consciousness, 
sensation, perception, judgment, abstraction, conception, 
attention, imagination, fancy, and memory, have all been 
analysed as distinct faculties. In the actual constitution 
of the mind, some of these faculties, so called, show 
largely, when analysed, the action of the Will. This is 
true particularly of attention, abstraction, and fancy. 
But as far as they express intelligence, I take them to be 
all comprehended in the Reason. These are not properly 
intellectual faculties ; but the intellectual faculty, under 
its different modes, and in its different relations. This I 
shall presently exhibit. In the outset, let us accustom 
ourselves to look upon the Reason as one. It indeed 

* Doctrine of the Will, p. 138. 



126 PEELIMINAEY VIEW OF 

exercises various offices ; it perceives, it judges, it draws 
conclusions, it imagines, fancies, and remembers ; but it 
is still tbe same faculty — it is, in all these, the one and 
indivisible Keason. 

The Eeason, as the faculty of knowledge, must have a 
peculiar constitution — it must be constituted for its office 
— it must be constituted to know. But it cannot know, 
unless there are objects of knowledge — unless there is 
something to be known : and that which is to be known, 
must likewise have its peculiar constitution and properties. 
Now, if, on the one hand, the Keason does not make its 
objects in the very act of knowing them ; so likewise, on 
the other hand, the objects do not make the Keason in 
the very act of being known. The Keason and its objects 
may exist in relation to each other, but they exist also 
independently of each other. I speak now of finite 
Keason. 

In the Divine and Infinite Keason, all possible forms 
of being and truth must have pre-existed in conception 
or idea, before any actual development or creation appeared 
in time or space : — And whatever actual existence or de- 
velopment there ever has been, must be consequential to 
the forecast, as well as to the causality, of the Divine 
mind. But in the constituted and finite Keason, there is 
no dependence of its objects for their existence, upon itself. 
Every form of truth, every form of being beside myself, 
would have a perfect existence, although I did not exist. 
And so, also, although there were no objects for my reason, 
still, as a real intelligence, it would have its fixed and 
perfect constitution. Its development would, indeed, be 
impossible, but it would nevertheless be there, ready to 
be developed whenever the required conditions should be 
supplied. This may be illustrated by the analogy of a 



THE EEASON. 127 

grain of wheat, or the seed of any plant. Let it be laid 
up in a granary, and there can "be no germination ; but 
let it have soil, light, heat, and moisture, and there springs 
up '^ first the blade, and then the full ear/' But the seed 
had its own life and peculiar forms before it was introduced 
into the circumstances and conditions of germination. 
The soil, heat, light, and moisture communicated no life, 
or distinctive forms: — the seed, if wheat, was perfect 
wheat in and of itself; if some other seed, it was of its 
kind, perfect in and of itself. The soil, light, heat, and 
moisture, only supplied the circumstances and conditions 
of its germination, growth, and fruit-bearing. So the 
Keason ; it is perfect in and of itself — it has its own life, 
energy, and distinctive forms inherent, inseparable, and 
independently of all exterior circumstances and conditions. 
The presentation of objects through sensation, is like soil 
to the seed ; books, conversation, examples, the regular 
discipline of schools, are like light, heat, and moisture : 
these are requisite to its germination, growth, develop- 
ment, perfection, and fruit-bearing; but all that comes 
forth of it, comes forth of its own forms, capacities, and 
richness, as the Keason. 

Now, it is very interesting and instructive to think of 
the principle of life and the distinctive forms of seeds ; 
and by the aid of the microscope to look within its store- 
house of wonders — its preparations for endless propaga- 
tion and increase ! Surely, he who thus thinks and 
examines, knows more of nature, attains to more truth, 
than he who merely plants and eats, without seeking any 
thing further. 

But of how much higher moment, to comprehend, if 
possible, the forms of our own intelligence ! 

Is it possible to attain to this — can I know tlie inherent 



128 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

forms — the iixed and independent constitution of the 
Keason? Can I find out with what preparations — ^with 
what pre-constituted and adapted capacities, the mind 
begins to know? 

The earhest development of Keason must be sponta- 
neous, like the germination of a seed sown in the soil. 
There can be no self-direction and forecast before know- 
ledge begins. But after Eeason has gone out to an indefi- 
nite extent among its objects, after it has germinated, 
sprung up, and increased toward perfection, unlike the 
plant, it has the power of reflection, or of looking back 
upon the process of its development, and of separating — 
at least so far as to establish enquiries — between its in- 
herent and pre-constituted forms and capacities, and the 
circumstances under which they make their appearance. 
It has the power of doing in relation to itself, what it does 
in relation to the plant. Nay, may not its self-knowledge 
be presumed to be more perfect, since it knows the plant 
by observation, while it knows itself in the interior and 
most intimate consciousness ? 

The inherent and original forms and functions of the 
Keason, can indeed be known only on condition of ex- 
perience ; but when known, they are seen to have an d 
priori existence. They are not known d priori, under- 
standing by this that they are known independently of ex- 
perience ; — they are known through experience, but as in 
their nature prior to it, or the experience would not itself 
have been possible. 



THE REASON. 129 



SECTION 11. 

OUTLINE OF THE IDEAS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE REASON. 

"The pre-constituted forms or elements under wMcli the 
Reason forms cognitions^ and assigns laws, are called 
Ideas. 

The capacities of the Reason to know in different 
modes and relations, we shall call its Functions. 

Ideas and Functions make up the constitution of the 
Reason. 

ideas. 

The ideas may be classified in two ways — 
First : "We may classify them as Ideas which deter- 
mine our cognitions, and Ideas which determine our ac- 
tivity. Under the first head would be comprised the 
Ideas of time and space, the finite and infinite, of cause 
and substance, of quantity and quality, necessity and con- 
tingence, and the categories of purely cognitive ideas in 
general. 

Under the second head would be comprised — 
The Idea of Utility, — that which gives birth to human 
industry and all its achievements. 

The Idea of Right and Wrong, — that which gives 
birth to Ethics, Law, and Religion. 

The Idea of Beauty, — that which gives birth to the 
Fine Arts. 

6* 



130 PEELIMINARY VIEW OF 

The Philosophical Idea, — that which leads man to at- 
tempt the explanation of his own development. 

This classification, however, does not preserve its par- 
ticulars entirely distinct, for the last class determine cog- 
nitions as well as activities. 

We may therefore adopt a second method of classifica- 
tion according to the philosophical divisions given in Part 
I., Sec. XI. We shall then have, 

I. Metaphysical Ideas. II. Nomological Ideas. 

The first determine our conceptions in Psychology, 
Dynamics, Anthropology, and Ontology. The second de- 
termine laws in the Morale, Esthetics, Somatology, and 
Logic. 

In this classification we accept all Ideas as cognitive 
in their character ; while the last division embraces those 
only which have the additional remarkable characteristic 
of becoming laws in the world of objective reality. * 

FUNCTIONS. 

I. Intuition, or the function of primary and immedi- 
ate knowledge. Ideas, Axioms, and First Truths in gen- 
eral, are the objects of this function. 

II. Sensuous Perception, or the function of forming 
cognitions upon sensations or the phenomena of the ex- 
terior consciousness. 

III. Abstraction and Generalization. It is by 
this function that the Keason, taking up the secondary 
phenomena, first views particular qualities separately, and 
then makes them the basis of extensive classifications. 
The quality is abstracted, and then generalized as a com- 

* Vide Part I., Sec. VII. 



THE REASON. 131 

mon sign ; and its name becomes the name of the class. 
Thus are formed genera and species. To this function we 
are indebted for a clear and distinct knowledge of things, 
and the formation of a ready and convenient language. 

lY. Judgment, or the function of perceiving the agree- 
ment or disagreement between two cognitions, united as 
the subject and predicate of a proposition. 

y . Invention, or the function of finding out and ap- 
plying principles and rules for the demonstration of theo- 
rems, the solution of problems, and the construction of 
machines ; and of making experiments for the determina- 
tion of Science. The imagination acts conjointly with 
this, by calling up in the mind the images of diagrams, 
and of models or archetypes of the outward construction. 

yi. Mediate Perception, or the function of inferring 
or deducing conclusions through a mediate cognition^ as 
formally exhibited in the syllogism. 

yil. Induction, or the function of examining and 
arranging the secondary phenomena, so as to determine 
their causes and laws, and thus to construct scientific 
systems. 

yill. Memory, or the perpetuity of knowledge. The 
Reason which knows, retains its knowledges. A faculty 
of knowledge without this power would scarcely deserve 
the name. 

Perhaps memory is too identical with the simplest no- 
tion we can form of Reason, to be called a function ; it is 
rather an inseparable characteristic. 

Recollection is more properly a function. The act 
of recollection is based upon memory. Its aim is to bring 
a permanent knowledge within the field of consciousness. 
The energy of the will in directing and holding the atten- 
tion, is involved in this act. 



132 PRELIMINAKY VIEW OF 

Whatever we learn, we learn in certain relations, com- 
monly termed association of ideas. Hence, when our past 
perceptions re-appear, they appear in their original rela- 
tions, or in relations nearly akin to them. Eecollection 
implies a dim foreshadowing of the knowledge to be re- 
called in some of these relations ; npon this foreshadow- 
ing, the cognitive faculty is steadily fixed, until the whole 
comes forth in distinct form and fullness. 

Attention, which some have set down as an intellec- 
tual faculty, is really the energy of the Will exerted over 
the Keason in its several functions. 

IX. Imagination. Under its first and simplest pre- 
sentation, this is the function of knowing objects which 
have form, or sensible qualities generally, when the actual 
sensations no longer exist. Thus in every act of memory, 
and in every conception of the distant, where the objects 
were originally known through the senses, the imagination 
revives the forms and sensible qualities. 

Again, the Imagination appears as a mediatory func- 
tion between the world of Ideas, and the world of the 
Senses. The Imagination forms upon the Ideas, Ideals or 
Archetypes, according to which the outward constructions 
are fashioned and related. Even in respect to the Divine 
Mind, we cannot but conceive of this function as forecast- 
ing and foreseeing the Universe before the creative act 
took place. The finite artist and mechanician — man, pro- 
duces his works in the same way. 

This appears in the Fine Arts, where the ideal con- 
ceptions of beauty and grandeur constitute the models or 
archetypes of the forms which spring up imder the chisel, 
and upon the canvass, or which speak in poetry. This ap- 
pears in the inventions of the useful arts, and in scientific 
discovery; for unquestionably, the imagination forms 



THE BEASON. 133 

archetypes of meclianical construction and scientific sys- 
tems. The Idea is not always strictly followed, and hence 
the Imagination degenerates into a fickle and wayward 
Fancy. But, nevertheless, where the Idea does become 
productive of scientific and mechanical results, this func- 
tion must be employed. 

Nor is the imagination excluded from the sphere of 
moral conceptions. Whenever man in his various relations 
and duties becomes the subject of thought, not only is the 
Idea of right and wrong the determining power of thought ; 
but the ideals of character, also, under the different varie- 
ties of moral greatness and beauty, present themselves in 
the imagination as standards with which to compare the 
actual, or archetypes to direct the creations of genius. 

The highest form of the imagination is the creative. 
Here the pure Idea generates an Ideal, which, surpassing 
the beauty of any natural form, inspires the artist to at- 
tempt a work of corresponding perfection. Whatever is 
created, is created according to the Idea. The Imagina- 
tion is the creative function of the same faculty — the Kea- 
son, — which gives forth the Idea. 

The Imagination is thus the representative, the media- 
tory, and the creative function. 

Let none be startled or offended, when it is said, that 
man produces more beautiful proportions and forms than 
nature. Nature and man are both servants of the Infinite 
Mind of Beauty and Wisdom. The first works according 
to fixed and necessary laws, without choice or conscious- 
ness ; the second works according to the same laws, but 
with choice and consciousness : the one shadows forth the 
Divine attributes as the effect related to the cause ; the 
other is the very image of the Divine. Why should not 
God, therefore, empower the thoughtful hand of man to 



134 PKELIMINARY VIEW OF 

bring to light certain forms of beauty, wliich lie has not 
committed to tbe insensate mecbanism of nature ? Has 
not the Idea of tbe Useful stimulated industry to make 
nature more commodious and bountiful ? And wby may 
not tbe Idea of tbe Beautiful inspire Art to make nature 
more beautiful ? 

" God bas not limited man's knowledge to tbat wbich 
is ; but bas enabled bim to perceive that wbich piay he ; 
and when be proceeds to modify God's work, he is not a 
trespasser and a violator, but a more noble instrumental 
power, by which God gives his creation a higher finish and 
a more perfect use." * 

Fancy is arbitrary imagination, or imagination not 
governed by the pure Ideas of truth and beauty. It pre- 
sents us, therefore, not Ideals, but humorous and gro- 
tesque images, created by intentional violations of esthetical 
laws, and incongruous and disproportioned combinations. 
Beauty and truth have defined and perfect archetypes, 
and therefore in given kinds, a limited variety ; but fan- 
ciful creations can have no assignable hmit, inasmuch 
as their very being consists in sporting with all law and 
rule, f 

X. Consciousness, is that function of the Keason by 
which it immediately knows phenomena. $ 

Consciousness has an exterior and an interior direction. 
In the former direction, it knows the phenomena of sensa- 
tion ; in the latter, the phenomena of the mental activi- 
ties beyond sensation. In the exterior and interior con- 
sciousness, we have all phenomena whatever, for we have 
comprehended here all the possible activities of our being. 

If we enquire. Whence do the phenomena of conscious- 

* Doctrine of the Will, p. 130. 
t Ibid, pp. 133, 134. J Vide Part L, Sec. II. 



THE KEASON. 135 

ness arise ? the only rational answer tliat can be obtained 
is, that tbey arise conjointly from the simple subjective, 
and the objective general, — that is, when these form a 
iinition in knowing, feeling, and wilHng. There can be no 
act of knowing, — that is, no phenomenon of knowing, un- 
less there be both a faculty of knowledge, and an object to 
be known, either in the world of pure Keason or of the 
Sense, — at least, an object which shall be the foundation 
of the cognitions of the knowing faculty : even dreams, 
and the wildest imaginings, have some relation to objective 
reality. There can be no sensations, unless there be both 
a sensitive faculty and real correlative objects ; and the 
same with respect to emotions and passions. There can 
be no volitions unless there be both a will or cause, and 
objects and ends of causation.'* 

From this unition of the subjective and the objective — 
unition, but not contact — the phenomenal appears, and is 
immediately known by the Eeason in its function of con- 
sciousness ; and then follow all the other functions in their 
due place and order. 

Self-Knowledge, the afi&rmation Ego sum, I am, in 
antithesis to the objective general — the not myself — is 
often represented as a form of consciousness, and thence 
called self -consciousness. This, perhaps, is more justly 
comprehended in the intuitive function, since the self is 
not phenomenal, and therefore cannot be immediately re- 
cognized by consciousness. It is true, however, that the 
antithetical affirmation stated above, is the most primitive 
of all affirmations : — in the very unition of the simple 
subjective with the objective, by which a first phenomenon 
is given, the Keason knows the two terms, and makes the 

♦ Doctrine of the Will, p. 138. 



136 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

affirmation ; and witli the consciousness of all subsequent 
phenomena, the affirmation is continually renewed. There 
is, therefore, a valid ground for representing self-knowledge 
as a form of consciousness ; and if properly explained and 
distinguished, the representation is striking, inasmuch as 
it expresses the intimate union of mind with itself when it 
awakes to the knowledge of its own being.* . 

Keflectiok, is a subsequent form of consciousness. 
While the common consciousness is a spontaneous and 
necessary recognition of phenomena, and a necessary self- 
knowledge, reflection is special and voluntary. In reflec- 
tion, my immediate aim is to know myself ; and it gener- 
ally implies a proposing to one's self some particular 
analysis of the mind. In order to affect this analysis, we 
first reproduce a state of consciousness, or renew former 
experiences, by bringing into view the correlative objects : 
and then, in this state of reproduced consciousness, or re- 
newed experiences, we awaken the reason to acts of close 
attention and thought. This state of mind is exceedingly 
complex : for the mind must at the same time keep before 
it, the correlative objects which are to awaken the re- 
quired phenomena, and bend itself to the work of examin- 
ing the phenomena in their subjective relations. But, 
still, let it be remembered that it is complex only as all 
thought and investigation are complex. In investigating 
the objective world, we do really produce within ourselves 
certain experiences or phenomena of consciousness, by 
means of the senses, and while these exist, we apply to 
them the Keason, in order to determine the forms and 
laws of nature. 

Spontaneous consciousness embraces our necessary and 

* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 1, 2, 3. 



THE REASON. 137 

natural experiences of the senses, and the mental act^ 
whicli necessarily and naturally arise in connexion with 
them. 

Keflection, or philosophical consciousness, embraces 
the experiences produced intentionally in reference to 
some knowledges to be attained of the subjective or the 
objective. 



138 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 



SECTION III. 

EXPLICATION OF IDEAS. 

In the "Introductory Yiew of Philosophy in General/' 
much has been said respecting Ideas, and I cannot but 
hope some explication of them given in the natural un- 
folding of the line of thought there attempted. In bring- 
ing up this subject in this place directly, my aim is, if 
possible, in a clear and simple way to give an answer to 
what has always been regarded and treated as a very diffi- 
cult question, viz. : What are Ideas ? The difficulty 
which exists, arises chiefly, I think, from the primordial 
and predeterminative character of Ideas. Here all analo- 
gies must be exceedingly distant and imperfect, since 
Ideas precede every form of cognition. Thus, when it is 
said that Ideas are the moulds of the understanding, and 
sensations the materials cast in them and taking form, we 
have, perhaps, the most striking analogy that can be 
found ; but, nevertheless, how vague the resemblance be- 
tween the plastic power of material moulds upon material 
substances, and the action of the first elements of thought 
in determining cognitions upon phenomenal conditions ! 

We have spoken of several Ideas incidentally in the 
preceding pages, such as Time, Space, Substance, Cause, 
Beauty, Eight, and Wrong. Now, the Idea of Time is 
not Time, the Idea of Space is not Space, the Idea of Sub- 
stance is not Substance, and so also of the others. Nor, 



THE EEASON. 139 

again, are the acts of knowing these Ideas, the Ideas 
themselves. That is, the Ideas are neither the realities 
from which they are named, nor the acts in which the 
realities are known. Time and space are realities ; sub- 
stance, as essential being, is a reality ; cause is a reality ; 
the distinction between right and wrong is a reahty ; in- 
finity and spirit are realities. They are, even although I 
do not know them. But how do I know them ? The 
mere experience of sensations does not give them. The 
Keason knows them by its own force or capacity. The 
Keason begins to act only when the sensations are expe- 
rienced ; but it knows not only, by consciousness, the 
sensations ; it knows, by intuition, these necessary realities 
likewise. But what is the force or capacity of the Eeason 
to know the metaphenomenal truths ? We say, the Kea- 
son has in its own constitution as the faculty of knowledge, 
ideas of time, space, substance, cause, beauty, right and 
wrong, and so on ; meaning by this, that the faculty of 
knowledge is preconstituted to know these objective neces- 
sary realities ; and that, that within itself which capaci- 
tates or adapts it to know each of them, is called the Idea 
of this reahty. 

The word Idea itself contains no mystery or magical 
power. It is a word introduced by one of the greatest 
philosophers who ever thought, and using, perhaps, the 
most perfect language in which thought was ever ex- 
pressed. We cannot find a better word for our purpose ; 
and there is, therefore, no good reason for diverting it from 
its origiQal use, or substituting any other in its place. 

We have in the preceding Section divided Ideas into 
the Metaphysical and the Nomological. The first express 
the inherent capacity of the Eeason to know the Eeahty 
of Being ; the second, its inherent capacity to know the 



140 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

Reality of Law. Mere phenomena, apprehended by con- 
sciousness, do not give either. These phenomena, as we 
have seen, arise from objective reahty without, and subjec- 
tive reality within. But what is the relation between the 
pure Eeason, with its Ideas prepared to know Reality, 
and the phenomena known by consciousness which form 
the conditions under which the knowledge of Reality be- 
gins ? Recollect Reality is of two kinds : the Reahty of 
first and necessary truths and principles, relating both to 
being and law ; and the Reahty of actual being, having 
specific constitution and qualities, and reduced under de- 
terminate law. Now, under the constitution of humanity, 
it is not intended that mind should attain to the Reahty 
of truths, principles, and laws, separately from the Reality 
of actual being. As man is himself reason and sense * — 
a union of the two Realities above named, — it seems to be 
designed that both shall be developed in his cognition, 
consentaneously, and at the same time. The first and 
second Reahties are related to each other in so much as 
the first is embodied in the second ; and man himself be- 
ing the type of this union, he knows the two in their 
union. "When he first awakes to consciousness, sensations 
or phenomena of the exterior consciousness first meet him, 
because thought in humanity is connected with physical 
life, and this fife reveals itself in sensation. These sensa- 
tions arise from the action of exterior causes upon his sen- 
suous organism — the world without thus makes its approach 
to the Reason within. Here, then, is the occasion for cog- 
nition. If the mind had no cognitive power of its own, — 
a power expressed by the word Ideas, — if it were a mere 
passive recipient, then there would be a mere conscious- 

* Parti., Sec. V. 



THE EEASON. 141 

ness of sensations, and notliing more : but now these sen- 
sations are like telegraphic signals given from the outer 
world, and the Keason has within itself the key or alphabet 
wherewith to read them. The Eeason can know the 
world without, because it can know the great truths and 
laws — the first form of Keality, which are embodied in 
the world without — the second form of Keality. The first 
knowledges thus embrace, as we have said, the two forms 
of Eeahty consentaneously. The second could not be 
known at all without the first— it would not be logically 
possible. The first would not be known without the 
second, because, in the constitution of humanity, mind is 
imprisoned in its tabernacle, until the windows of the 
senses be opened, and the signals of life and being come 
rushing in. 

Let me recur in this place to a thought thrown out in 
my Introductory View, Section YII. The Great Creator, 
before he formed the worlds, must have had the Ideas of 
all truth and law, and aU forms of being — He knew, and 
then created. He foreknew all possible being, because he 
had the Ideas of all possible being. Man, the finite mind, 
knows after creation has taken place, and after he has re- 
ceived in his sensitivity, motions from that creation ; but 
that he knows at all, arises from a Keason made in the 
likeness of the Divine, and having pre-constituted capaci- 
ties or Ideas adapted to primordial, universal, and neces- 
sary truths — the very truths in which the outer world, 
indeed the whole world of created bemg, " lives, moves, 
and has its being." 

That man knows himself, is explained in the same 
way. He has the Idea of subjective, as well as of objec- 
tive reality : And as the motions given in his sensitivity 
from without, and known by consciousness, give the call 



142 PRELIMINAEY VIEW OF 

to the Keason furnislied witb. its Ideas, to look without ; 
so the action of the mind itself gives the call to look 
within also. 

The two forms of Keality, which at first are concrete 
and complicated, are afterwards submitted to Keflection, 
and by Eeflection distinguished. 

It may, indeed, require a high effort of thought to 
comprehend Ideas ; but let this effort be made, and in 
the whole range of philosophy there is notldng so clear 
and interesting. Ideas are the elements of thought, the 
elements of philosophy, because the elements of Eeason 
itself A Keason without Ideas is an impossible concep- 
tion. Ideas are the cardinal psychological explication of 
the Reason 



THE KEASON. 143 



SECTION IV. 

EXPLICATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE REASON. 

The Keason, constituted with Ideas, goes into action. Its 
great office is to know. But tlie objects of its knowledge 
are not aU of the same Mnd, do not stand in the same re- 
lations, nor under the same conditions. Some of these 
objects are truths absolute and necessary ; some are phe- 
nomena variable and contingent ; some are immediately, 
while others are mediately perceived ; some precede, while 
others are gathered from observation ; some are actual, 
while others are only possible ; some are in time present, 
others in time past, and others again in time future ; 
some, in space, are contiguous to the senses, while others 
are distant. Hence arises the necessity of considering the 
Keason under different functions. In its constitutive 
Ideas, it is not only adapted to every variety of know- 
ledge ; it has, also, the power of searching out its objects 
under every variety of condition and relation. It can 
know phenomena and truths, and the relations between 
them ; it can know immediately and mediately ; it can 
know in various relations of time and space ; it can form 
pure cognitions, and cognitions upon sensuous conditions ; 
it can go out to the actual, and conceive of the possible. 
It has all these different functions. Its functions mani- 
festly express the variety and scope of its activitv. 



141 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 



SECTION V. 

DOES LOGIC COMPREHEND ALL THE FUNCTIONS OF 
THE REASON ? 

Logic has been defined in tlie general as comprising the 
laws wHck determine and govern the activities of the Eea- 
son.* Unless this definition receive limitations, Logic 
evidently must reach to every function. Limitations, how- 
ever, exist, and the reason for them is palpable. 

In one respect Logic, plainly, has general relations, 
viz. : in so far as it determines the most original laws of 
thought and cognition, f 

But when we enter the domain of particular functions, 
we find much that legitimately comes under other divisions 
of philosophy. 

Logic comprises those laws of the Keason which deter- 
mine the processes by which it reaches the two forms of 
Eeality — the Eeality of Truth and of Actual Being. This 
is its separate, unique, and peculiar domain. 

But memory does not describe a process by which new 
truths are arrived at ; it expresses simply the power of the 
cognitive faculty to retain old truths, or truths already 
gained. Hence it cannot belong to Logic. Kecollection 
is memory permeated by the will, imagination, and fancy. 
It evidently can belong to Logic no more than simple 
memory. It sometimes even becomes a mere art. 

* Page 83. f Page 84. 



THE REASON. 145 

Imagination also gives origin neither to ideas, and 
truths, nor to facts of reality. It is a mediatory, repre- 
sentative, and creative function ; forming ideals upon 
ideas, reviving the images of objects when the objects no 
longer address the sense, and combining forms of unreal 
beauty. Neither, therefore, does Logic comprise the laws 
of this function. 

It would, indeed, be possible to give Logic a designa- 
tion so general as to make it embrace all the functions. 
In this case Esthetics would cease as a separate branch of 
homology. But the distinction between Logic, as Hmited 
above, and Esthetics, is clear, natural, and convenient. 
They both, indeed, relate to forms of knowing ; but the 
one determines the laws of knowing the real ; while the 
other determines the laws of mere imitation of the real, 
and of knowing and projecting the possible. 

Imagination, therefore, must be assigned to the nomo- 
logical determinations of Esthetics. 

Memory, considered as an iiiherent property of the 
Keason, belongs to psychology simply. The whole doctrine 
of the association of Ideas, which figures so largely in 
treating of this function, amounts to this : — Whatever is 
known, is known, not in au isolated way, but in various 
relations ; these relations themselves making up a part of 
the objective reahty. When, therefore, past perceptions 
are renewed in the consciousness, whether they be objects 
of the sense or pure truths, they must of necessity appear 
in their appropriate relations. Eelations and parts of 
thought are often presented accidentally, or suggested by 
images of the imagination and fancy ■ and when so pre- 
sented, they are, of course, apprehended by the cognitive 
faculty, and the whole train of thought carried through, 
or dismissed in its unfinished state, at pleasure. 
7 



146 PRELIMINARY VIEW OF 

KecoUection, as a voluntary process, is, indeed, based 
upon the memory. When, however, its object is pure 
truth, there is often in reality a renewal of the process of 
investigation or ratiocination, by which it was originally 
arrived at. In this case, it is difficult to determine how 
far the recollection arises from memory, or from the pure 
reasoning power. There is a passage in Dugald Stewart, 
which illustrates this remark. "Sir Isaac Newton, as we 
are told by Dr. Pemberton, was often at a loss, when the 
conversation turned on his own discoveries. It is probable 
that they made but a slight impression on his mind, and 
that a consciousness of his inventive powers prevented him 
from taking niuch pains to_ treasure them up in his 
memory." 

In Newton's mind the original proofs were renewed 
with little aid from memory. And Stewart farther re- 
marks, that generally, while men of little inventive power 
trust to memory for the recollection of truths, men distin- 
guished for this power are prone to rely upon it. What, 
therefore, often appears to others as memory, is in reality 
reasoning, and conseq[uently comes under the laws of Logic. 

The other functions, for the most part, come under the 
determinations of Logic, inasmuch as they contain pro- 
cesses by which the two forms of Keality are attained. 

It is not necessary, however, to give Logic the multi- 
farious divisions of these functions. The functions often 
co-work together ; and there are a few general conceptions 
of the ends of Logic which happily embrace them all. 

Logic comprises the laws which determine the processes 
of arriving at Keality — ^the Keality of Truth and of Actual 
Being. 

First, therefore, we must consider the laws of the most 



THE REASON. 147 

original cognitions, botli tlirougli pure intuition, and 
through sensuous phenomena. 

Secondly. The laws which govern the observation and 
classification of secondary phenomena ; and that inductive 
process by which general principles are obtained. 

Thirdly. The laws of deduction, or inference. 

Fourthly. The laws of evidence, and the method of 
proof. 

This is the outline which, in the next Part, we shall 
attempt to fill up. 



PART III. 



LOaiC PROPER. 



BOOK I. 

PRIMORDIAL LOGIC 



SECTION I. 

GENERAL LAWS OF THE EVOLUTION OF IDEAS. 

In the prolegomena comprised in the two preceding Parts^ 
many things were necessarily anticipated in an incidental 
way. As, however, they were merely preparatory to my 
main purpose, I may not mar the development contem- 
plated in this Part, through an apprehension of appearing 
sometimes to repeat what had already been announced. 
Wherever this does happen, it will he found that a more 
formal and scientific announcement is attempted. 

On the subject of Ideas, also, it is somewhat difficult 
to mark with precision what strictly belongs to Psychology, 
and what to Logic. Ideas, regarded as the determining 
powers of cognition, do certainly belong to the first ; and 
I have so endeavoured to treat of them in the explication 
given in the preceding Part. In this Part, besides giving 
the general laws of their determination, I shall weave in 
much respecting the mode and conditions of their develop- 
ment, together with their characteristics, which may ap- 
pear more justly to belong to psychological disquisition. 



152 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

At one time J I had well nigh, concluded to bring this all 
into the 'Preliminary View" ; hut farther reflection has 
induced me to believe that I shall make a more simple 
and satisfactory presentation of the subject, and, on the 
whole, more philosophic, by comprising all these particulars 
under Primordial Logic. Lest any should object to this 
course, I thought it best to say thus much to shew that 
the same thoughts had occurred to my own mind, and 
that the difficulties had not been passed over without 
consideration. 

I. Humanity being the union of body and spirit, — 
the life of thought, and the physical life of the full-formed 
and constituted being, in the present sphere, begin, go on, 
and end together. Hence, even before birth, as Locke 
affirms,* there may be incipient thought, because, there 
is incipient sensation. 

But although thought begins .nth sensation, sensation 
is not the determinative power of thought. This power 
lies in the Ideas of the Keason. 

II. The first action of the Eeason is spontaneous, and 
unattended by reflection. Mind in humanity being finite 
and dependent, hath not its starting point in itself. The 
main-spring is energised by an invisible and infinite power. 
But when it has reached a certain development, different 
in different individuals, reflection begins, and it now 
traces back the path through which it has run its course. 

III. By reflection, it analyses the knowledges actually 
attained, together with the simple sensations. By this 
analysis it does not find the determining powers and forms, 
nor even all the materials of thought in sensation : but it 
finds certain conceptions which, when separated from the 

* Book XL, ch. 9, § 5. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 153 

sensations, are intuitively apprehended as universal, neces- 
sary, and absolute. 

IV. These conceptions must have been given in the 
dawn of cognition, as well as during the whole line of cog- 
nition, since cognition is impossible without them ; and 
yet they were not given before sensation, because, in the 
first place, as above stated, the life of thought, and physi- 
cal life showing itself in sensation, begin together ; and in 
the second place, the sensations are signals from the out- 
ward world of reality, that the time and occasion of thought 
have arrived, and that the field of thought stands invit- 
ingly open. 

V. Hence arises the distinction of antecedence in time, 
and in necessary existence, or chronological and logical 
antecedence.* The sensations are first in time; but 
these absolute cognitions are first in necessary existence. 
But although we speak of an antecedence in time as some- 
thing that we can conceive of, it is so slight, that con- 
sciousness cannot appreciate it, for no sooner does the 
sensation appear, than the absolute element is mingled 
with it. 

VI. The first cognitions, or judgments, which take 
their expression in propositions, are not to be confounded 
with Ideas. The Ideas are the determinative power of 
cognition, which exists independently of aU cognition. 
When the phenomenal conditions of thought are supplied, 
then the Ideas manifest themselves through the different 
functions. They manifest themselves through conscious- 
ness in the cognition of subject and object; through the 
imagination in the cognition of ideals ; through sensuous 
perception in the cognition of exterior substances, causes, 

* Part L, Sec. IX, 
7* 



154 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

and laws. That is, the Ideas determine to particular cog- 
nitions of an objective reality, to which the universal is 
related— ^and in this way determine to the cognition of 
the universal itself. For example, sensations of resistance, 
of colour, and form, are given ; upon this, the ideas of 
substance, cause, and space, determine to the cognition of 
a particular body, with its primary and secondary qualities ; 
and in determining to this particular cognition by the 
function of sensuous perception, they determine at the 
same time by the function of intuition, to the universal 
and necessary cognitions of space, substance, and cause, 
as comprised within the first and highest form of reality. 
YII. In the evolution of the Ideas we have thus four 
particulars : First, the phenomena of consciousness, as 
conditions in time, and effects of objective reality thrown 
within the sphere of the subjective simple ; Secondly, the 
cognition of particular objective realities ; Thirdly, the 
absolute and universal cognitions of the intuitive function 
determined by the Ideas ; and. Fourthly, the Ideas them- 
selves. The Ideas are first of all in the antecedence of 
necessary existence. The cognition of the universal in 
like manner is the antecedent of the cognition of the par- 
ticular. But in the antecedence of time, the reverse 
order takes place. Keflection, analysing our actual cog- 
nitions first, separates the metaphenomenal from the 
phenomenal in the particular ; Secondly, it separates the 
universal from the particular ; and Thirdly, it evolves the 
Ideas as the necessary grounds and antecedents in the 
Reaoon itself, of every form of cognition. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 155 



SECTION II. 

METAPHYSICAL IDEAS. 

L— SUBJECT, AND OBJECTIVE EXTERIORITY. 

The phenomena of tlie exterior and the interior conscious- 
ness are the antecedents in time. Among the phenomena 
of the interior consciousness there is one class which have 
the remarkable characteristics of self-determination and 
freedom, showing themselves in the acts of attention, or 
acts appropriating the cognitive faculty. All the phe- 
nomena of the interior consciousness appear, therefore, 
either directly, — as in simple voHtions, — or indirectly, as 
in cognitions directed by volition, with these remarkable 
characteristics. 

On the other hand, the phenomena of the exterior 
consciousness manifest themselves independently of this 
inward, self-determining activity. They appear in we, but 
are in no sense produced hy me. Upon these phenomena, 
the Reason is determined by the Ideas of Subject and 
Object to cognize the particular subject myself, and an 
exterior something not myself. From this particular cog- 
nition, as the initiative, it cognizes the universal distinc- 
tion of the interior subject and the exterior object. 

Reflection now analysing the mental process, it becomes 
evident that the Ideas of Subject and Object must have 
had an antecedent necessary existence, or the several cog- 



156 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

nitions could not have appeared ; since the bare phenomena, 
whether of the interior or exterior consciousness^ present 
us, in themselves, not realities, but appearances only, as 
the name intimates. The two classes of phenomena 
mentioned above, with their different characteristics, are 
the conditions on which the cognitions take place, but the 
Idea can alone be the power which determines the form 
of the cognition. 



II.— TIME AND SPACE. 

That part of our knowledge which is obtained through, 
or by means of the senses and muscular resistance, is con- 
nected with the Ideas of Time and Space. All the phe- 
nomena of body are given in space. All succession of 
phenomena is given in time. It is impossible for us to 
conceive of body without space. It is impossible for us to 
conceive of succession without time. In order, therefore, 
to know body, I must have the idea of space : and in 
order to know succession, I must have the idea of time. 

The ideas of time and space are simple and primary ; 
— they can be resolved into nothing antecedent — they are 
directly intelligible ; they neither require, nor can receive 
any definition. Their characteristics are obvious. They 
are necessary, that is, they cannot be supposed not to be, 
or not to have been ; they are • infinite ; and they admit 
of no representation that can be addressed to the senses. 

It is impossible that they should have their origin in 
sensation. JSTeither the secondary nor the primary quali- 
ties of bodies bear any resemblance to them. This book 
which I hold in my hand, ^and the hand itself, are in 
space ; but clearly they are not space. Form and solidity 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 157 

must be connected with space, and cannot be tbouglit of 
without space, but they have nothing in common with 
space, and nothing analogous to space. Body, conceived 
of under any modifications, and under any enlargement, 
is still in space, and totally distinct from space. The 
characteristics of body are contingency, form, and limita- 
tion — the very opposite of those of space. 

Time, if representable at all under forms addressed to 
the senses, must be representable by a succession of phe- 
nomena or events. But here we find the same opposition 
of cardinal characteristics. Time, taken as simple dura- 
tion — the sense in which I here employ it, is necessary, 
without form, and unlimited — as simple duration it is 
eternity. Any succession that may be given is contingent 
— that is, it may be supposed not to be, or not to have 
been : it is limited — it must have had a beginning, and 
may have an assigned termination ; and lastly, it may be 
represented in space, by the revolutions of the planets and 
a dial-plate. Succession must be in time, but is plainly 
totally distinct from time. 

As the cognitions of time and space cannot have their 
origin in sensation, their origin must be assigned to the 
pure Keason itself. 

How do these cognitions arise in the Reason ? Are they 
innate ? The just reply is, that the Eeason has an innate 
or inherent power of forming or developing those ideas, 
when the proper conditions are supplied. The conception, 
or act of intelligence, cannot be said to exist before it ap- 
pears in the consciousness. But the Reason, undoubtedly, 
in the potentiahty of its substance, contains these ideas 
as constitutive forms of thought : and with these forms is 
prepared to give out true knowledges or judgments, when- 
ever the sensations shall be supplied which form the occa- 



158 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

sions of its action. Sensations and muscular resistance 
are conditional to the development of these ideas ; but 
the pure Keason is the origin of them. 

Hence we affirm, that time and space are to be set 
down as original and inherent forms of the Keason; — 
meaning by this, that it is of the essential and necessary 
nature of the Keason, to think and form cognitions under 
these ideas ; so that whenever certain conditions .iind oc- 
casions come up, the Keason moulds, as it were, into an 
exact knowledge, the sensations which otherwise were 
fleeting. If we were to suppose the Keason incapable of 
developing the ideas of time and space, what would be- 
come of all our notions of the forms, magnitudes, motions, 
and velocities of bodies ? What would become of the 
notion of body itself ? Time and space seem two very 
simple ideas — and so they are : but how vast and momen- 
tous their relations and bearings ! 

When, however, we represent these ideas as inherent 
forms of the Keason, we do not mean to affirm that time 
and space have no existence independently of the Keason : 
this would be contradictory to the Keason itself ; for in 
the development of these ideas, the Keason assigns time 
and space an independent existence. Time and space 
are necessary, absolute, and infinite, and are conceived of 
as existing, although theie were no mind to recognize 
them, and to contain their ideas as forms of its thinking 
and knowing. Time and space are independent realities, 
which do not impress themselves upon the Keason through 
the sense; but the ideas of which, Keason potentially 
contains within itself as the knowing power, and brings 
out into consciousness, whenever sensations or any pheno- 
mena appear there, whose causes hold to them an actual 
relation. 



PIUMORDIAL LOGIC= 159 

III.— THE INFINITE AND THE FINITE. 

The very judgment wliich tlie mind passes upon any 
object of thought, — it is finite, — implies a conception of 
the infinite : for how could it affirm, — it is finite, — unless 
it knew the infinite ? If it be said that the finite is a 
positive idea, and the infinite only negative of it ; with 
equal propriety, to say the least, we may call the infinite 
the positive, and the finite the negative idea. 

Does not the mind have a distinct and positive cog- 
nition when it affirms of any thing, it is infinite ? Take 
space for example : when the mind affirms that space is 
infinite, does it not mean something more than that its 
limits cannot be assigned ? Truly we say, space can have 
no limit s,-^it is necessarily and absolutely infinite. 

When we can assign certain limits to an object, we 
say simply it is finite ; when we conceive that there must 
be limits, while stiU we are unable to assign them, we call 
it the indefinite ; but when no limit is conceivable or ad- 
missible, we say, it is infinite. 

Plainly, no phenomena, whether primary or secondary, 
present us the infinite ; it can be a cognition of pure 
Reason alone. Phenomena, indeed, are the conditions, 
but nothing more, since no multiplication of the finite can 
reaKze the infinite. Now, when through reflection we 
come to account for this judgment of the mind, we are 
inevitably led. to assign the Idea of the Infinite, in the 
Reason, as the determinative power and only sufficient 
ground. 

IV.— QUANTITY. 

Our knowledges are connected, also, with the idea of 
Quantity. Quantity comprehends Unity, Multiplicity, 
and Totality, or^ One, Many, and All. 



160 . PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

Unity is the foundation of every form of quantity. 
Many is unity repeated indefinitely. All is the total sum 
of unities. 

What is the idea of unity? Absolute unity is absolute 
indivisibility. 

In nature, there is no absolute unity in the sense of 
absolute indivisibility — ^matter is continuously divisible. 
In numbers, there is no absolute unity in this sense ; — 
every assumed unit is continuously divisible. But in mat- 
ter, any body, any mass, or any organized system, may be 
taken as a unity relatively to any supposed or real multi- 
plication of such body, mass, or system : and in numbers, 
any sum may be taken as unity relatively to any larger 
sum of which it is a fractional part. Here, every unity 
is made up of parts, and is itself but a part of some other 
unity. In matter, and in numbers, vre have only parts 
and wholes; and no absolute unity. In geometry, we 
have the indivisible point, but this is not really quantity, 
but the negation of a particular kind of quantity — that 
is, extension. It is where extension begins. ''•'* A line is, 
indeed, often represented as composed of an infinite num- 
ber of points ; but the point in this case is really a degree 
of extension indefinitely and immeasurably small ; and 
not a point which has neither length, breadth, nor thick- 
ness. A negation of all extension cannot be multiplied 
so as to compose a line. 

Infinite number is a contradictory idea ; for number 
precludes the idea of infinity, as well as the idea of abso- 
lute unity. ^Number may be continuously increased and 
diminished : but it can never reach the infinite. 

When infinity and unity are united in the same idea, 

* Part I., page 78. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 161 

we have absolute totality. Thus time ana space have 
unity, in that they are incapable of division into integral 
parts, or parts going to make them up : They are like- 
wise infinite, and therefore are absolute totalities. God 
is the One, and Infinite being, and therefore an absolute 
totality. 

There are successions in time, but they are not time. 
There are bodies in space, but they are not space, 
figures having extension may be imagined as drawn in 
space, but they are no integral portions of space, for space 
cannot be divided into any number of such figures as shall 
measure the whole of space. An indefinite variety and 
number of beings may be comprehended within the being 
of Grod as their cause ; but they are not God, nor a part 
of God : any possible multiplication of finite beings would 
not make up infinite being. 

Pantheism is contradicted by our very senses, in con- 
nection with our Keason ; for this which we see, we can 
divide, and multiply, and measure ; and, therefore, if it 
were a part of God, God would be capable of division, 
multipKcation, and measurement. 

In our own minds we have absolute unity again. But 
we have here only finite unity. Consequently, we have 
not absolute totality. There can be but one absolute 
totality of being, that is, God. But what is this finite 
unity which I affirm of myself— and how do I know it ? 
I am one in the idea which I cannot but have of my 
sprit ual substance, and its inherent and inseparable attri- 
butes. In my consciousness I find that I think, / feel, I 
choose, and I wiU. 

In the first place, it is plain that this 7, or myself, is 
not capable of physical division — it cannot be distributed 
into parts separated in spnce. Again : it cannot be logically 



162 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

divided, tliat is, distributed into genera and species. It 
is possible that its plieiiomena may admit of such a distri- 
bution ; but the spiritual substance itself cannot be con- 
ceived of under any such distribution. 

Neither can mind be numerically divided. It cannot 
be identified with any abstract number ; and since it can- 
not be resolved into physical parts, nor into mere exten- 
sion, it cannot be represented by the relations and condi- 
tions of abstract numbers. Numerical multiplication and 
division do not apply to it. 

We may, indeed, have a numerical multiplicity of 
minds, and a numerical totality of minds ; but this has no 
bearing upon the question of the substance of the mind 
itself. 

A metaphysical division is equally out of the question, 
for such a division is, in itself, impossible. A metaphysical 
division would imply either a division of the spiritual sub- 
stance itself, or a division of the attributes from the sub- 
stance : but the first would reduce the mind to the con- 
ditions of body, and remove it from metaphysical con- 
sideration ; and the last is metaphysically impossible, for 
substance and attribute mutually and necessarily imply 
each other, and cannot be conceived of as divided. 

It is to be remarked here, that time and space, and 
God, being totalities, as well as unities, do not admit of 
the idea of multiplicity. It is, therefore, only in ourselves 
that we gain the idea of perfect unity, and yet admitting, 
also, the idea of multiplicity, and of totality without 
absoluteness. 

Absolute unity, and multiplicity and totahty based 
upon it, and absolute totality, plainly, cannot be gained 
from the senses. These give the continuously divisible 
and multipHcable. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 163 

Upon tlie experience of my own personality, in my 
tHnking, feeling, and doing, I affirm that I am one, tliat 
I am neither a sum of parts which are separable units, 
nor is it possible for me to become a sum of parts. A 
collection of beings like myself will constitute multiplicity ; 
a complete collection will constitute totality : and upon 
this judgment respecting myself, arises the judgment of 
an absolute unity and totality — a one and all. 

The origin of the cognition of absolute unity and 
totality must, therefore, unquestionably be referred to the 
pure Keason, as constituted with the determinative Idea. 

But what is the origin of that unity which appears in 
one and many of a hind, where the particular represent- 
ing unity is itself divisible ; and of that unity which ap- 
pears in abstract numbers ? 

The relative and the limited must have its origin in 
the absolute and unconditional. It is impossible that the 
latter should have its origin in the former. 

But by the senses, in the order of time, the relative 
and limited are first given : and thus divisible and limited 
unity, in material objects, is first given. But were the 
mind unfurnished with the idea, or the potentiality of 
the absolute conception of unity, the impressions of the 
senses could not lead even to the limited cognition : and 
thus the absolute idea becomes the logical antecedent of 
the limited cognition. This is a general exposition ; the 
following is the particular : Through the impressions re- 
ceived by the senses, I awake to the conciousness of my 
existence — these impressions are the conditions and ante- 
cedents in time, of knowing, willing, and feeling. In know- 
ing myself, I have the knowledge of a particular, finite, 
but absolute unity — and this idea of unity, realized in my- 
self, is the immediate logical antecedent of the limited, im 



164 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

perfect and relative, numerical and physical unity. But; 
on the other hand, the logical antecedent of the idea of 
the particular unity, myself, is the absolute and infinite 
unity, the one and all. 

Now, when we affirm that the idea of Quantity is a 
form of the Eeason, we mean that the fi.nite Keason is so 
constituted, that when it comes to know itself, it knows 
itself as an absolute and finite unity, because it has the 
power of conceiving of an absolute and infinite unity ; it is 
prepared to judge of itself as a unity and finite, in the po- 
tentiality of judging of a unity infinite as well as absolute. 
The infinite comprehends the finite ; the finite cannot be 
augmented to the infinite. And so, likewise, when the 
phenomena of sense are given, it is prepared, in this ante- 
cedent conception of unity, to form cognitions of material 
and numerical unity. The material unity is concrete ; the 
numerical unity is abstract. 

The conception of the divisibihty of material unity 
arises upon the experience that that which is assumed as 
a unity, because standing alone in space, is separable into 
parts, each standing alone in space ; and as the assumed 
material unity occupies and measures a portion of space ; 
and as the space occupied, taken as simple extension, is 
capable of constant division in an endless approximation 
towards the point absolute, so, likewise, the material unity 
is conceived of under the same conditions. Continuous 
divisibility is a struggling of the intellect after absolute 
unity : and continuous multiplication is a struggling after 
absolute totality. Numerical division and multiplication 
bear to the material the relation of the abstract to the con- 
crete. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 165 



v.— QUALITY. 



Our intelligential activity developes also tlie idea of 
Quality. The quality of propositions is the affirmation 
or negation contained in them : — ^the nature or hind, that 
is, the quality, of a given proposition, is, that it affirms or 
denies the predicate of the subject. But a proposition 
only expresses or represents a judgment : and hence, 
quality belongs to the judgment itself. Now, all judg- 
ments must be either simple or comparative. A simple 
judgment is the mere affirmation or denial of the existence 
of an object ; a comparative judgment is the affirmation 
or denial of agreement, relation, or connexion, between 
two simple judgments ; the one being the subject, and 
the other the predicate. Comparative judgments do thus 
evidently depend upon simple judgments : the simple are 
primitive, or the first outgoings of the Intelligence ; the 
comparative are secondary and dependent. In the simple, 
primitive judgment, the decision of the mind respects the 
reality or the negation of the object of thought ; and so in 
the secondary judgment, the reality or negation of the 
agreement of the two objects of thought compared. It 
will thus follow, that under Quality, as the general cate- 
gory, are embraced the particular categories of Beality and 
Negation. In addition to these, a third particular cate- 
gory must arise, which is in some sort a combination of 
the two, and that is Limitation. Every reality of the 
sensible world has its limitations. It is a reality, but 
only within a certain limit, and at this limit, negation 
takes the place of reality. It is plain, that without ne- 
gation, this limit could not be conceived, as, without re- 
ality, it could not be demanded. 

Now, let it be remembered, that the reality conceived 



166 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

of by the intelligence is not the mere reality of the phe- 
nomena of consciousness, by which the world without, as 
well as my own actual existence, are given ;— It is the 
reality of objects lying beyond the phenomena, and exist- 
ing independently of them. If the intelligence were a mere 
blank before sensation began ; and if its whole capacity 
and office were described as a mere receptivity of sensa- 
tions ; then there never could be in the intelligence any 
thought of objective reality. Sensations are purely sub- 
jective affections : external causality and substance are 
not contained in them ; the reahty of any being or thing is 
not contained in them ; not even is the reality of subjective 
existence contained in them ; for the mere sensations do not 
contain the subject ; — the sensations of seeing, hearing, 
and smelling, for example, no more contain the I, or myself, 
than they contain any external object : and even the 
sense of resistance, as it is but an internal experience, 
does not contain either subjective or objective reality. 

It is true, that without sensations, the thought of re- 
ahty would not arise in the consciousness, as, indeed, no 
thought whatever would arise — no knowledge — no ex- 
perience. The sensations are conditional to the judgment 
of reahty. But, then, whence comes the judgment of re- 
ahty, whether objective or subjective ? There is but one 
answer that can be given. It is an a priori judgment of 
the Eeason, or a judgment determined by an Idea. 

Now, when we speak of QuaHty as an Idea of the Eea- 
son, we mean that the Eeason is so constituted, that when 
sensations are given, it on its part gives out the judgments 
of reahty, negation, and limitation — it does not, analyti- 
cally, draw them out from the sensations, but, syntheti- 
cally, affirms them upon the sensations. The judgment 
of reality is its own, added to the experience of sensations. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 167 

The mind is a receptivity of the sensations only ; its own 
inherent form of thought affirms the existence of a real 
subject and a real object. 

The judgment of reality appears first, chronologically, 
in the particular and limited subject and object ; but the 
Keason, as the faculty of the universal, extends the judg- 
ment to universality, and affirms that all sensations must 
be connected with subject and object — nay, that all phe- 
nomena of consciousness whatever must be thus connected. 
The judgment of reality extends to all our thinking, feel- 
ing, and volition. 

Again : the Keason, as the faculty of the absolute, 
upon the particular and limited reality, conceives of the 
absolute and unlimited reality, or the infinite. 

VI.— RELATION. 

Kelation is another category under which our know- 
ledges appear. If relation were nothing more than juxta- 
position, it would still follow that a priori judgments 
would be necessary, in order thus to comprehend objects ; 
— ^for time and space, which are a priori judgments, would 
be necessary. But relation is not mere juxtaposition. 
JuxtajDOsition in space and time is, indeed, all the relation 
which experience of the senses affords — immediate con- 
tiguity of objects, and immediate contiguity of changes^ 
forming succession. But when we reflect upon the objects 
of knowledge, we conceive of them as having interior re- 
lations, which are not representable under the forms of 
time and space. These relations are three : — 

I. Substance and Accidents, or Properties. 2. 
Cause and Effect. 3. Action and reaction, or re- 
ciprocity BETWEEN THE AgENT AND' THE PaTIENT. 



168 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

1. External objects are related to tlie human sensi- 
tivity in the production or development of sensations ; and 
are related to each other in the production or develop- 
ment of changes in form, appearance, and properties ; all 
these last being judged of again through the new sensa- 
tions produced. The subject, also, is related to the con- 
sciousness in the development of many internal phenomena 
within its field of view — as the phenomena of thinking, 
feeling, and willing ; besides those phenomena which are 
marked as changes in external objects from the agency of 
the subject, such as the muscular movements, and their 
extended sequents. Now, while nothing is immediately 
presented to the consciousness but the juxtaposition of 
the phenomena, there is an a priori synthetical judg- 
ment respecting the interior relation ; and the object and 
the subject, in respect of the changes connected with them, 
are affirmed to be Substance and Cause. Thus the ex- 
ternal objects, in their connexion with the human sensi- 
tivity, develope sensations which are commonly known as 
the result of properties in these subjects ; form and so- 
lidity receiving the designation of primary properties, be- 
cause, without them, the objects cannot be conceived ; and 
heat and cold, sweetness and sourness, fragrance, and so 
on, receiving the designation of secondary properties, be- 
cause, without these, the objects can be conceived, namely, 
by means of the primary properties alone. 

Substance and property are thus necessary to the con- 
ception of the objects, and mutually imply each other. 

So, also, with respect to the subject and its thoughts, 
volitions, and emotions — ^we cannot avoid taking the sub- 
ject as substance, and as such developing its properties. 

It is unquestionable, on the one hand, that unless the 
bare phenomena of consciousness were given, the idea of 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC, 169 

substance and property could not make its appearance ; 
but, then, on the other hand, it is equally unquestionable, 
that this idea is not obtained by analysis of the pheno- 
mena — sensations, emotions, thoughts, volitions. These 
do not contain substance ; but here, again, the synthetic 
judgment, a priori of the Eeason, afi&rms the relation. 

II. Cause cannot be developed from bare phenomena. 
Phenomena are not cause, nor do they contain cause ; but 
the Eeason demands to account for their existence ; and 
in doing this, gives again a synthetic a priori judgment. 

Those phenomena which connect themselves directly 
with the properties of substance, as well as those which 
are the immediate sequents of causality, must be referred 
to cause ; because all finite substance must be referred to 
cause — cause absolute and infinite. It is impossible, 
therefore, to exercise thought without the judgment of 
the relation of cause and efiect. 

The Idea of cause could not be developed, except upon 
condition of phenomena. The phenomena form the ante- 
cedents in time. But neither could the phenomena lead 
to knowledges unless the Eeason, in its own inherent ca- 
pacity, contained the Idea of Cause —as the idea of origi- 
nating power. 

The idea of causality is first given specifically in the 
affirmation of the causality of the WiU in every individual ; 
and then generalized by the Eeason, as the faculty of the 
Universal, into the axiom which connects cause with every 
phenomenon whatever, past, present, or to come. 

But the individual will, as a finite cause, presu23poses 
an infinite : I could not say of myself, I am a cause and 
finite, unless I had already the idea of cause, and of cause 
infinite. The antecedent condition, in the order of time, 
being supplied, the true logical order of the development 



170 PKIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

must, therefore, be as follows : The Eeason contains the 
Idea of Cause, and, as the faculty of the absolute and the 
infinite, forms the pure a priori cognition of an absolute 
and infinite cause ; and this is the basis on which I af- 
firm of myself, I am cause finite ; and the basis on which 
I make any affirmation of causality whatever. As there 
is infinite and absolute cause, so, likewise, there must be 
infinite and absolute substance. Cause and substance are 
inseparable. 

III. The third particular is that of action and reaction, 
or the reciprocity existing between two substances with re- 
spect to any change which takes place in one or both, from 
their correlation. Thus, when one body impinges upon 
another, as when a ball is thrown against a wall and re- 
bounds, there is, plainly, an action of the ball upon the 
wall, and a reaction of the wall upon the ball ; and it is 
in consequence of this reciprocity that the efiect takes 
place. When fire is applied to a combustible substance, 
there is both an action of the fire upon the substance, and 
a reciprocal action of the elementary particles of the sub- 
stance, as they enter into new combinations and increase 
the action of the fire, until its visible manifestations cease 
in the entire consumption. In all chemical changes and 
combinations, this reciprocity is exhibited. In the corre- 
lation of the human sensitivity with external objects, it 
appears again. Indeed, in all the developments of sub- 
stance and property, and of cause and effect, this recij)ro- 
city comes into view. 

The conception of this relation is, that in the system 
of reality and being, substances and properties condition- 
ate the development of substances and properties ; and 
causes and effects conditionate the action of causes and ef- 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 171 

fects ; and causes and substances mutually conditionate 
each other. 

This relation obviously depends upon the ideas of sub- 
stance and cause. But if substance and cause are syn- 
thetic and a priori, then this relation must have an a priori 
ground. 

The relation, indeed, could never be known, without 
the chronological antecedence of phenomena ; but as the 
phenomena do not contain the ideas of substance and 
cause — as these last cannot be analytically evolved — so, 
likewise, the phenomena cannot contain, and there cannot 
be analytically evolved from them, this judgment of a mu- 
tual conditionating. 

If we confine ourselves to bare observation, we not 
only fall short of the idea of cause, and rest in mere suc- 
cession unaccounted for ; we also substitute the conditions 
of the development of substance, and of the activity of 
cause, for the ideas themselves. But when we admit the 
synthetic a priori judgments of the Keason to have their 
place, then the distinction between the relation of mere con- 
ditions, is distinguished clearly from the relation of sub- 
stances and causes to their developments and effects. 

Finite substances and causes conditionate each other : 
the condition is not the substance nor the cause, and yet 
the substance cannot reveal its properties, nor the cause 
its effects, without the chronological antecedence of the 
condition. Motives are not the causes of volitions, and 
yet the Will cannot act without motives. Sensations are 
not the causes of cognitions, and yet the Reason cannot 
form cognitions without sensations, either in immediate or 
remote antecedence. The wall or the pavement is not the 
cause of the rebounding of the ball, but the rebounding 
could not take place without it, or some similar condition. 



172 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

But the distinctive idea of condition, given in respect 
of the finite, although a logical antecedent of our particu- 
lar cognitions, must itself have an absolute ground. The 
relation of cause and effect, has its ultimate ground in 
cause infinite and absolute : and the relation of substance 
and property has its ultimate ground in substance infinite 
and absolute. In like manner, the relation of reciprocal 
action must have its ultimate ground in an infinite and 
absolute concurrence. The movements of finite mind, and 
the movements of nature, cannot at once be resolved into 
movements of the infinite and the absolute, without cre- 
ating a system of Pantheism. But all these movements 
must be conditionated by the infinite and absolute — the 
infinite and the absolute must concur 'with. them. In this 
way it holds true, that " in God we live, and move, and 
have our being.'' 

It appears, then, that Kelation, in its three-fold form, 
is an Idea of the Eeason. 

From the sensations it cannot be educed ; but the Eea- 
son, upon its own inherent fullness and capacity, forms 
cognitions from the sensations, in the relations of substance 
and property, cause and effect, action and reaction. It 
comprehends, evolves, and employs the idea of relation, 
when the appropriate phenomena require it. 

VIL— MODALITY. 

Modality contains, 

Possibility and Impossibility ; 
Existence and Non-existence ; 
Necessity and Contingence. 

Every thing which the mind conceives of, is conceived 
of as possible or impossible ; as existent, or non-existent ; 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 173 

as necessary or contingent. Mode has respect to causality 
and substance. The enquiry of the mind is, whether a 
given conception can be realized, or whether it is impossi- 
ble to causality : whether it is actually existent, or not : 
whether it appears of necessity, or contingently? The 
answer to this enquiry gives us the mode or manner of 
the conception. 

No one will deny that we can think of that which we 
know to be impossible, as well as of the possible : that we 
can think of that which does not exist, as well as of that 
which does exist : that we can think of that which exists 
necessarily, or of that which exists contingently. 

But how do we come to think of the possible, contrast- 
ed with the impossible — the existent, contrasted with the 
non-existent— the necessary, contrasted with the contin- 
gent ? Can these ideas be analytically derived from the 
sensations, or are they synthetic, a priori judgments of 
the pure Keason ? 

I. The Possible and the Impossible. 
Our sensations are simple, actual phenomena; they 
are nothing more. Whether any thing beyond, or differ- 
ent from these sensations can exist, is a question which 
the mind starts, and thus shows that it has an idea of the 
possible ; but this idea is not a sensation, nor can it be 
comprehended within a sensation ; it is something which ' 
supervenes from the mind itself upon the sensations. 

The idea of the possible cannot but imply its opposite 
the impossible ; as the latter cannot but imply the former' 
The idea of the possible and impossible shows the mind 
leaping beyond the bounds of actual experience : so far 
from being confined to the bare sensations, it is not even 
confined to the cognitions of the actual, formed upon the 
sensations ; but multiplies forms of being in time and 



174 PKIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

space indefinitelyj botli of the possible, that is, such as in 
accordance with rational laws might exist ; and of the im- 
possible, or such as imply a violation of all law, and there- 
fore cannot be supposed to exist. It affirms, also, the in- 
herent impossibility of certain conceptions, e. g., that 4+ 
5 = 12. 

II. Existence and ISTon-existence. 

That we think of non-existence, as well as of existence, 
is undeniable. And that we form conceptions of objects 
under the mode of non-existence, as well as under that of 
existence, is equally undeniable. A point which has nei- 
ther length, breadth, nor thickness ; a line which has 
length, but no breadth nor thickness ; a cube which is 
formed of six planes united at right angles, but without 
solidity, and bodiless ; the properties of a geometrical 
arch without a possible realization in any material arch ; 
the conception of a shadow ; the conception of empty 
space ; combinations of the imagination in endless diver- 
sity ; the conception of creation out of nothing ; and 
again, the possible annihilation of creation — all these, and 
the like conceptions, imply the opposition of existence and 
non-existence, as a mode of thought. 

But it is quite obvious that non-existence could never 
be contained in any mere sensation. As our sensations do 
not directly give us reality, neither do they give us non- 
existence. Here, again, we must refer to the pure Kea- 
son, which, from the fullness of its own ideas, gives out 
cognitions and supplies the forms of knowledge. 

III. Necessity and Contingence. 

Two conceptions mutually imply each other, when the 
one cannot be thought of or defined without the other. 
It is thus with possibility and impossibility ; with exist- 
ence and non-existence ; and again, with necessity and 
contingency. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 175 

That these conceptions are in the mind is plain, be- 
cause we are now speaking of them. That we are con- 
tinually applying them is equally plain. There cannot 
be more than one straight line drawn between any two 
points- -there cannot he — that is, it is impossible. But 
how impossible? Is it impossible, because there is no 
jjower or skill adequate to draw more than one line ? ISTo, 
it is impossible in itself — it cannot be conceived of under 
any conditions — it is necessarily impossible. 

Again : we conceive of existence absolute and neces- 
sary, namely, the existence of Grod. God cannot be sup- 
posed not to exist, for if he did not exist, there would be 
no existence whatever. We have thus necessary truth 
and necessary being. 

There are also necessary relations. The relation be- 
tween the substance of any being and the attributes which 
go to make up our conception of that being, is necessary. 
The relation between Infinite Cause and the effects which 
it wills, is necessary. So, likewise, the relation between 
a finite cause determining itself to effects, and the effects 
determined, is necessary when these are both in its con- 
stituted energy. 

Necessity is absolute, when there is no conceivable 
condition. It is relative, when there is a conceivable con- 
dition. The being of Grod is absolutely necessary. Pure 
mathematical truths are absolutely necessary. The move- 
ments of the planets are relatively necessary ; because 
they continue to move upon condition that the system of 
nature remains unchanged : but it is conceivable that it 
may be changed. 

The opposite idea of contingency is clearly applicable 
likewise. That which is, but which may be conceived of 
both as not having been, and as having begun to be, un- 



176 PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

der the possibility that it might not be, is a contingent 
existence. Hence, whatever is created, is contingent ex- 
istence. Hence, also, all volitions are contingent. 

The distinction between natural and moral necessity, 
which has been frequently attempted, is absurd. Neces- 
sity is a simple idea, and entirely independent of the dis- 
tinction between the natural and the moral. Besides, the 
distinction between the natural and the moral cannot be 
made out without implying the ideas of necessity and con- 
tingency ; for that alone is moral which is free ; and that 
which is free cannot be necessitated. Hence, again, the 
terms moral necessity are contradictory. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 177 



SECTION III. 



NOMOLOGICAL IDEAS. 



1 AM reminded of the extensive field of tliouglit I have 
yet to travel over ; and since under the preceding head, I 
have been particular in illustrating the laws which deter- 
mine the evolution of Ideas, it wiU be admissible under 
the present head to bring the exphcation within narrower 
limits. 

I.— LAW. 

Law manifests itself in the orderly succession and the 
stated recurrence of phenomena. 

Phenomena, as barely existent, demand causality. 
The fixed relations and the uniform succession demand 
Law. ^*' How beautiful and glorious to thought is Law ! 
Law governs the sun, the planets, and the stars. Law 
covers the earth with beauty, and fills it with bounty. 
Law directs the light, moves the wings of the atmosphere, 
binds the great forces of the universe in harmony and or- 
der, awakes the melody of creation, quickens every sensa- 
tion of delight, moulds every form of life. Law governs 
atoms, and governs systems. Law governs matter, and 
governs thought. Law springs from the mind of God, 
travels through creation, and makes all things one. It 

* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 28, 29. 
8* 



178 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

makes all material forms one, in tlie unity of system ; it 
makes all minds one, in the unity of thought and love. 

The observations of the senses yield us only limited 
successions and recurrences of phenomena. These have 
an antecedence in the order of time. But Law, eternal, 
absolute, and universal, has antecedence in the order of 
necessary existence, and is an Idea of the Eeason. It is 
the Idea of Ideas, under the Nomological conception. 

II —MATTER AND SPIRIT. 

Is Spirit the negation of Matter ? With equal force, 
at least, we may say. Matter is the negation of Spirit. 
Do we know one better than the other ? Then do we know 
Spirit best, for we ourselves are Spirit, and Matter is 
iviihout us. But neither Matter nor Spirit are contained 
in the phenomenal. Here, again, the phenomenal is 
merely the condition, the antecedent in the order of time. 
But Matter and Spirit is a general cognition founded upon 
an Idea of the Eeason. It is an Idea which comprehends 
the whole actual and possible sphere of cause and law. 
Whatever exists and is governed, is either matter or spirit. 

III.— PERFECTION. 

Where phenomena are compared — and by experience 
we can compare nothing else — it is impossible to judge 
even of relative perfection, unless there be in the mind 
principles and archetypes with which in the first place to 
compare the objects of experience. For how shall we say 
of this particular. It is more beautiful than the other ; or 
of this. It is better, wiser, more just, unless there be in 
the mind a conception and archetype of beauty, and a con- 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 179 

ception and archetype of the good and the just, by which 
to determine the intrinsic character of each particular, in 
order to judge of their comparative perfection 1 But the 
conception of Perfection appears not merely in the com- 
parison of c[ualities in particular objects. We think of an 
absolute justice, truth, wisdom, and goodness, an absolute 
beauty, an absolute order, harmony, and fitness. It is ab- 
solute law attaining an absolute development. We think 
of Grod as Infinite Perfection — a form and measure of being 
to which nothing can be added, and from which nothing 
can be taken. But even in finite modes of being, we con- 
ceive of a Perfection which relatively to their archetypes, 
is absolute. There is an absolute beauty of the human 
form ; an absolute truth and justice in human action ; and 
an absolute loveliness in nature, which, if not realized in 
experience, is nevertheless represented in the imagination. 
We may deny absolute perfection to the mode of being, 
because it is finite : but we can represent it to ourselves 
as filling out its measure, as reaching the excellence, glory, 
and beauty of its archetype. 

Now, so far from absolute Perfection, under the form 
of the Infinite, being a presentation of the senses, not even 
in finite modes is it such a presentation. Actual experi- 
ence gives us the limited and variable phenomena, and 
nothing more. But how do our minds come to leap be- 
yond the actual realities of finite being, and to shape out 
an unseen perfection of truth and beauty ? How do they 
ascend up to the conception of Infinite Perfection ? There 
is but one satisfactory solution : the Idea of Perfection in 
the Keason. 

Thus constituted, when the antecedent conditions in 
time are suppKed by experience, the Keason forms those 
Ideal cognitions, through its function of -the Imagination, 



180 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

which inspire to works of art, to self-cultivation, and to all 
great and good deeds ; and stretching its eye beyond all 
created being, sees the Infinite himself in his ineffable 
greatness and beauty. 

The Idea of Perfection thus attaches itself to the whole 
sphere of human actiyity. It is the leading Idea. In the 
particular development, however, we have several Ideas 
which we shall proceed to consider. 

IV.— EIGHT AND WRONG. 

This antithesis is universally recognized. Men, indeed, 
have disagreed as to the particulars to be placed under the 
two terms — some placing under the first what others place 
under the second ; but the two terms themselves, as ne- 
cessarily and absolutely opposed, is a universal conception : 
all men think of Eight and Wrong. There are, also, many 
particulars which men agree in placing under the same 
term of the antithesis : there is a code of ethics embracing 
cardinal principles, which is well nigh universal. 

Again : the diversities of sentiment which actually ex- 
ist, can be explained in the same way that human error is 
explained on subjects confessedly admitting of exact de- 
termination, namely, the want of sufficient education in 
general, and the want of the requisite examination and 
thought in respect to the particular subject, unbiassed by 
prejudice and passion. 

The Right has been confounded with the Useful. The 
Useful is an Idea, or it is a mere induction of consequences. 
If the latter, then certainly it cannot be identified with the 
Eight. By a bare induction of consequences, we can never 
attain to an absolute and fixed judgment, since the induc- 
tion can never be complete. But the judgment of Eight 



PKIMOKDIAL LOGIC. 181 

and Wrong is absolute, fixed, and universal. The Keason 
affirms that the two terms can never be transposed ; and 
where any particular has received a clear and positive as- 
signment to one of the terms, no possible consequences can 
ever change its character. Thus, lying, injustice, malice, 
cruelty, blasphemy, adultery, murder, and many other par- 
ticulars, have received an assignment which is seen to be 
necessary and unalterable. And the same is true of the 
opposite virtues. 

But if we take the Useful as an Idea ; the impossibility 
of identifying it with the Eight is equally apparent. Ideas 
are distinguished by their aims. Now, the Idea of Utility 
aims at the improvement of the external world, so as to 
multiply the accommodations and comforts of man in his 
physical relations. But the Idea of Eight and Wrong 
aims to ^x the great law of duty in respect to both God 
and man, in the imperishable relations of moral obligation. 
The one determines what will minister to physical com- 
fort and enjoyment ; the other determines simply what is 
Eight, in distinction from Wrong, irrespective of all phy- 
sical comfort and enjoyment. Nay, it commands the 
Eight in opposition to physical comfort and enjoyment, 
and exalts self-denial into one of the most glorious and 
majestic forms of virtue. It indeed promises to persevering 
virtue ample rewards in the ultimate issue ; but it at the 
same time reveals virtue as pursuing its end, charmed by 
its own convictions and sweet consciousness, and in this 
way alone gaining its title, and establishing its meritorious- 
ness. The judgment of Eight and Wrong then could be 
derived from experience only as a distinct induction of 
consequences, since Utility as an Idea transcends expe- 
rience ; but" an induction of consequences being inadequate 
to account for this judgment, .with its actual characteris- 



182 PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

tics of necessity and universality, we are here again led 
to the conception of an Idea of Right and Wrong in the 
Eeason. 

Phenomena comprising the voHtions of a free and re- 
sponsible being, together with their sequents, form the an- 
tecedents in time conditional to the development of the 
Idea. Constituted with this Idea, no sooner does an act 
of such a being appear in the consciousness, than the Rea- 
son affirms of it, it is Bight, or, it is Wrong, Upon this 
particular judgment, it form's the axiomatic judgment. 
Every act of a free and responsible being must be Right 
or Wrong : and thence proceeds by reflection to recognize 
its own Idea. 

The Idea of Right and Wrong, projected in the various 
relations of humanity, determines a moral law for the gov- 
ernment of human conduct. The highest determination 
of a moral law is that made by the Divine Reason. A 
moral law, thus determined, is called, in respect to its ori- 
gin. Divine law. The human Reason, although it may 
fail to determine, of itself, an adequate moral law, never- 
theless, no sooner reads the Divine law with a clear and 
open eye, than it beholds the marks of eternal and neces- 
sary truth, and bows to the august and awful authority. 
The moral Idea within determines to the recognition with- 
out. The voice which speaks from Sinai, and the voice of 
the Divine Word, who walked among men, find their 
echoes within, in thoughts which seem to connect our 
being with a past Eternity. 

v.— FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY. 

Right arid Wrong can be affirmed of the acts of a free 
and responsible being alone. 



PRIMOKDIAL LOGIC. 183 

The conception of Freedom is involved in that of Con- 
tingence, which has already been considered. A free 
being is one endowed with the power of contingent deter- 
mination ; that is, the opposite of a necessary determina- 
tion. '•'*' 

Responsibility is involved in Freedom and Intelli- 
gence. A being who knows Law, and is capable of obey- 
ing or disobeying, is bound to account for his acts ; and is 
worthy of praise or blame, according to the account which 
he legitimately renders, f 

Freedom and Responsibility are affirmed by the Rea- 
son upon the consciousness of self-determining acts, be- 
cause it is constituted with the Idea of Freedom and Re- 
sponsibility. 

The Reason, as evolving the momentous Ideas of Moral 
Law, of Right and Wrong, of Freedom and Responsibility, 
is technically called the Conscience. 

VL— PERSONAL IDENTITY. 

The phenomena of consciousness present us, in them- 
selves, neither Personality nor Personal Identity. They 
are a bare flow of variable appearances. The personality 
is the subjective simple, in whose consciousness all these 
appearances pass along ; and who knows himself both as 
a cause and recipient of them. The identity of this per- 
sonality is its unchanged substance and properties in all 
time and circumstances, amid every variety of phenomenal 
presentation. It is the conception of identical and indi- 
visible oneness. The phenomena here again take ante- 

* Doctrine of the Will, Ch. II., Sec. III. and VII. 
t Moral Agency, Ch. III.. Sec. I. 



184 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

cedence in time ; while the unchanging subject holds the 
antecedence of necessary existence. 

When the conditional phenomena make their • appear- 
ance^ the Keason, furnished with the Idea of Personal Iden- 
tity, knows itself and its cognates in their simplicity and 
oneness. The cognition of Identity does not appear under 
any limitation of time. The Keason affirms, What I 
now am I always have been, and always shall be, in the 
whole circuit of my being. 

VII.— IM^IORTALITY. 

It needs no argument to satisfy any mind, that im- 
mortality cannot be a conception of experience. Indeed, 
many affirm that it is not even a truth of philosophy, but 
purely a doctrine of revelation. It appears to me that the 
history of this doctrine affords unanswerable proof that the 
conception of Immortality is developed in the human mind 
independently of a Divine Kevelation. But, if we grant 
as a matter of fact, that it was not developed in the hu- 
man mind until it was formally announced by Divine Ke- 
velation, it is nevertheless necessary that the Idea of Im- 
mortality should belong to the Eeason, in order to make 
the acceptance of the doctrine possible, unless it can be 
shown to be comprehended within elements of thought 
furnished by the senses. Whatever new doctrine is taught 
us, must be contained under facts or principles, and forms 
of thought which we already have. If, therefore, the sense 
cannot give us the conception of Immortality — as con- 
fessedly it cannot — and if we have no constituted principle 
or Idea within to give it, then the doctrine cannot be taught 
us ; just as a moral law cannot be taught us unless there 
be a Eeason or Conscience, furnished with Ideas of law and 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 18/> 

moral obligation, to respond to it, by forming the corres- 
ponding conceptions. 

Some seem to entertain the very strange notion, that 
Divine Kevelation is dishonoured by granting to human 
reason the possibility of arriving at the cognition of Im- 
mortality by its own innate powers. Now, it ought to be 
recollected that the human reason is no less the work of 
God than the written Word, and hence, that the acknow- 
ledgment of the glorious constitution of the former is doing 
honor to God in the same sense as the acknowledgment of 
the latter. The latter assumes that we have the former, 
by appealing to it. The mission of Divine Kevelation is 
special, to renew to human thought truths which sensu- 
ality and sin had lulled to repose ; and to bring to light 
that extraordinary system of grace which could belong 
neither to Logic nor to Observation ; but which, when 
brought to light, appears all over inscribed with those 
moral characters which meet the moral Ideas as the light 
meets the eye of the new-born infant — a blessed visitation, 
for which it is prepared. 

The above are strictly the Moral Ideas. We next 
proceed to the EstJietical. These, also, are allied to Per- 
fection as the leading Idea. 



YIIL— THE BEAUTIFUL. 



The Perfect is the conception of the utmost develop- 
ment of Law in general. Appearing in different spheres 
it takes different denominations. In The Morale, it is 
Rectitude ; in Logic, it is Truth ; in Somatology, it is 
The Useful ; in Esthetics, it is The Beautiful. 



18(5 . rRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

The Useful relates to the physical sensibilities and 
well-being of creatures that can enjoy and suffer. 

The Beautiful relates to a peculiar class of emotions 
belonging only to creatures endowed with Keason — a Rea- 
son constituted with Ideas determining to cognitions which 
stand in a causal relation to the emotions. 

The Useful determines the constitution, forms, and 
relations of bodies in respect to physical life and enjoy- 
ment. 

The Beautiful determines the forms, relations, and 
properties of bodies in respect to its peculiar emotions. 
These emotions are explained by referring simply to con- 
sciousness. 

Emotions are clearly distinguishable from sensations, 
in this, that the latter precede, while the former follow 
cognitions. Emotions of beauty obviously, therefore, can- 
not arise out of simple sensations. A judgment of forms, 
relations, and properties, intervenes between the two. 

The simple cognition of objects which we pronounce 
beautiful, is made on the general laws of sensuous percep- 
tion. The question is. Why do we add the jugdment, they 
are heautiful ? 

It may be replied, we experience the peculiar emotions 
to which, likewise, we apply this epithet ; and then, by 
analysis, ascertaining the peculiar forms and quahties 
which are invariably connected with these emotions, we 
accordingly pronounce them the Ohjective Beauty. 

Even according to this, the conception is not derived 
from sensations, but from emotions. But the emotions 
are preceded by cognitions, and these not merely the cog- 
nitions of the beautiful objects by the laws of ordinary 
perception ; but cognitions of those very forms and quali- 
ties as beautiful, which produce the emotions. It is, in- 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. . 187 

deed, true, that the experience of the emotions ilaim an- 
tecedence in time ; and a particular judgment of beauty 
assumes the appearance of a result of a mere analysis of 
properties ; but the conception which springs up in the 
mind, is of the Beautiful as applying universally and de- 
termining the forms to which the emotions correlate. 
We think of Beauty as a principle on which the Creation 
was constituted and ordered. We are conscious of con- 
ceiving of a Beauty far transcending that which we be- 
hold. Nay, the Imagination forms ideals and archetypes 
of specific forms unrealized in nature. The mind proceeds 
still farther, and conceives of an Infinite and Absolute 
Beauty. The Beautiful, therefore, has its constitutive 
Idea in the Eeason. 

The Beautiful is the generic form of the Idea. It is 
the Perfect, determining outward forms, relations, and 
properties, in respect to the esthetical sensitivity. But 
when we come to the particular spheres in which the Idea 
goes out as Law, we find it under several specific forms. 

The Beautiful is connected with the objects of two 
senses, the Eye,* and the Ear. 

The Beautiful in the World of the Eye becomes spe- 
cifically : 

1. Symmetry, or the proper relation of the parts en- 
tering into an organic whole, determined by a common 
measure. Thus, the parts of the human body are sym- 
metrical, when in size and form they seem to melt into a 
visible harmony. Thus, too, the parts of a building are 
symmetrical, when the dimensions, in relation to each 
other, and the pillars and ornaments, in relation to the 

* The Eye, of course, is assumed to have been iuformed by the muscular 
resistance respecting distance and motion. 



188 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

main structure, flow into one common unity and harmony. 
Symmetry, as an Idea, determines the Ideals of the Imagi- 
nation, which constitute the Archetypes of the Artist, 
Mathematical ratios and proportions are employed to de- 
termine precise measures and rules of mechanical execution. 
These, however, without the Idealized eye, would present 
a stiff and ungraceful outline. 

II. Grace. — Grrace appears in motion. Graceful lines 
are those which a beautiful, animated body naturally and 
spontaneously describes in space, from the moving power 
energizing within. Grace is symmetry in motion. Never- 
theless, the expression of Grace does not always demand 
actual motion ; it appears no less in attitude. But this 
always relates to motion. It expresses the point where 
motion has ceased, and where motion is just about to 
begin. There is Grace in a motionless statue, because the 
attitude expresses the motion which has been, just as it is 
passing into the motion which is about to be. This grace, 
this moveable heauty,^'' is the life of painting and sculp- 
ture. A dead body has a heavy, painful beauty, because 
every muscle is relaxed. There is here a total and final 
cessation of motion, and no projDhecy that it shall begin 
again. 

III. Eegularity, Uniformity, Variety. — Eegularity 
is the indication of law, and is opposed to confusion and 
disorder. Uniformity expresses the recurrences and rela- 
tions which indicate the presence of extended system, and 
is opposed to isolation and accidental production. Yariety 
expresses the multiformity and richness of the beautiful. 
These three are ever united in beautiful productions. There 
is no beauty in a straight line, — it has regularity and uni- 

* Schiller. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 1^9 



formity, but no variety. But a curved line, as it possesses 
aU is beautiful. A simple color cannot be caUed beauti- 
ful- for example, look at colors as disposed m a pamt-box. 
Nor yet is a confused jumble of colors beautiful. It is 
when bebeld in connection with form, and regularly blended, 
as in the flowers, the foliage, the rainbow, and the hu- 
man face divine,' that they claim to be beautiful The 
great system of Nature is constructed upon, these Estheti- 

cal Ideas. , « 

IV Determinate Foem.-AU forms are composed ot 

straight or curved Unes. The curved Hue is beautiful. 
The spiral Hue is a composition of curves. The straight 
line, in its simpHcity, is indifferent, or it is the _ line ot 
utility When two or more straight lines are jomed to- 
gether in the construction of regular forms, the esthetical 
properties begin to appear. But, what determines the dif- 
ferent forms of bodies and the lines of their motions ? 
Unauestionably, somatological necessities and laws enter 
extensively into the determination. The world is made as 
it is, because it is designed for use. This is one solution, 
but not of itself sufacient. It is not difficult to show how 
mere use might be attained without a thousand particulars 
which appear both in the works of God and man. Man is 
but copying the Great Maker, when he aims to make 
beautiful, as well as useful. The union of the two is the 
perfection of the universe. The Idea of the determmate 
form of beauty, in the mind of God, evolved aU the varie- 
ties of beautiful form in the creation. These forms are not 
arbitraiy ; nor are they merely the best for use ; they are 
the proper forms of the beautiful likewise. The human 
reason hath the same Idea ; and hence, it both recogmzes 
the beauty of actual form, and projects new forms of beauty 
in the creations of Art. 



190 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

V. The Sublime. — This is usually embraced under 
Esthetics. The fundamental Idea, however, is not the 
Beautiful, but the Infinite. Strictly, esthetical properties 
are gained, when the Infinite unites itself to the Beautiful, 
or to the higher Idea of the Perfect. This, indeed, is the 
common form; and hence the reason why the emotions of 
gi'andeur and sublimity are assigned to Esthetics. Infinite 
Beauty — Infinite Perfection, — these are the highest sources 
of the Sublime. 

Sublimity and grandeur are scarcely distinguishable in 
the emotion. In the natural world, usage has applied the 
one to the lofty, and the other to vast extent. 

Those objects of either Mnd which awaken the emotion, 
are objects which suggest the conception of the Infinite, by 
reason of their magnitudes, or the amazing power, wisdom, 
or perfection which they display. 

The Moral Sublime can be traced to the same element. 
Prometheus upon the rock, fills the mind with a sense of 
its own greatness and nobleness ; and we think on in the 
long track of our immortality until we seem lost in infinite 
being. 

The objects and beings of our experience cannot reveal 
to us the Infinite directly ; but when presented under 
forms of indefinite greatness — a greatness which surpasses 
the ordinary standards of comparison — the mind instinc- 
tively springs forward to meet the realization of its own Idea. 
It seems to see the skirts of the glory of the Infinite. 

Majesty and dignity belong to the same category. 
They are expressions of mental power and greatness, in the 
corporeal person of man. In the Arts of Sculpture and 
Painting, they are capital qualities. 

Thus far with respect to the World of the Eye. We 
proceed to the beautiful in the World of the Ear. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 191 

Beauty unquestionably relates to sound. The emo- 
tions of sweet music and of the sight of loveliness, melt 
together into one harmonious emotion. 

The esthetical qualities of sound are manifested in 
three ways : in Music, in Language, and in Tone. 

Beginning with Music, we have, 

I. Melody. — As a constitutive Idea, it determines the 
cognition of beauty in the relations of sounds flowing on in 
succession ; the laws which are to govern the succession ; 
and the movements of the Creative function in endless 
musical production. 

II. Harmony. — The Idea of Harmony determines the 
cognition of beauty in two or more successions of sound 
flowing on in the same time ; the laws which govern their 
union ; and the creative function in new and varied pro- 
ductions. 

Sensations cannot give the judgment of melody and 
harmony. If the judgment were derived from the mere 
sensitivity, it would belong to the emotions. But emo- 
tions are always preceded by cognitions ; and the cogni- 
tions must have their determinative Idea. 

Language has sound for its material. The Idea of 
melody determines the construction of Language likewise. 
This appears in the selection of elementary sounds, their 
combination into syllables and words, and the arrangement 
of words in propositions. Smoothness, euphony, elegance, 
and energy of style, all proceed from this Idea. 

Khythm, whether in music or verse, is comprehended 
in the general Idea of melody. It expresses the relative 
proportion of sounds as measured by time. 

Yerse is language, which, while used as the proper 
vehicle of thought, and retaining its laws as such, is 
wrought into the highest form of melody, of which the 
capacities of the constituent sounds will admit. 



192 PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

ToNEj m music, respects the intervals of sound, and is 
compreliended under the general Idea of melody. 

Tone, in speech, comprehends the universal language 
of thought and passion, superadding itself to the articulate 
and conventional sounds of language ; and contains the 
esthetical properties of Oratory. Accent, emphasis, and all 
the inflexions accompanying the expression of thought ; 
majesty, melody, tenderness, and force, accompanying the 
words of passion, make up its varieties. 

We here end our outline of the Esthetical Ideas. It is 
by these that we know and enjoy the beauty and sublimity 
of Nature. It is by these also, as the powers of creative 
thought, that aU the wonders of art are produced. 



The Ideas which follow next are the Somatological. 
In the general philosophical classification already given in 
Part I., I have adverted to the difficulties attending the 
determination of this class of Ideas.* What follows I wish 
to be regarded as an indication, or an attempt, rather than 
a pretension to be a complete evolution. Besides, a full 
development of this very extensive subject, were it possi- 
ble, would inevitably lead me to transcend the proper 
hmits of an elementary treatise. A strictly primordial 
logic, also, requires mainly the laws which regulate the 
determination of Ideas, and not their application, except 
so far as may be necessary for the purpose of illustration 
and a clear understanding. 

Before giving Somatological Ideas, we ought to sup- 
pose the Dynamical Ideas already to have been deter- 

* Pages 82, 83. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 193 

mined. But a reference to the Metaphysical Ideas will 
show that no further determination has as yet been at- 
tempted, save those included under the category of Kela- 
tion. By reflecting, however, we shall perceive that 
every form of Dynamical Conception is embraced by this 
Category. All movement and change lie in cause produ- 
cing effects, in substance developing properties, and in 
action and reaction. Advancing into the world of bodies, 
we are introduced to various classes of secondary pheno- 
mena; and these, while generally connected with the 
Cardinal Ideas above named, are still farther, in their 
peculiarities, conditional of the develox3ment of particular 
Dynamical Ideas. 

The most important particular Dynamical Ideas, are 
the Idea of centripetal and centrifugal forces ; the Idea 
of polarized forces ; the Idea of chemical affinity and re- 
pulsion ; the Idea of vital powers, or the grand Idea of 
Life, as the organific power ; and the Idea of instinctive 
activity. All these are powers and forces recognized in 
the Science of Nature. When I speak of the Ideas of 
these powers and forces, I mean that they are not deter- 
mined by the mere observation of phenomena ; but that 
the Keason contains within itself the constitutive elements 
which grasp, distinguish, and arrange the phenomena, and 
reduce them under their respective powers. 

Cause conceived of in its universality is metaphenome- 
nal, known on condition of phenomena. If, then, there 
be specific causes, they likewise, as causes, must be meta- 
phenomenal, and therefore capable of determination only 
by the supervention of Ideas. 

Cause, however, is an Idea of the utmost simplicity. 
It is that which accounts for actual existence, and all 
changes or phenomena. 
9 



194 PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

The diversity of causes apprehended and described 
under Dynamics arises from the diversity of the phe- 
nomena.* But in reality have we, under all this diver- 
sity, more than one cause in nature — a cause universal ? 
Admitting this, the diversity of phenomena arises from 
the various spheres in which cause acts, and the various 
laws which direct and govern its activity. And then, in 
evolving the Idea of Cause simply, we have really given 
all necessary consideration to pure dynamical philosophy ; 
and what remains to us legitimately, is the evolution of 
the Somatological Ideas, or the Ideas which go forth into 
the world of bodies, and give the law to all its forms, re- 
lations, and changes. 

All Ideas have some form of reality answering to 
them, although not adequate to them. The great law of 
their development is, that the reality must first move cer- 
tain phenomenal conditions in the consciousness, and then 
the Ideas come forth to determine cognitions and laws. 
There may be in the human Keason, Ideas yet unde- 
veloped, because the realities to which they relate have 
not yet come within the field of Experience. And espe- 
cially may this be true in respect to the world of bodies 
where there is such vast diversity and possibility. Mind 
does not penetrate matter as it penetrates itself Hence 
the laws of bodies appear under two kinds or degrees : 

THEORETICAL AND POSITIVE LAW. 

The first is the conception of a possible constitution 
of bodies, and one which will embrace and account for a 
certain number of the phenomena presented. But the 

* Doctrine of the Will, pp. 30-32 and 294. 



TRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 195 

Mind still remains in donbt, first, whether its conception 
be realized in any system, or be a mere appearance ; 
secondly, whether, if realized, the elements of universal- 
ity and necessity can be connected with it. While these 
doubts remain, it is relatively to the Mind-judging, a 
Theory J or a mere view taken for the occasion. 

When we speak of possible systems, we speak /iccord- 
ing to a limited observation. We think of vast diversity 
and possibility only in particular spheres. In the great 
universe there may be but one possible system determined 
by absolute and necessary laws, comprehending the whole, 
and yet permeating the minutest particulars : and all 
that we see may be but parts of this grand system, ap- 
pearing imperfect in particulars, because these are imper- 
fectly seen in their separation from the whole. Space is 
thus the infinite field in which the Infinite Being plants 
the perfect elements of worlds, which, under perfect and 
necessary laws, are led forth to perfect developments in 
long successions in Infinite Time. 

But if there be a diversity of princijoles possible, on 
which worlds can be projected into being, and linked to- 
gether on this extended scale^ must we not believe that 
the Infinite and Perfect Being has chosen the best ? Can 
his work be less than the best and the perfect 1 

The absolute and perfect laws — if such they be — which 
are embodied in the Creation, must have their correspond- 
ing Ideas in the Divine Mind ; and therefore, as far as we 
are constituted to ap]3rehend them, must have their cor- 
responding Ideas in our minds likewise. 

According to this view, every law realized will appear 
under the characteristics of universality and necessity. 
The first it certainly must have, and the last can be sus- 
pended only upon the question, whether Somatological 



196 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

laws in the Divine determination are of fixed and absolute 
perfection, or are arbitrary, and of various degrees of per- 
fection. And again, on the other hand, every conception 
of law appearing under these characteristics, even if sup- 
posed not to be realized in any known system, must find 
its reality somewhere, — either in some other part of space, 
or in some other period of time ; — it must be a, prophecy 
of the distant or the future. But such a prophetic Idea 
could be developed only in connexion with some form of 
reality in some degree symbolising with it. Could this be 
called Theory 7 I think the mind would repose in it as 
something higher than Theory. Newton's mind grasped 
the great law of gravitation before he verified it. He did 
not yield to it as the actual law of our system, until he 
had verified it : but it always seems to me to have lain 
in his mind from its first conception, as a law which must 
find its verification somewhere. It was a law penetrated 
by an Idea. 

Theory strictly is an ingenious conjecture — a tentative 
act — a feeling after a law, determined by the mere nascent 
development of an Idea, and serving the purpose of gene- 
ralizing the phenomena, reducing them to order, and pre- 
paring them for exact and proportionate expressions. 
This is exemplified in the Theory of Atoms, employed to 
represent the determinate proportions of chemical af- 
finities. 

In attempting an enumeration of cardinal Somatologi- 
cal Ideas, I shall begin with 

IX.— THE USEFUL. 

I have already introduced this Idea in distinguishing 
between it and the Beautiful. It comprehends the final 



PKIMOKDIAL LOGIC. ^ 197 

end of Material Creation in respect to creatures endowed 
with natural sensibilities— witli the capacity of physical 
enjoyment and suffering. The Useful, as an Idea, reaches 
to the perfect constitution and development of the world 
under this point of view. 

The universe, as far as presented to our observation, 
does not fully meet this Idea. When we reflect upon the 
character of the Great Creator, and the beneficent designs 
which every where appear, taken in connexion with the 
glorious prospects opened to our view in Divine Kevela- 
tion, we must believe that the universe is constituted upon 
this Idea, and that all things are tending to its realization. 
Nay, may it not be already realized in other parts of the 
vast whole ; and is not the Christian's heaven those per- 
fected worlds 7 

This Idea has stimulated human industry to work its 
wonders. Man finds the world a rude uncultivated wilder- 
ness before he begins to exert his industry. He fills it 
with comfortable dwellings, transforms it into smihng 
harvest fields, appropriates its mineral resources in a 
thousand useful arts, and even controls its powerful ele- 
ments, to accomplish his designs. He refines and multi- 
plies his wants, and by contriving to gratify them, multi- 
plies his enjoyments. 

God has made his highly endowed creature the skilful 
instrument of perfecting for kindly uses, a world which he 
has filled with ample resources. Human industry has not 
yet attained its limit : the resources of the world are not 
yet exhausted : this beneficent Idea has new wonders yet 

in store. 

The world was made under the Idea of Utility, as one 
of the constitutive elements ; and the improvements 
which are in progress, whether by physical laws in t]ieir 



198 PEIMOKDIAL LOGIC. 

necessary developmentj or by human industry, are gov- 
erned by this Idea. But this Idea is general and com- 
prehensive ; and gives only the most general form of 
Somatological law. We have yet to enquire into the 
Ideas which determine its interior forms, relations, and 
qualities. 

X.— CE¥TEALIZATION AND DIFFUSIOK 

The Idea of Centralization is that of perfect depen- 
dency arid union. The conception of body involves the 
conception of parts and a whole. But no whole is possi- 
ble without centralization. 

If there were but one vast Whole existent, a law of 
centrahzation would be sufficient. But if distinct wholes 
are to be arranged into a system with mutual relations 
and dependencies, and with one common and universal 
dependency constituting the unity of the system ; then 
there must be likewise a law of diffusion, harmoniously 
opposing itself to the law of centralization, and preventing 
a universal consohdation. This is the grand Idea upon 
which the universe is constituted. Gravitation, or the 
Centripetal force and law, is the great principle of centra- 
lization ; — the Centrifugal force, the great principle of 
diffusion. 

That it is an Idea, and not a mere theoretical concep- 
tion, cannot well be questioned ; for the characteristics of 
universality and necessity seem plainly to belong to it. 
In the wide space, beyond the utmost limits of observa- 
tion, whatever worlds and systems may there exist, we 
'believe, under all the force of a commanding Idea, to be 
arranged and governed on these two stupendous and all- 
uufficient principles. The history of science shows the 



PRIMOEDIAL LOGIC. 199 

constant tendency of tlie human Keason to the evolution 
of this Idea : and now that it is evolved, no other can he 
admitted as the Idea of the Universe. 

XL— AFFINITY AND EEPULSION. 

This is akin to the preceding, and perhaps compre- 
hended within it. There is this important distinction, 
however, which is ohvious : centralization and diffusion 
relate to cosmical masses ; whereas, affinity and repulsion 
relate to the constitution of the generic and specific vari- 
eties of the particular and minute masses which enter into 
the great wholes which are governed by the former. 

Affinity is of two kinds : First, the cohesion of homo- 
geneous matter ; secondly, chemical affinity. The first is 
permanent affinity, existing independently of change ; 
the second takes 23lace through change. 

Bepulsion is likewise of two kinds : First, mechani- 
cal ; secondly, chemical. The first relates to the motion 
of bodies by mechanical force ; the second, to the motion 
of chemical decomposition. 

No less universal and necessary is the principle of Af- 
finity and Eepulsion, than that of Centralization and 
Diffusion. One is the Idea of the great harmonious and 
all-comprehending system ; the other, the Idea of the 
minute and interior composition of the forms and orders 
of particular bodies. One determines the laws which 
grasp the wholes, without respect to their interior consti- 
tution ; the other determines the laws of this interior 
constitution. 

XII.— LIFE. 

Life is the Idea of the Organific power. Organic 
bodies are distinguished from inorganic in three ways : 



200 PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

Firstj they possess determinate, generic, and specific 
forms, which, remain unchanged amid the ceaseless flux of 
the particles which enter into them. Secondly, the 
actuating or moving power here tends to an unceasing 
change of particles ; while mechanical forces tend to 
equilibrium, chemical to composition or to decomposition, 
and then pause. Thirdly, in inorganic bodies accretions 
are made either by a simple cohesion of homogeneous 
matter, or by a simple union of particles, determined by 
inherent affinities ; while in organic bodies, a new power, 
acting from within, resists cohesion and affinities ; and, 
by a process of assimilation, projects, as from a centre, 
distinct particles metamorphosed into substances of quali- 
ties and forms determined by its own inward law. 

Wonderful is the law of life ! Under the myriad 
varieties of vegetable and animal bodies, it still preserves 
its identity. Observation gives us only the phenomena : 
the law is metaphenomenal. We think of it too as a law 
universal and necessary. It springs therefore from an 
Idea of the Eeason. 

XIIL— POLARITY. 

Polarity, as thus far determined, is magnetic, electric, 
chemical, crystalline, and optical. It is the conception 
of disturbance, repulsion, and separation, produced by the 
attempted union of like kinds ; and of harmony and re- 
pose, produced by the actual union of unlike kinds. 

That an Idea lies behind all the observations which 
have been made respecting polarity, determining their 
processes and results, is manifest : and that the concep- 
tion of polarity, as an attempted expression of the Idea, 
has been the guiding star to the most eminent philoso- 



PKIMORDIAL LOGIC. 201 

phers in their investigations in magnetism, electricity, 
chemistry, crystallization, and light, is abundantly at- 
tested : nevertheless, it does not yet appear, notwith- 
standing the confident assertion of Schelling, that the 
conception fully embodies the Idea, and leads it forth to 
the determination of a universal and necessary law. As 
yet, it is a theory, like a thin and almost transparent 
cloud, with the sun behind it. 

XIV.— INSTINCT. 

In vegetables we have vital forces, and the law of life, 
in its beautiful and wonderful variety of manifestation. 
In animals, as the genus, we have life and instinct. In 
man, the thinking species, we have life, instinct, and 
spirit. Instinct and spirit manifesting themselves in the 
sphere of observation, are not organific, but motive. Vital 
forces produce motion, but it is the motion of the organific 
process. Instinct and spirit produce muscular activity in 
the accomplishment of an end. 

The motion produced by spirit, or voluntary motion, 
belongs to psychology : Instinctive motion belongs to so- 
matology. Instinct is not volition, it is the shadow of vo- 
lition in the animal sphere. In both activities, ends are 
proposed, intelligent ial ends. In volition, the ends are 
deliberated upon and estimated by the agent himself, and 
selected by an act of freedom. In instinct, the ends are 
proposed by the infinite and all-governing intelligence, 
just as ends are proposed by this intelligence for all the 
movements of nature : and then the activities of the ani- 
mal are determined to these ends by necessary laws mani- 
festing themselves in the constitution of the animal, un- 
accompanied by deliberation and exclusive of choice. The 
9* 



202 PKIMOEDIAL LOGIC. 

all-compreliensive law of the mere animal natm-e is in- 
stinct. It is a universal and necessary law, governing a 
mode of being, and springing from a constitutive Idea. 

XV. REGULARITY, UNIFORMITY, VARIETY, SYMMETRY, 
AND DETERMINATE FORM. 

These have already been considered in their esthetical 
relations. They exist likewise in somatological relations. 
They bear a relation to the useful, analogous to the rela- 
tion which they bear to the beautiful. They all neces- 
sarily result from determinate and yet diffusive law. This 
appears palpably in the action of centripetal and centri- 
fugal forces, in vital forces, and in crystallization. 

In the absolutely perfect, they will not appear in con- 
flict under the two Ideas of Beauty and Utility. In the 
actual nature submitted to observation, they do appear in 
conflict. In the arts cultivated by man, this conflict is 
constantly experienced ; for example, in the form and ap- 
portionment of buildings. The Grecian Temple is a pure 
development of beautiful symmetry ; a commodious dwell- 
ing-house is a development of useful symmetry. There is 
a constant struggle in human art to unite the two ; and 
they appear together, in consequence, in a union of com- 
promise. 

The determinate form of nature viewed on a grand 
scale, as in the shapes of the planets, the Hne of their or- 
bits, and the vast arrangements of the starry heavens, pre- 
sent us a perfect union of the two Ideas. It is only in the 
details of the particular orbs that we perceive the opposi- 
tion, and especially in the sphere of human activity. In 
these details, we judge under the light of Astronomy and 
Greology, that a mighty progress is making from lower to 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 203 

higlier states. The intelligential activity, too, in being 
Ibroirglit to task itself in the field which it occupies, is at 
the same time developing its own greatness, and reaching 
forward to its ultimate destiny. 

XVI.— IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, RESEMBLANCE 

Identity and Difference are antithetical conceptions. 
Resemblance is the union of the two, in two or more ob- 
jects compared together. Personal Identity is the same- 
ness of the individual being in substance and essential pro- 
perties, taken in different and indefinitely distant times 
and places. 

In material particles or parts, there is no necessary 
identity, for matter, under the forces and laws of nature, 
is liable to indefinite change. The identity of bodies is an 
identity of certain forms and qualities, admitting differ- 
ences in other forms and qualities. Here an identity of 
substance cannot be considered, for the reason above stated 
— the constant fiux of matter. 

Identity and Difference actually existing in nature, 
lays the ground for the classification of bodies into genera j 
species, and individuals. Generic forms and qualities are 
those which are the most general and comprehensive ; thus 
animal, for example, embraces only the forms and qualities 
which distinguish all animals from all other living organ- 
isms. But in man, forms and properties are added which, 
as differentia, distinguish him from all other kinds or 
species of animals, and, at the same time, identify all the 
individuals of his own species : while in the individual man 
George, or Thomas, forms and properties are added which 
distinguish him from every other individual of his kind, 
and of course identify him with no one. 



204 PRIMOKDIAL LOGIC. 

It has been said that genera and species are names of 
general conceptions-j which we may form and vary at plea- 
sure ; and that consequently they have no corresponding 
reahties. It is indeed true that we have no such living 
and real being as animal, comprising only generic forms 
and quahties ; and no such living and real being as man, 
comprising only specific forms and quahties. It is true, 
also, that we can widely vary our classifications by uniting 
together different particulars under new points of agree- 
ment. But let it be recollected, that the words animal 
and man do express /or ms and qualities which really exist : 
The forms and qualities indicated by animal are found 
really existing in every particular animal ; and the forms 
and quahties indicated by man, are found in every indi- 
vidual man. And when we vary our classifications, we are 
still conversant with realities, for our classification still cor- 
responds to real identities and differences. We indeed 
view them in different relations, and invent new names to 
represent our new views ; but, nevertheless, we cannot 
view them out of actually existing relations. 

The truth is, that the determinate forms and quahties 
of bodies exhibit both identity and difference ; and these 
in their universahty constitute the possibihty of all classi- 
fication. If there were all difference, there would be all 
variety, and of course no classification. On the other hand, 
if there were all identity, there would be no variety, and 
here again no possibihty of classification. Identity enables 
us to bind together in classes and systems : Difference 
enables us to separate the classes, systems, and particulars : 
BO that, when we view parts, we still assign them their 
general relations : and when we view wholes, we still dis- 
tinguish and comprehend the particulars which go to make 
them up. We thus know the harmony and variety of the 
Universe. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 205 

If any one were to remark^ that universal identity 
would not be incompatible witb some diversity, inasmuch 
as the identical forms and qualities might be presented in 
different relations of time and space ; it would be sufficient 
to reply, that as we should in this case have continually 
the same recurring perception, we in reality would be un- 
able to distinguish different points in space, and different 
periods in time. 

On the other hand, if any one were incHned to merge 
identity into mere resemblance, by calling it the most per- 
fect resemblance, he might be convinced of the utter im- 
possibility of this conception, by reflecting, that resem- 
blance cannot be constituted without identity. There 
must be sameness in some forms or qualities, to enable us 
to bring them together ; and the union of points of same- 
ness with points of difference, in fact, makes resemblance. 

The conception of Identity and Difference, and their 
common relation in resemblance, is a universal and neces- 
sary concej)tion. We extend it not only to what we see, 
we know it must pervade all worlds. As a necessary so- 
matological conception, it must find in the reason its cor- 
responding and constitutive Idea. Hence, when pheno- 
mena are given as the required conditions and antecedents 
in Time, the Reason under this constitutive Idea — the Idea 
from which sprang forth the perfect system and the mani- 
fold variety of the Universe — begins to cognise resemblance, 
to classify the objects of perception, and to seize upon the 
glorious unity reigning amid the glorious diversity. 

XVII.— DESlt:iN, FINAL CAUSE, MEANS AND END. 

These are only different ways of expressing the same 
Idea. The great Architect of the Universe forecasted his 



206 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

design ; this design^ contemplated by himself, is the fina 
cause of the Creation ; and the Creation itself is a great 
system of means and ends, in which the means are ends, 
and the ends means, in a long chain of linked and harmo- 
nious subordination, and all connected with an ultimate 
end which is not a means, upon which the eye of God re- 
poses in infinite and quiet delight. 

This Idea of the Infinite Keason, is foimd also in the 
human reason. Hence nothing is more natural and spon- 
taneous than the enquiries which the mind makes after 
final causes in the structure of plants and animals, nay, in 
the whole order of Creation. 

As a principle of philosophical research, the conception 
of Final Causes has been adopted chiefly in respect to or- 
ganised bodies, because here more manifest and certain ; 
and here unquestionably it has achieved stupendous re- 
sults, of which the labors of Cuvier alone are a sufficient 
attestation. 

The conception of final causes, like other universal and 
necessary conceptions, accepts the observations of the sen- 
ses as its condition and antecedent in time ; but it can rest 
upon an Idea of the Eeaspn alone as its constitutive ele- 
ment. Phenomena fleeting and apparently irregular and 
confused, are grasped by this idea and reduced to orderly 
and beautiful relations. And it is not only in fields of ob- 
servation actually presented, that it arranges and composes 
phenomena, and educes system ; as a watchful and expec- 
tant eye, it is ever looking about to find phenomena that 
shall fall in with its own preconceptions. It is a necessary 
prophetic thought, which wanders through the universe. 
Where no observation can reach, it has full assurance 
there is design. 

I here close my view of Somatological Ideas. However 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 207 

brief and imperfect^ it will answer tlie end I liave in view, 
namely. Logical Construction. 

I will complete this ontline, with the Logical Ideas. 

XVIII.— TRUTH. 

Truth is an antithetical idea : its ojoposite is Falsehood. 

The great aim of the Keason is Truth : and Logic com- 
prises the Laws which govern the Reason in its searches 
after, in the processes by which it arrives at, Truth. 

Truth in itself is identical with the highest forin of 
Eeality — with absolute and necessary Reahty ; and it is 
the parent of all other reality — the Reality of actual objec- 
tive Being. The Ideas, and the necessary and universal 
conceptions which immediately spring out of them, are the 
essential body of Truth : Actual Being is the exterior 
embodiment of Truth. Hence Truth is that in which the 
Reason ultimately, necessarily, and securely reposes. 

When the Reason, contemplating Ideas and necessary 
conceptions, and their exterior embodiment in the consti- 
tution of the Universe, gives the judgment of Truth, it 
does so under the great Idea of Truth. Mere phenomena 
contain no truth, because they contain no reality, and con- 
sec[uently they cannot contain the judgment of Truth. 
The phenomena being given as conditions or occasions an- 
tecedent in time, the Reason under the Idea of Truth 
forms the conception of the subjective and objective Real- 
ities — it affirms that they are true. 

Falsehood is the opposite or negative of Truth, with 
the appearance or pretension of being Truth. In the high- 
est — the pure region of Truth, Falsehood cannot well find 
place. Ideas, and primary absolute conceptions, have such 
decided characteristics that it is difficult to imagine how a 



208 PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

falsehood can disguise itself in their habiliments. They 
are necessary, universal, and intuitively clear. How can 
a falsehood put on the appearances of these ? The very 
supposition seems to involve an absurdity. If it were so, 
could we ever have a certain and infallible test of truth? 
Is not this the great distinction between a presumed truth 
and a presumed falsehood, that when carried up to the 
primary conceptions and their determining ideas, the first 
quietly flows into these as a congenial essence, while the 
latter is repelled and flows baclr to seek its home elsewhere ? 
The necessity, the universality, the intuitive clearness, of 
the conception, are what give it the character of absolute 
Truth. Unless it attain these characteristics it cannot be 
absolute Truth ; and when it does attain them, it cannot 
but be absolute Truth. Falsehood here then must be ex- 
cluded. In this pure region, a mind may mislead itself 
by bringing along with it the gross prejudices, the wild and 
baseless theories, which it has collected in a lower region, 
and dogmatically investing them with the attire of Truth. 
But it is a wilful act — the act of a professed Sophist and 
Sectarian. But to the humble, sincere, open-eyed, and 
pure-hearted child of Truth, falsehood can find no en- 
trance among these primary ideas and principles. It is 
in the lower region itself — the region of observation, in- 
duction, and deduction, of human wiU and human passion, 
that falsehood finds a wide and natural field to walk in. 
Here the sense may be deceived by appearances, and the 
intellect amused and led astray by " Idols of the Tribe, 
the Den, the Market-place, and the Theatre."' 

But in whatever region of Knowledge the Keason takes 
its stand. Truth is its great and legitimate object. The 
Idea of Truth is the spring of aU its activity. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 209 

XIX.— THE PHILOSOPHICAL IDEA. 

This is tlie Idea of accounting for the development 
and progress of humanity in science, art, government, and 
religion. It is the Idea of accounting for every thing per- 
ceived or thought of. 

Enquiry supposes that the mind cannot rest satisfied 
with phenomena, whether of immediate consciousness, or 
taken in their secondary state, and representing the actual 
objects and events of the external world. No enquiry 
would indeed be made, if there were no phenomena pre- 
sented. But why is not the miad satisfied with its sensa- 
tions, and spontaneous and natural perceptions ? Why 
does it raise enquiries respecting causes and laws ? Not 
only is the Idea of Cause and Law here presumed, but 
also the Idea, that if causes and laws can be assigned, the 
phenomena will be accounted for. This restlessness of the 
human mind, when dealing with mere phenomena ; this 
conception, that there must be causes and laws ; this firm 
conviction, that science is gained, when the causes and 
laws are determined ; and this quiet satisfaction in the re- 
sult — all show the working of the philosophical Idea, or 
element of our being. 

That this is an Idea, cannot be doubted, for it is both 
necessary and universal. The Keason affirms that all 
phenomena are to be accounted for ; and that the princi- 
ple of every phenomenon really and necessarily exists, or 
the phenomenon would not be possible. 

The connection between this Idea and the preceding is 
very close : and some, at first thought, may even look 
upon them as identical. There is, however, one obvious 
distinction : Truth embraces all absolute and necessary prin- 
ciples, and, although gained upon phenomenal conditions, 



210 PEIMOEDIAL LOGIC. 

it may be contemplated -sejjarately from all phenomena : 
the philosophical Idea, on the other hand, always connects 
itself with phenomena, as determining the activity of the 
Intelligence in respect to them. Truth is the cardinal 
Idea of Primordial Logic ; the philosophicalj the cardinal 
Idea of Inductive Logic. Truth is the simple Idea of the 
primal and absolute authority ; the philosophical, the Idea 
of reducing every thing under that authority. 

XX.— INTUITION. 

Intuition has already been represented as one of the 
functions of the Eeason — the function of immediate in- 
sight. Now, connected with this function, is the Idea of 
the perfect and the absolute authority of such an insight. 
Hence we assign the name of the function, to express the 
corresponding Idea. Thus the Eeason, by the function of 
Intuition, perceives, directly, that there are thtee, and 
only three, dimensions in space. Such is its immediate 
and necessary perception. Now, this is a particular per- 
ception, or one instance of Intuition : but, upon this one 
instance, or upon any similar instance, there appears the 
universal affirmation, that Intuition is an absolute and 
perfect law of cognition, — that whatever is known by In- 
tuition, is nltimately and certainly known. All axioms — 
all first principles, and all primary sensuous perceptions, 
are thus legitimated. But the universal affirmation, or 
conception, itself reposes upon an Idea of the Keason, — 
namely, the Idea of Intuition, as the primal and highest 
and most authoritative form of Cognition. This Idea 
permeates Primordial Logic, and governs all its particular 
determinations. 



PKIMOKDIAL LOGIC. 211 



XXI.— INVOLUTION AND EVOLUTION. 

Besides Intuition, there are two other forms of cognis- 
ing truths or realities. These are Induction and Deduc- 
tion. In the inductive form, we cognise universal truths 
through particular phenomena in which the truths are 
embodied. In the deductive form, we cognise particular 
truths through universal truths which comprehend them, 
and out of which they are evolved. The two forms, in 
relation to each other, may he represented under the fol- 
lowing formulae : 

( a, h, c, d, &c. are X 
Induction < Z is a, h, c, d, &g. 
{ Therefore Z is X. 

r z is X 

Deduction ■{ a, or b, or c, or d, &c. is Z 
( Therefore a, or h, &c. is X. 

The first is an involution of inducted particulars, into a 
general expression. The second is an evolution of the 
general expression to a particular determination. 

According to these formulee, it is evident that the 
Induction must precede the Deduction, and that the lat- 
ter is a return to the elementary particulars of the former. 

If the mind be supposed to be placed at the point of 
observing the particulars, then, by the Inductive formula, 
it arrives at the general expression. If the general prin- 
ciple, or expression, be already gained by a previous In- 
duction, and the mind be placed at this point, then it can 
perceive each particular through the Deductive formula. 

But here the question may be started, what value is 



212 ' PEIMOKDIAL LOGIC. 

there in the Deductive formula, since it is a mere rtturn 
to particulars which were grasped by the Inductive at the 
outset ? , 

First. There is a more perfect comprehension of the 
general truth when viewed under the two forms, in their 
reciprocal relation. 

Secondly. The Induction, as an inference, does- not 
measure itself by the Induction, as a mere bringing in of 
the facts. The grounds of the general inference, made 
upon the limited colligation, will be hereafter explained. 
But this general inference upon the limited colligation, is 
the fact which shows the necessity of deductions, subse- 
quent to the induction which establishes the general prin- 
ciple from which the deductions are made ; for, since all 
the particulars were not really brought in and colligated, 
the general principle, when once established, becomes an 
authority for conclusions respecting particulars not origi- 
nally inducted. 

Thirdly. The Deductive formula does not invariably 
connect itself with the Inductive, as above exhibited. 
General principles are not universally the result of Induc- 
tive inferences, but are often a priori and intuitive. The 
first principles of morals and mathematics are palpable 
instances. These principles are established as a priori 
and intuitive judgments ; and then sciences, vast, compli- 
cated, and momentous, are evolved by the Deductive 
formula. 

Fourthly. In the practical affairs of life, there are re- 
ceived principles which are constantly applied by all men, 
without instituting anew enquiries respecting their origin 
and basis. Indeed, multitudes wlio are capable of apply- 
ing the principles, are unfitted for the investigations 
through which they w^ere originally obtained. This practi- 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 



213 



cal application is made in a series of deductions, wliicla, 
altliough not assuming, in the common language of men, 
the syllogistic form, nevertheless admit of being reduced 

to it. 

These considerations are sufficient to show the value 

of the Deductive formula. 

The fundamental Ideas of the Inductive and Deduc- 
tive formulae, and of the modes of cognition which they 
represent, are Involution and Evolution. On the one 
hand, the Keason does not contemplate any phenomenon 
or fact apart and isolated. It must be colligated with 
some other fact, and these again with others, and so on 
until we have a mass of facts bound together in the unity 
of system, and involved in a great central law. 

On the other hand, when the Reason seizes upon any 
law, axiom, or first principle, it does not contemplate it 
as dormant, unproductive, or ever revolving within itseE 
It feels impelled by its own Idea to look out for an ex- 
terior sphere in which the great truth shall unfold itself 
in manifold varieties. 

The Reason takes these two directions necessarily and 
universally ; and hence manifests here again the determi- 
native power of Ideas. 

XXIL— ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS. 

According to a general definition, Synthesis is the con- 
ception of the composition of systems— of systems of 
Truth according to logical principles and formula ; and 
systems of bodies according to natural and mechanical 
laws : while Analysis is the conception of the decomposi- 
tion of systems reversing the order of the Synthesis, and 
running back in the chain of principles, formula3, and 



214 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

laws. Geometry is a completed synthesis of principles 
and consequences. When taught, the synthetical order 
is observed — the pupil being instructed how to put to- 
gether the several theorems in a way to show their depend- 
ence upon the axioms and definitions, and upon preced- 
ing demonstrations constantly accumulating in the progress 
of the synthesis. A watch, also, or any piece of ma- 
chinery, when its separated parts are taken up and put 
together according to the laws of the mechanism, presents 
us a synthesis. On the other hand, we may begin with 
the remotest deductions of Greometry, and enquire upon 
what grounds they rest ; these grounds, in part at least, 
will prove to be other propositions deduced from something 
still going before : in this way we may continue to unwind 
the whole concatenation of dependent demonstrations 
until we arrive at the self-evident principles. So, like- 
wise, we may take in pieces the watch in the order of the 
mechanical dependency, until we arrive at the main-spring. 
We thus accomplish an analysis. He that has a perfect 
knowledge of Geometry, and of the watch, can readily 
synthesise or analyse both ; and the same kind of know- 
ledge enables him to do one or the other. To one ignomnt 
of Geometry, and just setting out to gain a knowledge of 
it, the synthetical mode is the true and certain mode ; for 
every step here is made according to established principles 
and demonstrations, which are continually evolving. Here 
the analytical mode, by constantly referring to previous 
demonstrations which are not yet comprehended, is liable 
to produce perplexity and confusion. In respect to the 
watch, also, an ingenious learner would more safely make 
experiments in putting together than in taking apart. 

In the construction of scientific systems, and in 
mechanical constructions, a synthesis of the parts neces- 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 215 

sarily precedes an analysis of the wliole. The natural 
mode of constructing is likewise the natural mode of learn- 
ing. But where wholes are presented us, as in pieces of 
machinery which are strange to us, and in natural organ- 
isms such as animals and plants, and in the subtile com- 
binations of chemical affinities, analysis of necessity pre- 
cedes synthesis. In such cases analysis cannot at once 
proceed with the nice accuracy of geometry and the watch, 
where the geometer and the mechanician know precisely 
where to begin, and how to separate, because they know 
the beginning, the continuity, and the completion of the 
systematic and the organic wholes before them. Instead 
of this, many tentative, and even destructive and futile 
experiments are made before the laws and the harmony 
of the construction appear. 

Analysis and Synthesis do not correspond to Induction 
and Deduction, but precede or accompany them. In geo- 
metry there is, in the progress of the evolution, a constant 
synthesis of axioms, definitions, previous demonstrations, 
and new forms and relations. The whole putting together 
must be made accordingly to a rigid logic : but neverthe- 
less, there is an ingenuity exercised in the combinations 
and ordering of the parts, for the purpose of eliciting 
conclusions or evolving proof, which is not provided for in 
the rules of deduction. This belongs in reality to another 
function of the Keason, which we have nsiuied. Inveoition/^' 

Analysis precedes Induction with experiments which 
are often the starting point ; and then accompanies it, by 
evolving in the continued experiments new and important 
phenomena. 

Synthesis also accompanies Induction, arranging and 

* Supra, p. lol. 



216 PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

combining tlie discovered truths so as to form a compact 
and harmonious system. 

Analysis and Synthesis are thus subsidiary to Induc- 
tion and Deduction. The Inductive Function is striving 
to see the general truth through the manifold particulars 
in which it is manifested, in the unity of system. The 
Deductive Function is striving to see the particular and 
remote conclusions comprehended in the general truth, in 
the unity of system also. The Inventive Function, by 
its analysis and synthesis, presents the requisite media of 
the Inductive and Deductive cognitions, and preconceives 
and suggests the systematic construction. 

All these functions are related in their operations to 
the Intuitive Function, as will appear in subsequent de- 
velopments. 

Analysis and Synthesis, considered as Ideas in the 
Keason, are certainly nearly akin to, if not identical with, 
the Ideas of Involution and Evolution. If the Ideas be 
regarded as Identical, then Analysis and Synthesis are 
only conceptions under the common Ideas distinguishable 
from Induction and Deduction by the characteristics above 
given. 

It appears to me, however, that Analysis and Synthesis 
are distinct Ideas determining Invention ; while Involution 
and Evolution determine Induction and Deduction. In- 
volution and Evolution are Ideas which determine the 
conception of phenomena running together and colligated 
in general laws, and general laws reciprocally governing 
the development of phenomena; and the conception of 
particular truths and conclusions comprehended in general 
truths, and general truths evolved into the particular 
truths and conclusions. But Analysis and Synthesis, 
taken as Ideas, determine the conception of a system of 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 217 

laws governing a system of "bodies — where tlie whole im- 
plies constituent parts^ and the parts imply an harmonious 
whole ; and the conception of a system of truths, where 
each particular truth with the long chain of consequences 
which it involves is interlinked with other truths and con- 
sequences, constituting the unity of absolute science, and 
where the particular truths and consequences ultimately 
lead back to pure intuitions. 

It thus becomes plain how Analysis and Sj^nthesis aid 
Induction and Deduction. While inducting facts for the 
purpose of finding a law in relation to any subject of en- 
quiry, there must be some preconception or Idea to guide 
in the selection of phenomena, and the form of the ex- 
periments : and now the Inventive function is busy in 
arranging and combining, and in various tentative sugges- 
tions. But what governs the Inventive function ? Is it 
not the great Idea of System, where constituted wholes 
and constitutive parts are reciprocal ; or, in other words, 
is it not Analysis and Synthesis? And so again, when 
engaged in demonstrating theorems, and solving problems, 
the Idea of the wide-spread relations of truths and prin- 
ciples — the Idea of their synthetical and analytical capa- 
city — determines the Inventive function in searching for, 
and finding, the material of the ratiocination. 

The same appears also in our reasonings on moral and 
all practical questions. We find arguments, because, 
under the Ideas of Analysis and Synthesis — the Ideas of 
the wide-spread and systematic relations of truth — we 
know where to look for them. 

It is sufficiently obvious that the Ideas of Analysis 

and Synthesis are necessary and universal. Whatever be 

the scope or the subject of our reasoning, they inevitably 

make their appearance. Nor is it conceivable that any 

10 



218 PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

course of reasoning can be conducted independently of 
them, since trutli, in its very nature, is analytical and 
synthetical. 

I here close the outline of Ideas. Next in order will 
be the consideration of axioms, and of primary cognitions 
and definitions — those which belong to the Intuitive 
Function. "We shall thus complete Primordial Logic. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 219 



SECTION IV. 

PRIMARY SENSUOUS COGNITIONS, OR COGNITIONS OF 
THE EXTERIOR CONSCIOUSNESS. 

The primary sensuous cognitions, in general, are those 
wMch are formed intuitively by tlie Eeason, respecting 
the exterior world, through the force of its constitutive 
Ideas, and upon condition of sensuous impressions in the 
exterior consciousness. 

When these . impressions are received in the exterior 
consciousness, the Keason, under the Idea of objective 
exteriority,* conceives of an outer world. This is its first 
sensuous cognition. 

Exerting the muscular activity under the Idea of our 
personal causality, and experiencing a resistance in this 
outer world, we now, under the Ideas of cause, space, 
limitation, and substance, cognise body. In this cognition 
are involved at once what are commonly called the pri- 
mary qualities of body, namely, hardness or resistance, 
extension and form. They are primary, because they com- 
prise the necessary contents of the cognitions. Indeed, 
the cognition is now complete. Secondary qualities are 
cognised in particular bodies through the appropriate 
organs, under the Idea of Cause, or of determinate law. 

* Supra, p. 155. 



220 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

When body is known, then the sensations of which we 
are immediately conscious, are referred to causes inhering- 
in bodies, or to their specific constitution, correlating with 
the human sensitivity. 

The cognitions of body involving the primary qualities, 
are thus primary sensuous intuitions. 

The knowledge of specific forms, of relative magni- 
tudes, and of relative distances, implies acts of memory, in 
connecting the successive impressions made upon the mus- 
cular organism, in handling bodies, and in locomotion. 
There are also various acts of calculation, and inferences 
from comparison. 

Introduced into the external world, phenomena now 
put on their secondary * form : we are no longer engaged 
with the simple sensations of our being, but with the 
realities from which they spring ; and which, in the case 
of the secondary qualities of bodies, we name from the 
very sensations which they supplant in our habitual 
thought. 

Next in the order of this development of sensuous cog- 
nition, is to be noticed the remarkable transfer which is 
made of the knowledge originally belonging to the muscu- 
lar organism, as the medium, to the organs of the secon- 
dary qualities, and, as chief of these, to the eye. The 
colors of objects, and the varieties of light and shade, be- 
come early associated with the primary qualities of bodies, 
with their specific forms, relative magnitudes, and dis- 
tances ; so that, the simple sensations of color become 
such ready and familiar signs of the external world, that 
we now know every thing by the eye alone. Next to the 
eye, in importance, is the ear, in this acquired system of 

* Supra, p. 59. 



PRIMOEDIAL LOGIC. 221 

signs. The other senses, however, play a part by no means 
insignificant. 

Thus, by the power of Ideas, man steps out from his 
internal sensations into the world which is correlated to 
him ; and so appropriates these sensations, that every act 
of consciousness becomes an act of observation. 



222 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 



SECTION V. 

PRIMARY SUBJECTIVE COGNITIONS, OR COGNITIONS OF THE 
INTERIOR CONSCIOUSNESS. 

These are tlie cognitions which are formed intuitively by 
the Keason, respecting the simple subjective, through the 
force of its Ideas, and upon condition of the phenomena 
which arise from the subjective activity. 

When these phenomena are recognised in the interior 
consciousness, the Eeason, under the Idea of subject,*^ 
conceives of the simple subjective, or the Me, 

Under the appropriate Ideas, we are next determined 
to cognise the Me as the spiritual substance, antithetical 
to the material substance which we have cognised without. 

Here the same remarkable transfer of phenomena, 
which we have noticed in the precediag Section in respect 
to bodies, takes place in respect to the spiritual being, f 
HaviQg cognised the subject, we no longer thiak of bare 
phenomena of the consciousness, but of effects and mani- 
festations of spiritual faculties ;. and the intelligence, caus- 
ality, and sensitivity which constitute our triune being, are 
known and distinguished. The Ideas of personality. Eight 
and Wrong, Freedom, Kesponsibility, and Immortality, 
now clothe this being with lofty and glorious attributes ; 
and through the simple consciousness of interior phenomena, 
as conditions, we have the intuitions of self-knowledge. 

* Supra, p. 155. f Supra, pp. 56, 57. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. *223 

It will be understood botli in respect to sensuous, and 
to subjective intuitive cognitions, tbat when I undertake 
to point out tbeir progressive development ; and the trans- 
fer of pbenomena from the consciousness to the objective 
and subjective realities — thus associatiug the phenomena 
with the causes which produce them, instead of viewing 
them in the field of their immediate manifestation, — I 
nevertheless do not mean to aver that this progressive de- 
velopment and this transfer are really recognised iu the 
consciousness in relation to successive and marked periods 
of time ; but only to indicate the logical order and relations 
of the facts. In the very dawn of our being iu the world 
of the senses, our faculties open their play unitedly and 
harmoniously ; and ere we begin to exercise reflection, we 
find ourselves in a world already realized. But when we 
attempt to know ourselves, we must of necessity represent 
to ourselves in clear propositions the logical order of the 
cognitive development. In doing this, we assume periods 
of time correspondiQg to the order of this development for 
the sake of distiactness, while yet, in relation to time, 
there was actually simultaneity. 



224 PBIMORDIAL LOGIC. 



SECTION YI. 

AXIOMS. 

Axioms * are those truths which depend neither upon In- 
duction^ nor upon previous deductions ; but which are in- 
tuitively cognised under determinate Ideas. 

It is evident that before deductions are possible, there 
must be judgments expressed in propositions. Now these 
judgments must of necessity be resolved either into intu- 
itions, or into Inductions. If into the latter, even then, 
in the last result, we come to intuitions, since all facts of 
observation, whether belonging to the interior or exterior 
consciousness, must ultimately rest in simple intuitions. 

The consciousness of phenomena, if regarded as a form 
of perception, is manifestly immediate and intuitive. But 
beyond this, the primary sensuous and subjective cogni- 
tions, as we have seen, are intuitive likewise. The Real 
is not an induction from the phenomenal : The latter is a 
condition ; the former an Intuition. 

But Axioms, while they are independent of Induction 
and Deduction on the one hand, — on the other, must not 
be confounded with the primary cognitions whether sen- 
suous or subjective. These primary cognitions relate to 
the Eeality of Being ; axioms relate to the Reality of 
Truth, f A primary cognition expressed, becomes a pro- 

* Greek 'A|iw^a, Authority, Worth. Hence, an established principle — 
one the authority of which cannot be called in question, 
f Supra, p. 140. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 225 

position wMcli affirms existence. Thus a primary sen- 
suous cognition expressed, becomes an affirmation of tlie 
existence of bodies and tlieir qualities : and a primary sub- 
jective cognition expressed, becomes an affirmation of -tbe 
existence of the simple subjective with its faculties and 
functions. 

But an axiom is a proposition expressing a judgment 
of universal and absolute truth — of truth which indeed 
holds important connexions with actual Being, when ac- 
tual Being is given ; but which, nevertheless, is no less 
true, if being be not given, or only hypothesised. For ex- 
ample, the axiom, If equals he added to equals^ the sums 
icill he equalj is a truth no less, if there be no actual 
Being. And the axiom, every hody must he in space, de- 
mands merely a hypothesis of body, and not an affirma- 
tion of the existence of body. It is true, indeed, that the 
mind does not proceed to form axioms antecedently, in the 
order of time, to judgments of actual Being ; '"* but still, 
when the axioms are formed, they are seen to have a 
necessary and independent existence, and a logical ante- 
cedence. 

Axioms are determined immediately by Ideas. The 
judgments which they express are the first judgments of 
Truth ; and they in themselves are the first proj)Ositions 
of Truth. 

Axioms may be classified, according to the philosophi- 
cal divisions above given, into the metaphysical^ and the 
nomological. The Keason, with its Ideas entering into the 
world of Keahty, forms not only its cognitions of that which 
is, conceived of as mere facts of existence, but affirms also 
truths universal and absolute. The Keason again, by its 

* Supra, pp. 60 and 140. 
10* 



226 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

Ideas, not only determines tlie laws which actually govern 
the Keal, hut here likewise makes universal and absolute 
affirmations respecting the necessary forms of law. These 
axiomatic affirmations reach the spheres of determinate 
science, and constitute the starting points of the scientific 
construction. 

METAPHYSICAL AXIOMS. 

I. Axiom of Substance and Attributes. — The Sea- 
son not only cognises particular substances and attributes, 
but upon such particular cognitions as the chronological 
conditions, makes the universal affirmation. Every sub- 
stance implies attributes, and every attribute implies sub- 
stance. 

II. Axiom of Cause and Effect. — The Keason first 
cognises a particular cause upon certain phenomenal con- 
ditions ; and then upon this particular cause, taken in its 
turn as a condition, it affirms the axiom. Every pheno- 
menon implies a cause. 

III. Axiom of Body and Space. — Body is a primary, 
sensuous cognition ; but no sooner does the cognition take 
place, than the Keason affirms, Every body must be in 
space. 

IV. Axiom of Time and Succession.— The cognition 
of some particular succession is the conditional starting 
point ; upon this the Reason affirms. Every succession 
must be in time. 

V. Axiom of the Finite and the Infinite. — Time 
and Space and the Deity are cognised under the Idea of 
the Infinite. In the antecedence of Time, the limited and 
finite are indeed first cognised ; but it is only by the Idea 
of the Infinite that it becomes possible for us to affirm of 



PKIMORDIAL LOGIC. 227 

any thing, It is finite. Thus a particular instance of the 
Finite becomes to us a condition of the judgment of the 
Infinite. The axiom which immediately follows this judg- 
ment in the order of Time is, Every Finite implies the In- 
finite, 

YI. Axiom of the Objective and the Subjective. 
— The Subjective and Objective are cognised on the con- 
dition of particular phenomena, and their relations seen 
in particular instances. But here agaiu the Keason af- 
firms. Universally the Objective implies the Subjective. 

YII. Axiom of Universal Being. — The Eeason cog- 
nises matter and spirit in the particular, and then goes on 
to affirm, All being must be either matter or spirit. 

These are the fundamental and most general meta- 
physical axioms. My object, however, in the above, as 
well as in what follows, is not to give a complete enumer- 
ation of the axioms, but only so far as shall serve to illus- 
trate their peculiar characteristics, and the law under 
which they are determined. The characteristics of axioms 
are manifest : they are, absoluteness, independency, and 
universality. The law of their determination is equally 
clear ; they are affirmed by the Keason, under the com- 
prehension and force of its Ideas. In the general view al- 
ready given of the evolution of Ideas, * the axioms will be 
recognised in the separation of the universal from the par- 
ticular. In the order of time, we have the phenomenal, . 
the particular, and the real, before we have the Axioms 
and Ideas ; but when we have arrived at Axioms and 
Ideas, we perceive that in necessary existence they claim 
antecedence. Ideas determine those universal judgments 
of truth which are expressed in axioms ; and these univer- 

* Page 154. 



228 PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

sal judgments make the particular cognitions logically pos- 
sible. For example, althougli I cognise a particular body 
in space, before I affirm the axiom, Every body must he in 
space, nevertheless, the potential existence of this judg- 
ment in the Reason constitutes the possibility of the par- 
ticular cognition. This two-fold order, — ^the order o£ ac- 
tual development in time, and the order of logical deter- 
mination, — is the all-important principle to be kept in 
mind. 

NOMOLOGICAL AXIOMS. 

I. Axiom of Universal Law. — The Idea of Law de- 
termines this axiom, in the same way that the Idea of 
Cause determines the axiom of Causality. When partic- 
ular phenomena are given, the Idea of Cause determines 
to the assignment of a particular cause ; and then upon 
this determines the affirmation^ Every phenomenon must 
have a cause : so here, likewise, when particular pheno- 
mena are given, the Idea of Law determines to the as- 
signment of some law ; and then upon this determines the 
affirmation. Every phenomenon must have a law. The 
Eeason does not admit the possibility of chance. No-Law 
is as great an absurdity as No-Cause. A violation of law 
is conceivable only in the case of free, and therefore moral, 
agents ; '••* but even here the violation takes upon itself a 
form of law — a law of evil. 

II. Axiom of the Uniformity of Nature. — In- 
volved in the Idea of Law is that of order, harmony, and 
system. Order, harmony, and system are the develop- 
ments of law. The Beason, therefore, not only affirms on 
the presentation of phenomena, there must be law govern- 

* Moral Agency, Chap. VII., Sec. I. 



PRIMOKDIAL LOGIC. 229 

ing them ; but still farther, these phenomena, thus gov- 
erned, must present uniform recurrences and adjusted re- 
lations. The judgment thus formed is as universal and 
absolute as law itself. The axiom which has obtained as 
the expression of this judgment is as follows : Nature is 
U7iiform in lier operations. By this axiom, we are led to 
bring together the homogeneous phenomena under the 
laws ; and to expect with certainty the reappearance of 
phenomena. 

III. Axiom of Universal Design, — This Axiom is 
determined by its appropriate Idea, and is as follows : 
Whatever exhibits marks of design, is the ivork of an In- 
telligent Creator. 

The Ideas of Law and Design being developed, upon 
the condition of particular phenomena, the Axiom is 
thereupon immediately affirmed by the Eeason, and be- 
comes thenceforth the starting point and guide in all sub- 
sequent observations and experiments. This Axiom lies 
at the foundation of the so-called a posteriori argument 
for the existence of a Grod. Hence the ultimate basis of 
this argument is an a priori principle. But the ultimate 
basis of all cognition and ratiocination is, as we have seen, 
composed of a priori principles. 

IV. Axiom of the Correspondence of Ideas and 
Eeality. — Every Idea implies a Beality of Actual Being 
or of Truth ; and every Beality of Actual Being or of 
Truth, implies an Idea. Every Idea developed is devel- 
oj^ed in connexion with some form of Reality, * in the ef- 
fort of the Eeason to grasp Eeality. On the other hand, 
let us place ourselves in the world of Eeality, and all our 
attempts at rational explanation lead us back to the Con- 

* Supra, Part II., Sec. 3. 



230 PMMOKDIAL LOGIC. 

stitutive Ideas. * Now, upon the particular instauces of 
this two-fold movement, the Eeason supervenes with the 
universal affirmation which we have given above. All 
Ideas must attach themselves to Eealities. All Kealities 
must correspond to Ideas. It is the cardinal Axiom of 
pure Philosophy. 

V. MoKAL Axioms. — I have given the cardinal moral 
Ideaj namely, the Idea of Eight and Wrong ; but have 
not, for obvious reasons, entered into an explication of the 
particular Ideas of Justice, Benevolence, and so on, con- 
tained under it. It would, in like manner, transcend the 
objects of this elementary Treatise to attempt^ in detail, 
a presentation of the Moral Axioms. I will only remark, 
that the Divine Code announced at Sinai, and afterwards 
expounded and exeraplified by the Eedeemer of men, is 
in truth a collection of the fundamental Moral Axioms. 
They are indeed given under the form of laws, but they, 
at the same time, contain the affirmation of great and uni- 
versal truths, uttered by the Infinite Eeason, and re- 
sponded to and re-affirmed by the Eeason of every moral 
being. 

VI. EsTHETiCAL AxiOMS. — Thcsc are determined by 
the Idea of Beauty, and comprise the first principles of 
Esthetical Science and of the rules of Art. I will adduce 
only two or three. These wiU answer the end of illustra- 
tion. And I propose nothing further. 

1. Beauty of every species and form has its Ideal or 
Archetype in the Imagination. 

2. Every particular form of Beauty presents a union 
of regularity and variety. 

3. Nature and Art are homogeneous ; but the former 
does not limit the latter. 

* Supra, Part I., Sec. 10. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 231 

VII. SoMATOLOGiCAL AxioMS. — A Complete exhibition 
of these would strictly belong to a Philosophy of Nature. 
Here, also, I am aiming only at an illustration of the great 
law of determining Axioms by the Ideas of the Eeason. 

1. Axiom of the Inertia of Bodies. — This Axiom is 
determined by the Idea of Matter, as a passive, and not a 
self-moving substance. Our actual experience is limited ; 
nay, as to one part of the Axiom, we have no experience 
whatever, namely, that a hody^ when ^ut in motion, will 
continue to move on for ever in the line of the imjpulsej 
unless it meet with resista7ice from another force : for we 
have no example of a body moving on without meeting 
with a resistance, tending either to bring it to a state of 
repose, or to change the direction of its motion. Besides, 
the universality and absoluteness of the entire affirmation 
must carry it beyond the possibility of experience. 

2. Axiom of Action and Reaction. — The equality of 
reaction to action in an opposite direction, is an affirmation 
of universal and necessary truth, and therefore transcends 
the reach of experience. It is determined by the Idea of 
Kelation under the third form,'^ 

3. Axiom of ' the Centre of Gravity. — That everybody 
has its centre of gravity, or a point, around which, when 
supported, all the parts of the body are balanced by the 
gravitating force, is unquestionably a universal and neces- 
sary conception. By mere experience it could not be de- 
termined ; nor has any one ever attempted to determine it 
by experience. On the other hand, the Ideas of Action 
and Eeaction, and of Centrahzation, cannot but determine 
it. It is a truth with which we begin our investigations 
in Nature, and of which no subsequent experience renders 
us more certain and confident. 

* Supra, p. 171. 



232 PRIMOHDIAL LOGIC. 

It will be seen by reflecting upon these and other 
axioms, which might be adduced from mechanical science, 
that the order of development is as follows : 

First. The Keason, by its function of consciousness, 
comes, in the order of time, in connection with the phe- 
nomena of the external world. 

Secondly. Its constitutive Ideas now form the original 
sensuous cognitions. 

Thirdly. Thus introduced to particular Kealities, the 
Ideas determine the universal judgments, which, when ex- 
pressed in clear and convenient language, become axioms. 

YIII. — Axioms of Pure Science.— These belong to 
the Mathematics. They are universal and intuitive affirm- 
ations of the Keason respecting the two forms of quantity, 
namely, contiiiued and discrete/'' 

The most remarkable of these Axioms are those gener- 
ally laid down in mathematical treatises as Axioms of 
Equality and Inequahty. The Ideas which determine 
these Axioms are Quantity, Identity, and Difference. 

Unity, multiplication, and diminution are the funda- 
mental conceptions of the Science of Numbers : and these 
are contained in the Idea of Quantity. Equation is the 
fundamental conception of Geometry and Algebra ; and 
this is given in Identity. Proportion, as an equation of 
ratios, is embraced by the same conception : and Katio is 
but a comparison of quantities in respect to a common 
unit. 

What remains to be remarked respecting axioms of this 
class will naturally come up under the following section. 

♦ Supra, p. 92. 



PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 233 



IX.— LOGICAL AXIOMS. 



Axioms of tMs class relate to tlie processes of the Eea- 
son in general in its trutli-seeking activity. We tave seen 
that there are three cardinal forms of this activity, Intui- 
tion, Induction, and Deduction. Logical Axioms, there- 
fore may he classed under three corresponding heads. 

Axioms relating to Istuition.-I. Whatever the 
Season intuitively Jcnows, it knows under the charaeterts- 
tics of Universality and Necessity. Intuitive truths are 
universal, that is, true without any exception ; and neces- 
sary, that is, their opposites are impossihle. 

2 Whatever is known intuitively neither requires nor 
admits of demonstration. Demonstration always pre- 
sumes something going hefore which is already known. 
An endless retrogression of demonstrations is an ahsurdity. 
There must he some first truths which do not require de- 
monstration ; and which, because they are first, do not 
admit of demonstration, smce there is nothing by which to 

demonstrate them. 

3 Whatever is known intuitively must reach beyond 
any induction of particulars, and he antecedent to them 
in the order of necessary existence. All induction is to 
us unavoidably limited, and must he led on by some ante- 
cedent and guiding principle. Induction without a pur- 
pose does not belong to philosophy. 

Axioms relating to INDUOTION.-Axioms relating 
to Intuition properly belong to this division of our Trea- 
tise Axioms relating to Induction cannot be discussed 
here without anticipating what properly belongs to the 
next division. I shall, therefore, adjourn any statement 

of them. „, , 

Axioms relating to Deduction.— The reason above 



234 PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

given applies to this class of Axioms likewise. I shall ac- 
cordingly adjourn them to the appropriate division, only 
remarking, that the ^^ Dictum de omni et nullo" — that 
loliatever is affirmed or denied of any term distributed, 
or, taken universally, is affirmed or denied of every par- 
ticular comprehended under it, — ^which Aristotle employs 
for explaining the validity of Deduction, — is a cardinal 
Axiom of this class. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 235 



SECTION YIl. 

OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF AXIOMS IN GENERAL. 

These characteristics liave appeared in the course of the 
preceding section ; they are Universality, Necessity, and 
Logical Antecedence to Induction and Deduction. My 
principal object in presenting them in a separate section, 
is to meet certain ohjections which have been urged against 
them. 

It has been said that Axioms are merely statements of 
general observations. For example, that "Every body 
must be in space," means nothing more than that " Every 
, body," as far as observation goes, is in space ; " and that 
the Axiom, " If the same or equal quantities be added to 
equal . quantities, their sums wiH be equal," and aU the 
other Axioms of Equation, are merely of the same nature 
— expressions of general observations, unattended by any 
exception. Here, it will be perceived, that universality is 
merged into generality ; the necessary into the inconceiv- 
able ; and absolute truth into phenomenal conditions. 
That "Every body is in space" is thus merely a fact in 
the experience of all men ; and it is inconceivable that any 
body should not be in si)ace, because no fact of this Mnd 
has ever appeared in human experience. And if it be af- 
firmed in opposition to this, that our thought at least sur- 
passes our observation when passing beyond the possibility 
of actual observation — beyond aU visible stars, — we think 



236 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

that if bodies be there also, they must there also be in 
space ; — then it is replied that we make to ourselves in 
this case an imaginary representation of facts, which are 
merely copies of real facts, and that we are thus still in 
the region of observation : — The imagination takes the 
place of the sense, and wherever it goes, it only represents 
facts of the sense ; — wherever it goes, it still makes for it- 
self locahty and particular facts. It does not fill immensity, 
nor grasp the universal, — it is only extending observation, 
and multiplying facts in another way. 

The above is the argument fully stated. The answer 
does not appear to me difficult. 

First. Before we can determine the validity of Axioms 
as necessary, universal, and intuitive truths, we must de- 
termine the validity of Ideas. Have we ideas of Space, 
of Necessity, of the Infinite, and so on ? It does, indeed, 
seem, that if we have any positive cognition whatever, 
space is such an one. Equally positive is our cognition of 
its characteristics. Space is necessary and infinite, and 
having no limits, it has no form. And when we affirm 
that it is infinite, we do not mean to express merely our 
incapability of conceiving of limits ; but the utter impos- 
sibility of limits. And, again, when we affirm that space 
is necessary, we do not mean to express merely our inca- 
pability of conceiving of no 'space, but the absolute being 
of space independently of all conception whatever. To 
make all cognitions personal and relative — deriving their 
characteristics from the individual constitution, is to deny 
to Truth any independent and absolute foundations. Then 
are we, for aught we know, only entertained with shadows, 
and without any fixed certainty of Keality. But we can- 
not yield to such doctrines ; because we have that within 
us which assures us of their falsity. Our cognitions are 



PEIMORDIAL LOGIC. 237 

factSj wliich are explained, and can only be explained by- 
referring to the Ideas of the Keason. 

Secondly. It bas been sbown in tbe preceding pages 
that tbe primary pbenomena are simple sensations and af- 
fections of our own being revealed to consciousness ; and 
tbat tbey assume tbeir secondary character as manifesta- 
tions of Keality, only through the supervention of Ideas. 
Without Ideas we should never attain substance, cause, or 
law, nor the exterior sphere of their manifestation. The 
very cognition of Body, therefore, depends upon Ideas 
which assign it substance and qualities, connect it with 
causes, and give it limits, and form and place. IlTot even 
a particular body can be cognised in space without Ideas. 

INow, when we have the Idea of Space and the Cogni- 
tion of Body with their opposite characteristics, the Eeason 
cannot but af&rm ' Every Body must be in space.' It is 
by no means an affair of observation and induction — it 
does not depend upon looking at this body and that body, 
in order to see whether they reaUy are in space, and 
thus from multiplied observations drawing a general con- 
clusion : On the contrary, no sooner do we cognise Space 
and Body, than we affirm absolutely and necessarily, 
^ Every Body must be in space.' So far from requiring 
imagination beyond actual observation, actual observation 
itself is anticipated. • 

The same reasoning will apply to all other Axioms. 
Take the Axiom, ' If equals be added to equals, the sums 
will be equal.' This Axiom is not a general conclusion 
from repeated trials and observations ; but no sooner have 
we cognitions of Quantity, Identity, and so on, under the 
corresponding Ideas, than we make this and the kindred 
affirmations as universal and necessary affirmations. Here, 
again, instead of multiplying observations by imaginary 



238 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

cases, we pause for no observation wliatever, bnt directly 
determine the Axioms by the Ideas. 

Take another Axiom : ^ If two straight lines intersect 
or cross each other, they can never meet again ; but if pro- 
duced, must go on diverging for ever/ Now, having formed 
the conception of two straight Hues, drawn in space in thQ 
position above stated, we require no observation along the 
course of their production, either actually or by the imagi- 
nation, in order to gather facts for a general conclusion : 
the instant the thought is fixed upon the lines at the point 
of intersection, the affirmation is made under the charac- 
teristics of Universality and Necessity. 

The distinction between a conclusion gained by extended 
and careful observation, and a truth which at once flashes 
upon the mind — between the result of a long drawn out 
induction, and an immediate determination of the Eeason, 
— is clear and palpable. The phenomenal conditions, under 
which such a truth is given, are easily separable from the 
truth itself; since they neither contain nor measure it : for 
example, the sensation of hardness which is conditional to 
our cognition of Space, neither contains nor measures 
Space. Again, the universality of such a truth is clearly 
distinguishable from the generality of an observation ; — for 
the truth is affirmed without admitting the possibility of 
limits or exceptions, as tlfat ^ Every body must be in 
space ; ' but an observation, as that of the rising and set- 
ting of the sun, and that of the rising and falling of the 
tides, admits of the possibility of limits and exceptions. 
Omnipotence can change the whole order of the system, 
but not even Omnipotence can form a body not in space. 
Once more, the inconceivableness of a fact, and the neces- 
sity of a Truth, are also clearly distinguishable. A fact is 
inconceivable, when it is both removed from the sphere of 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 239 

our observation, and unlike any fact wluch has come under 
our observation. Thus a person residing witliin the Trop- 
ics, and who has never seen ice, cannot conceive of freezing 
water. The Cartesians rejected the Newtonian doctrine 
of the gravitation of bodies, on the ground that it is in- 
conceivable that a body can act where it is not. Their 
error lay in adopting a theory of causality which made the 
causal activity a matter of sensuous conception. The 
Newtonian doctrine is inconceivable as a sensuous fact, if 
causes act only in the contact of material particles. But 
the doctrine was to be determined on other grounds than 
the possibility of observing the attractive force itself. A 
necessary truth, on the other hand, is not received, because 
it is conceivable as an observed fact, nor because its oppo- 
site is simply inconceivable : It is received because it is 
absolute and fixed as a cognition of the Eeason, and its 
opposite impossible. That 'Every body must be in 
space, that ' Two straight lines cannot enclose a space,' 
are necessary truths, because seen by intuition to be such 
that their opposites are impossible. You may say, if you 
please, that their opposites are inconceivable, taking this 
term in an intense and superlative sense, and, indeed, 
identifying it with the impossible : but the term is objec- 
tionable, because ambiguous, and liable to confound pure 
intuitions of the Eeason -^ith facts of observation. 



240 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 



SECTION YIII. 

GENERAL RELATIONS OF AXIOMS. 

I. Axioms, in themselves, primary universal and neces- 
sary intuitive truths, are related as logical antecedents to 
universal and necessary deductive truths. The science of 
Geometry affords us a perfect and stupendous example of 
this relation. 

II. Axioms are related also as logical antecedents to 
our cognitions. The Axiom ' Every body must he in 
space' offers an illustration. When we come to cognise 
any particular hody, we of necessity must cognise it in 
space ; hut we can cognise it in space only upon the 
ground of the Axiom, ' Every body must he in space.' 
As the idea of space is the logical antecedent of the cog- 
nition of the hody, so also the universal affirmation is the 
logical antecedent of any particular designation, for a par- 
ticular designation implies the general truth. The sensa- 
tion of resistance is the antecedent in time — the condition 
or occasion of the cognition of both body and space : and 
as comprehending the cognitions in their relation to each 
other, appears the Axiom, ^ Every body must be in 
space.' The same course of remark appHes to the Axioms, 
^ Every phenomenon imphes a Cause,' and ^ Every phe- 
nomenon implies a Law,' and other similar Axioms. To 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 241 

attempt to establish these Axioms by induction, is for ever 
to travel in a circle, since every fact inducted implies the 
Axioms themselves. 

III. Axioms either take immediately the form of 
Laws, or determine Laws. As instances of the first, we 
may adduce the great moral laws announced at Sinai. I 
have abeady referred to these. Every one of these utters 
a universal and necessary moral truth. Duty as here pre- 
sented is not arbitrary, but rational. 

In the department of Physics, we have a striking illus- 
tration in the Three Laws of Motion. The first Law is 
the Axiom of the inertia of bodies, the Axiom itself being 
determined by the Idea of Cause : The second law is the 
Axiom of Efiects proportioned to their causes, and is de- 
termined by the same Idea : The third law is the Axiom 
of Action and Keaction. These are Axioms, because uni- 
versal and necessary truths determined by ideas. 

They are universal, for no exception is admissible ; 
they are necessary, for the Keason affirms the impossibility 
of their opposites. They are true on a mere hypothesis 
of bodies. But when taken in their relations to actually 
existing bodies, they become actual primary laws. 

All primary laws are Axiomatic : but there are secon- 
dary laws which proceed from the Axioms. All ethical 
laws for the specific regulation of human conduct, and all 
civil jurisprudence, are thus derived. 

All the secondary laws of Physical Science are depend- 
ent, in like manner, upon the primary Axiomatic laws. 
Here, too, the Mathematics are applied, inasmuch as the 
motions, magnitudes, distances, times, weights, and forces 
of bodies are representable either as continued or discrete 
quantities.* 

* Supra, pp. 92 — 5. • 
11 



242 PKIMOEDIAL LOGIC. 

I have already shown* tliat science in general is con- 
structed out of phenomena by the aid of Ideas and Axioms. 
In the pure Mathematics, the phenomenal material belongs 
to the interior consciousness — that is, is given in reflection 
— and comprises particulars comparatively few in number, 
simple, and definite. 

In physical science, on the contrary, the phenomena 
belong to the exterior consciousness, that is, are given in 
sensation, and are various, complicated, and multitudinous. 
In the latter, therefore, observation and experiment, nice, 
laborious, and extensive, are required. And here it is 
that Inductive Logic receives its widest and most im- 
portant application. 

* Part I., Sec. XU. 



PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 24S 



SECTION IX. 

DEFINITION. 

" The end or scope of aU definition, is to make any give; 
object clearer, plainer, and more distinct to the Intelli- 
gence. Adopting the usual division of logicians, we re- 
present definition as either nominal or real. A nominal 
definition is merely substituting one name for another, — 
the name substituted being supposed to be better under- 
stood. A real definition aims to explain the nature of the 
thing, by enumerating its parts, assigning its classification, 
pointing out its substance, describing its properties and 
relations, or fixing its limits and distinctions. 

"A real definition may be accidental or essential. 
When accidental, it explains merely those accidents or 
properties of an object which are not constitutive of it, 
and without which it can be conceived ; — for example, the 
name, time, place of birth, and employment of an indi- 
vidual, are accidents. "When essential, it explains the 
essence and properties of an object which are constitutive 
of it, and without which it cannot be conceived ; — for ex- 
ample, mind and body are essential parts of an individual 
man. 

" Again : an essential definition is logical, when it as- 
signs the object its place, under generical and specific 
classification. Thus man is logically defined an intellec- 
tual animal — animal being the genics, intellectual ' the 



244 PRIMOEDIAL LOGIC. 

differentia, or that wMcli distinguislies him essentially 
from all other animals. 

" An essential definition is physical, when, where the 
objects admit of it, the physical parts are enumerated, 
meaning by physical parts those which are presented to 
the observation of the senses. 

" An essential definition is metaphysical, when it as- 
signs essence and properties to the object, which are me- 
taphysical — meaning by metaphysical that which is not 
known by observation of the senses, but by intuition of 
Eeason ; — for example, Man is a spiritual being ; body is 
a resisting substance. From this it appears that a logical 
definition is dependent upon antecedent, physical, and 
metaphysical definitions. 

" Now, it is plain, that in order to define^ we must 
have some prior conceptions by which to define. In a 
mere nominal definition, we must have a prior word al- 
ready better understood than the word we are about to 
define. In a real definition, we must already have a clear 
knowledge of the essences, properties, and accidents we 
may make use of for this purpose. A definition, there- 
fore, which we are at this moment framing, must be pre- 
ceded either by definitions already made, or by concep- 
tions which do not require or admit of antecedent defini- 
tions. 

" When present definitions presume antecedent defi- 
nitions, these antecedent definitions must be preceded by 
other antecedent definitions, or by conceptions which do 
not require or admit of antecedent definitions. We must, 
therefore, in all cases, at length come to conceptions which 
do not require or admit of antecedent definitions ; for a 
retrogression of definitions ad infinitum, is an absurdity. 

"These starting points of thought — these primary 



PRIMOKDIAL LOGIC. 245 

conceptions and beliefs, are logically necessary to account 
for, explain, and define all our other knowledges. They 
are like the light, which, w^hile it reveals all objects of 
sight, can find nothing by which it itself can be more 
plainly revealed. That we cannot analyse light proves 
nothing against its existence : we know it must exist, be- 
cause we see all things by means of it. Indeed, we must 
affirm in general, that whatever is clearest to our minds, 
and really best known, must be incapable of explanation 
definition, or demonstration : for if these were required in 
reference to the objects supposed, then it would follow 
that there must be something beyond these still clearer, 
and still better known, namely, that by which the ex- 
planation, definition, or demonstration is to be eflected, — 
which is contrary to the hypothesis." * 

The distinction above made between a nominal and a 
real definition is palpable ; for to give the signification of 
one word, by means of another more familiar, is widely 
different from pointing out what is designed to be ex- 
pressed by the word itself. But inasmuch as a real defi- 
nition is designed to point out what is expressed by the 
word itself, it has been contended that no definition can 
properly be said to explain the nature of a thing ; but 
only to determine the appropriation of a word : Thus, to 
define Man is not to point out the nature of man, but to 
show what is intended to be expressed by it. 

Now it seems to me that to determine the appropria- 
tion of a word is equivalent to defining the nature of the 
thing for which the word stands. Take the usual defini- 
tion of a circle, for example : — ' A circle is a figure con- 
tained by one line, which is called the circumference, every 

* Doctrine of the WiU, Ch. II., Sec. I. 



246 PRIMORDIAL LOGIC. 

point of whicli is equally distant from a" common point 
caUed the centre/ Here it is evident that the word circle 
cannot be defined, or, in other words, its appropriation de- 
termined without explaining that for which it stands. In 
the course of this real definition we give also two nominal 
definitions, when we call the containing line the circum- 
ference, and the common point the centre. We may also 
nominally define a circle hy saying, ' it is a figure hounded 
by a circumference.' But taken together as above, we 
have a real definition of circle. In this definition we have 
undoubtedly an intuitive cognition expressed ; for in de- 
fining a circle it is implied that it is an actual magnitude. 
We may indeed define that which has no real existence, 
as a griffin, a centaur, or a harpy ; but then it is under- 
stood that we are referring to imaginary beings. 

Eeal definitions, in so far as they contain or imply 
judgments of truth, are authoritative. This is true of 
geometrical definitions, with the exception of those which 
are merely nominal. ^ A surface is that which has length 
and breadth without height or thickness,' is a real defini- 
tion, because it points out and affirms two dimensions in 
space ; and it is authoritative just to the extent of this 
affirmation. Strictly nominal definitions can be made out 
only by synonymes or by a circumlocution. 

A real definition is complete or incomplete. It is com 
plete, only when all that is comprehended by the word 
which represents the object of thought is expressed. Thus 
that ' Man is a rational animal ' is a real definition, but 
still an incomplete one ; for the object of thought repre- 
sented by the word ^Man' comprehends more than is 
expressed by the genus 'Animal,' and the difi'erentia 
' Kational.' 

Definitions are varied according to difi'erent ends pro- 



PRIMOEDIAL LOGIC. 247 

posed. The definition is always adequate when it meets 
the end proposed. To define ' Man ' as a ^ rational ani- 
mal' is sufficient in ordinary classification to distinguish 
him from all other animals. According to a distribution 
which Cuvier made of the species of the Animal King- 
dom, he found it necessary to define ^ Man' "amammife- 
rous animal having two hands.'* Both definitions are real, 
because giving in part what really belongs to Man : both 
are incomplete, considered in respect to the whole subject 
* Man ; ' and yet both are adequate when considered in 
respect to their particular ends. Indeed, what are tech- 
nically called definitions must of necessity, in numerous 
instances, be incomplete, either from our imperfect know- 
ledge of the subject, or from its manifold richness ; so 
that to give a complete definition would be equivalent to 
a scientific disquisition. 

In G-eometry, and in all absolute science, the defini- 
tions are complete. They express a complete and per- 
fectly clear cognition, and give a name to the object of the 
cognition. That ' a straight line is the shortest distance 
between two points,' and that ^ a curve line is one which 
changes its direction at every point,' are cognitions clear 
and full, while the objects of the cognitions are distinc- 
tively named. Were not this the case, the definitions 
could not be received as a basis of the exact and rigid 
scientific construction. 

There is one enquiry which yet remains. What dis- 
tinguishes an Axiom from a real Definition ? An Axiom 
has been shown to be a universal and necessary truth de- 
termined immediately by Ideas. A real definition is the 
explication of a cognition represented or expressed by 
some particular word or phrase. Cognition may be primi- 
tive and intuitive, or secondary and derived. If the latter, 



248 PRIMOEDIAL LOGIC. 

it plainly cannot be axiomatic. But suppose it be the 
former, like the definitions of Geometry ? Then, in this 
case, it is unq[uestionably authoritative as an original in- 
tuition : — the definitions of a straight and of a curved, line, 
of a circle, of a triangle, of a right angle, of a parallelo- 
gram and so on, must be rigidly adhered to in all the sub- 
seq^uent demonstrations ; but still they are only cognitions, 
of certain magnitudes. Now, an Axiom does not respect 
any particular magnitude, but comprehends all alike. 
Thus when it is affirmed that ^things which are equal to 
the same thing, are equal to each other;' that, ^ if equals 
be added to equals, the wholes will be equal,' no respect 
is had to any particular magnitude or quantity: the 
Axioms are true alike of all Geometrical magnitudes, of 
all real quantities, or of quantities represented generally 
under Algebraic Symbols. We have thus a very plain 
distinction — the distinction between an original intuitive 
cognition in relation to a particular subject, and a univer- 
sal judgment limited to no particular subject. The defini- 
tion of a circle is authoritative, but it is so only in rela- 
tion to a circle ; while the Axiom, *^ If equals be added to 
equals, the wholes wiU be equal," is so manifestly univer- 
sal, and independent of any particular subject, that it not 
only appears just as clear in the general expression as in 
the particular, but really takes logical antecedence in the 
general expression, and determines by its authority the 
truth of the particular. 

I here complete the view I proposed to take of Pri- 
mordial Logic. Next in order is Inductive Logic. Before 
we can proceed to Deduction, we must have truths and 
principles from which to deduce. These are furnished 
by Intuition and Induction. Hence the two correspond- 
ing forms of Logic. 



BOOK II. 

INDUO TIVE LOGIC 



SECTION I. 

INTRODUCTION. 



It is sometimes said, that to an Omniscient Being neither 
Induction nor Deduction are necessary ; but that to such 
a Being all truth and knowledge are intuitive. Induction 
and Deduction indeed are not necessary to an Omniscient 
Being, considered as indispensable means of knowledge. 
Such a Being must have the power of seeing all truth 
directly. It is told of Newton that his mind grasped the 
conclusions of Geometry without laboriously passing through 
the usual process of reasoning. This indicated a mental 
energy superior to that of men in general. But, never- 
theless, the truths and knowledges, at which we arrive by 
Induction and Deduction, do not stand in the same rela- 
tion to the mind with intuitive truths. An intuitive 
truth is not only — in respect to the mode of knowing — 
seen directly ; — it is also seen to be true in itself— true 
independently of all antecedents. But a deductive truth, 
even if— in respect to the mode of knowing — seen to be 
true without passing through the deductive process ; still, 
11* 



250 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

if a reason be given for its truth, and it be minutely 
analysed, it must to every mind be seen to be true, not in 
itself and independently of all antecedents, but true, 
because something going before and upon which it depends, 
is true. So also an inductive truth, although known 
directly by the power of an Omniscient mind, must be 
known in all its relations and dependencies ; otherwise it 
is not truly and perfectly known. It thus appears, that 
when we speak of Intuitive, Deductive and Inductive 
truths, we refer not merely to modes of knowing, but to 
the intrinsic character of the truths themselves. 

What, then, are those truths and knowledges, which 
are arrived at in the way of Induction ? In other words, 
what is the field of Induction ? 

The field of Induction is that in which we find the 
secondary phenomena. 

The primary phenomena are simply the conditions of 
the primary cognitions. In these we attain objective 
reality. Then, the phenomena — thenceforward recognized 
as the phenomena of objective reality — become the ma- 
terials of Induction. 

Phenomena have Cause and Law as necessary antece- 
dents. The phenomena do not by generahzation make up 
the Cause and Law ; but the Cause and Law are the 
ground of the phenomena. The mere classification of 
phenomena under Kesemblance and Difference, for the 
purpose of affixing a common name, is widely different 
from assigning them Cause and Law. In attempting to 
account for the resemblance and difference, we of course 
have to proceed to Cause and Law ; but the classification 
itself gives us neither the one nor the other. 

In the Divine Mind, cause and law existed before phe- 
nomena were developed. Here" was the actual necessary 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 251 

antecedence. The mind which conceived and created. 



conceived and created from its own plenitude. The Divine 
Mind, therefore, foresaw the phenomena in the cause and 
law which it contained within itself. The phenomena 
must have been connected with cause and law in the 
Divine Conception, since the connexion isjiecessary to the 
completeness of the knowledge. But here we see that 
the order of knowing is identical with the Oi'der of neces- 
sary existence. 

It is conceivable that the Divine Being might have 
constituted finite minds with such lofty powers as directly 
to know the causes and laws of the Universe, and through 
them the appropriate and necessary phenomena. Now, 
that these causes and laws are attained, phenomena 
through them can be known in regions of space where the 
eye has yet made no observations, and predicted in periods 
of time lying far away in the future. And these lofty 
minds, in possession of the causes and laws by a superior 
intuition, might in like manner grasp the phenomena 
springing out of and depending upon them. But man is 
not a being thus constituted. The order of his develop- 
ment presents us — First, simple sensations : Secondly, 
the realization of the objective world by Ideas appropriat- 
ing the sensations : Thirdly, the observation of the phe- 
nomena of this objective world in order to determine its 
causes and laws. Now, under the last, we have the field 
of Induction as before stated : and the great point to be 
determined is, how by the observation of phenomena the 
causes and laws are arrived at. 



252 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION II. 

CAUSES AND LAWS. 

The iDMlosopliical distinction between Cause and Law is 
perfectly clear. Cause is that which accounts for the ex- 
istence of being and phenomena : Law is that which ac- 
counts for the order and relations of being and phenomena. 

Cause may be divided into two grand classes, spiritual 
or mental, and physical ; the former presenting two grades, 
the infinite and the finite, the latter presenting the finite 
only. 

Now, in philosophical strictness, the only enquiry that 
can arise here respecting Cause is. Whether the physical 
cause is really distinct from the spiritual. In respect to 
all our enquiries into the constitution of the objective 
world, every end is answered by granting at once — First, 
that in every finite intelligence there is a proper Cause 
which accounts for all the voluntary acts : Secondly, that 
in the universe of matter all causality is resolvable into 
the First and all-comprehending Cause. Physical causes, 
viewed in philosophical simplicity, are invisible powers ly- 
ing behind the phenomena of the universe. Whenever we 
attempt to classify these, we in reality classify only the 
phenomena which are received as the signs or expressions 
of the Causes.* 

* Plienomena, and phenomena alone, are classed into genera and species 
on the grounds of resemblance and difference. We, indeed, speak of a mag- 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 253 

What are ordinarily termed physical causes are merely 
phenomena which are stated and invariable antecedents, 
or fixed conditions of other phenomena : for example, the 
sun and moon in the changes of the tide ; visible fire in 
combustion ; water and steam as propelling powers, the 
conjunction of substances in chemical changes ; light, heat, 

netic cause, a bealing cause, a consuming cause, and so on ; but these differ- 
entia really refer to the phenomena ; — the phenomena of magnetism, of heal- 
ing, and of combustion, all differing from each other ; hut Cause is one simple 
Idea, the Idea of that which accounts for the possible and actual existence of 
these various phenomena. Indeed, we can conceive of the same cause as pro- 
ducing them aU ; as when we conceive of the Divine Being as the universal 
and sole Cause. This plainly is possible : and in the case of second causes we 
do actually attribute a vast variety of phenomena to one cause ; the phenomena 
being capable of being reduced to genera and species, while the cause retains 
all its simplicity. 

" Human power, taken under any point of view, is one of perfect sim- 
plicity ; it is nothing that can be described under any form ; it can neither be 
physically separated into parts, nor logically distributed into genera ; it always 
manifests itself by volition ; and yet how various are the phenomena produced 
— the phenomena of which Jrolition is the immediate antecedent ! 

" There may, however, be differences in degree ; one cause may produce 
a greater variety of phenomena than another ; and thus, causes which produce 
certain, phenomena, and act in relation to certain substances only, may be 
conceived of as simply limited in power without implying difference in kind 
If, for example, I were gifted with the power of regulating my digestive func- 
tions, or the circulation of my blood, or of moving my ears after the manner 
of a dog or a horse, it would argue no new power differing in kind, but merely 
the extension of my causality. My vohtion now is limited to the movement 
of certain members, and cannot influence others ; if I could move my ears as 
I do my hands, then my volition wotild do one thing more than it is now 
capable of doing. 

" Again, water is known to hold salt in solution : Now, if we were to sup- 
pose water to have the additional power of dissolving wood and holding the 
potassium in solution, we would not be altering in our conception the nature 
or kind of solvent power in water : — We would only be enlarging that power. 
It is manifest that if we had made the experiment of the solvent power of 
water only upon sugar, we might with as much reason conjecture that, if fui- 
ther tried, it would dissolve wood, as that it would dissolve salt." — Doctrine of 
the Wm, pp. 31, 32. Sec also p. 801. 



254 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

air, and moisture in vegetation, and so on. In making 
out a science of nature it is immaterial, as before inti- 
mated, wliat we conceive the invisible and real causes to be ; 
or wbetber we conceive of only one universal cause pro- 
ducing all tbis variety of effect. On tbe other hand, the 
very determination of such a science depends upon ob- 
serving the order and relations of the phenomena. But 
the order and relations of the phenomena do not truly be- 
long to cause, but to law. Hence the aim of Induction, 
when expressed with philosophic precision, is not to arrive 
at causes, but to arrive at laws. Thus in gravitation, the 
great enquiry did not so much respect the nature of the 
cause, as the fact of the regulated central determination 
of bodies. The expansion of steam is a phenomenon ; and 
other phenomena are connected with it as invariable con- 
sequents : We know there must be cause lying behind 
the phenomena — of this we are satisfied — whether it be a 
physical cause, distinct and measured in its own sphere, 
or the all-pervading universal Cause ': but the great points 
of interest to us in science and practical mechanics are 
the order and relations of the phenomena ; in other 
words, the law which governs the evolution of the pheno- 
mena. 

If the undulatory theory of light be established, the 
interest of the thing does not arise from having arrived at 
an ultimate cause ; but in having gained new phenomena 
with wider relations and more comprehensive laws. An 
ultimate cause we have not attained ; the ethereal undu- 
lations precede the sensations of light, and the presence 
of the sun. precedes the undulations ; and thus we have a 
succession of related phenomena ; — while enquiries still 
arise respecting the correlation of the sun and the aU-per- 
vading elastic ether which may bring to light other ante- 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 255 

cedent phenomena. The real enquiry then is, not after 
the ultimate cause of light, but after the whole succession 
of inter-dependent phenomena connected with the sensa- 
tion under all its phases. Throughout the whole succes- 
sion of phenomena there is cause acting, cause developing 
the phenomena ; but that which we seek after — the 
characteristics of phenomena, their order and relation, is 
comprehended by law. We can conceive of one universal 
cause producing from its own fulness every variety of 
phenomena ; but this variety itself denotes diversity of 
design and therefore diversity of law. 

The attraction of gravitation draws bodies towards the 
centre of the earth. Suj)pose it were ascertained that an 
exceedingly subtile ether exists between the particles of 
matter, having in itself a central determination by which 
all bodies are made to tend toward the centre : Then in- 
deed we should have a new class of antecedent pheno- 
mena ; but the tendency of bodies towards the centre 
would be no more explained than before, as far as cause is 
considered ; we would only be carried one step farther 
bach in our observations ; and we might now institute en- 
quiries respecting the force acting upon or in the particles 
of the subtile ether. Unquestionably, however, were such 
an ether discovered, we should enlarge our view of the 
laws and order of creation. 

To revert to the theories of light. By the common 
theory, luminous particles are supposed to be thrown off 
in straight lines from the luminous body, the phenomena 
of this emission being the antecedent phenomena deemed 
sufficient to account for the consequent phenomena : By 
the undulatory theory, the sensation of light and all the 
phenomena are supposed to find their sufficient antecedent 
phenomena in the undulations of the elastic medium ; 



256 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

that is, the ethereal undulations being granted as the in- 
variable antecedent to the sensation of light, and the ces- 
sation of these undulations as the invariable antecedent 
of darkness or the absence of this sensation, then the 
movement of these undulations will serve to explain all 
the phenomena of vision. In both theories we have in 
part a hypothesis of phenomena, and in part a statement 
of actual phenomena ; and the object in both is so to con- 
nect the hypothetical with the actual as to exhibit not the 
cause of the actual phenomena, but the law. That light 
consists of fine particles thrown off from luminous bodies 
and moving in straight lines with an inconceivable velocity, 
is a theory which legitimately connects itself with the phe- 
nomena of reflection and refraction as exhibited in specu- 
lums, prisms, lenses, and so on. These phenomena can 
also be legitimately connected with the undulations of the 
imponderable medium. Other phenomena, however, are 
deemed by philosophers to be legitimately connected only 
with the last theory. But in neither theory do the hy- 
pothesised constitute the cause of the actual phenomena, 
but only the required conditions of their manifestations. 
If now we conceive of the great and all-comprehending 
Mind designing to produce the phenomena of light and 
vision, whether by his direct agency, or by second causes 
permeating and acting in material substances, then the 
manner in which different substances are related to each 
other, and the fixed order and dependency of the pheno- 
mena, become to us the exponent of the law, which the 
Great Designing Mind ordained for his own efficiency, or 
for the governance of the secondary powers. The two 
theories present us in part, two different orders of pheno- 
mena, and hence two different laws of light and vision. 
In the minute and complete determination of these laws. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 257 

SO far as the conception of quantity comes in, the mathe- 
matics, as the science of quantity, is employed to give the 
expressions. 

What then is law ? Is it only the invariable succes- 
sion of phenomena? May the Creator, by his omnipo- 
tence, ^x the succession of phenomena in any order he 
pleases, and is this fixed and arbitrary succession the law 
of Nature? 

Law is not arbitrary in tJie morale. Hence that suc- 
cession of phenomena which comprises the conduct of re- 
sponsible beings can be right and fit only when conformed 
to one law. 

Equally clear is it that the law of the Beautiful is not 
arbitrary. 

But how stands this question in Somatology ? This is 
the point now to be considered. 

In the first place, in any system of bodies there can be 
no room for arbitrary laws, so far as the conditions of the 
system bring the bodies under mathematical formulae. 
And bodies, since they must have magnitudes and deter- 
minate forms, and be related to each other, and have mo- 
tion as the resultant of forces, cannot escape these formulae. 
It is inconceivable and impossible, that a universe of bodies 
should have been constituted in violation of the principles 
of the science of quantity. 

In the second place, the very notion of arbitrary law is 
absurd. Law is the work of the Eeason — the necessary 
outflow of its Ideas. The will may institute arbitrary 
].*ules, as the word arhitrary indicates. The Will may 
violate the Reason ; but the institutions of arbitrary 
choice in opposition to Reason, or in the mere freakish- 
ness of Fancy, are not to be dignified with the name of 
laws, in the high and proper sense. 



258 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

In tlie third place, arbitrary clioice cannot be ascribed 
to Infinite Intelligence. He who is the Fountain of truth, 
law, beauty, benignity, and order, cannot be thought of as 
creating the universe otherwise than under the light of 
his Eternal Ideas. And when we come to look into his 
works, we find everywhere the resplendent marks of law : 
and the farther our observation penetrates, the more 
varied, resplendent, and positive do these marks become. 

The axiom, " that every phenomenon presumes a law," 
or that every phenomenon is the result of intelligent de- 
sign, is affirmed by the Reason in the clear insight that 
Infinite Intelligence, and not arbitrary choice, decided the 
system of !N^ature. 

There might indeed have been a variety of systems 
governed by laws more or less benign and perfect, a con- 
ception which we allow in the various theories by which 
we attempt to express the laws of given phenomena ; but 
nevertheless, we are constrained to believe that an infi- 
nitely perfect Intelligence could not but have projected 
the best possible system, taking it in all its relations. 
"When we look therefore into ISTature, we expect not only 
to find laws properly so called ; but we expect also to find 
the wisest and most benign laws. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC, 259 



SECTION III. 

THE HUMAN REASON AS EELATED TO THE OBJECTIVE 

WORLD. 

The great and all-wise Being, who constituted the outer 
world, constituted also the Mind which is to investigate its 
laws. The Mind does not go to its work unfurnished. 
Made after the hkeness of the Creator — after the likeness 
of that Eeason from whose Ideas aU law sprang forth ; — 
constituted therefore with Ideas, and thus having sources 
of law within itself, it cannot go out into the world where 
law is embodied and reahzed, without waking up the 
glorious recognition. Having eyes to see, the light which 
pours in upon it seems not a strange, hut an expected and 
genial visitation. The human mind is prepared to know 
a world which had its origin in mind. As an artist com- 
prehends the works of art, so does the mind of man com- 
j)rehend the works of God. 

I have already, in the preceding Parts, said so much 
of the Ideas of the Keason, that I need here barely allude 
to the subject, or call it up again only so far as to apply it 
to the matter in hand. 

The development of the Ideas, as we have seen, does 
not take place separately from Keahty ; but when the re- 
ality is present in relation to which they are to act, then 
they manifest themselves. The manifestation is spon- 



260 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

taneous — the earnest outflow of the mind to reach its 
proper objects. 

In the first place, Ideas of cause and law, and of con- 
sequent system and order, Ideas psychological and soma- 
tological, as soon as phenomena are given, determine the 
mind to undertake investigation^ and hold up the objects 
to be attained. 

Then, inasmuch as Ideas comprehend the constitution 
of the universe, just so far as in the presence of the con- 
ditionating and quickening Eeality they are developed, 
does there appear a prophetic power of the Intellect pre- 
conceiving, suggesting, theorizing, and sometimes, as in 
the case of Newton, seeming to grasp at once the great 
system of things. It is impossible to express the extent to 
which the spontaneous inspiration of Ideas carries the 
mind, or all the modes of their action. Like the forma- 
tion and growth of a common Language in masses of 
mind, like the development of Music without rules of art 
in popular tunes, or the growth of Poetry from rude bal- 
lads to the IHad of Homer, like the spontaneous inventions 
and discoveries of man before he began to philosophise, 
from the results we feel assured there is law exact and 
beautiful ; but still, as in the fine vibrations of the air, and 
in the more subtile oscillations of the ethereal medium of 
light, no representation is possible : The movement lies so 
far behind all ordinary and famihar forms, and is so much 
more dehcate and subtile than any thing we are accus- 
tomed to handle, to speak of, or to represent, that we can 
find nothing by which to convey it. In the germination 
and growth of plants, how many fine influences are at 
work of which the physiologist presents us no diagram, 
and which he can command by no formula ; so likewise in 
mind, the germs of thought, their first sj)ringing forth, 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 261 

and their infinite and beautiful complexities in reasoning, 
invention, memoryj imagination, and taste, while exhibit- 
ing in their result the commanding presence of law, sur- 
pass the finest skill of the analyst. 

The superior power which some minds display in in- 
ductive reasoning may be accounted for mainly by the re- 
markable degree in which they are endowed with three 
quahties. Clearness, Candor, and Patience. Clearness of 
mind, the result of exact and laborious discipline, prevents 
uncertain, confused, and inapposite observations and ex- 
periments, and leads to accurate and sound judgments. 
Candor purifies the mind from all " idols,'' and makes it 
an honest truth-seeker. Patience disposes to undistracted 
attention, quiet and protracted thought, cheerfulness in 
undertaking labors, perseverance in overcoming difficulties, 
and willingness to wait until investigation shall ripen the 
harvest of knowledge. 

But Ideas not only impel the philosopher to undertake 
investigation, and suggest the route he is to pursue, and 
foreshadow the results at which he is to arrive, — they also 
determine the Method of Investigation. 

There are three particulars in relation to wliich this 
method requires to be expounded : 

I. The induction of phenomena for the purpose of 
classifying them into genera and species. 

II. The induction of phenomena for the purpose of 
arriving at the expression of a general fact, or a general 
order of sequence, but without determining a fixed and 
absolute law. 

III. The induction of j)henomena leading to the de- 
termination of a fixed and absolute law. 



262 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION IV. 

GENERAL VIEW OF CLASSIFICATION. ' 

Classification is dependent upon abstraction and gener- 
alization. "When phenomena are realized Tinder their 
secondary form, the first impression must be that of an 
undistinguished totality. By abstraction the mind fastens 
upon a particular quahty or feature, and separates it from 
the mass. This quality, or feature, is then noted in other 
objects ; and at length generalized as a common sign for 
the whole class to which it belongs. In the next place, a 
name is given to the common sign, which thenceforth be- 
comes the name of the class. When there \s but one 
quality generalized, the class must be exceedingly general, 
and. described in great incompleteness. As we add on 
qualities, we narrow the limits of the class, and at the 
same time describe with greater completeness. 

The most general arrangement of classes is that of 
G-ENUS and Species. The Genus, or hind, expresses only 
the particular, or particulars, in which all the species com- 
prehended under it are identified. The Species, or the 
particular forms of the kind, express all of the Genus, 
and in addition to this, the differentice, or points of difier- 
ence between one species and another. The Genus is thus 
divided into Species by the addition of quahties. Every 
Species is made up, in the last analysis, of Individuals. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 263 

An individual is that wMcli admits of no farther di^feron;^! 
because all the qualities belonging to the object are st^^":^ 
posed to be indicated by the name assigned to it. . S^fe^"' 
above may be conveniently represented as follows : ^^ "^^-vj^ 

Genus=The common Essence or Quality. ^'^^ 

Species = Genus + Differentia. 

Individual=Genus-|-Differentia+ Accidents. 

By Accidents are meant the individual peculiarities. 
We will illustrate by an example : 

Genus Animal=The common property or essence by 

which animals are distinguished 
from vegetables. 

Species Man=AnimaH-Kational. 

Individual C8esar=Animal+Kational+All the quali- 
ties which distinguished Ca3sar 
from all other men, and made 
him particularly Caesar. 

There are different orders of Genera ; for a genus may 
be a species * in relation to some higher genus, while a 
genus truly in relation to orders comprehended under it. 
Thus Animal may be said to be a species of Creature, . 
understanding by Creature any thing created ; Vegetahle 
being another species of creature. The distinction thus 
arises between a Maximum and a Proximum Genus, — 
Maximum denoting a genus which is not a species, and 
Proximum a genus next above a species, but yet not the 
highest genus. It is evident, however, that in our Classi- 
fication we are not necessarily limited to a certain number 
of divisions : on the contrary, we can multiply them ac- 
cording to our convenience. Hence we find naturahsts 
making Orders and Classes, in addition to Genera and 
Species. 

♦ Species here is taken in an imperfect sense. 



264 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

Classification is either I^atural, Scientific, or Arbi- 

TEARY. 

I. Natural Classification. This is that spon- 
taneous Classification which appears in all language, in- 
dependently of scientific investigation. Thus all the 
ohjects of nature, as Animals, Vegetables, and Metals, in 
their different kinds, and all the products of human art, 
are distinguished and classed. 

II. Scientific Classification. This is the result of 
scientific and elaborate investigations, and appears in books 
of Science and Natural History. The terms here em- 
ployed are invented for t^^ purpose, and are generally un- 
intelligible to the vulgar, Decause remote from common 
use. 

Scientific Classification is strictly natural, also, in one 
point of view ; that is, it is conformed to the actual Sys- 
tem of Nature. Natural spontaneous Classification arises 
from that striking, palpable, and outside view of Nature, 
which all men readily and unavoidably take : Scientific 
Classification arises from a more intimate and curious, and 
an interior view of Nature, determined by philosophical 
aims and principles, formally laid down and reflected 
upon. 

III. Arbitrary Classification. This is an inten- 
tional violation of natural identity and difference. It 
conseq[uently is altogether distinct from the two preceding 
forms of Classification. It is an incongruous and grotesque 
assemblage of particulars produced by the sportive fancy 
for humorous and witty effect. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 265 



SECTION V. 

PKINCIPLES DETERMINING THE INDUCTION OF PHENOMENA 
IN CLASSIFICATION. 

Ideas of Identity and Difference, Ideas of Synthesis and 
Analysis, belong to the common human mind, and impel 
it, whether spontaneously and witl^^-at reflection, as in the 
first form of Classification, or whether through reflection 
and investigation, as in the second form, to classify and 
distinguish the objects of perception. The world without, 
made after the Ideas of the Divine Architect, derives 
from these Ideas its diversity and unity. And here, again, 
the mind of man, made after the likeness of its great 
Original, is prepared to read this diversity and unity. 
The Identities and Difl'erences of all created things, the 
beautiful variety amid perfect system and order, find 
within our reason the key of interpretation. JVe do not 
really classify : the Classification is already made in the 
constitution of the world ; TFe only read and compre- 
hend it. 

And even Arbitrary Classification has its law within 
ourselves ; for it is only the nice perception of natural 
and rational identity and difierence which enables us to 
make those violations of congruity which produce the 
humorous and ludicrous effect. Hence we find that minds 
of the most delicate and perfect structure are most keenly 
12 



266 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

alive to genuine wit and humor. In Addison, we have 
a striking exemplification of this fact. 

After pointing out the Ideas which lead us to classify 
at all, it still remains to explain the principles on which 
the different classifications arise. 

The conception of general Classes, such as Genera, 
comprehending other Classes such as Species, the concep- 
tion of divisions and subdivisions, until we arrive at 
Classes composed barely of individuals, naturally arises 
out of the Idea of the unity and variety of system. But 
the particular question to be determmed is, How do we 
select the distinct characteristic of the Genus and the 
Species ? In other words. Why, amid many identities 
and differences, do we fix upon the particular ones 1 

I. We have seen * that the Idea of Determinate 
Form, both esthetically and somatologically, enters into 
the structure of all things. Hence the identities and 
diversities of the world appear in the forms of things as 
limited in space. !N"othing is more obvious to the common 
eye than these, and therefore no classification springs up 
more readily and spontaneously. Thus animals and plants 
are known, distinguished, arranged, and named. The 
Idea of Determinate Form within the human mind pre- 
pares and predisposes it for the actual knowledge of the 
generic and specific forms of nature. The conception of 
the determinate forms of objects, however, is connected 
with that of interior functions and properties ; and even 
m the most unreflective and spontaneous judgments, the 
two are not entirely separated. Thus the distinction 
between the animate and inanimate never lies wholly in 
form, but in the Idea of Life, as an organific power deter. 

♦ Pages 189, 202. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 267 

mining the difference. And, again^ the distinction be- 
tween animals and plants never lies wholly in the form, 
but in sensibility, locomotive activity, voluntary appropria- 
tion and skill, and various functions belonging only to 
the former. There is, in line, a conception of different 
laws governing these different forms of life. 

Specific identity may be defined by the form alone. 
It is the Identity of the outline drawn and limited in 
space, and the Identity of proportion and of mechanism, 
making together one distinct picture for the imagination. 

Generic Identity, on the contrary, lies not in the col- 
lective outline of form, but in the outline of capital parts, 
and in connection wdth this, in the oneness of relations, 
ends, and functions. 

The Individual embodies the generic and specific 
identities, and superadds aU the lineaments, shades, and 
expressions, which combined constitute the finished and 
unique picture. 

II. Another ground of Classification is found in the 
Identities and differences of the order of antecedence and 
sequence of phenomena. The important ideas which 
govern here are Cause and Law. But nevertheless we 
have not in the mere classification, the determination 
specifically of causes and laws, but only the arrangement 
and naming of phenomena, from the fact that they 
uniformly precede as immediate antecedents certain other 
phenomena, or uniformly succeed them as immediate 
sequent s. 

This, like visible form, is a principle of ordinary 
classification: for although the uniformities imply Law, 
and would not excite attention unless the Idea of Law 
were in the mind, still they are not contemplated in par- 
ticular reference to Law, or with a view at once to cs- 



268 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

tablisli Law, but simply to obtain a convenient arrange- 
ment and nomenclature. Such, a classification is indeed 
subsidiary to the determination of Law — a preparatory 
process of the highest moment. We have a striking 
exemplification of its imjDortance, as well as of its mere 
subsidiary character, in the history of Chemical Science. 
Experiments were multiplying from the age of the 
alchymists, and the observed uniformities of the pheno- 
menal seq[uence as they continually became enlarged and 
modified, suggested new classifications and new terms. 
The facts were thus preserved, disseminated, and handed 
down ; philosophical meditation had distinct objects before 
it ; new 'investigations had their obvious starting points; 
and a widening avenue of knowledge gave still more invit- 
ing prospects. But it was reserved, at a late period, for 
Dalton and Faraday to propound Theories which, if indeed 
still theories, approach very near the line where theory 
merges into law, and proclaims the ultimate end of human 
thought attained. 

III. The highest ground of classification is the con- 
ception of a fixed law comprehending and governing the 
phenomena. 

The determinate forms of bodies spring from some 
law, whether somatological or esthetical, or from a union 
of both ; and the uniform sequences of phenomena have 
likewise their law somewhere. Now, before any law is 
distinctly conceived of, the classification, as we have repre- 
sented, takes place by the mere marks of likeness and un- 
likeness in form, and the mere correspondency of the 
sequences. Thus arise the classifications which obtain 
commonly among men, and which are expressed in the 
general terms of ordinary language. Thus also arise the 
earlier classifications of Science, while, by various tenta- 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 269 

tive efforts, it is groping its way to stupendous and sure 
results. But no sooner liave conceptions of general and 
fixed laws become developed, than the human mind 
attempts classifications from a higher point of view. 
Now the law which is conceived of as binding together 
the widely diffused and multiform parts of an extended 
system, gives the generical designations ; while the species 
show the complete unfolding of formative powers, whether 
by a plastic force impressed from without, or by an organ- 
ific energy acting from within. If the laws which govern 
the widely extended systems in their unity, and those 
which control the specific developments in their complete- 
ness, be accurately discovered, then the classification will 
attain its highest perfection. And just, as under theoreti- 
cal conceptions, an approximation is made towards the 
point of accurate discovery, will an approximation be 
made towards a perfect classification — a classification 
which at the same time is the most philosophical and the 
most natural. 

The history of Natural Science affords us abundant 
illustrations of the progress of classification. I have 
already referred to Chemistry. Botany and Zoology 
afford perhaps the most striking illustrations, since on 
account of the multitude of particulars, classification 
becomes at once an object of paramount importance. 
The earlier classifications in these sciences were formed 
by arranging the particulars according to their external 
parts. Hence they were merely descriptive ; and as 
description must vary according to the accuracy and 
variety of the observations, new systems were continually 
appearing, and endeavoring to supplant one another. 
Linnteus, by introducing the sexual principle, henceforth 
gave to the classification of plants a phytological 



270 ' INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

character, and advanced Botany to tlie dignity of deter- 
minate Science. Cuvier accomplished a similar reforma- 
tion in Zoology. With him the interior organization, 
as manifesting a wise and harmonious design, became the 
great object of research. Under this great Idea he not 
only arranged the tribes of animals at present existent, 
but even called forth into beautiful and rational symmetry, 
the fossil and fragmentary remains of ancient and extinct 
generations. It was the apprehension of the rational 
design and of the organific law, which led these great 
philosophers to their invaluable and immortal achieve- 
ments. 

Having distinguished the cardinal principles of classi- 
fication, we may next proceed to enq^uire particularly into 
the distinctive characteristics of genus and species. 

I have already remarked, that we are not necessarily 
confined to the particular classes of genus and species. 
In reality, wherever a number of particulars have any 
common characteristic, they may be classed together on 
this ground. And so also, on the other hand, any point 
of difference between particulars may be assumed as a 
ground for separating them, and seeking for them some 
other distribution. But we have seen tl^t there are 
principles, which, amid the vast number of possible 
classifications, demand a limitation ; and even spon- 
taneously constrain the common mind to conform to it. 
Besides genus and species, which have universally obtained, 
and which therefore seem to be a most natural division, 
we have Orders of a widely comprehensive character, 
including genera ; and again. Orders of a limited charac- 
ter, included under species. The comprehensive orders, 
however, are only a higher description of genera, and the 
limited orders a variety of the species ; so that an exposi- 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 271 

tion of genus and species must include tlie main principles 
of logical division. 

I sliall begin with Species. In respect to form, I have 
already defined species, a completed picture for the imagi- 
nation. If we take the species on the higher ground of 
law working in the interior organization, the same concep- 
tion of completeness becomes the governing conception. 
In the species we have the completed organization. 
Every individual, of course, is a completed organization. 
But the individual contains no organism, powers or pro- 
perties, which do not belong to the species. Indeed, 
every individual may be taken as a representative of the 
species to which he belongs ; and the species is but a col- 
lection of individuals identified in the whole organism, 
and in all the powers and properties which go to make up 
the distinct and complete being under its organific and 
determining law. The individual is justly said to be dis- 
tinguished from the species only by accidents ^ and not by 
essential constitution and properties. These accidents 
are either circumstantial and separable, that is, they 
stand around the individual, describing locality, position, 
and exterior relations generally, but forming no part of 
the essential being ; or they are modifications of the 
essential and constitutive organism and properties of the 
species. The clear conceptions of Identity and Constitu- 
tive Law enable us to compare and limit the species ; 
and the equally clear conception of difference enables us 
to detect those higher modifications which do not affect 
the identity of the species, and only form the accidents 
which serve to distinguish the individuals. These con- 
ceptions are developed under their proper Ideas in the 
process of making comparisons of phenomena. There is 
thus the union of a certain tact acquired by experience, 



272 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

and of rational a 'priori determination. It is tliis union 
which, makes classification truly philosophical. 

The orders formed under species are based upon modi- 
fications more remarkable, yet not destructive of the pal- 
pable identity of the species. 

Genus differs from species in this, that while the last 
expresses a completed organization, and all the essential 
properties, and is capable of full representation in the in- 
dividual, the former comprises only a part of the organiza- 
tion and properties, and cannot take the individual as its 
representative. It is true, indeed, that the common mark 
by which several species are united under one genus, 
must be found in every individual of the several species ; 
but then it appears in the individual in the unity of all 
the parts, while in the genus it is abstracted from them. 

The all-important inquiry here is, what shall govern 
us in the selection of the generic mark ? Having a clear 
conception of species as determined by the identity of the 
constitutive law of the complete organization, and of the 
essential properties, we now, under the idea of system, 
proceed to consider the relations between the several 
species. Here identities are also perceived ; and it is 
possible to select any one of them as the generic mark. 
But suppose an identity be perceived in a certain number 
of instances, with respect to a particular mark, how can 
we be certain of its universality ? We cannot be certain 
of its universality, unless it be a mark which is the ex- 
ponent of a universal law. The occurrence of the mark in 
a great number of instances, and to the extent of our ob- 
servation, would lead us to suspect the presence of a law ; 
and therefore the selection of this mark as a generic desig- 
nation becomes, a convenient and wise expedient, until we 
are enabled to reach a higher ground. A proper generic 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 273 

classification then cannot "be based uj)on a trivial and 
doubtful mark. It must be one, wliicb, by its importance 
and prevalence, points at least towards a law. But wbere 
the law is gained, there the generic mark becomes per- 
manently fixed, and there alone. We may take as an il- 
lustration, the generical distinction between the animate 
and the inanimate. Here the great Idea and the laws of 
life are the ground of the distinction ; and here we are as- 
sured that it is fixed unalterably. Of equal clearness and 
fixedness is the distinction between the animal, and the 
vegetable, because we comprehend clearly the peculiar 
laws of their organizations. And so universally, wherever 
we perceive a. common mark in several species, which 
stands as the exponent of a law working in all these 
species, there we have the sure and proper element of the 
genus. 

As several species are embraced by a genus under a 
common mark, so again several genera may be embraced 
by a higher genus under a common and more comprehen- 
sive mark. This mark is the exponent of a higher and 
more comprehensive law, binding together laws, which, 
in their particular spheres, govern and explain the phe- 
nomena. The human mind is ever intent upon system, 
and hence is ever seeking for higher generalizations. By 
synthesis, it aims at a universal unity, and by analysis, 
developes unity into constituent parts harmoniously col- 
Kajated. 

From the foregoing, I tliink it must be clear that clas- 
sification has its starting-point in Ideas of the Eeason ; 
and that definite laws already known, or the theoretical 
conception of laws, form the determining principles. 

These principles undoubtedly obtain an expression in the 
form of axioms and definitions, which, if they have not 

12* 



274 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

been formally laid down, have nevertheless, as current 
and generally understood judgments, formed the immedi- 
ate authority and guide of all just and philosophical classi- 
fication. 

A statement of the leading axioms and definitions be- 
longing here will close this part of our subject. 

I. Every universal is made up of particulars identified 
either in their determinate form, or in their cardinal pro- 
perties, or in their organific or constitutive law, or in all 
conjointly. 

II. Every particular is comprehended within a univer- 
sal by the identity either of determinate form, or of cardi- 
nal properties, or of organific or constitutive law, or of all 
conjointly. 

III. Species is the identity of determinate form, car- 
dinal properties and organific or constitutive law, con- 
jointly, w^here all these exist in the subject, so that every 
particular is essentially complete in the description of its 
species. 

lY. Genus is the identity of several species in a car- 
dinal form, property, or law, which comprehends them in 
the unity of system. 

V. The unity of nature lies in identity ; the variety of 
nature lies in difference. 

YI. Where difference consists in the opposition of de- 
terminate forms in the organisms compared, and in essen- 
tial properties, while at the same time there is an identity 
in some constitutive law comprehending all alike, there 
arises the distinction of species. 

YII. Where the difference consists in the opposition 
of determinate forms in the organisms, and of essential 
properties, without identity in some general comprehend- 
ing law, there arises the distinction of genera. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 275 

VIII. Where several genera are comprehended within 
an order or higher genus, the identity which binds them 
together, appears also in the several species under each 
particular genus ; but then it appears alone in the higher 
generalization, leaving behind in the lower classes the other 
points of identity. 

Scholium. Species is an identity throughout. Genus 
is an identity in part. As the points of identity diminish, 
the generalization advances. Thus from the individual we 
advance to the species, from the species to the proximum 
genus, from the proximum to the maximum. The uni- 
versal law sits like a sovereign in lofty state, regulating 
all ; but having under it a multitude of subordinates, 
which it binds together in an intimate and harmonious 
co-working. 



276 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION VI. 

DISTINCTION BETWEEN A GENERAL EACT AND A FIXED 
AND ABSOLUTE LAW. 

The relation between Ideas and Laws lias been treated of 
in a preceding Part. '''" If tlie views there presented are 
just, then that alone is entitled to the name of law which 
finds its correspondent and basis in an Idea. Moral laws 
thus answer to the Ideas of right and wrong, freedom and 
responsibility, personal identity, and immortahty. Esthe- 
tical laws answer to the Idea of the beautiful, under its 
different modifications. And so, likewise, somatological 
laws must answer to their appropriate Ideas. This I have 
attempted to exhibit under Primordial Logic. The charac- 
teristics of Ideas are necessity and universality in their 
proper spheres. Hence the axioms, definitions and laws, 
must be necessary and universal likewise in their proper 
spheres. 

The Intuitive Function, in connection with suflS.cient 
observation, perceives these laws. The law is seen to com- 
prehend the facts of observation, and thus to be the law of 
the facts ; while, as a law, it is seen to be universal and 
necessary. 

Now, on the other hand, a general fact is the mere 
statement of a series of facts, appearing to the extent of 

* Part I., Section VIL 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 277 

our observation in a uniform relation of sequence. We 
may proceed to give a theory, or even to determine a law 
of the facts ; but this is another affair. Taken as a mere 
general fact, the series is neither theory or law. 

But the enquiry may here be made, How, then, does 
a general fact differ from generalization under genus and 
species ? Generalization is a grouping of phenomena on 
the ground of identity in one or many particulars, for the 
]3urpose of assigning a common name, which may thence- 
forth be employed in our thinking and reasoning, as the 
sign of all contained under it. But the general fact is the 
affirmation of the identity itself as a truth belonging to 
the whole class of things contemplated. The identity 
affirmed in the general fact, however, is not always the 
one upon which the generalization is based. For example : 
upon the observation of certain identities and differences 
we have classed certain animals under the terms sheep, ox, 
deer. Upon a farther observation of these animals, we 
find that they are deficient in the upper cutting teeth, and 
that they ruminate. We extend our observations, and we 
find ,that all animals, deficient in the upper cutting teeth, 
ruminate. 'Now, upon these identities we may class to- 
gether all these animals as ruminating animals. But the 
general fact is the affirmation that all sheep, oxen, deer, 
and so on — that is, all animals already classed by certain 
identities and differences — have this additional identity, 
of being deficient in the upper cutting teeth ; and again, 
that all animals thus deficient, ruminate. So, also, in 
chemistry, we call all substances which change vegetable 
blues into red, acids ; and those which change them into 
green, alkalies ; but the general fact is the affirmation 
that all acids, and all alkalies, possess these respective 
properties ; and again, that acids and alkalies neutralise 



278 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

each other. In the general fact is contained the affirma- 
tion of a uniform order of sequence, upon which we may 
base a classification or not, as we please, e. g. when we ob- 
serve that the animals above described ruminate, we 
are under no necessity of classing them as ruminants : but 
whether we do so or not, the general fact remains. In 
fine, in the one case we are aiming simply to arrange and 
name : in the other, we are affirming a truth and the 
semblance of a law. To name all animals which have the 
above-mentioned characteristics, ruminating animals, is 
plainly different from affirming, generally, all animals 
which want the upper cutting teeth ruminate. 

I call the general fact the semblance of a law, for the 
general fact, as such, is not a law. But, nevertheless, it 
answers the most important ends in calling before the 
mind the stated connections existing between phenomena. 
" Batewell, the celebrated cattle-breeder, observed, in a 
great number of individual beasts, a tendency to fatten 
readily ; and in a great number of others, the absence of 
this constitution : in every individual of the former de- 
scription, he observed a certain peculiar make, though 
they differed widely in colour, &c. Those of the latter 
description differed no less in various points, but agreed 
in being of a different make from the others. These facts 
were his data : from which, combining them with the 
general principle that Nature is steady and uniform in her 
proceedings, he logically drew the conclusion, that beasts 
of that specified make have universally a peculiar tendency 
to fattening.''* This was the general fact at which 
Bakewell arrived, a fact of great practical moment to all 
cattle-breeders. But as announced by him, it was no law, 

* Wliateley's Logic, Book IV., ch. ii., § 2. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 279 

because connected with no Idea. Now let iis suppose that 
tlie j)ecuHar make was one connected in respect to climate, 
food; &c., with the freest and most genial development of 
the organific power of life ; and also, that it combined the 
finest esthetical proportions, so that the conclusion might 
have been announced as follows : — The most genial culture 
gives the highest animal beauty, and the highest animal 
beauty is connected with the highest animal utility, ex- 
hibited in strength, activity, and a tendency to fattening. 
Should we not here be advanced beyond a general fact to 
the conception of a universal law, and that because w^e 
have brought in points of consideration connected immedi- 
ately with Ideas? 

That bodies fall to the earth, was a fact of general ob- 
servation before Newton saw the apple fall ; and as a gen- 
eral fact, it was of eminent and daily use among men ; but 
it was not until this general fact had been elaborated in 
the mind of Newton that it became the exponent of a law. 
But what gave to gravitation now the characteristics of a 
law ? Was it not the Idea of centralization — the Idea of 
the universal and necessary arrangement of matter in or- 
der to form a system? The centrifugal law is no less 
based upon an Idea ; for the Keason sees with intuitive 
certainty that without a diffusive movement harmoniously 
united with the central movement, matter could not exist 
in space in separate masses. ''' 

Chemistry has, until very recently, been a science of 
general facts, and, therefore, an imperfect science. Now, 
the great advance made by the combined labors of Dalton, 
Davy, and Faraday, and especially by the investigations 
and acute reasonings of the last, are just an advance from 

* Supra, p. 198. 



280 li^DUCTIVE LOGIC. 

a mass of general facts to a comprehensive law, developed 
under tlie force of an Idea : at least, it is a near approxi- 
mation to such a result. The identification of chemical 
and electrical attractions is a lofty generalization. But 
the Idea and the law are indicated, if not fully expressed, 
in the conception of Polarity, *-•" or, to use Faraday's lan- 
guage, in the conception of " an axis of power having 
equal and opposite forces." In the law of gravity and of 
the centrifugal force, we have the law of the cosmical 
masses : in Polarity, or the '^ axis of power," we have the 
dawn at least of the law which governs the interior con- 
stitution of bodies. These are the great laws of the uni- 
verse. 

The method of arriving at general facts is the empiri-" 
cal method. It is the method of the earlier processes of 
science, and preparatory to the determination of laws. 
On many subjects the human mind has not advanced be- 
yond these general facts. This is true of medicine, for ex- 
ample. From accident and investigation, certain substances 
have been found to possess a remedial effect; until at 
length something like general rules have been instituted 
for the treatment of various diseases. The whole history 
of Therapeutics exhibits a conflict of theories, and a mass 
of conjectures often sagacious, but more frequently wild 
and loose. The subject is one of extreme difficulty, on 
account of the multitudinous influences which have to be 
taken into the account. Even at the present day, more 
reliance, perhaps, is to be placed upon individual expe- 
rience, judgment, and tact, than upon any established 
general principles. Curious and hopeful generahzation 
may have been made, but no law has as yet appeared. 

* Supra, p. 200. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 281 

But the defect in Therapeutics is not merely the want 
of laws, hut the want of clearly ascertained general facts ; 
for were it certainly known that certain substances could 
expel disease, for instance, as certainly as that a particular 
breed of cattle fatten easily, we should obtain practical 
rules of the highest value. 

General facts, when once established by a sufficient 
number of experiments, show the presence of law, although 
the law has not yet attained to an expression, and they 
may, therefore, be applied as authoritative. Numerous 
chemical compositions and decompositions were settled as 
unquestionable facts, before the later great chemists ap- 
peared. Eules of practical mechanics obtained before the 
laws of the science were discovered. On all subjects open 
to common observation, the uniform order of sequences has 
been noted among the multitude, and general facts have 
been attained with more or less accuracy. 

But notwithstanding the many beneficial results arising 
from spontaneous observations of the uniformities of Na- 
ture, it must be confessed that errors have likewise arisen 
in this way. Observations may be defective in many 
ways : They may be made hastily and inaccurately ; they 
may not be sufficiently varied, nor often enough repeated ; 
and they may be made under prejudice, with an excited 
imagination, or with a concealed, obstinate determination 
to arrive, at all events, at a particular conclusion. These 
defective observations have been so rife in Therapeutics, 
that the word empiricism has in common usage become di- 
verted from its original and just meaning, and is apphed 
to express those loose and baseless methods of treating dis- 
ease which are enveloped in mystery, at once to excite the 
imagination of the multitude, and to conceal their own ab- 
surdity. Popular beliefs, also, in dreams and omens, are 



282 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

only another form of empiricism, or loose and insufficient 
observation. And yet, even these errors show the noble 
constitution of the human mind ; for it is the strong sense 
of law which creates the tendency to draw general conclu- 
sions, wherever uniform sequences appear. 

The importance of estabhshing principles and rules of 
observation in view of arriving at general facts and laws, 
is apparent to every one. This, indeed, comprises, in the 
main, the Logic of Induction. To this we shall now pro- 
ceed. In the first place, we shall speak of observation in 
respect to general facts ; and in the next place, in respect 
to laws. The distinction between the two which I have 
attempted to draw, I think, will not be misconceived. It 
may, indeed, be summed up as follows : General facts are 
the uniform sequences of phenomena — or the uniform de- 
pendence and involution of phenomena, so that a given 
consequent cannot exist without a certain antecedent, nor 
a given antecedent without involving a certain consequent : 
Law, in distinction from the orderly sequence itself, is that 
which governs it and accounts for it, and without which 
the sequence would not have been possible. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 283 



SECTION VII. 

THE LOGIC OF GENERAL FACTS. 

The great Francis Bacon, the first who labored at a fuU 
exposition of the Inductive Philosophy, himself signally 
failed in all his attempts to give an exemplification of its 
principles. The catalogues of facts which he has left are 
of little or no value. The reason is obvious : — The facts 
are heterogeneous, mixed, scattered, casual, and often 
trivial. The observations appear to have been governed 
by no principle, no definite aim, no prophetic thought, in 
fine, by no Idea. As the observation of facts and ideas 
are both demanded in a philosophy of Nature, so the 
omission of one or the other must be fatal to any attempt 
to arrive at such a philosophy. Bacon exposed the errors 
of those who had attempted this work by Ideas alone. 
He himself failed, because he attempted it by observation 
alone. 

The point now distinctly before us is to ascertain the 
true logical grounds of deciding when phenomena have a 
real and fixed connection, as antecedent and consequent, 
so that we may affirm, as a general fact, that they are thus 
connected. 

The connection of phenomena, as stated antecedent 
and consequent, is the exponent of law. Hence, we are 
determined to the observation of orderly sequences as 
naturally j)resented, and to make experiments in order to 



284 INDUCTIVE- LOGIC. 

enlarge the field of observation, by the Idea of lav/. If we 
do not find the la,w itself, we shall find its beautiful mani- 
festations — we shall know at least that we are dwelling in 
the light of its countenance. 

The Idea of law gives rise to the axioms of universal 
law and of the uniformity of Nature.* These axioms are 
like the voices of the Idea, ever speaking to our thoughts 
as Ave search about and pry into the phenomena of Nature. 

Thus, then, in seeking to establish general facts, we 
are looking out for the uniformities of Nature. 

The phenomena which we examine and compare, must 
stand in the one or the other of the .two relations of ante- 
cedent or consequent, for phenomena are in a continual 
flux, and conditionate one another in this way, the same 
phenomena being consequents of antecedents, and antece- 
dents to consequents. The flux of phenomena, however, 
is not a lengthening chain of succession, ever presenting 
new particulars, but is composed of cycles, where the end 
returns into the beginning : and the complexity of Nature 
presents us cycle winding within cycle, cycle crossing 
cycle, and all in perfect harmony ; for not only are the 
particulars of each cycle related, but cycle also is related 
to cycle in the unity of one vast system. The acid which 
is itself a consequent of the union of two simples, returns 
by one cycle into these simples again ; and by another re- 
lation, becomes an antecedent in another cycle, and aids 
its movements, as in double elective afi&nity. General 
facts, therefore, may be more or less extensive. The 
perpetual relation of a particular antecedent and con- 
sequent is in itself a general fact; an established cycle 
of antecedents and consequents is a general fact ; and 

* Supra, p. 228. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 285 

the establislied connexion between different cycles is 
another form of general fact. But the principles are the 
same which govern the whole ; for the observation in all 
is the observation of recurring antecedents and conse- 
quents. 

There is one thmg here worthy of being remarked, 
namely, that when we are seeking for the stated conse- 
quent of an antecedent, we may employ experiment as 
well as observation, since being already in possession of the 
antecedent, we can place it in different relations in order 
to see what consequents are connected with it ; but that, 
on the contraiy, when we are seeking for the stated ante- 
cedent of a consequent, we can employ observation only, 
for the consequent being subsequent to the antecedent, 
we cannot place it in different relations in order to see 
how it arises, since it already is ; and, therefore, we have 
to watch for new instanGCS where the consequent in ques- 
tion is presented together with its proper antecedent. 

Our object being to estabhsh the fact of uniformity, it 
is necessary to settle, as a preliminary question, how many 
instances are demanded to this end. As Nature is gov- 
erned throughout by exact law, if it can be shown, in re- 
spect to any succession, that a given consequent does take 
place when a certain antecedent is present, all other ante- 
cedents being excluded, then if there be only one instance, 
this one is sufficient to estabhsh the fact of the sequence. 
Suppose, for example, that we exclude, m the combustion 
of a metal, all antecedents but oxygen gas, then it becomes 
certam, upon the axiom of the uniformity of Nature, that 
the presence of oxygen is a condition of this phenomenon. 
But it does not appear from this that oxygen is a general 
condition of combustion. We may, therefore, proceed^ to 
observe and experiment other combinations, excluding 



286 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

oxygen — and if we find tliat in all such instances no com- 
bustion takes place^ tlie7i, and not until then, we infer that 
oxygen is a general and indispensable condition of this 
phenomenon. Here one instance is not sufficient, since, 
although oxygen is a supporter, there may be other sub- 
stances which act in the same way. When several instances 
concur, the conclusion becomes strong ; and when all 
known observation "and experiment give the same result, 
no doubt is any longer entertained, for the uniformity 
seems now fully developed. The case in which we deter- 
mine that oxygen is a condition of combustion, and the 
case in which we determine that it is a general condition, 
are widely different, since one instance is sufficient for the 
first, whereas the induction must be extended in the 
second.* Wherein lies the distinction between the two 
cases ? Is it not that in the first case we take a given 
antecedent, and excluding from it all other antecedents, 
we observe it in circumstances w^here, if any consequent 
ensue, it alone can be the condition and antecedent of 
that consequent ; while, in the second case, we take a 
given consequent, and observe it as it occurs in a variety 
of circumstances, in order to see whether in all these cir- 
cumstances there is a general difference, and but one uni- 
form point of agreement, and that point the presence of 
the oxygen ? 

Here, then, we see the greater advantage we possess in 
following the sequence from the antecedent to the conse- 
quent, than in the reverse order. In the first, having the 
antecedent, we can, as before remarked, by experiment 

* Oxygen, for some time, was considered the only supporter of combustion. 
This was the general fact until subsequent discoveries brought to light other 
supporters of combustion. In no gemrcd fact, therefore, do we attain the neces' 
mry — this belongs only to law. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 287 

•- 

place it in diiferent circumstances and isolate it ; but in 
the second^ we cannot experiment, but must merely ob- 
serve the instances in which the consequent appears in 
connection with an antecedent : and here the circumstances 
may be so numerous as to require many comparisons in 
order to detect the particular antecedent required. But, 
on the other hand, the antecedent itself may be complex, 
and require analysis in order to determine the force of the 
different elements. Where this analysis is possible, so 
that we may separate the elements, we can reduce the 
experiment again to the utmost simplicity. If we have 
established that common air is necessary to combustion, 
and afterwards find that combustion takes place in another 
gas different from common air, we may be led to en- 
quire whether this gas is present in common air; and 
when by analysis we have arrived at the composition of 
the atmosphere, we may test the elements in order to 
determine whether one element alone is the condition of 
combustion. 

But it often happens that we cannot analyse the com- 
plex antecedent. For example, a certain remedy appears 
to be efficacious in a particular disease ; now, if all the 
circumstances are precisely the same in any other case of 
the disease, the remedy may here be expected on the gen- 
eral uniformity of ISTature to be equally efficacious. But 
the complexity of the antecedents creates a two-fold diffi- 
culty. Do we have such a perfect knowledge of all the 
circumstances in the first case — the constitution of the in- 
dividual, the influences of regimen, &c., the nature of the 
disease itself, and the force of the recuperative power of 
nature, as to be confident to what extent, or even if at all, 
the remedy is to be taken as an antecedent to the 
recovery ? And if all this were granted, is our knowledge 



288 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

of all tlie circumstances in tlie second case sufficiently 
minute and accurate to enable us to decide upon tlie 
identity of the two cases ? Now^ it is evident that where 
antecedents are thus complicated^ observations and experi- 
ments need to be multiplied in order to arrive at a general 
expression in any degree satisfactory. 

It appears from the preceding remarks, that the num- 
ber of instances necessary to enable us to decide upon a 
prevailing uniformity, depends upon our success in elimi- 
nating all the antecedents and consequents foreign to the 
particular sequence we are contemplating. If, in the case 
of the treatment of disease, we can eliminate every thing 
but the disease and the remedy, then we shall at once be 
in a condition to decide upon the sequence. We shall 
proceed, therefore, to consider the 

PRINCIPLES OF ELIMINATION. 
I. GrENERAL DIFFERENCE WITH UNIFORM AGREEMENT 

IN ONE POINT. — Here we suppose several instances of con- 
joined antecedents to be brought under observation, in 
each instance, all the antecedents being different but one. 
Now, if in all these instances a particular consequent uni- 
formly appears, then we infer the general fact that the un- 
varying antecedent is connected with the unvarying con- 
sequent. Two instances thus agreeing would, on the 
axiom of uniformity, lead us to a conclusion. This con- 
clusion, however, attains its greatest force only where the 
agreement is verified by general observation and experi- 
ment, that is, by all the observation and experiment, not 
only of the individual philosopher, but also of the whole 
fraternity engaged in the same course of investigation. 
Thus, if in several combinations of elements, all differing 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 289 

except in the single circumstance of tlie presence of oxy- 
gen^ and if in all these an acid is uniformly produced^ 
then we would conclude, under the conditions above laid 
down, that oxygen is the acidifying element. 

The same principle applies to the observation of an 
unvarying sequent appearing amid varying sequent s : 
here, if the antecedents generally appear irregular and 
indeterminate, but among these there is one antecedent, 
which, in all the observed instances, is uniformly present, 
then we infer that it is connected with the unvarying se- 
quent. 

There is another mode of applying this principle, 
which, wherever it is possible to combine ifc with the pre- 
ceding, makes the elimination far more perfect. Suppose 
that, after having determined, in several instances gene- 
rally unlike, the connexion of an unvarying antecedent 
with an unvarying consequent, we are able next to com- 
pare instances which are also generally unlike, and agree 
only in the uniform absence of the particular antecedent 
noted before, and in the absence of the corresponding 
consequent, or in the absence of the .consequent and the 
absence of the corresponding antecedent, — then we have 
here an indication of uniformity tending to the same 
general result. By the first mode of applying the princi- 
ple, we eliminate all the unlike and varying antecedents 
and consequents from the particular antecedent, and con- 
sequent on the ground of their unvarying co-presence : 
by the second, on the ground of their unvarying joint ab- 
sence, 

II. General agreement with uniform difference 
IN ONE POINT. — By this principle, we effect a complete 
elimination. There are three modes of applying it. 

First : Let there be a number of antecedents and con- 
13 



290 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

sequents conjoined : remove one of tlie antecedents, tlie 
consequent which disappears with it is its particular con- 
sequent. Or if we observe the disappearance in some in- 
stance of one of the consequents^ and find that a certain 
antecedent has also disappeared, then we infer again the 
sequence of the two. In the first case^ we may experi- 
ment as well as observe ; in the second, we can only ob- 
serve ; since we can compel the disappearance of a conse- 
quent by the removal of its antecedent, but we cannot 
act upon the antecedent through its consequent. Where 
we repeat the experiment or the observation, and in every 
instance remove, or note the disappearance of, the same 
element, and in every instance find that the same corre- 
sponding antecedent or consequent is likewise wanting, 
we of course confirm the general fact by a wider induc- 
tion. 

Second : Let there be several antecedents attended 
with certain consequents ; and among these let there be 
introduced a new antecedent, the new consequent which 
now appears we infer to be in sequence with the new an- 
tecedent. Let this be repeated in other instances, and if, 
wherever we introduce the particular antecedent the same 
consequent uniformly appears, and there only, then the 
elimination of all foreign influences is complete, and the 
sequence under investigation firmly established. 

On the other hand, if, among several phenomena, a 
new phenomenon should make its appearance, and if, upon 
examination, a new antecedent should be found to be also 
present, then a connexion between the two would be in- 
ferred. If, in repeated instances, the same concurrence 
takes place, nothing seems wanting to the elimination. 

Third : Let there be a number of antecedents, pre- 
Benting complicated effects, concurrent, opposing, or inde- 



INDUCTIVE Locrc. 291 

pendent of each other. If, upon examination, we can 
trace certain of the consequents to particular antecedents, 
then we may at once suhduct these consequents with their 
antecedents from the sum total. What remains now, be- 
comes the subject of new investigations ; and thus we may 
successively eliminate antecedents and consequents, until, 
we will suppose, only one consequent remains. ISTow, if 
there be only one antecedent also remaining, then we in- 
fer its connexion with the consequent. This remaining 
consequent is what Sir John Herschel calls the residual 
phenomenon. I borrow from him the following illustra- 
tion : '^ The return of the comet predicted by Professor 
EnckCj a great many times in succession, and the general 
good agreement of its calculated with its observed place 
during any one of its periods of visibility, would lead us to 
say that its gravitation towards the sun and planets is the 
sole and sufficient cause of all the phenomena of its orbit- 
ual motion ; but when the effect of this cause is strictly 
calculated and subducted from the observed motion, there 
is found to remain behind a residual phenomenon, which 
would never have been otherwise ascertained to exist ^ 
which is a small anticipation of the time of its re-appear- 
anceSj or a diminution of its periodic time, which cannot 
be accounted for by gravity, and whose cause is therefore 
to be inquired into. Such an anticipation would be caused 
by the resistance of a medium disseminated through the 
celestial regions ; and as there are other good reasons for 
believing this to be a vera causa, it has therefore been as- 
cribed to such a resistance." * 

III. Elimination by corresponding quantities and 
INTENSITIES. — Antecedents and sequents may be brought 

* Discourse on tlie Study of Natural Pliilosopby, p. 15G. 



292 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

under the concejDtioii of Quantity ; and as Quantity has 
its exact science, antecedents and sequents are reducible 
to precise expressions. Now, tliere are certain antecedents 
which never entirely disappear, and therefore we cannot 
effect an elimination on the preceding principles. For in- 
stance : heat is always present, so that we can never de- 
termine by actual experiment what consequent would dis- 
appear if heat were entirely withdrawn. But if, by chang- 
ing the quantity of heat, we find corresponding changes in 
the consequents, then we know, as before, that a sequence 
exists. We do not remove the antecedent, nor change the 
essential order of the sequence, — we only modify the ante- 
cedent, and uniformly a like modification takes place in a 
stated consequent. Thus, we notice, in the first place, 
certain changes in our sensations with respect to heat and 
cold ; then, observing quicksilver, we see that as our sen- 
sations of heat increase in intensity, a corresponding ex- 
pansion of its bulk takes place, and that, as our sensations 
moderate, its bulk contracts, and that this contraction re- 
gularly goes on as the cold becomes more and more severe, 
until at length we make out an exact scale of temperature. 
Now, having determined that quicksilver regularly ex- 
pands and contracts, as the temperature increases or de- 
creases, we apply the scale to the observations we make 
upon other metals, and then upon bodies indiscriminately ; 
and thus the general fact appears, that all bodies are ex- 
panded by heat, and contracted by a loss of heat. In the 
same manner, we may determine that all bodies, v/hen put 
in motion, will continue to move until brought to a state 
of rest by an opposing force, taking this in the light of a 
general fact : We continue to remove obstacles, and as 
the obstacles are removed, the time of the continuation 
of motion is increased, and thus, although we can never 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 293 

remove all ' obstacles, we may infer that if all obstacles 
were removed, the body would continue to move on for 
ever. '••" 

" Sound consists in impulses communicated to our ears 
by the air. If a series of impulses of equal force be com- 
municated to it at equal intervals of time, at first in slow 
succession, and by degrees more and more rapidly, we 
hear at first a rattling noise, and then a hum, which by 
degrees acquires the character of a musical note rising 
higher and higher in acuteness, till its pitch becomes too 
high for the ear to follow. And from this correspondence 
between the pitch of the note and the rapidity of succes- 
sion of the impulse, we conclude that our sensation of the 
different pitches of musical notes originates in different 
rapidities with which their impulses are communicated to 
our ears/'f 

There is another form of the method to be noticed. 
\¥e may succeed in removing entirely the antecedent, but 
the consequent, instead of disappearing with it, m^y only 
undergo some modification, — perhaps a mere change in 
the d-egree of its intensity. If this modification of the 
consequent be uniform, then we cannot but infer a real 
sequence ; but inasmuch as the consequent is modified 
only, and does not disappear with the removal of the an- 
tecedent in question, it must be consequent to some other 
antecedent or antecedents also. This, then, becomes a 
case of compound sequence ; and the only way to arrive 
at the several antecedents is by tentative experiments, in 

* I introduce this merely as an illustration of the process of elimination 
under the principle laid down. The proposition is really an axiom — a univer- 
sal and necessary affirmation, determined by the idea of matter itself. — Yi^A 
si'jpra, pp. 158 and 219. 

t Herschel's Discourse, p. 153. 



294 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

which we eliminate successively various circumstances of 
the phenomena, or introduce new circumstances. In this 
way we enlarge our knowledge of the antecedents, or at 
length, by making the phenomenon disappear in conjunc- 
tion with the eliminations, ascertain the entire compound 
antecedent. 

lY. Elimination of the teems of a Sequence, in 

ORDEK to determine WHICH IS THE ANTECEDENT, AND 

WHICH THE Consequent. — Phenomena may be invariably 
concomitant, and therefore be known to have a fixed con- 
nexion, as antecedent and consequent, but the order of the 
sequence may not at once appear. Now, inasmuch as the 
causal influence acts through the antecedent to the pro- 
duction of the consequent, it follows that a consequent can 
be made to disappear, or be modified only by the elimina- 
tion or modification of the antecedent. Hence, if in at- 
tempting to eliminate or modify one of the terms of a se- 
quence, we hit upon the consequent, we shall soon find 
that it is the consequent, by being compelled to introduce 
an antecedent in order to accomplish our purpose : 
whereas, if we hit upon the antecedent, we shall remove 
or modify it without introducing the other term, and its 
removal or modification, immediately acting upon the 
other term, will show the order of sequence. 

We have an illustration of this in the Theory of Dew, 
by the late Dr. Wells, and which Sir John Herschel, in 
his Discourse already referred to, introduces as throughout 
'^ one of the most beautiful specimens of inductive experi- 
mental enquiry lying within a moderate compass." * 

We propose dew as a phenomenon whose invariable 
antecedent we would ascertain. " In the first place, we 

* Ibid, &c., pp. 159-163. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 295 

must separate dew from rain and tlie moisture of fogs, and 
limit the application of the term to what is really meant, 
which iSj the spontaneous appearance of moisture on suh- 
stances ex]30sed in the open air when no rain or visible 
wet is falling. Now, here we have analogous phenomena 
in the moisture wliich bedews a cold metal or stone when 
we breathe upon it ; that which appears on a glass of 
water fresh from the well in hot weather ; that which ap- 
pears on the inside of windows when sudden rain or hail 
chills the external air ; that which runs down our walls, 
when, after a long frost, a warm, moist thaw comes on : 
all these instances agree in one point, the coldness of the 
object dewed, in comparison with the air in contact with 
it." In the above we have an illustration of our first 
principle, there is here a general difference ivith iiniform 
agreement in one j^oint. 

But with respect to night dew, is this the real antece- 
dent ? " Is it a fact that the object dewed *5 colder than 
the air? Certainly not, one would be at first inchned to 
say ; for what is to maize it so 1 But the analogies are 
cogent, and unanimous ; and, therefore, we are not to dis- 
card their indications." The similarity of the consequents 
argue a similarity of the antecedents. In this case, to 
settle the c[uestion, we have only ^' to lay a thermometer 
in contact with the dewed substance, and hang one at a 
little distance above it, out of reach of its influence. The 
experiment has been therefore made ; the question has 
been asked, and the answer has been invariably in the 
affirmative. Whenever an object contracts dew, it is 
colder than the air. Here, then, we have an invariable 
concomitant circumstance." But is cold the antecedent 
or the consequent of dew? The vulgar prejudice would 
make it the consequent. " We must, therefore, collect 



296 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

more facts, or, wMch comes to the same thing, vary the 
circumstances ; since every instance in which the circum- 
stances differ is a fresh fact ; and, especially, we must 
note the contrary or negative cases, i, e. where no dew i? 
produced." 

" Now, 1st, no dew is produced on the surface of 
l^olished metals^ but it is very copiously on glass, both ex- 
posed with their faces upwards, and in some cases the 
under side of a plate of glass is also dewed ; which lasi 
circumstance excludes the fall of moisture from the sky 
in an invisible form/' Here, then, according to our second 
principle of elimination, is a general agreement with a 
difference in one point, namely, the substance of the 
material. But what relation have the metal and glass to 
the invariable concomitant circumstance of cold in the 
production of dew ? Have we removed the dew, and 
thus prevented the cold in the case of the metal, or have 
we removed the cold and prevented the dew ? Unques- 
tionably the latter ; for the metal being a good conductor 
of heat, has continually brought the heat from within 
itself, or from the earth beneath, upon its surface, while 
the glass, being a poor conductor, has suffered its surface 
to become cooled. " This done, a scale of intensity 
becomes obvious. Those pohshed substances are found 
to be most strongly dewed which conduct heat worst ; 
while those which conduct well resist dew most effectually." 
We have thus determined that cold is the antecedent of 
dew, and not dew the antecedent of cold. 

The same fact is confirmed by other strildng experi- 
ments. Thus, rough surfaces, which radiate heat most 
freely, are most copiously dewed, the substance remaining 
the same. Again, substances of a loose texture, such as 
cloth, wool, eider-down, cotton, velvet, &c., contract dew 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 297 

more readily tliaii substances of a close texture^ sucli as 
stones^ metals, &c., and tlie former are precisely those 
wMch. are selected for clothing, since, on account of their 
feeble conducting power, they do not carry away the heat 
from the skin to the air. 

" Lastly : among the negative instances, it is observed 
that dew is never copiously deposited in situations much 
screened from the open air, and not at all in a cloudy 
night; but if the clouds withdraw, even for a few minutes, 
and leave a clear opening, a deposition of dew presently 
begins, and goes on increasing.'' This remarkable fact 
shows the same order of sequence. " Those surfaces which 
part with their heat outwards most readily, and have it 
supplied from within most slowly, will of course become 
coldest, if there be an opportunity for their heat to escape, 
and not be restored to them from without. Now, a clear 
sky affords such an opportunity. It is a law well known 
to those who are conversant with the nature of heat, that 
heat is constantly escaping from all bodies in rays, or by 
radiation, but is constantly restored to them by the 
similar radiation of others surrounding them. Clouds and 
surrounding objects, therefore, act as opposing causes, by 
replacing the whole or a great part of the heat so ra- 
diated away, which can escape effectually, without be- 
ing replaced, only through openings into infinite space.'' 
We are thus led to the general fact, that any surface 
"cooling by radiation faster than its heat can be re- 
stored to it by communication with the ground, or by 
counter-radiation, so as to become colder than the air/' 
condenses the moisture of the air upon itself in the form 
of dew. 

Herschel remarks, ^* In the analysis above given, the 
formation of dew is referred to two more general pheno- 
ls* 



298 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

mena : the radiation of lieat^ and tlie condensation of in-* 
visible vapor by cold. The cause (antecedent) of the 
former is a much higher enquiry, and may be said indeed 
to be totally unknown ; that of the latter actually forms a 
most important branch of physical enquiry. In such a 
case, when we reason upwards till we reach an ultimate 
fact, we regard a phenomenon as fully explained ; as we 
consider the branch of a tree to terminate when traced to 
its insertion in the trunk, or a twig to its junction with 
the branch ; or rather, as a rivulet retains its importance 
and its name till lost in some larger tributary, or in the 
main river which delivers it into the ocean.'' Now, the 
ultimate fact upon which all enquiry reposes can, in respect 
to cause, be nothing less than the Divine volition ; and 
the ultimate fact in respect to law can be that law only 
which rests immediately upon an Idea. We may con- 
tinue, by observation and experiment, to enlarge our know- 
ledge of the order and relations of phenomena — of antece- 
dents and consequents indefinitely, reaching from one ante- 
cedent to another ; but no mere antecedent phenomenon 
gives a place for the repose of thought. The radiation of 
heat, and the condensation of vapor by cold, are antece- 
dents to the formation of dew. Could we now discover 
their antecedents, we should only have new phenomena 
calling for other antecedents again. We thus accumulate 
general facts, but we want still the centraHsing, aU-com- 
prehending, and necessary Law. An infinite series of 
sequences there cannot be. But if the ultimate fact be a 
mere antecedent like the other antecedents, that is, 
uniformly preceding its consequent, and haviag no dis- 
tinguishing characteristic except that of being the last, 
then must enquiry cease here by a mere arbitrary decision 
of the Deity or of Fate. It does not cease because the mind 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 299 

feels satisfied, but because it is permitted to go no farther. 
But if the ultimate fact be not a pbenomenon, but a law, 
affirming, in the light of Ideas, what must be, not a tiling 
of observation, but an intuitive thought, then indeed must 
enquiry cease, not by a necessity of compulsion, but by a 
necessity of pure Keason itself. 

I have already remarked that the flux of phenomena 
is not to be represented as a lengthening series of particu- 
lars, which, as it runs back, is ever evolving some new 
antecedent, until we reach an ultimate phenomenon ; but 
that, on the contrary, this flux goes on in cycles where the 
end runs into the beginning.* In a series of the first 
kind, the ultimate fact would be either an unconditional 
phenomenon, which is contrary to the nature of pheno- 
mena ; or it would be law as we have defined it, removed 
from the sphere of phenomenal development ; whereas the 
rational conception of law demands that it be everywhere 
present, permeating the whole development. But, in a 
series of the second kind, all the phenomena are both 
conditionated and conditionating, and the law, as from a 
centre, radiates into the whole cycle, filling out and govern- 
ing the whole. 

It ought to be remarked here, also, that theory applies 
to general facts as well as to law. In the latter applica- 
tion, the conception has already been given.-f In the 
former application, we mean by it the hypothesis of an 
antecedent general fact for the purpose of conditionating 
a known fact, and thus enabling us to give a more full and 
rational explication of the whole series under considera- 
tion. As instances, we may cite the undulating theory 
of Light ; and Dalton's theory of Ultimate Atoms. In 

* Supra, p. 269. f Supra, p. 194:. 



300 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

both, instances^ we have antecedents hypothesised and 
connected with actual phenomena. We hypothesise, in 
order to supply undiscovered parts of a cycle of pheno- 
mena, the parts which are known suggesting those which 
are unknown : or the unknown facts may be hypothesised 
on the basis of a theory or a law, which, already compre- 
hending the known facts, demands certain other facts to 
complete the cycle. 

In making observations, we may hit upon any part of 
a cycle of facts, and thence be led through the relations 
of antecedents and consequents to other parts. Herschel 
remarks, in respect to the induction in the case of dew, 
" Had we no previous knowledge of the radiation of heat, 
this same induction would have made it known to us, 
and, duly considered, might have led to a knowledge of 
many of its laws." That is, any part. may serve as a good 
starting point. " In the study of nature,'' he adds, " we 
must not, therefore, be scrupulous as to liow we reach to 
a knowledge of such general facts : provided, only, we 
verify them carefully when once detected, we must be con- 
tent to seize them wherever they are to be found.''' * 
Now, it is because the development of phenomena moves 
in a cycle that we may begin at any point indifferently, 
since, beginning wherever we please or happen to, we 
cannot lose the connected particulars. If we go back 
from consequent to antecedent, the last antecedent becomes 
the consequent of the first consequent, which, relatively 
to it, becomes an antecedent ; and if we go from antece- 
dent to consequent, the last consequent becomes an ante- 
cedent to the first antecedent, which, relatively to it, 
becomes a consequent. 

* Supra, p. 174. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 30] 

Were the cycles of plienomena completed, then ob- 
servation and experiment would have done their work in 
respect to establishing general facts ; then the uniform 
antecedents and consequents would all be known. 

I shall close this section by summing up the cardinal 
points. 

I. The governing ideas are Cause and Law. 

II. The leading axioms are those of Universal Law, 
and of the Uniformity of Nature. 

III. The last named axiom may be conveniently ex- 
panded into two particular axioms : ''" 

1. Like antecedents involve like consequents. 

2. Like consequents imply like antecedents. 

lY. General facts may be determined to an indefi- 
nite extent before the law is arrived at, but whenever 
a law is arrived at, or a theory adopted, the cycle of 
facts may be enlarged or completed by their necessary 
demands. 

Y. Hypothesis relates either to fact or to law. . Hypo- 
thesised laws are theories. 

YI. In the observation of phenomena we must be both 
general and minute ; noting all the phenomena, and all 
their characteristics. 

YII. Uniform antecedence and sequence of pheno- 
mena, the semblance and exponent of law, is determined 
by a method of elimination which excludes whatever is 
foreign to the particular relation to be determined. 

YIII. The formula of Induction f comprehends every 
mode of elimination, since it determines the general ex- 
pression of the uniform sequences. 

IX. "When general facts are attained, they may be 

* Supra, page 228. f Page 211. 



302 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

verified by returning to the particular instances from 
wHcli they were derived, or by multiplying instances. 
There are often accidental and unlooked-for verifications, 
which are of great weight, because they seem like a spon 
taneous testimony of nature. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 303 



SECTION VIII. 

INDUCTIVE LOGIC OF UNIVERSAL AND NECESSARY LAWS. 

Laws are determined in two ways, either directly in the 
form of axioms ; * or indirectly, through an induction of 
facts. The ultimate determining power in both cases lies 
in Ideas of pure Keason. 

We have seen that even Ideas and Axioms demand 
phenomenal conditions for their development ; but this is 
widely different from that induction of facts which at • the 
first leads us to uniform antecedents and consequents, and 
in the end to universal and necessary laws. 

The axiomatic forms of law appear in the most origi- 
nal laws, such as the laws of Logic itself, and The Morale; 
but tho great laws of Nature, those which comprehend 
the interior constitution of substances, and the constitu- 
tion of systems of bodies, are laws arrived at by Induc- 
tion. 

The Idea of Law, that sublime Idea so quickening to 
thought, leads on all observation and experiment, whether 
the result be merely general facts of uniform sequences, or 
universal and necessary laws. Uniform sequences are the 
exponents of law ; hence, in seeking for them, we are 
really seeking ultimately for law. In the progress of our 
research we pass from one generalization to another more 

* Supra, p. 241. 



304 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

extensive and comprehensive^ until at length we seem to 
reach an ultimate generalization, and this we call the 
great and ultimate law. But it is not the great and ulti- 
mate law simply because it is at present the ultimate 
point of investigation ; it may he only the most general 
fact, or an antecedent the most remote, which we have as 
yet reached. To make it law, something is required in 
its own intrinsic nature, as exhibited to the eye of Reason. 
Law, taken on its highest ground, lies in the pure Idea ; 
taken under its highest manifestation, it is the determi- 
nate purpose or design of the Creative Mind. And in its 
sphere ; in relation to its appropriate phenomena, it i§ 
universal and necessary. Thus the great moral law in its 
sphere, that is, responsible being ; in relation to its ap- 
propriate phenomena, that is, the conduct of responsible 
being, is universal and necessary : it is the law without 
exception and in every instance ; and it is the necessary 
Jaw, no other being admissible. It lies originally in the 
Idea of Right and Wrong ; it appears as the wise design 
in the Creative Mind which bodied forth this noblest 
form of being ; and it gives birth to every rule of moral 
action. 

So also in Somatology, law taken on its highest ground 
lies in the pure Idea ; taken under its highest manifesta- 
tion, it is the determinate purpose or design of the Crea- 
tive Mind. In its sphere — e. g. the interior constitution 
of bodies or their arrangement into system, in relation to 
its appropriate phenomena — e. g. the changes of bodies in 
composition and decomposition, or their motions in masses 
through space, it is universal ; and, considered as the 
wisest and the best, * it is necessary. Now, that upon 

* Part I., Sect. VII. Also, Part III., pp. 191, 195. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 305 

wliicli tlie Keasoii fastens wlien it becomes satisfied that a 
law is attained, is tlie correspondence between the out- 
ward generalization and its own Idea, and the presence in 
the generalization of the characteristics of nniversality and 
necessity. Tims, Gravitation is an ultimate generaliza- 
tion ; but it is more, for the Reason perceives its corres- 
pondency with its own Idea of Centralization,* and there- 
fore judges not only that it is the ultimate generalization 
actually attained, but also that there is no other beyond it 
that can be attained, and affirms that it is the law, and 
the necessary law, of all systems of bodies. 

The logical process by which we arrive at universal 
laws is akin to that by which we arrive at general facts. 
Indeed the establishment of general facts is a part of the 
process. The principles, therefore, laid down in the pre- 
ceding Section, are applicable here also. 

It is impossible to prescribe the number of general 
facts which are demanded as conditions of the determina- 
tion of a universal law. Sometimes the law is precon- 
ceived at a very early stage of the investigation ; such 
was the fact in the case of iN^ewton in respect to gravita- 
tion. Although believed to be a law, it can, under these 
circumstances, be received only as a hypothesis, until vo- 
rified in numerous and decisive applications. But the 
Secret conviction, the earnest hope, and the indomitable 
purpose of investigation, inspired by the conception from 
the beginning, proves it to lie deeper in the soul than a 
fortunate guess or an enticing fancy. 

The verification of a law hypothesised is strikingly 
illustrated in Physical Astronomy. " The law, for ex- 
ample, which asserts that the planets are retained in their 

* rase 198. 



306 li^DUCTIVE LOGIC. 

orbits about the sun, and satellites about tbeir primaries^ 
by an attractive force, decreasing as tlie square of the dis- 
tances increases, comes to be verified in each particular 
case by deducing from it the exact motions which, under 
the circumstances, ought to take place, and comparing 
them with the fact. This comparison, while it verifies in 
general t'iie existence of the law of gravitation as supposed, 
and its adequacy to explain all the principal motions of 
every body in the system, yet leaves some small deviations 
in those of the planets, and some very considerable ones in 
that of the moon and other satellites, still unaccounted 
for ; residual phenomena, which still remain to be traced 
up to causes. By further examining these, their causes 
have at length been ascertained, and found to consist in 
the mutual actions of the planets on each other, and the 
disturbing influence of the sun on the motions of the satel- 
lites." '*' And thus these residual phenomena turn out an. 
additional verification of the law of gravitation. 

In other instances the law dawns slowly, and is pre- 
ceded by many vague and inadequate hypotheses, which 
have to be overcome before the true Hght can shine clearly. 
And when it begins to shine, hypotheses appear, which in- 
deed are more or less ingenious and satisfactory, but still 
indecisive. And thus there appears a gradual convergence 
from many points to the all-comprehending law. But 
when the law is attained, whatever be the process by 
which we attain it, it is known to be the law by its suffi- 
ciency in respect to the phenomena to be explained, by its 
universality and necessity, and its echo to the Idea of the 
Reason within. 

There is also to be remarked a difference in the men- 

* Herschel's Discourse, p. 166. 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 307 

tal constitution, by wlucb. a superior degree of tlie intui- 
tive function seems to be awarded to some individuals. 
These are the chosen interpreters of nature. By a sudden 
and wonderful leap they are seen to pass from a limited 
induction to a stupendous conclusion. With a prophetic 
power they seem to foretel the law, which, before ordinary 
minds, lies only as the result of an immense and laborious 
observation. The mere experimenter and observer collects 
facts, but does not gain laws. On the other hand, a mind 
of high intuitive energy cannot make itself independent 
of experiment and observation ; for those high prophecies 
require the verification of facts. It is the union of the 
two which makes the finished philosopher of nature, for it 
is the union of the two which constitutes the true Induc- 
tive Logic. And indeed, where these high gifts are found, 
we may generally expect a corresponding skill and dili- 
gence in collating facts ; for the mind that can penetrate 
the laws of nature under her simplest manifestations, will 
be prone to seek the fullest confirmations of these laws 
from observation and experiment. 

In the discovery of laws there is so much that appears 
like inspiration, and indeed so much that is really inspira- 
tion, if Keason be the inspiration of the Almighty in man, 
lihat to lay down exact logical rules and formulae designed 
to govern and represent the process of discovery, would 
appear puerile in the attempt, and prove impracticable if 
attempted. 

The great principle, however, can be clearly expressed. 
It is that which has already been alluded to, namely, the 
union of Ideas and Observation. It is the force and light 
of the cardinal Ideas of Cause and Law which at first im- 
pel and guide us in investigation. Ideas of Time and 
Space open to us the possibility of succession and arrange- 



308 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

ment. But^ beyond this, the laws which govern the world, 
inasmuch as they had their origin in the Divine Mind, 
cannot be strange to us. While, therefore, the perceptive 
and inductive functions are busy in collecting facts, the 
mind is intensely meditative, and intuition is awake. 
ISTow it is that the Ideas which are to spring forth into 
law are quickened and called upon. The orderly and uni- 
form sequences of phenomena are noted ; — these we have 
called the exponents of law. Generalization follows gen- 
eralization. Hypotheses are framed. Observation is en- 
larged, and rendered more exact by experiment. The 
Eeason conceives more and more clearly. All that lies be- 
fore it in the phenomenal world, having proceeded from 
the Divine Ideas, is ready to meet corresponding Ideas in 
the human mind. At length the required Idea is devel- 
oped, and it projects itself into the external world as the 
law of the phenomena. 

It will be perceived that we have limited the term law 
to the universal and necessary. In common usuage the 
term is applied to uniform sequences in general. The 
former is the strictly philosophical use. While we are 
looking at particular sequences separately from the uni- 
versal law, or in ignorance of it, it may perhaps be con- 
venient to call them laws of nature ; but when viewed in 
connexion with the law, they are seen to be only forms of 
its manifestation or exponential facts. For example, it 
might be called a law of wood, and of vegetable mattei 
generally, to float in water, — and of metals and minerals, 
to sink ; a law of vapour to rise, in the atmosphere ; a law 
of water, to flow down descents of any degree, — and of bo- 
dies generally, to roll down declivities when moved ofi" 
their balance ; a law of the tides, to rise and fall ; a law 
of the penduhim, to preserve a determinate vibration ; and 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 309 

fso on. But when the law of universal gravitation is un- 
derstood, then these particular laws, so-called, are per- 
ceived to be mere uniform sequences determined by the 
universal law. 

And here we may understand the diflference in the in- 
telligent apprehension, between uniform sequences and 
universal laws. All these particular laws, taken in them- 
selves as uniform sequences, are mere arbitrary facts. 
We come to know them familiarly ; and, indeed, we seem 
to understand them, because we are accustomed to their 
appearance ; but still, all we can say of them is, that such 
is the order of nature. But when we can refer them all 
to one universal law, we gain a deeper and more satisfac- 
tory insight. Now we perceive a unity and simplicity in 
nature which awakens admiration, like that which we ex- 
perience when we view a grand and perfect mechanism. 
But still more, we now perceive the great comprehending 
law to be a universal and necessary law — the law of the 
universe springing from an Idea. Nothing is so intelhgi- 
ble as Ideas, for they are the elements of the Keason it- 
self, " the light of all our seeing." In the Idea of cen- 
tralization we perceive how the universe must be consti- 
tuted, and in the law of gravitation we find the realiza- 
tion of the Idea. Equally satisfactory is the law of cen- 
trifugal force, as the realization of the Idea of Diffusion. ''' 

The human intellect has oftentimes expended its force 
in hypothesising new and more remote antecedents, instead 
of directing itself through an induction of unquestionable 
facts to the discovery of a law. Des Cartes hypothesised 
vortices as antecedents to the primary phenomena of the 
planets in their revolution about the sun, and of the 

* Page 198. 



310 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

satellites about the planets. And Bernoulli attempt<3d, 
in accordance with this hypothesis^ to explain the elliptical 
form of the orbits by the shape of the planets, acting like 
the rudder of a boat in the stream of the vortices. But 
]iow were the vortices themselves to be explained ? A 
mere multiplication of the antecedents only threw the 
difficulty farther back without overcoming it. Nay, more ; 
it introduced new difficulties, in the necessity of sustaining 
the hypothesis. 

Chemistry, the science of material elements and their 
mutual relations in the composition and decomposition of 
bodies, was, until a late period, a mere collection of uni- 
form sequences. As such, it was of immense practical 
importance. And as the facts of chemistry had to be 
elicited by nice, ingenious, and difficult, and often 
dangerous experiments, the discovery of a new fact often 
formed an epoch in the science, and conferred a just and 
lasting fame on the discoverer. But still the facts stood 
out to view simply as facts, unexplained by any central 
and comprehensive law. They indeed revealed a beautiful 
and benign constitution of nature — they connected them- 
selves with the idea of paternal wisdom and goodness ; but 
this was accounting for them only under a moral aspect. 
The same wise and benign ends might perhaps have been 
reached equally well by a different constitution. What 
was required, was the intellectual purpose growing neces- 
sarily out of an Idea, and projecting itself in the outer 
world as the all-pervading law of the interior constitution 
of bodies. 

I have already had occasion to refer to the stupendous 
results to which the genius of Faraday has conducted us. 
In these results, chemistry attains to simplicity and unity. 
All chemical changes are now made to appear under one 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 311 

great law, by whatever name we call it, whether of Polarity 
or of Electrical Induction. Behind the law there lies an 
Idea.* Neither the Idea nor the law have as yet reached 
a full development, hut to this point we are evidently 
tending. The Idea must he an Idea of the pure Keason, 
related to the elemental constitution and changes of bodies 
analogously to the Idea of centrahzation and diffusion in 
its relation to the masses of constituted bodies ; and the 
corresponding law must comprehend and govern in its 
sphere, analogously to the law of gravitation in its sphere. 
In Faraday we perceive, in an extraordinary degree, the 
union of the most exact, elaborate, and extensive experi- 
mentation with Ideal conceptions. It is a union of the 
Senses with the world of the Reason ; like the union of 
those opposite polar forces by which he solves the mys- 
teries of his favorite science, and brings to light the order 
and harmony of Nature in her elements. 

The application of the mathematics to the expression 
of physical laws arises from the fact that the subjects of 
these laws are real quantities, such as magnitude, motion, 
time, and distance. For example, gravitation implies 
motion, and motion is related to space ; the intelligible 
expression of the law, therefore, requires its expression in 
the relation of space. 

Ere we close this part of our investigation, we must 
return for a moment to the cychcal order of phenomena, 
and the central position of law. Receiving this, at least, 
as a convenient, if not a purely rational conception, it must 
be evident that the law, as law, cannot be absent from 
any point of the phenomenal movement ; but is Hke an 
indefinite number of radii drawn from the centre to the 

* Page 200. 



312 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

circumference^ whicli are many, and yet^ in their perfect 
identity, one ; so tliat we may regard the circumference as 
formed either by the extremities of an indefinite number 
of equal radii projected from a common centre, or by the 
extremity of one of the radii revolving about the centre. 
Now, suppose our observation were fixed upon only one 
point of the circumference, we might account for its exist- 
ence by conceiving of it as merely the extremity of a 
straight line : or, suppose' we were to observe several points 
in curvilinear juxtaposition, then we might account for 
them by conceiving of an angle of which the whole arc 
formed the measure. But as our observation became more 
extended, we might be led to the conception of a circle, 
and then every point would be explained in reference to it 
alone, and the particular straight line and the particular 
angle would pass out of thought in the wider generaliza- 
tion. Now, our first conclusions were true, but they did 
not contain the whole truth ; and when the whole truth 
is ascertained, we no longer require our first conclusions. 
In like manner, in a cycle of phenomena, our observation 
is fixed at first upon a certain antecedent and consequent, 
and we name the particular end of the uniformity, a law. 
Here indeed is no error, for the law from the centre 
radiates into this particular uniformity, and is the true 
source of it. But, inasmuch as the particular sequence 
in question is only one of a wide circle of sequences, we 
require the law of the whole ere we have the sufficient 
law of the part. This law of the whole permeating every 
part explains every part ; and like the centre and radii of 
a circle, is a conception of pure Reason based upon ^n 
Idea. 

The Eeason in its Ideas enjoys a perfect and quiet 
cognition ; and when phenomena are explained by laws, 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 313 

which again are explained hj Ideas, then we have reached 
the clearest light, and the highest satisfaction of know- 
ledge.* 

The leading Axioms and definitions of the Inductive 
Logic of Universal and Necessary Laws, so far as implied 
in the foregoing, may be summarily stated as follows : 

I. Every particular phenomenon is both an antecedent 
and a consequent, taken in different relations : and, as a 
part of a harmonious whole, is comprehended by a law. 

II. Every law is the projection of an Idea. 

III. Observation and experiment supply the orderly 
sequences of phenomena, and thus conditionate the de- 
velopment of law ; but the law itself, with its character- 
istics of universality and necessity, is a conception of the 
Reason. 

IV. A rational hypothesis is an effort to find a law by 
tentative acts ; — it is feeling after a law by rational fore- 
thought, if haply we may find it. 

V. Observation and experiment, without a rational 
hypothesis, is like a man groping at objects at random 
with his eyes shut. But even rational hypothesis, un- 
accompanied by the former, is only felicitous dreaming. 

VI. Inasmuch as the world of the senses was created 
by the Divine Eeason from its own Ideas ; and inasmuch 
as the mind of man is made after the likeness of the 
Divine Mind, therefore can it truly be said to know the 
world of the senses only so far as, like the Divine Mind, 
it finds its Ideas there projected. 

VII. Hence the Science of Nature can be determined 
only by a union of Sensuous Phenomena with Ideal Con- 
ceptions. 

VIII. The criteria of a law are, its sufiiciency in 

* Part L, Section X. 
14 



314 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

respect to the plienomenaj its characteristics; viz., univer- 
sality and necessity, and its correspondence to an Idea. 

IX. Law implies Canse. Cause is present wherever 
law is manifested. Law expresses the rational plan, the 
wise and fit developments of Cause. ■ 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 315 



SECTION IX. 

. THE LOGIC OF ART. 

Art depends upon tlie Inventive Function.* There is a 
Logic of Science ; is there also a Logic of Art ? 

Art exists before Science. Sometimes it is the effect 
of accident. Generally, in its earlier stages^ it is the 
effect of human wants inspiring an unreflecting ingenuity 
to empirical efforts. Art, in its highest state, is an effect 
of ripened science. 

Pure accident and empiricism reach art by mere felici- 
ties. But even where there is no science, there is often 
exhibited an ingenuity and skill which impress us as a 
manifestation of high and extraordinary powers. Men of 
this mould seem to invent by a sort of inspiration. They 
seem prepared for every difficulty, and arrive at results 
the most curious with wonderful ease and tact. These 
instances are found both in the mechanical and the fine 
arts. There must be here an exceedingly vigorous spon- 
taneous development of Ideas, together with a nice and 
quick observation, and a vivid imagination. 

There is, therefore, a true Inductive Logic, leading 
virtually to important conclusions, although they be not 
stated in the form of distinct propositions. These con- 
clusions really direct the hand of the mechanician and 

* Page 231. 



316 INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

the artist. They are not reflected upon as nniversal prin- 
ciples, and therefore are not elaborated into a scientific 
system; they appear to the individual as something 
belonging to him, something that answers his special pur- 
pose, and with this he remains content. In his use they 
soon become reduced to mere rules of art. This natural 
and spontaneous Logic plays an important part in the 
development of humanity ; and that which we call Genius, 
and which so proudly overcomes all obstacles, presenting 
us the unscientific but skilful mechanician and artist, or 
leading onward the untutored, as in the case of Ferguson 
and Corregio, and a multitude of others, to the loftiest 
eminence of science or art, is chiefly a natural logical 
power, lying in the proper union of Ideas and external 
observations — a union of the Ideal and the sensuous. 
Unite with this the highest form of the imagination, and 
you have the most splendid form of genius : for it is the 
imagination which from Ideas creates those ideal repre- 
sentations which constitute archetypes of all that man 
accomplishes of the great, the beautiful, and the sublime. 

"Where all the lights of science are enjoyed, invention 
exhibits a chain of the nicest reasoning, both inductive 
and deductive. The latter form of reasoning appears 
indeed in the cases above mentioned ; but more remarkably 
here, inasmuch as the invention sets out with principles 
already ascertained. In its progress it may have to mak3 
many inductions, and to exert that high prophetic power 
which gives birth to rational hypotheses. Indeed, the 
imagination is here also tasked in ideal representations of 
mechanism. The steam engine from its conception to its 
present state, exhibits a constant series of scientific in- 
ventions springing from a rigid logic. 

One of the most beautiful instances of scientific in- 



INDUCTIVE LOGIC. 317 

vention is Davy's safety-lamp. Here conclusions were 
drawn from established scientific principles ; new induc- 
tions were made ; a hypotliesis formed ; an ideal of the 
invention represented in the imagination, from whence an 
external model or diagram could be produced ; and thus 
every thing was made ready for that simple effort of 
mechanical skill which completed the great achievement, 
— great as a work of the intellect, and no less great as a 
merciful visitation to poor and laboring men. 



BOOK IIL 

DEDUCTIVE LO GIO 



SECTION I. 

INTRODUCTION. 



We have hitherto been engaged with the Logic of First 
Truths, General Facts, and Universal Principles and Laws. 
"We are now to consider the Logic of drawing inferences 
from a comprehending or containing Whole, to particulars 
concluded under it. In Inductive Logic, particulars were 
shown to be involved into universals : In Deductive Logic, 
we must show that universals may be evolved into par- 
ticulars.* 

Deductive Logic implies, 1. That some first truths, 
general facts, and universal principles have been estab- 
lished : it implies, therefore, a considerable advance of hu- 
man knowledge. 2. It implies that a cultivated language 
exists, one adequate to express truths, principles, and 
facts, in clear and precise propositions. 

It is, therefore, with propositions that we begin in De- 
ductive Reasoning. These propositions may themselves 

* Pages 211-213. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 319 

be conclusions drawn from antecedent propositions, or 
tliey may be primary and underived. They may be ana- 
lytical or synthetical ; and synthetical ct priori or a pos- 
teriori. * But the manner in which they may have been 
obtained is not taken into account in the particular deduc- 
tion with which we may be engaged. Neither do we take 
into account the subject matter of the propositions ; this 
is referred to particular sciences. If the subject matter 
be pure quantity, it is referred to the mathematics ; if it 
be composed of natural phenomena, it is referred to phy- 
siology, natural philosophy, or chemistry, and so on. In 
considering any branch of science, or any subject whatever, 
we may have occasion to make many deductions — these 
may be a means to one end : but in each particular de- 
duction we have only to pay regard to the proper relation 
between those propositions which form our premises, and 
the conclusion we deduce. This part of Logic, therefore, 
aims to express a universal form of deduction, — one that 
shall apply to every subject indifferently. 

• Vide Part I., Sec. X. 



320 DEDUCTIVE LOGIO. 



SECTION 11. 

ANALYSIS OF PKOPOSITIONS. 

A JUDGMENT is an affirmation of tlie mind. When ex- 
pressed in language, it becomes a proposition^ because it 
is then propounded to general attention. Every proposi- 
tion consists of a subject and a predicate. Tbe subject is 
that of which the affirmation is made ; the predicate is 
that which is affirmed of the subject. 

The affirmation is either positive or negative ; that is, 
an affirmation of agreement or of disagreement. * 

The subject and predicate are collectively called 
terms. Each term expresses an object of thought com- 
plete in itself. 

That which connects the terms together in a propo- 
sition, is called the Copula. This copula must always be 
IS, in positive propositions ; and is not, in negative. The 
reason is obvious, viz., that the verb to he enters neces- 
sarily into the simple and direct form of affirmation. In 
the ordinary forms of language, propositions do not, in- 
deed, generally employ the substantive verb ; but they 
are always capable of being reduced to this form, by using 
a participle or an adjective, in connection with the verb : 
e. ^. " Caesar conquered," may be reduced to the form, 
" C^sar was victorious," in which the copula appears. A 

* Supra, p. Qi. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 321 

term may consist of one or of several words. No single 
word is capable of being a term in itself, except a nomina- 
tive noun, because no otber word, in itself, expresses a 
complete object of thought. The infinitive mood of the 
verb is not an exception, for this is really a noun : e. g. 
" To be loved is to be happy : " i. e. 

Sub. Fred. 



t ^ t ^ 

" The state of being loved is a state of happiness." 

When the adjective appears as a predicate, the noun, 
of course, is understood in connection with it. Where a 
term consists of one word, it is called a simple term ; 
where it consists of several, a complex term. 

Sometimes no little circumlocution is necessary, in or- 
der to reduce a proposition, consisting of complex terms, 
to its exact form : e. g. " If he starts to-day, he wiU pro- 
bably arrive the day after to-morrow : " i. e. 

Sub. 



" The event of his starting to-daj 

is 

Pred. 



< : ■; ; ; ; ^ 

an event w^hich makes it probable he wiU arrive the daj after to-morrow." 

Again : "I am sure he said so : " i. e. 

Sub. Pred. 



" The thing referred to by ' so,' is what I am sure he said." 

Simple terms are singular or common. A singular 
term stands for an individual, and can be predicated only 
of itself. A common term stands for many, and, of course, 
can be predicated of many. 

Propositions are categorical or hypothetical. The for- 
mer is an unconditional affirmation ; the latter a con- 
ditional. 

u* 



322 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

Propositions are distinguislied again by Quality and 
Quantity. 

The Quality of a proposition refers to its positive or 
negative cliaracter : e. g, '^ A. horse is a quadruped/' is 
positive ; " A covetous man is not contented/' is negative. 
We must be careful to distinguish betvreen a strictly ne- 
gative proposition, i. e. one which connects the negative 
particle with the copula, and one which contains a de- 
scriptive negative particle in one of its terms : e. g. " He 
was conversing with a man not like the one you describe/' 
is positive ; " He was not conversing with a man like the 
one you describe/' is negative. Sometimes it is conven- 
ient to transfer the negative particle from the copula to 
one of the terms, and thus to change the negative form 
for the positive : e. ^. " Man is not perfect " is equivalent 
to " Man is imperfect." 

The logical use of the negative particles must be dis- 
tinguished from those uses which obtain in the famiHar 
idioms of conversation. In the latter, they sometimes not 
only deny, but affirm the contrary : e. g. the remark some- 
times playfully made, "He is no fool," is intended not 
merely to deny one kind of quality, but to attribute no 
common share of the opposite kind ; whereas, in the logi- 
cal use, the negative particles simply deny, and never im- 
ply, an affirmation of the contrary. 

The Quantity of a proposition expresses the extent of 
the affirmation or negation. When the ^predicate is 
affirmed or denied of the whole of the subject, the propo- 
sition is universal ; when it is affirmed or denied only of 
a^ar^ of the subject, the proposition is particular : e. g. 
" All men are mortal," " No miser is happy," are univer- 
sal ; " Some men are prudent," " Some animals are not 
sagacious," are particular. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 323 

Propositions, slb positive, and negative, and universal, 
and particular, are distributed into four kinds. These 
are generally, for the sake of brevity, represented by the 
symbols A, E, I, and 0. And since Deductive Logic 
considers the form of propositions, and not the matter, we 
may conveniently represent the subject and predicate by 
symbols. The whole, then, may be represented as follows ; 
A, Universal affirmative. Every X is Y ; 
E, Universal negative. No X is Y ; 
I, Particular affirmative. Some X is Y ; 
0, Particular negative. Some X is not Y. 

In conversational idiom, when we affirm a part, we in- 
tend to deny the remainder. Thus, when we say, " Some 
of the company have arrived," we intend to signify that a 
part have not arrived. But, in logical language, on the 
contrary, we intend to signify no more than we express. 
Thus, when we say some X is Y, we do not mean to imply 
that some X is not Y ; this may or may not be, and no 
doubtful form of predication is admissible. 

Indefinite propositions, e. g. "Birds have wings," 
"Food is necessary for life," "Fish live in the water," 
are those whose quality is left unexpressed. These do not 
belong to the province of Logic, for here no proposition 
can be indefinite, but to that of Ehetoric. The truth is, 
that indefinite propositions never appear in correct writing 
— unless the intention be to mislead — except where, from 
the connection, or from the well-known nature of the mat- 
ter, every reader at once is able to supply the true quan- 
tity. Thus, when it is said " Food is necessary to life," 
the writer is sure he will not be misunderstood ; otherwise, 
he ought to supply the quantitive particle. 

Where the subject of a proposition is a singular term, 
the proposition is reckoned among universals, because the 



324 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

« 

whole subject is spoken of: e. g. " Socrates was an Athe- 
nian philosopher/'' means the whole of Socrates. 

Propositions may be universal, without having both 
their terms taken universally : e. g. when it is said, " All 
horses are quadrupeds/' the term " horses " is taken uni- 
versally, but not the term " quadrupeds ; " for it is not 
true that all quadrupeds are horses : but in the propo- 
sition, " No merciful man will abuse dumb animals," both 
terms are taken universally ; for, in excluding merciful 
men from that class who abuse dumb animals, we do also 
exclude the latter from the former. In the other example, 
althousrh all horses are affirmed to be contained in the 
class '^ quadrupeds, '^ this does not imply that all quadru- 
peds are contained in the class "horses." In particular 
affirmative propositions, it is evident that neither term is 
taken universally : e. g. " Some undeserving men are 
prosperous." 

In particular negatives, the subject plainly is not taken 
universally ; but the whole of the predicate being excluded 
from the subject, must be regarded as taken universally : 
e. g. " Some good men are not prosperous." Here the sub- 
ject enters only partially ; but the predicate composed of 
the class " prosperous," is entirely excluded from the sub- 
ject " Some good men." When any term is taken uni- 
versally, it is technically said to be distributed. Employ- 
ing the symbols already introduced, the whole can be pre- 
sented at one view. 

A, X is Y. Subject distributed. 

E, X is Y. Subject and predicate distributed. 

I, X is Y. Neither term is distributed. 

0, X is Y. Predicate distributed. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 325 



SECTIOISr III. 

OF PROPOSITIONS AS OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER. 

Propositions are opposed to each otlier when the subject 
and predicate remain the same ; and they differ in quan- 
tity or quality, or in both. 

I. Opposition in quantity. A is opposed to I ; and E 
to 0. The nature of this opposition is such, that A being 
affirmed, I must be affirmed likewise ; and the same in 
respect to E and : and the denial of I and respec- 
tively involves the denial of A and E ; but the denial of 
A and E does not involve the denial of I and 0. 

This results from the axiom. That the affirmation of 
the universal is the affirmation of the particular : and the 
negation of the particular destroys the universal ; but the 
negation of the universal does not destroy the particular. 

II. Opposition in quality. A is opposed to E ; and I 
to 0. The nature of this opposition is such that A being 
affirmed, E must be denied ; but I being affirmed, is 
not to be denied ; and vice versa. The denial of A or E 
does not involve the affirmation of the other ; but the de- 
nial of I or does involve the affirmation of the other. 

This results from the following axioms : 1. A univer- 
sal positive and a . universal negative being contraries 
throughout their whole extent, cannot both be true. 2. 
A particular positive and a particular negative being con- 



326 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC 

• fcraries within Kmitation, may lie upon different parts of 
the same field, and therefore both be true. 3. The de- 
nial of a universal of one quality does not legitimate the 
affirmation of a universal of the opposite quality, since 
both universals may be false, and the truth lie only in 
the particulars : but both the particulars cannot be false, 
for then both the universals would be true. 

III. 0]3position in both quantity and quality. A is 
opposed to ; and E to I. The nature of this opposition 
is such that A being affirmed, must be denied ; and E 
being affirmed, I must be denied ; and vice versa. And 
again : A being denied, must be affirmed ; and E be- 
ing denied, I must be affirmed ; and vice versa. 

This results from the axioms : 

1. Opposition in quantity and quality, inasmuch as it 
excludes all agreement, amounts to positive contradiction, 
so that the affirmation of one form of the proposition can- 
not be less than the destruction of the other form. 

2. The opposition of a universal positive to a particu- 
lar negative, or of a universal negative to a particular 
positive, constitutes a perfect alternative, — the denial of 
the one being the affirmation of the other. 

The most general form of this axiom is as follows : To 
deny a positive, is equivalent to affirming a negative; 
and to deny a negative, is equivalent to affirming a posi- 
tive. In this form, quantity is not taken into the account ; 
but the introduction of the idea of quantity modifies the 
expression of the axiom , since to deny a universal posi- 
tive, is not to affirm a universal negative, inasmuch as 
this may also be false, i. e., the universality may be false ; 
but it is to affirm a negative, i. e., the negative must be 
true in some form ; and therefore, as it is not necessarily 
true in the universal form, it remains that it must be true 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 327 

in the particular form : and so also of denying a universal 
negative in relation to a particular positive. 

The following table presents the whole at one view : 

Affirming is equivalent to denying and affirming. 
A = E, 0, = I, 

E = A, I, = 0, 

I = E, 

= A. . 

Denying is equivalent to affirming and denying. 
A = 0, 

E =1, 

1 = E, 0, = A, 
= A,I, - E. 



328 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION lY. 

OF THE CONVEKSION OF PEOPOSITIONS. 

A PKOPosiTiON is converted by the transposition of its 
terms : i. e., the subject becomes the predicate, and the 
predicate the subject. 

The proposition as given, is called the exjposita; when 
converted, it is called the converse. 

The law which governs the conversion of propositions is 
as follows : No converse may assert more generally than 
the exposita. This law results from the axiom, that, A 
consequence cannot transcend its premises. Hence, what 
is affirmed in the exposita of a part only, cannot, in the 
converse, be affirmed of the whole. The application of 
this law is very evident. 

1. Universal affirmative. A, X is Y, does not distri- 
bute the predicate, but only the subject : all the X^s are 
in the Y's, but the Y's may contain more than X's ; and, 
therefore, from the affirmative, every X is Y, we can only 
affirm some Y is X ; i. e., as much of the Y as answers to 
theX. 

2. Universal negative. E, X is Y distributes the 
predicate as well as the subject. If there is No X in Y, 
then, consequently, there is No Y in X. 

3. Particular affirmative. I, X is Y distributes neither 
one nor the other : If only Some X is Y, then only Some 
Y is X. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 329 

4. Particular negative. 0; X is Y distributes only 
tlie predicate : only some X's are not contained in the Y, 
but all tbe Y's are excluded from the some X's in ques- 
tion. Hence, a simple conversion cannot take place ; for 
tliis would distribute the X, and, of course, make it to as- 
sert more generally tban tbe exposita : From some X is 
not Y, we cannot infer some Y is not X, for then, by the 
converse, all the X's are excluded from the some Y's in 
question. It is true, indeed, that some Y is not X may, 
in some instances, be consistent with the exposita some 
X is not Y, but it is consistent, not as the converse of this 
form, but as a deduction from another form of the propo- 
sition : e. g., " Some soldiers are not brave men," is con- 
sistent with the exposita, "Some brave men are not 
soldiers ; " but the first is not true, as the corrverse of the 
last, which plainly it is not ; but as the contradictory of 
the universal affirmative, " All soldiers are brave men," 
this contradictory, from our knowledge of the matter, being 
first denied. 

In like manner, the several forms A, Y is X ; E, Y is 
X ; I, Y is X, may be consistent with 0, X is Y, in par- 
ticular instances, where the matter is such as to admit of 
it. But legitimate conversion takes place independently 
of the matter. According to a strict exposition of the 
form, therefore, a particular negative exposita has no con- 
verse. A negative proposition, however, may be changed 
into a positive, by connecting the particle of negation 
with one of its terms : e. g., 

Suh. Pred. 



" Some brave men are not soldiers," 

may be converted as a particular positive, thus, 

Suh. Pred. 



" Some not soldiers are brave men." 



330 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

Here the exposita and converse are identical, and may 
be represented under the bare form thus, some X is not Y ; 
converse, some not Y is X. Where the particle of nega- 
tion is a component of the term which it affects, the con- 
version, by a particular positive, is peculiarly graceful : 
e. g.y ^'Some good men are not fortunate;" converse, 
" Some unfortunate men are good men/' 

To deny a negative being equivalent to affirming a 
positive, we may convert a positive, under a form of nega- 
tion, or contraposition : e. g., " Every poet is a man of 
genius." This is equivalent to " No poet is not a man of 
genius ; " which may be converted by " He who is not a 
man of genius is not a poet." * 

The following table contains the different kinds of con- 
version under the bare form : 

EXPOSITA. CONVERSE. 

A, X is Y = I, Y is X, 

E, X is Y = E, Y is X, 

I, XisY = I, YisX, 

0, X is Y = I, mtY is X. 

By contraposition. 
A, X is Y = E, notY is X. 

Some universal positive propositions, such as defini- 
tions, for example, have convertible terms, i. e,, exactly 
equivalent terms, and, in this case, are said to admit of a 
universal positive as a converse : e. g., "All equilateral 
triangles are equiangular ; " but to state this strictly, we 
should say, " All the equilateral triangles are all the 

* Wliatele/s Logic, Book XL, ch. ii., § 4. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 331 

equiangular triangles." And so, again, the example, " A 
good government is that wMcIl lias the happiness of the 
governed for its object," and which also seems to admit of 
conversion hj a universal positive, if stated strictly, be- 
comes, " All the .good governments are all those which 
have the happiness of the governed in view." But these 
propositions need not be considered universal, for, in 
the first example, we are spealdng not of "all triangles," 
but only of some triangles, i. e., those which are " equi- 
lateral : " and in the second example, we are spealdng, 
not of " aU governments," but only of some governments, 
i. e., "good governments." We may, therefore, convert 
them by particular positive propositions, as follows : 

" Some triangles, {. e., the equilateral, are equiangular." 
" Some triangles, i. e., the equiangular, are equilateral." 
" Some governments, i. e., the good, have the happi- 
ness of the governed in view." 

" Some governments, i. e., aU which have the happi- 
ness of the governed in view, are good governments." * 

♦ Whateley's Logic, ibid. 



o 



32 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION Y. 

PEOPOSITIONS CONSTKUCTED INTO SYLLOGISMS. 

A SYLLOGISM * is the formula of the most direct and simple 
deduction possible. 

Let X is Y represent, as before, any proposition. If 
the agreement of X and Y is directly perceived, then in- 
tuition supersedes the necessity of deduction : but if it 
cannot' be perceived directly, then we must enquire for a 
medium. Now, suppose this medium to be Z, and that 
we perceive by intuition, or as the result of a previous de- 
duction,f that X and Y respectively agree with Z, then 
we infer that they agree with each other. We have thus 
the formula of positive conclusions : 

XisZ, 

Y is Z, 
therefore 

X is Y.J 
The axiom which determines this formula is the fol- 
lowing : If two terms agree with one and the same third 
term, they agree with each other. 

Again : Let X is not Y represent any proposition in 
which disagreement is affirmed between two terms. If 
this disagreement be not intuitively perceived, we must 
once more seek for a medium through which to deduce it. 

* Vide supra, p. 84. f Pages 64, 65. + Page 211. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 333 

Let Z^ again, be tliat medium ; and sujDpose that either, 
by intuition, or as the result of a previous deduction, we 
perceive that X agrees with Z, but that Y disagrees with 
Z ; then we infer that X and Y disagree with each other. 
We have thus the formula of negative conclusions : 

XisZ, 

Y is not Z, 
therefore 

X is not Y. 

The axiom which determines this formula, is the fol- 
lowing : If of tioo termSy one agrees, and the other disa- 
grees with the same third term, they disagree ivith each 
other. 

If the two terms both disagreed with the third term, 
no inference could be made, because no relation could be 
estabhshed between them. 

The above axioms are really axioms of pure science.* 
They apply rigidly to the formula of deduction, because 
this formula is wholly independent of the matter of propo- 
sitions. . 

It is evident that the syllogism can have neither more 
nor less' than three terms. If it had two terms, there would 
be no deduction, but merely a proposition. If it had four 
terms, it would have one term more than is required for a 
simple deduction ; and this fourth term would either be 
irrelevant, or would be a term in another link of a chain 
of deduction. A chain of deduction may be of an indefi- 
nite length, as in geometry, for example, where the whole 
science is a <;hain of deduction from the axioms and pri- 
mary definitions ; but the links of the chain must each 
consist of the syllogism, — this being necessarily the ever- 
recurring form. 

* Vide supra, p. 232. 



334 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

As the syllogism, or formula of deductiorij lias three, 
and only three, terms, so also it has three, and only three, 
propositions. Two of the propositions contain the com- 
parisons of the two terms, respectively, with the third 
term. The third proposition contains the comparison of 
the two terms with each other, in which their agreement 
or disagreement is inferred. The term with which the 
two are compared is called the middle term ; the term 
compared with the middle in the first proposition, is called 
the majoi^ term ; the term compared with the middle in 
the second proposition, is called the minor term. The 
first 'two propositions are together called the premises; 
and the last proposition is called the conclusion. The 
proposition which contains the major term, i. e., the first, 
is called the major premiss ; and that which contains the 
minor term, L e., the second, is called the minor premiss. 

But now the question arises, what determines the 
order of comparisons, or the major term, and the major 
premiss 1 Before we can answer this, several principles 
must he considered. 

1. It is evident that if all the terms were distributed, 
it would be quite immaterial how we arranged the pre- 
mises. If all X be contained in all Z, and all Y be con- 
tained in all Z, then X and Y cannot be otherwise than 
compared through Z, in their whole extent. 

2. If the middle term be not distributed, then the 
two terms or extremes cannot be certainly compared 
through it, for one of them might agree with one part of 
it, and the other with another part, and thus no relation 
between them be established : but a distribution of the 
middle in one of the premises is sufficient, for if one 
extreme has been compared to the whole of the middle 
term, and the other to only a part of it, a relation is 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 335 

evidently establislied between tliem, since every part of 
the middle term, in this case, presents the extreme com- 
pared with the luliole of it, to the extreme compared with 
a part of it. 

3. Hence it appears, again, that where there are two 
particular premises, no legitimate conclusion can he drawn ; 
for we shall then have either an undistributed middle, e. g. 

Some Z is X, 

Some Y is Z ; 
or we shall fail in establishing a relation between the two 
extremes ; for the only case of a distributed middle with 
particular premises, is where the middle term is the predi- 
cate of a particular negative, e. g. 

Some Z is X, 

Some Y is not Z, 
in which some Z and X being first affirmed to agree, and 
then some Y only being excluded from Z, it cannot follow 
certainly that some Y is not X, since some other part of 
X may not agree with Z, and some other part of Y may 
agree with Z, for particulars of opposite qualities may 
both be true ; and thus the conclusion is left wholly in- 
definite. 

4. But the case is widely different where one of the 
premises is universal, and the middle term is distributed, 
e. g. 

All Z is X, 

Some Y is Z ; 
here all Z being contained in X, the some Y contained in 
Z must be contained in X also. Again : in the premises, 

No Z is X, 

Some Y is Z, 
inasmuch as the whole of Z is excluded from X, and some 
Y is contained in Z, it follows that some Y is not in X. 



Q 



36 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



Hence if one of the premises is a universalj it is suffi- 
cient if only the middle term be distributed, and this takes 
place when the universal premiss is E, or when, if it be 
A, the middle term is the subject. 

5. We may not distribute in the conclusion a term 
which has not been previously distributed in a premiss, 
for this would violate the cardinal axiom, that A conse- 
quence cannot transcend its premises. 

6. From two negative premises no inference can be 
made ; for, since in this case both extremes disagree with 
the middle term, we cannot know, by means of this term, 
whether they agree or disagree with each other. 

7. If one of the premises be negative, the conclusion 
must be negative also. Here one of the extremes is 
affirmed to agree, and the other to disagree, with the 
middle term, and consequently they must disagree with 
each other. 

8. If one of the premises be particular, the conclusion 
must be particular also; for, although the whole of one 
extreme is compared in the universal premiss with the 
middle term, yet, as in the particular premiss, only a part 
of the other extreme is compared with the middle term, 
only a part of the first can be compared with the second 
in the conclusion. 

9. "Where there are two universal positive premises, 
we cannot draw a universal conclusion, if the two extremes 
are both predicates in the premises, for then they are both 
undistributed : e. g. 

All Z is X, 
All Z is Y, 
therefore 

Some Y is X. 

The ambiguity of the middle term is a fallacy arising 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 337 

from tlie matter, or the peculiar use of words, and there- 
fore is not to be considered here, where we are discussing 
the pure deductive formula. 

It is evident that only four different conclasions can 
be drawn, viz. : A, E, I, and ; now the premises which 
are to determine these conclusions must be constituted in 
accordance with the above principles. Let us consider 
them in order. 

I. A universal affirmative conclusion. This can be 
drawn where all of one extreme can be inferred to be con- 
tained in the other. It is not necessary that the contain- 
ing extreme should itself be distributed ; it may contain 
the other extreme, and a great deal more ; all which is 
necessary to the universal conclusion is, that all of one 
extreme should be affirmed to be contained in the other. 
Now, as the middle term must be distributed, it must be 
the subject of one of the premises ; and as one of the 
extremes must be distributed, it must be the subject of 
the other premiss ; and again, as it is the only extreme 
distributed, it must be the subject of the universal con- 
clusion. And, once more, as the middle term is the 
medium of comparison, it, on the one hand, must embrace 
the whole of one extreme, and, on the other hand, must 
itself be all embraced by the other extreme. The follow- 
ing arrangement of the terms is the only one which com- 
prises all the conditions of a universal conclusion : 

A, Z is X, 

A, Y is Z, 

A, Y is X.* ' 
Hence the major term is here the one which contains 
the middle, and the minor is the one which is contained 
in the middle. 

* Barbara. 
15 



338 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

We miglit arrange the premises thus : 

A, Y is Z, 

A, Z is X, 

A, Y is X, 
but the major premiss is generally placed first. 

II. Universal negative conclusion. Here the two ex- 
tremes are universally denied of each other. Hence there 
is only one possible arrangement of the terms, viz. : so 
that one extrerae shall he universally excluded from the 
middle term, and the other extreme universally contained 
in it, as follows : 

(1.) (2.) 

E, Z is X,* E, X is Z/[- 

A, Y is Z, or A, Y is Z, 

E, Y is X, E, Y is X. 

The only difference between the two syllogisms above, 
is the conversion of the major premiss, in the last. 
Or we may express the same thing thus : , 

(3.) (4.) 

A, X is Z,X A, X is Z,§ 

E, Y is Z, or E, Z is Y, 

E, Y is X, E, Y is X. 

The only difference between the last two is the conver- 
sion of the minor premiss, in the second. And the only 
difference between the first and the last two is, that the 
extreme which, in the first two, is excluded from the 
middle term, in the last two is contained in it ; and the 
extreme which, in the first two, is contained in the middle 
term, in the last two is excluded from it. 

* Celarent. f Cesare J Camestres. | Camenes. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 339 

But it is evident that all these different forms satisfy 
the conditions required, and are virtually the same. 

As to the title of the extremes, the term which 
becomes the subject of the conclusion is generally called 
the minor term, and that which becomes the predicate 
of the conclusion, the major term. In a universal nega- 
tive conclusion, however, this is of no account, inasmuch 
as it is simply convertible. It is quite immaterial 
whether we express the conclusion by E, Y is X, or E, 
Xis Y. 

Indeed, the 2, 3, and 4 forms may all be easily re- 
duced to the first : the 2, by simply converting the major ; 
the 3, by simply converting the minor, and making it to 
change places with the major, and then simply converting 
the conclusion ; and the 4, by transposing the premises, 
and simply converting the conclusion. 

III. Particular affirmative conclusion. This conclu- 
sion is drawn where one of the premises is a particular 
affirmative, or where both premises are universal affirma- 
tives. 

1. Where one of the premises is a particular affirma- 
tive, all of the middle must he contained in one extreme, 
and some of the other extreme in the middle, or, which 
amounts to the same thing, since a particular affirmative 
is simply convertible, some of the middle in the other ex^ 
treme. The form which directly presents this is the fol- 
lowing : 

(1.)' 
A, Z is X, 

I, YisZ, 

I, YisX.* 

* Darii. 



340 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

The deduction here is manifestly valid. There are 
three other forms, viz. : 

(2.) (3.) (4.) 

I, Z is X,* A, Z is X,t I, X is Z4 

A, Z is Y, I, Z is Y, A, Z is Y, 

1, YisX. I, YisX. I, YisX. 

All these evidently fulfil the required conditions. 
Here, again, the 2, 3, and 4 forms may be reduced to the 
first : the 2, by simply converting the major, transposing 
the premises, and then converting the conclusion ; the 3, 
by converting the minor ; and the 4, by transposing the 
premises, and converting the conclusion. 

Scholium, It will be remarked that the change of the 
forms, by conversion of propositions, and the transposi- 
tion of the premises, does not alter the current of the 
deduction. "We have seen§ that a proposition, when law- 
fully converted, asserts no more than it did before : the 
transposition of the premises obviously does not change 
their character, nor their relation to each other; and 
since, when this transposition is made, what was before 
called the major becomes the minor term, and vice versa, 
the conclusion is converted, to correspond to it. 

2. Where both premises are universal affirmatives. 
Here, either both extremes are predicates, and of course 
undistributed, or one oi>ly is a predicate, and undis- 
tributed. 

There are then two forms : 

* Disamis. f Datisi. % Dimaris. 

§ Supra, See. IV. 



PEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 341 

(5.) (6.) 

A, Z is X,'- A, X is Z,t 

A, Z is T, A, Z is Y, 

I, YisX. . I, YisX. 

These also can easily be reduced to the first : the 5, 
by converting the minor premiss into I ; and the 6, by 
transposing the premises, and simply converting the con- 
clusion. After the transposition, we consider A, X is Z, 
as I, X is Z, for only the particular is required for the 
conclusion. Indeed, these forms are quite unnecessary, 
since a particular affirmative conclusion requires only one 
universal premiss ; and two universals, arranged as above, 
cannot form the premises of any thing more. 

IV. Particular negative conclusion. We have seen 
that from two particular premises no inference can be 
drawn, not even where a particular negative, of which the 
middle term is the predicate, and consequently distributed, 
is one of the premises. Nor, again, can any inference be 
drawn from two negatives. One at least of the premises, 
therefore, must be a universal, and only one of them a 
negative. If there be two universal premises, the extreme 
contained in the universal positive must be a predicate, 
so that it be not distributed, for if both extremes were 
distributed, then the conditions of a universal negative 
would be fulfilled. From this it follows that we can draw 
a particular negative conclusion only in the three follow- 
ing ways : 

1. The whole of one extreme must be excluded from 
the middle term, and some of the other extreme must be 
contained in it. There are six forms in this division : 

* Darapti. t Bramantip. 



342 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

(1.) (2.) (3.) (4.) 

E, Z is X/' E, X is Z,t E, Z is X,X E, Z is X,§ 

I, YisZ, I, YisZ, A, ZisY, I, Z is Y, 

0,YisX. 0,YisX. 0,YisX. 0,YisX. 

(5.) (6.) 

E, X is Z,\\ E, X is Z,^ 

A, Z is Y, I, Z is Y, 

0, Y is X. 0, Y is X. 

2. The wliole of one extreme must be contained in 
tlie middle term, and only some of tlie other extreme ex- 
cluded from it. In this the preceding is reversed. Here 
is only one form, viz. : 

(7.) 

A, X is Z,** 
0,YisZ, 
0, Y is X. 

3. Some of the middle term must be excluded from 
one extreme, and the whole of it contained in the other 
extreme. Here also is only one form, viz. : 

(8.) 
0, Z is X,tt 
A, Z is Y, 
0,YisX. 

Every one must perceive, upon a little reflection, that 
these three divisions embrace all possible negative conclu- 
sions'. 

Here, again, all the forms can be shown to be identical 
In their principle, by reducing all the others to the first 

* Ferio. f Festino. | Felapton. § Feriso. || Fesapo. 

^ Freslson. ** Baroko. ft Bokardo. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 343 

form. 2 is reduced by simply converting the major ; 3, by 
converting the minor into I ; 4, by simply converting tbe 
minor ; 5, by simply converting tlie major^ and converting 
the minor into I ; and 6, by simply converting both the 
major and minor. In these the mode of reduction is 
obvious and easy. 7 and 8 are reduced in a manner more 
circuitous : In 7, the major term must be changed by con- 
traposition, and the minor changed into I, by connecting 
the negative particle with the predicate/" thus : 



A, X is Z, hy contraposition f E, not Z is X, 

0, Y is Z, hy connecting the particle I, Y is not Z, 
0, Y is X, " " 0, Y is X. 

In 8, the minor is changed into E, by double negation, 
and is not converted as before ; the major is converted 
into I, as before ; the premises are then transposed ; and 
lastly, the conclusion, by a double negation and conversion, 
is made to correspond legitimately as well as in form with 
the premises, thus : 



■ 0, Z is X converted into I, not X is Z, 

A, Z is Y hy douhle negation hecomes E, Z is not Y. 

Transposing these p^^emises lue have < ' ' * 

/ I, not X is Z. 

Then 0, Y is X, 5?/ douhle negation ') 

and conversion gives the proper > Q not X is not Y. 
conclusion ) 

* Vide Section IV. 

t Contraposition supposes a previous double negation ; it is a simple con- 
version, after a change has been made by this negation, e. ff. E, X is not Z is 
the double negation, and then by conversion, E, not Z is X. 



344 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

As this is somewliat complicatedj I will give an illus- 
tration : 

Oj " Some oppressed men are not discontented ; 
A, All oppressed men are wronged ; 
Therefore 

0, Some wronged men are not discontented." 

ThiS; when reduced as above, becomes 



E, "No oppressed men are not wronged ; 

I, Some not discontented are oppressed men ; 

0, Some not discontented are not not wronged." 

This may also be reduced to the first form of the par- 
ticular positive, viz., to A, I, I, by converting the minor 
term and the conclusion into I, by connecting the negative 
particle as before^ and then transposing the premises, thus : 

0, Z is X converted and transposed to minor I, not X, is Z 
A, Z is Y transposed to major A, Z is Y 

0, Y is X converted I^ not X is Y 
A, All oppressed men are wronged ; 

1, Some not discontented are oppressed men ; 
I, Some not discontented are wronged ! *^ 



From the foregoing analysis, it appears, that there are 
but four original distinct syllogisms, comprising the four 
possible conclusions, viz.. A, A, A ; E, A, E ; A, I, I ; 
and E, I, 0, as arranged under the first form of each kind ; 
—all the other forms being capable of a legitimate reduc- 
tion to these primary forms. 

* Whately's Logic, Book II., Ch. iii., § 5. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 345 

At the beginning of this section we considered the two 
primary axioms of pure science which determine the gene- 
ral formula of Deduction. But in analysing this formula 
under the ideas of quantity and quality, we find another 
axiom developed. In every form of the syllogism one of 
the extremes is more comprehensive than either the other 
extreme, or the middle term ; and the middle term com- 
prehends this other extreme, whether it be the whole or a 
part of the class to which it belongs, thus : 

AH Z is X, 

All, or, some Y is Z, 

therefore we may infer 

All, or, some Y is X. 

Hence, it appears, that what is affirmed of Z, viz., 
that it is comprehended by X, must be affirmed of Y also 
to the extent that it is comprehended by Z. So far with 
respect to Quantity. 

With respect to Quality, the middle term is always 
universally affirmed, either to be comprehended by, or to 
be excluded from, the first extreme ; and the other extreme 
is in whole or part affirmed to be comprehended in the 
middle term, thus : 

All, or, no Z is X, 
All, or, some Y is Z, 

therefore we may infer 

All, or, some Y is, or is not, X. 

Here, again, what is affirmed of Z, viz., that it univer- 
sally does, or does not, agree with, or belong to X, must 
be affirmed of Y also, to the extent that it is compre- 
hended by Z. 

15* 



346 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

Now all this is evident ; and the axiom which forms 
the basis of it, is the Dictum de omni et nullo of Aristotle, 
viz., Whatever is affirmed or denied of any term distri- 
huted, (i. e. taJcen universally,) is affirmed or denied of 
every particular com]oreTiended under it. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 347 



SECTION YI 

OF MOODS AND FIGUBES. 

The Mood of a Syllogism is determined by the quantity 
and quality of tlie tliree propositions which compose it, 
and is represented by the corresponding symbols ; thus, 
A, A, A, expresses the mood of the syllogism which gives 
a universal positive conclusion ; and so with respect to the 
others. 

The Figure of a Syllogism refers to the situation of the 
extremes in the premises with respect to the middle term. 
Now, obviously, there are but four variations that can be 
made, viz., the middle term must be the subject in both 
premises ; or the predicate in both ; or the subject of the 
major, and the predicate of the minor ; or the predicate 
of the major, and the subject of the minor. The following 
table presents their several relations : 

(1.) (2.) (3.) (4.) 

ZisX, XisZ, ZisX, X is Z, 

YisZ, YisZ, ZisY, ZisY, 

YisX. YisX. YisX. YisX. 

Now as there are four kinds of propositions. A, E, I, 
0, and three are appropriated to each syllogism, all the 
possible ways of combining them must be sixty-four. For 
four different majors multiplied into four different minors, 
and these again into four different conclusions, is a com- 
bination of four, three times, 4x4x4=64. Eegarding it 



348 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

as a mere arithmetical problem, since the sixty-four Moods 
can be each stated in the four different Figures, we shall 
have in all 4x64=256 varieties of the syllogism. The 
arithmetical determination, however, although noticed by 
logicians, is of very little nse. We find out in this way the 
utmost limit of the syllogisms, but we are not aided, in the 
least, in discriminating between the true and the false. 

This discrimination can be made only on the principles 
laid down in the preceding section ; and which have there 
been applied to determining the legitimate and required 
syllogisms, independently of the apparatus of Moods and 
Figures. And yet, after having completed this analysis, 
there may perhaps be some convenience in employing 
Moods and Figures in distinguishing the different forms. 

The legitimate forms, we have seen, are in all nine- 
teen ; of which, one only is used for universal positive con- 
clusions, four for universal negative, six for particular 
positive, and eight for particular negative conclusions. 
These are found in the different Figures. That figure 
which embraces the four cardinal forms, is called the first. 
All the other forms, we have seen, can be reduced to these 
cardinal forms. 

The following lines have been contrived to aid in com- 
mitting the Moods to memory ; and to present, at one 
view, the mode of reducing the secondary Moods to the 
primary : 

Fig. 1. bArbArA, cElArEnt, dArll, f ErIOque pii- 
oris. 

Fig. 2. cEsArE, cAmEstrEs, f EstInO, bArOkO, se- 
cundge. 

Fig. 3. tertia, dArAptI, dIsAmIs, dAtlsI, f ElApt- 
On, bOkArdO, f ErIsO, habet : quarta in- 
super addit, 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 349 

Fig. 4. brAmAntlp, cAmEnEs, dImArls, fEsApoo, 
frEsIsOn. 

In the above, tlie initial letters b, c, d, f, denote the 
mood of the first figure to which the secondary mood must 
be reduced : e. g. In brAmAntIp the b indicates that it 
is to be reduced to bArbArA ; * and so of the others. 

The capital letters denote the moods ; s, denotes the 
simple conversion of the proposition which precedes it ; p, 
the conversion per accidens of the proposition which pre- 
cedes it, i. e., the conversion of A into I, or of I into A f ; 
m, (mutandi) that the premises must be transposed. 

Baroko and Bokardo are names given in reference to 
Reductio ad impossihile ; a method of reduction employed 
by some, particularly in respect to these moods. The B 
denotes that the new mood is to be formed in Barbara ; 
and the K, that for the proposition immediately preced- 
ing it, the contradictory of the conclusion must be substi- 
tuted. These moods, however, have in the preceding sec- 
tions been reduced in the ordinary way.J 

* If reduced to Barbara, it of course is true in Darii, 

t This last occurs in Bramardip only, and here not because a particular can 
legitimately be converted into a imiversal, but because the new arrangement of 
the premises requires a universal conclusion. The transposition of the premises 
places the mood in the 1st Fig. and it becomes Barbara necessarily. 

X The kind of arguments to which the different moods are in their nature 
best adapted, is an investigation of very high interest. I have not entered 
upon it in this treatise. Perhaps I shall undertake it hereafter. In the ab- 
sence of any thing original to offer, I take the liberty of appending the follow- 
ing striking remarks from Dr. Whately's excellent work. They are given in a 
note at the foot of one of the pages of Book 11., Ch. III., § 4 : 

" With respect to the use of the j&rst three Figures (for the fourth is never 
employed but by an accidental awkwardness of expression,) it may be remarked, 
that the First is that into which an argument will be found to faU the most 
naturally, except in the following cases : — First, When we have to disprove 
something that has been maintained, or is likely to be believed, o.ur arguments 



350 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

will usually be found to take most conveniently the form of the Second Figure, 
viz. we prove that the thing we are speaking of cannot belong to such a Class, 
either because it wants what belongs to the whole of that Class (Cesare), or be- 
cause it Tios something of which that Class is destitute (Camestres) ; e. ff. ^ No 
impostor would have warned his followers, as Jesus did, of the persecutions 
they would have to submit to ; ' and again, ' An enthusiast would have ex- 
patiated, which Jesus and his followers did not, on the particulars of a future 
state.' 

" The same observations will apply, mvicdis mviandis, when a Particular 
conclusion is sought, as in Festino and Baroko. 

" The arguments used in the process called the ' Abscissio Infiniti,' will in 
general be the most easily referred to this Figure. 

" The Third Figure is, of course, the one employed when the Middle term 
is Singular, since a Singular term can only be a Subject. This is also the form 
into which most arguments will naturally fall that are used to establish an db- 
jedion (Enstasis of Aristotle) to an opponent's Premiss, when his argument is 
such as to require that Premiss to be Universal. It might be called, therefore, 
the Enstatic Figure. E. G. If any one contends that ' this or that doctrine 
ought not to be admitted, because it cannot be explained or comprehended,' 
his suppressed major premiss may be refuted by the argument that ' the con- 
nection of the Body and Soul cannot be explained or comprehended,* Sfc. 

"A great part of the reasoning of Butler's Analogy may be exhibited in 
this form." 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 351 



SECTION VII. 

OF THE EEDUCTION OF SYLLOGISMS. 

Eeduction of Syllogisms is of two kinds, Osfensive He- 
duction, and Reductio ad impossihile. The aim in both 
kinds, in respect to Syllogisms, is to prove the validity of 
the secondary forms. 

I. Ostensive Reduction. — Here the proof is made out 
by showing the identity of the secondary and primary 
forms ; and this is done by actually changing the secondary 
into the primary, without making them assert more, or, 
differently from what they did before. 

This change is effected by conversion of terms, and 
transposition of premises. But it has been fully shown 
that these do not effect either the kind or the extent of 
the predication. When the secondary are reduced to the 
primary form, the proof is made out, because these forms 
are a direct expression of the Dictum de omni et nullo. 

II. Reductio ad impossibile.- — By this method we prove 
the vaKdity of a secondary Syllogism as a form of reason- 
ing, by showing that if we grant the premises, the conclu- 
sion cannot he false. For that in all cases must be a valid 
form, by which, from true premises, we cannot draw a false 
conclusion. 

The method is simply this : Since by the opposition 
of propositions, every proposition must be true if its con- 
tradictory be false, and false if its contradictory be true, 



352 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

we take the contradictory of the conclusion of the Syl- 
logism or form in question^ and construct with it, as a 
premiss in connection with another unquestionahle pre- 
miss, a new Syllogism in the first Figure. Now if the 
new conclusion thus deduced be false, then the assumed 
premiss must he false, for there is no question respecting 
the validity of the form in the first Figure ; and if the as- 
sumed premiss he false, then the original conclusion of 
which it is the contradictory must be true : e. g. Let ua 

take Baroko : 

A, X is Z, 

0, Y is Z, 

0, Y is X. 

If this conclusion be not true, its contradictory is true, 
viz., A, Y is X. Let us, then, construct a new Syllogism 
with this contradictory as a premiss, in the first Figure. 
This we can do by merely substituting it for the minor 
premiss in the above Syllogism ; we shall then draw a con- 
clusion in Barbara, thus : 

A, XisZ, 

A, Y is X ; 
therefore, 

A, Y is Z. 

Now it will be perceived that this new conclusion is 
the contradictory of the original minor premiss, — and the 
premises it will be recollected were granted ; hence it 
must be false ; and being false, the new premiss is false, 
and this being false, its contradictory, the original conclu- 
sion, must be true. 

All the secondary forms may be tested in the same 
way, e. g, Feriso. 

E, Z is X, 

1, Z is Y, 
0,YisX. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 353 

Substituting tlie contradictory of the conclusion A, Y 
is X, for tlie major premiss^ we form tlie following Syllo- 
gism in Darii : 

A, Y is X, 

I, Z is Y ; 
therefore, 

I, Z is X. 

But the new conclusion contradicts the original major 
E, Z is X ; consequently it is false ; and being false, the 
new premiss is false, and this being false, its contradic- 
tory, the original conclusion, must be true. 



354 DEDUCTIVE LOGICf. 



SECTION VIII. 

OF MODAL, HYPOTHETICAL, AND DISJUNCTIVE 
PROPOSITIONS. 

i. Modals. — These propositions do not differ in form from 
what are called pure categorical propositions. X is Y 
represents both. The modality is merely a peculiarity of 
the matter, and consequently does not pertain to the pure 
logical formula. Besides, in the matter itself, modal pro- 
positions can be so disposed as to become pure categoricals. 
This is effected by attaching the modal words to the sub- 
ject or the predicate. U. G, " It is probable that aU 
knowledge is useful," i. e. 

Sub. Fred. 



I ' ^ I > 

" All knowledge is probably useful." 

Again : 

" It is possible that he may arrive to-morrow ; " i. e. 

Svb. Fred. 



( - ; ^ I ^ 

" His arrival to-morrow is possible." 

A subject and predicate may each be expressed by 
several words, but this cannot affect the form. 

II. Hypotlieticals. — These are propositions which con- 
tain a hypothesis in one of their terms, and are therefore 
like Modals capable of being reduced under the categori- 
cal form. Where the force of the reasoning lies in the 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 355 

hypothesis the case is widely different ; but it is evident 
that this is not the fact in Examples like the following : 

Every Z is X or p. 

Every Y is Z ; 
therefore; 

Every Y is X or p. 

The aim here is not to conclude which of the two Y 
iS; whether X or p : hut only that Y is X or p. 

III. Disjunctives. — These are a kind of compound 
propositions, consisting of several categoricals, one of 
which is affirmed to be true ', e. g. A. is either B or C or 
D. '^ow if we can deny all but one, then that one is 
true ; or if we can affirm one to be true, then the others 
are false ; thus, But A is not B or C ; therefore A is D : 
or A is D, therefore it is neither B nor 0. 

A Disjunctive proposition, however, is capable of being 
reduced like a Modal to a pure categorical, thus : 

Sub. . Pred. 

AH A not B or'c is d7 
Or, 

Svb. Pred. 



All A not B or D is 0. 

A Syllogism with such propositions contains the usual 
forms ) e. g. 

Every A not B or is D. 
AU Z is A not B or 0. 
Therefore, all Z is D. 

" It is either Spring, Summer, Autumn, or "Winter ; 
but it is neither Spring, Autumn, nor Winter ; therefore 
it is Summer,'' i. e. 

Every season not Spring, Autumn, or Winter, is 
Summer. 



356 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



The present season is a season not Spring, &c.; there- 
fore, the present season is Summer. 

When we affirm one to be true, and infer the falsity 
of the others, the same reduction may he made ; thus : 
No A being D is B or C, 



Z is A being D, 
Therefore, Z is not B or 0. 



No season being Summer, is Autumn or Winter, &c. 

The present season is a season being Summer ; there- 
fore, &c. 

Or, again, a Syllogism of this kind may be put into 
the form of a conditional, thus : 

If A is not B or 0, 
Then A is D, &c. 

It is evident, therefore, that the preceding kinds of 
propositions require no new formula, but lie within the 
principles already established. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 357 



SECTION IX. 

HYPOTHETICAL REASONING. 

A CoNDi'ivOi^ a.^. proposition consists of an Antecedent and 
a Consequent, each of which is a distinct proposition, — 
e. g., 

Antecedent. 



" If the Scriptures are not wholly false, 

Cmisequent. 

, ' > 

They are entitled to respect." 
If Y is Z, 
Then Y is X. 
There are two rules generally applied in hypothetical 
reasoning. 

1. If the Antecedent be granted, the Consequent is 

granted also : e. a., 

^ If YisZ, 

Then Y is X. 



But Y is Z, 

Therefore, Y is X. 
2. The Consequent being denied, the Antecedent 
must be denied also. 

If Y is Z, 
Then Y is X. 



But Y is not X, 

Therefore, Y is not Z. 



358 ■ DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

The first rule is founded upon tlie obvious principle, 
that a false Antecedent or Premiss cannot yield a true 
conclusion. The second rule is founded upon the no less 
obvious principle, that an Antecedent or Premiss must be 
false, which yields a false conclusion. 

But, from the falsity of an antecedent, we cannot infer 
the falsity of the consequent, for the consequent may flow 
out of some other antecedent which is true : e. g.. 

If Y isZ, 
Then Y is X. 

Now, suppose Y is Z to be false, stiU Y is X may be 
proved by some other antecedent, e. g., Y is P. 

Hypothetical reasoning really differs from categorical, 
only in that, one of the premises is a hypothesis. The 
formula and all the principles are the same. If Y is Z, 
then Y is X : this is an affirmation that if one proposition 
be granted, another must be granted also. But, one pro- 
position alone cannot authorize an inference. We here 
then have only part of an argument, viz. : the conclusion 
and one of the premises. Which premiss have we, and 
can we supply the other ? There is no difficulty. The 
conclusion always contains the minor and major terms ; 
the other premiss contains the middle, together with 
either the major or minor. Il^ow, if there be a term in 
the antecedent or premiss, the same as the subject of the 
consequent or conclusion, then the given premiss is the 
minor premiss ; but if the same as the predicate of the 
consequent, then the given premiss is the major. And in 
either case, in order to supply the wanting premiss, we 
have only to connect the middle term with that term of 
the conclusion which is not found in the given premiss or 
antecedent : e. g., 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 359 

If Y is Z, 
Then Y is X. 

Here the wanting premiss, obviously, according to the 
above, is the major, which supply, and we have the fol- 
lowing syllogism : 

Z is X, 
If Y is Z, 
Then Y is X. 

Or we may state it thus : It is affirmed, that if Y is 
Z, then Y is X : but wliy does it follow, that, if Y is Z, 
Y is X also 1 The answer to be given is. Because Z is X 
— if Y is contained in Z, then Y must be contained in 
X also, because Z is contained in X. 

"If the Scriptures are not wholly false, then the 
Scriptures are entitled to respect." 

But, wliy does this follow? Because, " Whatever is 
not wholly false, is entitled to respect." Or, "Every 
book of pure morality and heavenly promises, &c., not 
wholly false, is entitled to respect : " 

" If the Scriptures are such a book, not wholly false," 

" Then the Scriptures, &c." 

Take another case * in which the minor premiss is 
wanting : 

If ZisX, 
Then Y is X. 

The antecedent here must be the major premiss, be- 
cause it compares the middle with the predicate of the 

* The suppression of the minor premiss, and the construction of a condi- 
tional out of the major and the conclusion, gives that case in which the ante- 
cedent and consequent have a different subject, and which, by some, is supposed 
to involve peculiar difficulties. See Whately's Logic, Book XL, Chap, iv., § 6 
uote at the foot of the page. 



360 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

consequent or conclusion. We can easily supply the 
minor : The affirmation is that, If Z is X, then Y must 
be X also. But, why must this follow ? Because Y is Z. 

" If whatever exhibits marks of design is the work of 
an Intelligent Creator ; 

" Then the universe must be the work of an Intelligent 
Creator." But why? 

Because, "The universe exhibits marks of design." 

In ordinary language, all reasoning is usually in an 
Enthymematic form ; i, e., one premiss is suppressed ; 
because, when one premiss and the conclusion are stated, 
the mind, generally, readily supplies the other. Thus 
the syllogism just above, usually appears, in ordinary lan- 
guage, with the major suppressed ; since when it is- af- 
firmed that, " The universe must be the work of an In- 
telligent Creator, because it exhibits marks of design," 
every one assents on the ground that, " Whatever exhibits 
marks of design, must be the work of an Intelligent 
Creator." 

What therefore is called by logicians, a Conditional 
Proposition, is nothing more than an enthymeme, with 
the given premiss hypothesised. And to grant the ante- 
cedent, is merely to remove the hypothesis. The hypothe- 
sis has nothing to do with the pure logical form, for, that 
we ever hypothesise is owing to considerations lying wholly 
in the matter or subjects of our reasoning. And to reduce 
a conditional, we have only to supply the suppressed 
premiss. 

The validity of the Kules before given, now, also, 
appears clearly to arise out of the nature of the syllogism. 
To grant the antecedent, is to grant the consequent, 
because, since the suppressed premiss is of course granted, 
not being hypothesised, to grant the antecedent is to 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 361 

remove tlie hypothesis from the other premiss, and conse- 
quently to remove all doubtfulness from the argument. 
And to deny the consequent, must be the destruction of 
the argument, since it is equivalent to granting the con- 
tradictory of the conclusion, and consequently denying 
the premises. 

16 



362 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



SECTION X. 

OF THE DILEMMA. 

A DILEMMA is formed by bringing togetber several Con- 
ditional Propositions, so that different antecedents shall 
have the same consequent; or, different antecedents shall 
have different consequents; or, the same antecedent shall 
have different consequents. 

I. Different Antecedents witb the same Consequent. 

If A is B, And if A is C, And if A is D, 
Then A is X, tben A is X, tben A is X, &c. 
Now, if tbe matter be such that we can disjunctively 
grant the antecedents, thus : 

But, A is B, or A is D ; then it must follow that 
A is X. 

JJ. Different Antecedents with different Consequents. 

If A is X, If A is Y, If A is Z, 

Then A is B, then A is C, then A is D. 

Now here again, if the matter is such that we can 
disjunctively grant the antecedents, then we must disjunc- 
tively grant the consequents likewise : thus : 
But A is X, or Y, or Z. 

Therefore A is B, or C, or D. 
III. The same Antecedents with different Conse- 
quents. 

If A is B, If A is B, If A is B, 

Then A is X, then A is Y, then A is Z. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 363 

NoWj if we perceive from the matter, that the common 
antecedent admits of all these consequents, then of course, 
by granting the common antecedent, we grant all the con- 
sequents. 

Where we grant the antecedent, and establish the 
consequent, the dilemma is called constructive. 

But where we deny the consequent, and destroy the 
antecedent, the dilemma is called destructive. 

We have already remarked in the preceding section, 
that the hypothesis arises from the peculiar character of 
the matter of the proposition ; for the logical form sup- 
poses the connection between the subject and predicate to 
be certain. And so here again the possibility of disjunc- 
tively affirming the antecedents, or of disjunctively deny- 
ing the consequents, lies in the peculiar character of the 
matter. The force and keenness of the dilemma, as a 
weapon in debate, arises from the matter also, and from 
many relations and circumstances of which the forensic 
disputant knows how to avail himself : e. g., An individual 
may be so situated that his words^ or conduct, or both, 
justify two or more inferences unfortunate for himself,- 
from one or the other of which he cannot escape. He 
must adnait one fact or the other, and either is an ante- 
cedent involving a stinging consequent. We have here 
described the second kind of Dilemma, and of which the 
several antecedents are the "horns" : e. g.^ " If iEschines 
joined in the public rejoicings, he is inconsistent ; if he 
did not, he is unpatriotic ; but he either joined or not , 
therefore he is either inconsistent or unpatriotic." 

From the denial of one or the other of the consequents, 
we necessitate the denial of one or the other of the ante- 
cedents ; and this proves no less forcible than the other 
mode. Thus we may state the preceding example in the 



364 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

following manner: '^If -^scMnes is consistent, he did 
not join in the public rejoicings ; if lie is patriotic, he did 
join in them : hut he either joined or not ; therefore he 
is either not consistent, or not patriotic/' 

The first kind is forcible taken in the constructive 
mode ; for here the individual who is the subject of the 
dilemma is involved in several facts, so related, that some 
one must be admitted, and any one leads to the torturing 
inference. 

The third kind is the weakest, and perhaps ought not 
to be considered a dilemma at all. Having only one an- 
tecedent, it wants the *' horns/' In the constructive 
mode, it is merely a conditional, in which the antecedent 
involves several consequents ; and this is common to many 
conditionals, without yielding any peculiar advantage in 
debate. On the other hand, there is no point in disjunc- 
tively denying the consequents, since the denial of any one 
of them destroys the common antecedent, so that the 
whole force of the argument is found in one of the simple 
conditionals. 

Where the dilemma has the subject of the consequents 
different from the subject of the antecedents, the antece- 
dents are major premises. This is obvious from what was 
shown in the preceding section. 

Since the dilemma is merely a combination of condi- 
tionals, it may be resolved into these again, and each con- 
ditional reduced to the complete syllogism, by supplying 
the suppressed premiss. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 365 



SECTION XL 

OF THE SORITES. 

This is an abridged form of an argument consisting of 
several Syllogisms. It is either categorical or hypothe- 
tical. 

I. Categorical Sorites. — This is so arranged that the 
predicate of the first proposition is the subject of the 
second, and the predicate of the second the subject of the 
third; and so on. In every new proposition a new predi- 
cate appears ; and in the last proposition it is inferred 
that the first subject agrees with the last predicate ; e. g. 
A is B, B is C, C is D, D is E ; therefore A is E. It is 
evident that in the same manner the last predicate may 
be affirmed of all the intermediary subjects. The truth 
of the argument is evident . If all A is contained in B, 
and all B in C, and all C in J), and all D in E, then all 
A., B, and C must be contained in E likewise. 

By carefully inspecting the Sorites, we shall perceive 
that the first proposition of the series is a minor premiss, 
and all the other propositions major premises, except the 
last, which is a conclusion ; so that we have here parts of 
several Syllogisms, which are so related that the conclu- 
sion of the preceding becomes the minor premiss of the 
succeeding ; and the Sorites is constructed by su23pressing 
aU the minor premises but the first, and aU the conclu- 
Bions but the last ; thus : 



366 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

(1.) (2.) 

A is B, B is C, is D, 

B is 0/ A is B, A is C. 

C is B, Therefore A is C, Therefore A is D, 
D is E, (3.) 

Therefore A is E. D is E, 

A is D, • 
Therefore A is E, 
The Sorites is formed of the Primary Syllogisms, i. e. 
those of the first Figure, because in this, inasmuch as it is 
the natural form of the Syllogism, no change hy conver- 
sion or otherwise has to he made in the propositions in 
transferring them from one Syllogism to another, which 
will be the case in the other figures, since the middle term 
is continually changing ; e. g. In Darapti the 1st Syllo- 
gism would be, 
BisC, 

B is A, and then the next Syllogism is C is D, 
Some A is C, Some A is 0, 

Some A is D, 
Which is Darii ; and this can be prevented only by con- 
verting A is C. 

It will be perceived, also, that the first and last pro- 
positions of a Sorites alone can be Particular ; for the 
major premiss in the first Figure is always universal, but 
the minor term and the conclusion may be particular. 

Where a Sorites has a Negative Conclusion, only the 
last term of the series, before the Conclusion, can be nega- 
tive. Thus, A is B, B is C, C is D, and No D is B, 
therefore No A is E. Otherwise we should have two Ne- 
gative Premises in the Syllogisms. 

II. Hypothetical Sorites. — This consists of a series of 
Conditionals, so related and arranged, that the Consequent 



DEDUCTIVE LOQIO. 367 

of the first becomes the Antecedent of the second ; and 
the Consequent of the second, the Antecedent of the third, 
and so on ; and then, by granting the first Antecedent, 
we grant the last Consequent, and indeed all the Conse- 
quents, thus : If A is B, then A is C, and if A is C, then 
A is D, and if A is D, then A is E ; but A is B, there- 
fore A is E. 

By denying the Consequents successively, we of course 
deny the Antecedents ; and this forms the destructive 
Sorites. The Conditional can, as before shown, be reduced 
to complete Syllogisms ; and then the Syllogisms will be 
found to be related in the same way with those of the 
Categorical Sorites, viz., the conclusions of each preceding 
Syllogism being the minor premiss of each succeeding one. 
The only difference, then, between the two kinds, lies in 
the hypothetical character of one of the premises in the 
last kind. 

A Sorites may be constructed either by suppressing 
the major or minor, just as conditionals in general. 

Scliolium, — It appears from the preceding Analysis of 
Hypothetical reasoning under all its different modes, that 
it involves no new formulas or principles. Every kind of 
Deduction therefore is comprehended by the Dictum de 
omni et nuUo, and the axioms of agreement and disagree- 
ment. The fundamental Ideas are Evolution, Identity 
and Difference, Quantity and Quality. 



863 I/EDUCTIVE LOGIC 



SECTION XII. 

APPLICATION OF THE DEDUCTIVE FOEMULA. 

The greater part of human reasoning is of tlie Deductive 
kind. The number of first principles and general truths 
is comparatively few, but their application is infinite. 
Many of them, and especially in Keligion, Morals and Po- 
litics, have been spontaneously developed in the human 
mind ; and many others, the result of nice and laborious 
investigation, have become current, through the means 
which now exist for widely circulating knowledge. In the 
constant expansion of knowledge by scientific men ; and 
the improvements of art by the ingenious and skilful ; and 
in the multiform practical duties of the general human 
life, these first great principles and truths receive their 
continual and diversified application. Hence there is no 
department of knowledge, of art, or of duty, where Deduc- 
tive Logic is not required. 

But are Conclusions, in order to be legitimate, re- 
quired to be drawn strictly according to the deductive 
formula? By no means, if we intend by this the formal 
expression of every step of the reasoning. This is not 
necessary, for many things are so plainly implied when not 
expressed, that their formal expression would only en- 
cumber the style. But still, in every case of legitimate 
Inference no logical principle can be violated, and the Ian- 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 369 

guage is capable of being reduced to the Syllogistic form. 
Hence, whenever it is required to test the validity of in- 
ferences, a resort to the Syllogism is decisive. 

It would not be diflficult to give here examples of the 
application of the formula in testing deduction in a variety 
of subjects. I at first intended this. Upon reflection, 
however, I have concluded to limit these examples to one 
subject, and this one eminently clear and beautiful. I 
mean Geometry. My first plan would have tended con- 
siderably to swell a work, already, perhaps, transcending 
the just bounds of an elementary treatise ; besides, all the 
ends of illustration will, I think, be found to be answered 
by this one. 

Demonstration is of two kinds, direct and indirect. 
Direct demonstration is the deduction of a conclusion from 
admitted truths and principles : indirect shows the truth 
of a proposition by proving that its contradictory violates 
admitted truths and principles. Geometry employs both. 
It is a science * of absolute certainty, for its fundamental 
Ideas are clearly developed ; its Axioms are perfect ; f its 
Definitions adequate and precise : its subject pure and 
exact quantity ; and its deductions are made with the ut- 
most rigour. 

After laying down its axioms and definitions. Geome- 
try proceeds to make its deductions. The first deduction 
must necessarily be made directly from the axioms and 
definitions. But the next may employ the deduction al- 
ready made as a basis, in connection with the axioms and 
definitions, and so onward. Hence the field of deduction 
is continually enlarging. 

In constructing this science, much depends upon the 

* Pages 89, 90. t Page 2S2 

16* 



370 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

order of arrangement : for since propositions already de- 
monstrated are employed in demonstrating others, it is 
evident that one arrangement may be superior to another 
in affording facilities for the progressive demonstration.'*' 

After the science has been constructed, it is highly 
advantageous and beautiful, to reverse the order, and 
trace back remote propositions through the connected 
chain of demonstrations to the axioms and definitions. 

In illustrating the application of the Deductive formula 
in this science, I shall first take an instance of direct 
demonstration. The proposition I have selected is the 
following : 

" A line which bisects the vertical angle of a triangle, 
divides the base into two segments, which are proportioned 
to the adjacent sides.^' 

We have in this proposition, deductions both from 
axioms, and from propositions previously deduced, so that 
it will serve to illustrate both. 

A C B is the triangle, and the angle at C is bisected 
by the line C D. 

Now to aid the deduction by bringing in other rela- 
tions besides those simply presented in the triangle, we 
produce a line A C, and draw B E parallel to D, so that 
the two lines thus added meet in E. We now have a 
case of alternate angles included between two parallel 
lines and an intersecting line, and this is our first, 
syllogism, as follows : 



I 



* Corollaries are important links in the chain of demonstration. They are 
propositions which in all cases require demonstration. In the usual definition 
of a Corollary, it is said to he " An ohvious consequence deduced from some- 
thing going before." But because it is " ohvious," the deduction is not given, 
but left to he supplied hy the learner ; and yet in some instances the deduction 
of the Corollary is more diiBcult than that of other propositions where it if 
formally given. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



371 



All alternate angles are equal ; 

But the angles BCD and E B are alternate angles ; 

Therefore these angles are equal. 




But BCD and A C D are equal by construction ; 
and this leads to another syllogism, viz. : 
B C D is equal to A C D, 
E B C is equal to B C D, 
Therefore 

E B C is equal to A C D : 
i. e. Ail B C D, as an equal, is contained in A C D, 
All E B C, as an equal, is contained in B C D, 
Therefore 

All E B C, as an equal, is contained in A C D. 
In the second deduction, the conclusion of the first 
deduction is made the minor premiss : it will be remarked, 
that this is therefore a case of the Sorites ; but the Sorites 
comprehends all cases where one deduction flows out of 
another. 

Or we may deduce it elirectly from the axiom, " Things 
equal to the same thing, are equal to each other : " thus, 



372 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

All things equal to the same thing, are equal to each 

other ; 

E B C and A C D are things equal to the same thing, 

viz. BCD; 

Therefore they are equal to each other. 

This is a syllogism of which the axiom forms the major 
premiss. It is evident that in all cases of deduction 
from an axiom, the axiom must form the major premiss. 

Inspecting the diagram still farther, we perceive that 
the angles A C D and C E B are an outward and inward 
angle, opposite to each other on the same side of a Hne 
A E, cutting the two parallel lines C D and E B ; hence 
their equality is inferred as in the first deduction ; the 
major premiss being here again a proposition before proved, 
viz., " All outward and inward opposite angles on the 
same side of a line intersecting two parallel lines, are 
equal." 

But we have just before inferred the equality of A C D 
and E B 0, therefore we infer again from the axiom 
already quoted, and, in the same way, the equality of 
C E B and E B C ; thus. 

All things equal to the same thing are equal to each 
other ; 

E B and E B C are things equal to the same, viz. 
A C D; 

Therefore, they are equal to each other. 

We have now two angles of a triangle E BC, opposite 
two of its sides, equal ; we therefore infer the equality of 
these sides from a proposition already proved, which here 
again becomes the major premiss of the syllogism, thus : 

" Every triangle equal in respect to two of its angles, 
is equal also in respect to the two sides opposite these 
angles ; " 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 3*73 

The triangle E B C is a triangle equal in two of its 
angles, viz. C E B and E B C ; 

Therefore, it is equal in the two sides opposite these 
angles, viz. the sides E C and B C. 

Inspecting next the whole triangle A B E, we perceive 
that it is a triangle having its two sides, A B and A E, 
divided hy a line C J) parallel to its base E B ; we can 
therefore infer the proportionality of the segments of 
the sides from a proposition already demonstrated, thus : 

^' Every triangle having a line drawn parallel to its 
base dividing its other two sides, is a triangle whose sides 
are divided proportionally ; '' 

The triangle A B E is such a triangle ; 

Therefore its sides are divided proportionally, viz. 

A D : D B : : A : C E. 

But, if A C is proportional to E, it must be pro- 
portional to C B, equal to C E ; for 

E C is a proportional of A C ; and 
C B is E C ; therefore 
C B is a proportional of A C. 
Hence AD:DB::AC:CB. 

The above analysis shows conclusively that the formula 
of Deduction permeates geometrical demonstration. 

Although, for the purposes of demonstration, it is not 
necessary, generally, to draw out the whole deduction in 
detail, still a better insight would be gained of Geometry, 
and striking illustrations afforded of this part of Logic 
if it were occasionally done. Indeed, by raising questions 
respecting the axioms and definitions in order to show 
their necessary and intuitive character, as well as by 
analysing the demonstrations, the study of Geometry may 
be connected with the highest parts of Logic, and be made 



374 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

to embrace the whole, with, the exception of Induction ; 
and this again may be happily connected with the whole 
range of natural science. The study of science would 
thus be placed on the most elevated grounds, and Science 
herself be clothed with light as with a garment. 

In the course of the preceding analysis we have re- 
ferred to several propositions previously proved. Now we 
might go back to these and analyse them in like manner, 
until we should repose amid the axioms and definitions 
and their governing Ideas. But this process has been so 
amply, and I hope so clearly indicated, that I do not deem 
it necessary. One of the propositions referred to, how- 
ever, affords an illustration of the indirect mode of 
demonstration, otherwise caEed the Beductio adahsurdum, 
or the Beductio ad impossihile. I wiU. therefore proceed 
to give an analysis of the demonstration of this one pro- 
position more. The proposition is stated as follows : — 

"Every triangle equal in respect to two of its angles, 
is equal also in respect to the two sides opposite these 
angles.'' 

If this be not true, its contradictory is true, viz. : — 

" Some triangles equal in respect to two of their angles, 
are not equal in respect to the two sides opposite these 
angles.'' 

Let A B C be the triangle having its two angles A 
and B equal. 

Now if the contradictory be true, and the two opposite 
sides B and A C, are not equal, then of course one must 
be greater than the other. Let us therefore suppose A C 
to be the greater, and take A D, on AC, equal to B C. 
Next join B D. Now we have a triangle A D B within 
the triangle ABC; and, comparing them, we have, by 
the contradictory, in the first triangle, side A D equal to 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 



375 



side B C, in the second ; also tlie side A B is common to 
both ; also, by the hypothesis contained both in the pro- 
position and the contradictory, the angle A in the first, 
is equal to angle B, in the second. But it has previously 
been shown in the chain of geometrical deductions, that 
" Any two triangles having two sides and the included 
angle in the one, equal to two sides and the included 
angle in the other, are equal each to each/' This we 
assume as a major premiss ; and then add as a minor, 
" The two triangles A D B and A B 0, by the contradic- 
tory, are, two triangles having two sides and the included 
angle in the one, equal to two sides and the included 
angle of the other.'' Hence the conclusion, " The two 
triangles A D B and A B C are equal." 



A 




Here we assumed the contradictory as a minor premiss 
in connection with an unquestionable major. But what is 
the conclusion ? That one triangle, A D B, contained in 
another triangle, A B C, is equal to its container ; I e. 
I'hat a part is equal to a whole. The conclusion then, 
inasmuch as it violates the axiom, " A whole is greater 
than any of its parts," is false. But the falsity of the 
conclusion must be traced to the falsity of one or both of 
the premises, since the form is correct ; but the major 
was granted ; therefore the falsity is in the minor ; and 



376 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

the minor being false, its contradictory must be true ; but 
the contradictory is the original proposition. 

Illustrations of the Syllogism can be drawn from Ge- 
ometry and from the Mathematics generally, to an indefi- 
nite extent. The above, however, will answer the ends of 
a general and elementary work. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 377 



SECTION XIII. 

OF FALLACIES. 

A Fallacy is a false argument artfully constructed, with 
the intent to deceive ; or, unwarily stumbled upon, from 
an ignorance of the Logical form, or of the subject under 
consideration. 

The full examination of this subject would lead us into 
a wide field, and one in which all the principles of Logic 
would have to be brought under review. The limits we 
have judged fit to assign ourselves will prevent an exami- 
nation in detail ; but we hope, nevertheless, to present 
the important points with sufiicient amplitude. 

In giving a division of Fallacies we must foUow the di- 
visions of Logic itself We shall not, however, pursue the 
same order : but as we have just now been engaged with 
the Deductive Formula, we shall first consider the Falla- 
cies pertaining to this part, so as not to break the contin- 
uity of the investigation, and reserve what remarks we may 
have to make on Fallacies pertaining to the other parts of 
Logic for the close of this Section. 

FALLACIES OF DEDUCTION". 

These are divided into Fallacies in the formula ; and 
Fallacies in tJie matter. 

The latter arc not strictly logical ; but inasmuch as 



378 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

they lie in tlie matter of propositions employed in deduc- 
tion, and where also a rigid adherence to the formula is 
used to conceal the Fallacy in the matter, this appears to 
be the most appropriate division to which they can be 
assigned. 

I. Fallacies in the Formula. — These have virtually 
been set forth already in the Analysis of the Formula in 
Section Y. Nothing more is necessary here than a sum- 
mary view of them : 

1. Undistributed Middle; e, g, 

I, Z is X, 

A, Y is Z, 

A, Y is X. 
Here, although all Y is contained in Z, yet as only 
some Z is contained in Y, and only some Z in X, that 
part of Z which is contained in X may contain no part of 
Y, and thus there can be no ground for an inference. 

2. Illicit Process. — This designates the fallacy of dis- 
tributing a term in the conclusion which has not been pre- 
viously distributed in the corresponding premiss, and thus 
drawing a conclusion beyond the data; e. g. 

A, Z is X, 
A, Z is Y, 
A,YisX. 

3. Tiuo Negative Premises. — Here, since both terms 
are excluded from the middle, no comparison of them can 
be made through it ; e. g. 

E, Z is X, 
E, Y is Z. 

4. Positive Conclusion, where there is a Negative Pre- 
miss ; or a Negative Conclusion^ where both premises are 
positive. 

5. Particidar Premises. — In all cases where both pre- 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 379 

raises are particular, we shall have an undistributed middle, 
or an illicit process of the major or the minor term, or both 
combined. 

6. More tlian three terms plainly expressed. — This is 
an attempt to combine two Syllogisms into one. 

7. Inferring the falsity of the conclusion from that of 
the premiss; or the truth of the premiss from that of the 
conclusion. 

The first of these fallacies appears where, when an in- 
adequate or false argument has been used to establish a 
conclusion, and the argument having been successfully re- 
futed, it is inferred that the conclusion is false ; e. g. If it 
be argued in favor of the immortality of the soul that all 
men entertain a belief of it ; admitting that the argument 
might be refuted by adducing the instance of some nation 
who manifest no conception of immortality, still this is no 
ground for concluding against the doctrine. The argu- 
onent must go for nothing, but the doctrine of immortality 
may still have a real and impregnable foundation. This 
fallacy, indeed, identifies itself with the illicit process ; e. g. 

A, Z is X, 
I, Y is Z, 
I, Y is X. 
Now, if the minor be refuted, as is supposed in the ex- 
ample above, then the argument will stand 

A, Z is X, 
0, Y is not Z, 
0, Y is not X. 
In which there is an illicit process of the major. 

The second of these fallacies, viz., inferring the truth 
of the premiss, from the truth of the conclusion, is a case 
of undistributed middle ; e. g. If from the truth of the 
doctrine of immortality wo infer its universal belief, thus, 



380 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

*^ Whatever is universally believed is true. The doctrine 
of ImmortaKty is true. Therefore it must be universally 
believed ; " i. e. 

A, Z is X, 
I, Y is X, 
I, Y is Z. 

The above, therefore, is not really a distinct branch of 
fallacies in the formula, although at first viev\r it might 
appear to be so. 

II. Fallacies in the Matter. 

In this class of Fallacies, the formula is supposed to be 
strictly observed. 

1. Ambiguous Middle. — This fallacy consists in using 
a word, as a middle term, which admits of two significa- 
tions. In the major premiss, the major term agrees with 
the middle, taken in one of its significations ; and in the 
minor premiss, the minor term agrees with the middle, 
taken in another signification ; and then in the conclusion, 
the minor and major are, according to the formula, in- 
ferred to agree with each other. The two extremes are, 
indeed, compared with the same word, but with two very 
difierent ideas ; so that in reality we have two middle 
terms ', e. g. 

" A pitiful man is beneath respect. 
Howard, the philanthropist, was a pitiful man. 
Therefore he was beneath respect." 

Many words, however, are so settled in their significa- 
tion, that such fallacies cannot be successfully practised 
with them. Perhaps the word pitiful is one of these. 

Logicians have distinguished several kinds of Ambigu- 
ous Middle : 

Fallacia Figurce Dictionis, in which the middle term 
ifl not precisely the same word, in form, in both premises, 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 381 

but so nearly akin that they may be assumed to have the 
same meaning ; e. g. 

" A designing man is unworthy of confidence. 
This man has formed a design. 
Therefore he is unworthy of confidence." 

Many fallacies may be formed in this way ; and the 
sHffhter the shades of difference in the meaning of the two 
Mndred words, the more likely is the fallacy to pass un- 
detected. 

Fallacia Plurium Interrogationum. — This fallacy con- 
sists in asking several questions apparently the same, and 
yet in reality of several different meanings, and therefore 
admitting of several different answers. The question 
forms one of the premises of the argument ; and then, 
when an answer is given, the sophist stands ready with 
another premiss to make out a conclusion, which, because 
unexpectedly opposite to what the one replymg intended, 
serves to embarrass, if not to confound, him ; e. g. There 
are cases in which we may strictly follow the statute law, 
and yet be guilty of great injustice and cruelty. Now let 
the question be asked. Is not a man justified when he 
does that which is lawful ? Here a reply would not be 
likely to be given in the negative : and when given in the 
affirmative, another premiss might be formed embodying 
some act of oppression — as a landlord seizing the goods of 
a worthy, but sick and unfortunate tenant ; and then the 
conclusion appended that the landlord is justified in 
doing so. 

Fcdlacy of Division and Composition. — In this fallacy 
the middle term in one premiss is taken collectively, in the 
other, distrihutively. If in the major premiss it be taken 
collectively, and in the minor distrihutively, it is a Fallacy 
of Division ; e. g. 



382 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

" Five is one number ; 
Three and two are ^ve ; therefore, 
Three and two are one number." 

If in the major the middle term be taken distribu- 
tively, and in the minor collectively, it is a fallacy of com- 
position ; e. g, 

" Three and two are two numbers ; 
Five is three and two ; therefore, 
Five is two numbers." 

" There is no fallacy more common, or more likely to 
deceive, than the one now before us ; the form in which it 
is most usually employed, is, to establish some truth, sepa- 
rately, concerning each single member of a certain class, 
and thence infer the sense of the whole collectively ; thus 
some infidels have labored to prove concerning some one 
of our Lord's miracles, that it might have been the result 
of an accidental conjunction of natural circumstances. 
l!Text, they endeavor to prove the same concerning another; 
and so on ; and thence infer that all of them might have 
been so. They might argue in like manner, that because 
it is not very improbable one may throw sixes in any one 
out of a hundred throws, therefore^ it is no more improba- 
ble that one may throw sixes a hundred times running." * 

Fallacia accidentis. — In this form of the ambiguous 
middle, the middle term in one premiss is used to express 
merely the essence of a thing ; and in the other premiss, to 
express the same thing, together with its accidents ; e. g, 

" What is bought in the market is eaten ; 
Eaw meat is bought in the market ; 
Therefore raw meat is eaten." 

In the major premiss we are considering edible sub- 

* Whately's Logic, Book XXL, § 11. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. ' 383 

stances in general, without referring to their circumstances ; 
in the minor, we "bring into view one of these substances 
with its circumstances ; and then infer of the latter what 
was true only of the former. 

There are many ways in which words become ambigu- 
ous ; but the discussion of this subject does not properly 
belong to Logic. To reason well, a thorough knowledge 
of some one language, at least, as the vehicle of thought, 
is evidently indispensable ; but the language in which our 
- ratiocinations are expressed, and the principles and for- 
mulaB which are to govern and direct the reasoning process 
itself, are two different branches of study. 

2. Fallacies relating to the connection hetiveen the 
matter of the premises and that of the conclusion. 

The preceding head related to the matter of the middle 
term as ambiguously expressed in the two premises. ISTow 
as the same matter is expressed in the two premises, and 
in the conclusion, inasmuch as the last compares together 
the two terms, which in the former had been compared 
with the middle term, it is obvious that Fallacies may 
arise also in respect to the correspondency between the 
representations of the premises and the conclusion, admit- 
ting the form to be correct and the middle term to be un- 
ambiguous. 

Logicians have distinguished and given names to sev- 
eral forms of this Fallacy. 

1. Petitio Princijpii, or, arguing in a circle. — In this 
form of the Fallacy in question, the connection between 
the premises and conclusion is such, that the premises 
themselves are dependent upon the conclusion ; so that 
the conclusion must first be assumed to be true, before we 
can find premises to prove it. This Fallacy, in order to 
be successful, must of course be artfully constructed, for, 



384 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

when exposed, it is too gross to delude any mind for a 
moment. Hence, much, here depends upon obliquity and 
obscurity of the language. To attempt to prove the exist- 
ence of a God from the Sacred Scriptures must be a petitio 
prmcipii, since they profess to be a revelation from God, 
and therefore assume His existence. 

This Fallacy, however, is not by any means always an 
intentional one. Acute reasoners have sometimes very 
honestly fallen into it. 

Thus the famous argument used by many writers on 
Moral Agency, to prove that the " Will is always deter- 
mined by the strongest motive," is a notable instance of 
this fallacy, where the reasoners were eminent both for 
logical skill and moral integrity.* 

" The win is always determined by the strongest mo- 
tive." How do you prove this ? " The will is always de- 
termined to some volition or other, and it is always 
determined by motives, for they always are present." But 
how does this prove that it is determined by the strongest 
motive ? " That must be the strongest which determines 
it." "Why ? " Because it could not otherwise be deter- 
mined." How do you know that ? '^ Because it must be 
determined by the strongest motive." It is evident that 
the very point to be proved is the point assumed. 

2. False or undue assumiotio^i of premises. This 
embraces those instances in which the premises, although 
not dependent upon the conclusion, require to be proved 
before the reasoning can be admitted to have any force. 
In all cases of Deduction we have to begin with principles 
already established ; or if assumed at the beginning of a 

* One of tlie roots, if not the root, of this error, is tlie not distinguishing be- 
tween an order of sequence, and the principle of causality ; between the mo- 
tives as uniform antecedents to volitions, and Will as itself, the cause of volition . 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 385 

course of reasoning — as is sometimes convenient — they 
must, before the course is completed, be satisfactorily- 
proved. It is, therefore, always an important enquiry, 
whether the principles with which we begin are sufficiently 
established to be made the premises of an argument. A 
judicious and honest reasoner will be cautious in this re- 
spect ; but it is of the nature of sophistry boldly to assume, 
and to supply by a show of confidence, the want of a true 
or an adequate basis. 

" Sometimes men are shamed into admitting an un- 
founded assertion, by being confidently told that it is so 
evident that it would argue great weakness to doubt it. 
In general, however, the more skilful sophist will avoid a 
direct assertion of what he means unduly to assume, 
because that might direct the reader's attention to the 
consideration of the question whether it be true or not ; 
since that which is indisj)utable does not so often need to 
be asserted : it succeeds better, therefore, to allude to the 
proposition as something curious and remarkable ; just as 
the Koyal Society were imposed on by being asked to ac- 
count for the fact that a vessel of water received no ad- 
dition to its weight by a live fish put into it ; while they 
were seeldng for the cause, they forgot to ascertain the 
fact, Ttiid thus admitted, without suspicion, a mere fiction.'' 

There are several species of false assumption mentioned 
by Logical writers, but as they all involve the same prin- 
ciple, weT shall only give a brief summary of them. 

JSfon causa, ^^ro causa. A false assumption of causes. 

Here the facts are given, and assuming a cause for 
them, we reason from it as a real and established connec- 
tion. 

A 71071 vera, pro vera. This, if it diflers from tho 

* Wliateley's Logic, ibid. § 14. 
17 



386 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

preceding, is probably meant to designate a false assump- 
tion of facts, as in the anecdote of the Koyal Society, 
quoted above. 

When causes and facts both exist, the connection be- 
tween the two may be assumed on insufficient grounds : 
it may be assumed either that the causes necessarily in- 
volve the facts, or that the facts cannot be referred to any 
other antecedents. The first relates to the inherent na- 
ture of causes ; the last to the necessary conditions of the 
facts. 

A non tali, pro tali. This is reasoning from a false 
assumption of parallelisms ; or from false analogies. 

False assumption of references. This appears chiefly 
in references made to the Holy Scriptures. Every passage 
is authoritative. Hence, although a writer may find few 
or none which in reality bear upon a favorite dogma, still a 
mere array of the references strikes the eye ; and if the pas- 
sages are not examined, which, through the indolence of 
human nature, is apt to be the case, the desired end of the 
sophist is obtained. 

Assumption of prohahilities. When the premises are 
each probable with a certain degree of probability, the 
combined probabiHty is assumed to be an addition of 
prohahilities, whereas it is only a prohahility of a proha- 
hility. 

If Z is only probably X, and Y is only probably Z, 
then Y is probably X, not with an increasing, but with a 
decreasing probability ] e. g. 

Z is probably (say f ) X, 

Y is probably (say |) Z ; therefore 

Y is probably (f X f^A) X- 

In a sorites the probability is stiU more weakened, and 
weakened the more the sorites is extended. A cumulation 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 387 

of arguments consists of arguments drawn from distinct 
sources ; this differs widely from arguments depending one 
upon the other. 

3. Ignoratio ele7icM, or irrelevant conclusion. — This 
fallacy consists in connecting with given premises, not the 
legitimate conclusion, but one which, although widely 
different from it, shall, in the language, so resemble it, or 
be so covertly substituted for it, that the deception goes 
undetected by the reader or hearer. *' Various kinds of 
propositions are, according to the occasion, substituted 
for the one of which proof is required. Sometimes the 
particular for the universal ; sometimes a proposition with 
different terms; and various are the contrivances em- 
ployed to effect and to conceal this substitution, and to 
make the conclusion which the sophist has drawn answer 
practically the same purpose as the one he ought to have 
established." 

" A good instance of the employment and exposure of 
this fallacy occurs in Thucydides, in the speeches of Cleon 
and Diodotus, concerning the Mitylenseans : the former 
(over and above his appeal to the angry passions of his 
audience) urges the justice of putting the revolters to 
death ; which, as the latter remarked, was nothing to the 
purpose, since the Athenians were not sitting in judg- 
ment, but in deliberation, of which the proper end is expe- 
diency." 

Archbishop Whately, from whom the above extracts 
are taken, has so admirably exhibited the different forms 
of tliis fallacy, that I cannot resist the temptation of be- 
coming still more largely his debtor. Indeed, on the whole 
subject of Deductive Fallacies, I freely confess my indebt- 
edness to him. 

Argumentum ad liominem, <S:c. — " There are certain 



388 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

kinds of argument recounted and named by Logical 
writers, which we should by no means universally call 
Fallacies ; but which when unfairly used, and so far as they 
are fallacious, may very well be referred to the present 
head; such as the ^ argumentum ad hominem^ or per- 
sonal argument, ^ argumentum ad verecundiam^ ^ argu- 
mentum ad populum,' dc, all of them regarded as contra- 
distinguished from ' argumentum ad rem/ or, according 
to others, (meaning probably the very same thing,) ' ad 
judicium.^ These have all been described in the lax and 
popular language before alluded to, but not scientifically : 
the ' argumentum ad hominem/ they say, ' is addressed to 
the peculiar circumstances, character, avowed opinions, or 
past conduct of the individual, and therefore has a refer- 
ence to him only, and does not bear directly and abso- 
lutely on the real question, as the ' argumentum ad rem ' 
does : ' in like manner, the ' argumentum ad verecundiam ' 
is described as an appeal to our reverence for some re- 
spected authority, some venerable institution, &c., and the 
' argumentum ad populum/ as an appeal to the prejudices, 
passions, &c., of the multitude ; and so of the rest. 
Along with these is usually enumerated ' argumentum ad 
ignorantiam/ which is here omitted, as being evidently 
nothing more than the employment of some kind of Fal- 
lacy, in the widest sense of that word, towards such as 
are likely to be deceived by it. It appears then, (to speak 
rather more technically,) that in the ^ argumentum ad 
hominem ' the conclusion which actually is established, is 
not the absolute and general one in question, but relative 
and particular ; viz. not that ' such and such is the fact,' 
but that ^ this man is bound to admit it, in conformity to 
his principles of Reasoning, or in consistency with his own 
conduct, situation,' &c. Such a Conclusion it is often 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 389 

both allowable and necessary to establish, in order to si- 
lence those who will not yield to fair general argument ; 
or to convince those whose weakness and prejudices would 
not allow them to assign to it its due weight : it is thus 
that our Lord on many occasions silences the cavils of the 
Jews ; as in the vindication of healing on the Sabbath, 
which is paralleled by the authorised practice of drawing 
out a beast that has fallen into a pit. All this, as w^e 
have said, is perfectly fair, provided it be done plainly, 
and avoiuedly ; but if you attempt to substitute this par- 
tial and relative Conclusion for a more general one — if you 
triumph as having established your proposition absolutely 
and universally, from having established it, in reahty, 
only as far as it relates to your opponent, then you are 
guilty of a Fallacy of the kind which we are now treating 
of : your Conclusion is not in reality that which was, by 
your own account, proposed to be proved : the fallacious- 
ness depends upon the deceit or attempt to deceive. The 
same observations will apply to ' argumentum ad verecun- 
diam,' and the rest.'" 

Fallacious refutation. This is the refutation of a pro- 
position assumed to belong to an opponent ; and thus 
really an evasion of the point in dispute. 

Nearly akin to this is the expedient of shifting one's 
ground, by covertly adopting and discussing some other 
question than the one taken up at the beginning. 

" A practice of this nature is common in oral contro- 
versy especially ; viz. that of combatting both of your op- 
ponent's premises alternately, and shifting the attack from 
the one to the other, without waiting to have either of 
them decided upon before you quit it."' 

We refer to the same head, " the very common case 
of proving something to be possible when it ought to have 



390 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

been proved higUy ]}T6bable ; or prohable, wlien it ought 
to have been proved necessary ; or, which comes to the 
very same, proving it to be not necessary, when it should 
have been proved not probable ; or improbable, when it 
should have been proved impossible. 

Fallacy of Objections. This consists in " showing that 
there are objections against some plan, theory, or system, 
and thence inferring that it should be rejected ; when that 
which ought to have been proved is, that there are more 
or stronger objections against the receiving than the re- 
jecting of it. This is the principal engine employed by 
the adversaries of our Faith : they find numerous ' objec- 
tions ' against various parts of Scripture, to some of which 
no satisfactory answer can be given ; and the incautious 
hearer is apt, while his attention is fixed on these, to for- 
get that there are infinitely more and stronger objections 
against the supposition that the Christian religion is of 
human origin ; and that when we cannot answer all ob- 
jections, we are bound in reason, and in candor, to adopt 
the hypothesis which labors under the least. That the 
case is as I have stated, I am authorised to assume, from 
this circumstance : that no complete and consistent account 
lias ever been given of the manner in which the Christian 
religion, supposing it a human contrivance, could have 
arisen and prevailed as it did." 

Fallacy of proving part of a Question. The skilful 
sophist having proved or disproved a part of the question, 
by enlarging upon this, often succeeds in removing out of 
view another part, perhaps the most important of all. 

" This is the great art of the answerer of a book ; sup- 
pose the main positions in any work to be irrefragable, it 
will be strange if some illustration of them, or some sub- 
Drdinate part in short, will not admit of a plausible objec- 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 391 

tion ; the opponent then joins issue on one of these inci- 
dental questions, and comes forward with ^a Keply' to 
such and such a work. 

" Hence the dano^er of ever advancins; more than can 
be well maintained, since the refutation of that will often 
quash the whole : a guilty person may often escape by 
having too much laid to his charge ; so he may also by 
having too much evidence against him, i. e. some that is 
not in itself satisfactory : thus, a prisoner may sometimes 
obtain acquittal by showing that one of the witnesses 
against him is an infamous informer and spy ; though per- 
haps if that part of the evidence had been omitted, the 
rest would have been sufficient for conviction." 

Suppressing the Conclusion. There are two ways of 
suppressing the true conclusion : First, by omitting to 
state the proposition you are to prove, at the beginning 
of the argument ; and then, after a long spun and elabo- 
rate argument, drawxug a conclusion remote from the true 
one, with a confident and plausible air. Secondly, by 
omitting to give the conclusion altogether, but framing an 
argument in such a way as to lead the hearer to draw the 
wrong conclusion, which the sophist aims at. We have 
a striking instance of this species of reasoning in Antony's 
speech over the dead body of Csesar. 

" Jests. Jests are Fallacies ; i. e. Fallacies so palpa- 
ble as not to be likely to deceive any one, but yet bearing 
just that resemblance of argument which is calculated to 
amuse by the contrast ; in the same manner that a parody 
does, by the contrast of its levity with the serious produc- 
tion which it imitates. There is indeed something laugh- 
able even in Fallacies which are intended for serious con- 
viction, when they are thoroughly exposed. There are 
eeveral different kinds of joke and raillery, which will be 



392 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

found to correspond with the different kinds of Fallacy : 
the pun (to take the simplest and most obvious case) is 
evidently, in most instances, a mock argument founded on 
a palpable equivocation of the middle Term : and the rest 
in like manner will be found to correspond to the respec- 
tive Fallacies, and to be imitations of serious argument/' 

Jests, however, are often very serious arguments, when 
their effects are considered ; for that which is turned into 
ridicule, becomes, in some degree, an object of contempt, 
or, at least, ceases to command respect and careful atten- 
tion. They are dl^o popular arguments, for they require 
no thought, and afford a piquant amusement. 

Fallacy of Epithets. This appears in the disputes of 
political parties and religious sects. The fallacy is of a 
twofold character : First, the odious name may be fastened 
upon an individual, or upon the party or sect to which he 
belongs, with the utmost injustice : there may be merely 
a seeming agreement arising from similar names and cir- 
cumstances, without any real identity of principles ; or 
there may be an agreement only in points unimportant, or 
even commendable ; but, notwithstanding, when the hue 
and cry is once raised, the multitude are prone to rush to 
the chase, and join in the ferocious sport. Secondly, the 
name itself may have become odious unjustly : it may be 
a good name, darkened and marred by the prejudices and 
jjersecutions of a benighted and bigoted age ; but its cha- 
racter has become fixed in the popular apprehension, and 
no one now stops to enquire into its origin or its princi- 
ples : it is the symbol of enormous error, if not of crime, 
and he who is adjudged worthy to wear it, may fail to 
gain a second hearing. In this fallacy, the conclusion is 
not generally concealed until the close of an argument, 
and covertly applied ; it is brought out at the beginning 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 393 

in the epithet itself, and frequently supersedes the neces- 
sity of even the show of an argument. 

We close here our view of the Deductive Fallacies. 
It will be seen that those arising from the matter of the 
propositions are numerous. It requires both mental dis- 
cipline and tact to guard against and to detect them. 
But one thing is evident, that a pure, benevolent, and 
truth-loving spirit is the most effectual protection against 
this species of false reasoning. 

The fallacies which I next propose to consider, are 
those of Induction and Intuition : fallacies belonging to 
the two former parts of Logic, and therefore rather im- 
properly introduced here. Notwithstanding this seeming 
impropriety, I have concluded to do so, for the purpose of 
making the whole subject of fallacies a unique portion of 
the work. Besides, I propose to handle what remains 
briefly, as it is not of a nature to require nor to admit of 
an exposition running much into details. The common 
human life is peculiarly the theatre of deduction, for it is 
here that principles are aj^plied or violated most exten- 
sively ; it is therefore the theatre which presents most 
abundantly both the opportunities and the temptations 
of sophistry. 

FALLACIES OF INDUCTION. 

These are of three kinds : Fallacies of Observation, 
Fallacies in determining General Facts, and Fallacies in 
inducting Laws. 

I. Fallacies of Observation. — We note here three 
Fallacies : 

First. Inadequate Observation. All the phenomena, 
if possible, in relation to a given subject should be ob- 
served : and the mind should not rest content while any 

17* 



394 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

phenomena probably remain wbicb^ by any labor and dili- 
gence in observation and experiment, may be brought to 
light. But human nature is prone to accept as sufficient 
a set of limited but familar observations lying within the 
immediate neighborhood of the individual. Men are, as it 
were, divided into tribes dwelling in deep valleys ; and 
each tribe looketh upon its valley as the wide universe, 
and the high mountains around as the horizon of being 
and the impassable boundary of thought. This begetteth 
narrow-mindedness, bigotry, and imperfect and crude 
knowledges. The philosopher passes over the mountain 
tops, walks through valley after valley, converses with all 
the different tribes, sees the same things as they appear 
in different places ; and thus prepares himself to learn the 
general laws which govern God's creatures, and to enjoy 
the harmony and beauty of all things. Again, human 
nature is impatient of the slow and persevering labor de- 
manded in prosecuting observation and experiment. It 
is far more pleasant to our natural indojence to take such 
observation's as force themselves upon us, and to leave the 
rest to conjecture, than to endure the toil and restraint, 
and wait for the results of thorough investigation. 

Another form of this Fallacy appears where the obser- 
vation, although extensive, is imperfect and hurried. 
Such are the busy collectors of facts, the ambitious found- 
ers of lyceums and cabinets, who bring us abundance of 
things and but little thought ; who indeed manipulate, 
but do not nicely examine. 

Facts show the state of the world. He, therefore, who 
does not look at all the facts, and examine their charac- 
teristics minutely, is not prepared to form sound judg- 
ments. He may express opinions, but he is not entitled 
to any authority. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 395 

Secondly. The Fallacy of making Observation and 
Experiments loithout a purpose, or a prophecy of the end 
in the form of a rational hypothesis. 

We have already alluded to the catalogues of facts 
made by Bacon. ■'•^' These are an example of the Fallacy 
under consideration. By the knowledge already attained 
of the constitution of the world, and the spontaneous in- 
spiration of Ideas awakened in profound and patient me- 
ditation, the mind when it comes within a new field of in- 
vestigation is prepared and impelled to form some hypo- 
thesis of the order of sequences, if not of the ultimate law. 
We call this a rational hypothesis, because it considers 
laws already ascertained, and thoughtfully watches the 
indications of the initiative phenomena. Such a hypothe- 
sis at the early stage of investigation is necessary, in or- 
der to arrange the facts already gained, and to know where 
to make further observations, and how to adjust experi- 
ments. 

Without such a hypothesis, every thing is done at 
random. It is indeed sheer empiricism — a trying of ex- 
periments like a blind casting of dice, with a wondering 
and puerile curiosity to know what will turn up next. 
Philosophical investigation foresees its end with more or 
less clearness. Like Bunyan's pilgrim, it at least sees a 
little shining light a great way off, and by keeping that 
little light in its eye, it at length reaches the straight and 
narrow way of Truth. When l!^ewton saw the apple fall, 
he formed his hypothesis ; he thenceforward had a definite 
and great end before him. 

Thirdly. The Fallacy of making facts hend to favorite 
theo7^ies. — When Theories are once formed, men are ever 

* Pap;e 284. 



396 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

ready to become intoxicated with them. An ingenious 
Theory is a proud effort of the Intellect, and, therefore, 
not easy to be relinqnished by its author ; and the light 
and order which it gives to facts which before appeared 
complicated and inexplicable, soon brings it into general 
favour with enquiring minds. Hence there springs up a 
passion to apply it, and to make every thing accord with 
it. Men begin to forget that it is a mere hypothesis, 
which may or may not be true ; and that, if not confirmed 
by general observation, it must yield to some more perfect 
conception. In this way they are often betrayed into 
great absurdities. We have an illustration of this, in 
the tenacity with which some chemists for a while adhered 
to the Phlogistic Theory. 

ITow Truth and Philosophy alike demand that a Theory 
shall be adopted, always with the tacit understanding, 
that it is to be held in abeyance to farther discoveries. 
And here the great Philosopher shows his greatness, in 
that he becomes wedded to nothing but truth ; and hold- 
ing theories only as a means of truth, he is ready to 
modify them according to the indications of new facts, or 
even to renounce them when they cannot be verified, or a 
better light is obtained. Thus Newton, for a time, laid 
aside the law of gravitation, while the calculations did 
not appear to sustain it. But in the end he had his rich 
reward. 

II. Fallacies in determining General Facts. 

First. The fallacy of affirming a uniform Sequence, 
from a mere observation of coincidences. — This Fallacy 
is very common. The superstition of dreams and omens, 
the empiricisms of medicine, and a thousand empty popu- 
lar maxims, all belong here. 

Because two phenomena are found to be conjoined in 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 397 

time anct place, therefore, by this Fallacy, one is assumed 
as the uniform antecedent of the other, and we are to 
expect the recurrence of the one wherever we find the 
other. Now, before we have a right to conclude that the 
two are in uniform sequence, we must prove by experiment 
that the given Consequent never takes place except where 
the Antecedent in question is present ; i. e. We must 
prove by Negative instances as well as Positive. Upon 
further examination, we may find the same Consequent 
to coincide in time and place with a thousand other phe- 
nomena ; but that alone can be its proper Antecedent, 
loitliout ivhicli it does not take place. This indeed is the 
Fallacy condemned in the memorable language of Bacon : 
■ — " Inductio qu£e procedit j)er enumerationem simplicem, 
res puerilis est, et precario concludit, et periculo exponitur 
ab instantia contradictoria, et j)lerumque secundum 
pauciora quam par est, et ex his tantum modo quae pr£esto 
sunt j)ronunciat. At Inductio quae ad inventionem et 
demonstrationem Scientarum et Artium erit utilis, Na- 
turam separare debet, per rejectiones et exclusiones 
debitas ; ac deinde post negativas tot quot sufficiunt, 
super affirmativas concludere.'' ''•" 

Secondly. The Fallacy of denying whatever has not 
been found hitherto in the common observation of men, or 
does not exist in generally received maxims. 

This Fallacy is of the same nature with the preceding, 

* " That induction which proceeds by a mere enumeration of instances, is 
a puerile aflfair, and concludes precariously, and is exposed to danger from 
contradictory instances, and for the most part it gives its decisions according 
to fewer instances than is proper, and from those only which are then present. 
But an induction that would be useful to the discovery and demonstration of 
the sciences and arts, ought to distinguish nature through proper rejections 
and exclusions, and then, after a sufficient number of negative instances have 
been adduced, to draw the conclusion upon the positive ones."— Bk. i.,Aph.l05. 



398 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

and equally condemned by the language of Bacon. The 
former affirms that those are proper Antecedents and 
Consequents which have been found together ; the latter, 
that none can exist beyond those which have hitherto 
been found together. The one gives authority to untested 
empiricism ; the other denies any truth to exist beyond 
it. The one consigns us to the despotism of bigotry and 
ignorance ; the other cuts us off from all hope in the 
future. The one affirms the majesty of ancient authori- 
ties ; the other denies all farther improvement. 

In opposition to both, Philosophy affirms that she will 
receive nothing which she has not tested by the principles 
of human Keason ; and that she will dare to receive every 
thing which she has thus tested. 

The above are the chief Fallacies, given in brief, which 
belong to this division. They will be found upon reflec- 
tion to comprise a violation of the Principles of Elimina- 
tion laid down under Inductive Logic ; for, the aim of 
those principles is to provide a test for sequences in gene- 
ral, so that we may determine amid the mass of pheno- 
mena, which are properly related as Antecedents and 
Consequents. 

III. Fallacies in Inducting Laws. 

We have seen that the tests of a Law are its 
sufficiency to account for the phenomena, its characteris- 
tics of imiversality and necessity, and its correspondence 
to an Idea. ITow we note as a Fallacy under this head : 

First. The confounding of a general fact with a law. 
— To establish a general Fact, is to establish a uniform 
order of sequence in relation to certain phenomena ; e. g. 
the influence of the sun and moon upon the tides. The 
law under which this particular sequence is comprehended 
is the law of gravitation taken in connection with the 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 399 

peculiar interior constitution of fluids, which causes them 
to yield to an influence which does not affect the solid 
parts of the earth in the same manner. It is common to 
call the general facts laws ; and thus "the two lines of 
investigation are not clearly distinguished. This, per- 
haps, is not so strictly a Fallacy in Induction, as a con- 
fusion in the end aimed at, and which may lead to ftil- 
lacious inductions. A general fact viewed in itself is 
contingent ; it receives higher characteristics only when 
viewed as an exponent of Law, and then of course is dis- 
tinguished from it. But a perfect method of philosophis- 
ing demands that it keep its true place in every stage of 
the induction, and thus, instead of shutting up investiga- 
tion, it becomes a means of leading it on to its last results. 

Secondly, The great Fallacy, and one which has been 
alluded to more than once in this work, is, the separation 
of Observation and Ideas. This Fallacy has two modes, 
accordingly as it reposes upon Ideas independently of ob- 
servation, or as it employs observation independently of 
Ideas. 

The true logical development of Ideas takes place in 
connection with the reality of Nature ; and the laws of 
Nature are discovered and expounded only in the light of 
Ideas. The first mode of the Fallacy, therefore, shows 
itself in splendid but obscure conceptions of the order of 
Nature ; while the other presents us collections of sequences 
without system. 

FALLACIES IN RESPECT TO INTUITION. 

I have already remarked,^' that in the sphere of In- 
tuitive Truths falsehood cannot well find place, because 

* Primordial Logic. Idea of Truth, pp. 207, 208. 



400 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. . 

the cliaracteristics of tliese truths are so clear and decided ; 
and because if there be falsehood here, there can be no 
absolute test of Truth. But, on the other hand, it cannot 
be denied that affirmations have been made, apparently 
with an intuitive positiveness, which afterwards have 
been totally set aside ; e. g. The celebrated philosophical 
maxim, that, " A thing cannot act where it is not."' 
Even Newton, in order to escape the force of this maxim 
in its bearing upon the law of gravitation, imagines a 
subtle ether diffused through the space between the sun 
and the planets, as a mediate cause ; affirming that, ''It 
is inconceivable that inanimate brute matter should, 
without the mediation of something else, which is not 
material, operate upon and affect other matter without 
mutual contact." He even pronoiances it " so great an 
absurdity," that he cannot believe that any man, "who in 
philosophical matters has a competent faculty of thinking, 
can ever fall into it." * And yet in our day the most 
philosophical minds do not perceive it to be at all in- 
credible that the sun and planets can act U|)on each other 
through the intervening space without any medium what- 
ever. 

It would appear from this and similar instances that 
might be adduced, that there are Fallacies in respect to 
Intuition. I say Fallacies in respect to Intuition, for 
fallacious intuitions there cannot be. An Intuition carries 
with it its own truth, it is necessary and absolute ; to 
deny it is to belie Keason itself, and to destroy the possi- 
bility of certainty. What was said, therefore, under the 
" Idea of Truth," as above referred to, I conceive to be 
impregnable. 

* See Playfair's Dissertation on the Progress of Mathematical and PJjysical 
Science. 



DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 401 

But the question still remains^ How are we to account 
for Fallacies in respect to Intuition ? If it be granted 
that an intuitive truth cannot he clisputedj how can a 
false maxim put on, to appearance, the characteristics of 
such a truth? 

In the first place, there is to be remarked an ambiguity 
in the word '" inconceivable ; " it may be taken either 
absolutely or relatively : the absolutely inconceivable is 
the contradictory of all rational conception, and therefore 
equivalent to the irapossible ; the relatively inconceivable, 
on the other hand, is only the opposite of the particular 
conceptions of an individual, of a class, or of an age. 
Now nothing is more common than men adhering to even 
wild and puerile maxims, and denying whatever lies 
beyond the range of their immediate experience with the 
utmost positiveness and pertinacity ; this undoubtedly is 
owing to the undeveloped state of their minds, and the 
tyranny of prejudice. 

This fallacy is one which we have already noticed 
under a preceding head.* Philosophers, it must be con- 
fessed, have given us similar examples : having embraced 
certain dogmas, and committed themselves to maintain 
them, they manifest the utmost certainty of conviction, 
and that too with great sincerity. It follows, therefore, 
that in maintaining false maxims, men may assert with 
great earnestness, and apparent strength of belief, and may 
use the epithets "absurd" and "inconceivable," only 
because of their education, prejudices, and point of view. 
Now suppose these same men to be relieved from all these 
hindrances, and to occupy the same relative ground that 
wo do, with whom their fondly cherished maxims are ex- 

♦ Pa^re 398. 



402 DEDUCTIVE LOGIC. 

plodedj would it not be possible for tbem to believe as we 
do? And would they not see that they had before 
occupied a fallacious position, but that, now, they had 
attained to the. right one ? While in error, we are often 
very confident, and may be even so much so, as to think 
that our judgments are intuitive ; but when we really 
attain the truth, then we see plainly enough that those 
confident errors had not the strength and clearness of 
intuition. We are now in a condition to make a compari- 
son ; before, we were not. Notwithstanding all the mis- 
takes we may make, there is such a thing as perceiving 
absolute truth, and knowing that we are right. 

In the second place, we can account for these pre- 
tended intuitions by a want of development in the Ideas 
which govern the sphere in which they appear. The 
maxim above mentioned was founded upon an erroneous 
conception of Causes ; showing that the Idea of Cause 
was not clearly developed in the minds of those who 
advocated it. Now it is the clearer development of this 
Idea which enables us to conceive of the mutual attrac- 
tions of the sun and the planets without any medium in 
the intervening space ; nor can we ever again conceive 
such a medium to be necessary.* 

All the Fallacies which arise in respect to intuition 
have their origin unquestionably in a want of philosophical 
development ; for Philosophy is not merely a system of 
truths and a law of method, but a state of the Eeason 
in man. Just as this development advances, does the 
vision of Truth become brighter and brighter unto the 
perfect day. But that perfect day is still to us an object 
of hope, and ever shall be, until we reach that Uncreated 
Light, in which we shall see Light itself. 

* Primordial Logic, Sect. VII., and particularly p. 239 



BOOK IV. 

THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION I. 

NATURE OF PROOF. 



When we have arrived at judgments, we may state tliem 
in the form of Propositions or Theorems, and then subjoin 
to them the Logical Process by which they have been de- 
termined. This is called the order of Proof. 

Opposed to the. order oi Proof i^ the order of Investi- 
gation. When we are searching after Truth we pursue 
the order of Investigation ; we employ our Intuitions, or 
the knowledge we may have already gained ; we make ob- 
servations and experiments ; we compare ; we generalize ; 
we meditate ; we employ Induction and Deduction ; and 
when Truth appears, it appears as a Conclusion. The 
truths at which we thus arrive are entirely new, or were 
before but dimly seen as conjectures or theories. 

When we undertake to prove a proposition, we either 
know it to be true or false, or we are uncertain of its 
character. 

1. If we know it to be true, then we must be ac- 
quainted ^vith the investigation upon which it rests ; and 



404 THE DOCTKINE OF EVIDENCE. 

to prove it, will be only to subjoin tbat process of investi- 
gation, according to Logical formulae, or, at least, in strict 
accordance with logical principles. 

2. If we hnow it to be false, then we must see tbat it 
is either deduced from false premises or is a false deduc- 
tion. To prove it false, therefore, will require either an 
exposition of its premises, or a statement of the fallacious 
syllogism. 

3. If ive are uncertain of its character, we proceed to 
test it. The method of testing it will depend upon the 
nature of the proposition. 

1. If the proposition affirm an Antecedent, we test it. 
by searching whether it stands as a necessary or probable' 
condition to the existence of any known Consequents. 2. 
If the proposition affirm a consequent, we test it by 
searching whether any known antecedents involve it. In 
doing this we have to apply the principles of elimination 
laid down in Inductive Logic. 

We have here, then, two kinds of proof developed 
which are defined according to the nature of the connec- 
tion which they hold to propositions to be proved. 

1. When the proof holds to the proposition to be 
proved, the relation of Antecedent to Consequent, or of 
Principle or Law to phenomena, as in its nature envelop- 
ing them, — ^it is called a priori ; i. e. I prove that such 
consequents, or such phenomena as the proposition affirms 
to exist, must exist, because an antecedent or principle 
exists which involves them. 

In this case, when the argument is reduced to the 
form of a syllogism, the antecedents or principles from 
which we prove the phenomena or consequents, form the 
premises : and the physical and logical sequences are said 
to correspond. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 405 

2. When the proof holds to the proposition to be 
proved, the relation of phenomena to law, or to necessary 
condition ; in other words, the relation of consequent to a 
necessary principle or antecedent, it is called ct posteriori ; 
i. e, I prove that the antecedent or principle which the 
proposition affirms to exist, must exist, because phenomena 
exist, which demand the former as the necessary condition 
of their existence ; in some cases as explaining the very 
fact of their existence, — in others, the mode of their ex- 
istence. 

When the d posteriori argument is reduced to the 
form of a syllogisnr, the phenomena or consequents consti- 
tute the premises, and the physical and logical sequences 
are opposed. 

• These two methods of proving, although introduced 
above in immediate connection with uncertain proposi- 
tions, or those whose character remains to be tested, em- 
brace likewise the preceding cases. When I am myself 
certain of the character of a proposition, in representing 
that character to another, that is, in proving it to him, I 
must necessarily adopt one or the other of these methods, 
according to the nature of .the proposition, as above stated. 

This is manifest from a comparison of these methods 
with the two great forms of reasoning, the Deductive and 
Inductive. 

To prove a ptriori is to prove a consequent from an an- 
tecedent, a phenomenon from a law, by showing that the 
antecedent and law involve the consequent and the phe- 
nomenon. This corresponds to Deduction in its princi- 
ple, for it is the containing whole determining the par- 
ticular or particulars contained. 

Again : To prove a posteriori is to prove an antece- 
dent from a consequent, a law from phenomena, by show- 



406 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

ing that the existence of the consequent or of the pheno- 
mena can be accounted for only hy the admission of the 
antecedent, or the law which the proposition affirms. 
This corresponds to Induction in its principle ; for it is 
the particular or particulars determining the whole, as that 
which comprehends them and contains the cause and law 
of their being. 

To prove, therefore, is to reverse the order of Investi- 
gation. 

In the latter, we are searching after unknown truths ; 
in the former, we are seeking to establish known truths. 
Both processes comprehend the same principles, and es- 
sentially the same materials ; only, that in the order of 
investigation, many steps are merely tentative, and give 
no positive results ; while in the order of proof, where the 
whole of the preceding investigation is before the mind, 
notliing but what is essentially constitutive of the argu- 
ment is selected and appropriated. Where we test an 
uncertain proposition, there are tentative steps, and in- 
vestigation and proof are in some degree commingled. 

The d, priori method of proving must not be con- 
founded with a priori principles. The former assumes 
antecedents, which involve the conseq[uents to be proved 
by them, without any reference to the logical property of 
the antecedents. But when principles are designated as 
a priori, we have direct reference to their logical pro- 
perty. By an a priori principle, we mean a principle 
which has not its origin in the sense, but in the pure Rea- 
son. Sense or experience is a necessary condition of its 
development, i. e. the reason would not go into action to 
develope the principle, were not an experience given as a 
datum; but when the principle is developed, we then 
clearly see that the experience itself would not have been 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 40V 

possible liad not tlie principle had a prior existence ; e. g. 
body and space, phenomena and cause — space and cause 
being a priori revealed, upon condition of body and phe- 
nomena ; but when revealed, we see there could have 
been no experience of body and phenomena, had not space 
and cause had a prior existence. Ideas, and all first 
truths and axioms, are. therefore, a priori principles. 



408 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION II. 

THE DIFFERENT KINDS OF A PRIORI AND A POSTERIORI 

PROOF. 

All tlie otlier forms of Evidence or Proof may be reduced 
to the a priori and the a posteriori. 

I. Testimony. — This belongs to the a posteriori. 
The testimony given is a fact which demands as the con- 
dition of its existence the truth of what it affirms, unless 
other conditions can be shown satisfactorily to account 
for it. 

II. Concurrent Testimony. — The concurrence is a fact 
which can be accounted for, only by admitting the truth 
of the testimony. 

III. Argument from progressive approach, e. g. the 
law of vis inertice may be proved in this way. This is 
likewise d posteriori proof. The facts of the progressive 
approach are supposed to be accounted for, only by admit- 
ting the existence of the law. 

lY. Proving hy example or fact is a posteriori, be- 
cause it is establishing some point as the condition or ne- 
cessary antecedent of the example or fact. Sometimes the 
a priori is united with the d posteriori ; when, from in- 
ducted examples, we establish a principle, and then again 
apply this principle to a particular instance. 

The whole process is not usually put down, but we go 
elliptically from the inducted examples to the particular 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 409 

conclusion, suppressing the formal statement of the gen- 
eral principle which intervenes in the mental process. 

Simple reasoning from example is nothing more than 
inductive reasoning. 

V. Reasoning from experience. — This is reasoning 
either from the past and present to the future, or from 
the present to the past. When ice reason from the past 
and present to the future, we show a priori what the fu- 
ture must be from the causes which have been, and now 
are, at work. When loe reason from the present to the 
l^ast, we show a p)Osteriori what the p)ast must have been 
from the facts now existing. 

VI. Reasoning from resemblance and analogy. 

1. Resemblance, — Eesemblance is distinguished from 
identity by admitted differences ; identity excludes differ- 
ences. Now, reasoning from resemblance is reasoning 
either from the differences or the agreements of the two 
parallel cases ; i. e. the actually existing agreements are 
shown to involve other points of agreement, or the ac- 
tually existing differences are shown to involve other 

oints of difference. This is done d, priori, or a posteri- 
ori, according to the nature of the case ; a priori, when 
the existing facts of resemblance or difference are antece- 
dents to those which are to be proved from them ; and a 
posteriori, when the existing facts of resemblance or dif- 
ference are sequences of those to be proved from them. 

2. Analogy. — This is not direct or simple resem- 
blance, but a resemblance of relations, or a resemblance 
of circumstances in a common relation. In simple resem- 
blance there are only two terms ; in analogy, there are 
three and four. 

1. Where there are th^ee teriiu, there is a relation of 
two to a common third. This is a resemblance of circum- 

18 



410 THE DOCTKINE OF EVIDENCE. 

stances in a common relation. ' In tMs case, our object is 
either — tlie analogy being granted — to prove circumstances 
in one relation by resembling circumstances in the otber 
relation, or to prove the common relation or analogy it- 
self, by tbe resembling circumstances. Where we wish to 
prove circumstances in one relation by resembling circum- 
stances in the others, the reasoning is d, priori or a poste- 
Hori, according to the nature of the relation between the 
existing particulars and those to be proved ; — e. g, an 
analogy is granted to exist between mind and body, as 
respects education ; — their development has a common re- 
lation to exercise. Now, there are many resembhng cir- 
cumstances in this common relation, and these circum- 
stances may be made a basis of reasoning to the existence 
of other circumstances of resemblance after the a priori or 
ci posteriori method, as the nature of the connection shall 
determine. 

Where we wish to prove the common relation, or the 
analogy itself, from the resembling circumstances, we pro- 
ceed according to the a posteriori method. The resem- 
bling circumstances are shown to require the analogy as 
the condition of their existence ; — e. g. Butler's Analogy : 
here the common relation of Eevelation and the Universe 
to Grod is shown, from the resembling circumstances ; and 
objections to the first answered, by showing that similar 
objections must lie against the second. 

2. Where there are/owr terms, there is a resemblance 
of relations. If this resemblance is granted, then we pro- 
ceed a priori to prove results ; — e. g. it being granted 
that an analogy exists between the relation of a king to 
his subjects, and of a father to his children, we may prove 
ct priori that a king must guard and guide his people, and 
yield his personal interests to their wants. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 411 

If we wish to prove an analogy of relations from facts^ 
we proceed a iDosteriori. Tlie establisliment of such an 
analogy is like the establishment of a general principle by 
induction ; and the analogy thus established is employed 
like a principle in reaching new conclusioi;^. 

Indeed, the analogy always contains a principle. In 
the first case, that of a common relation of two terms to a 
thii'd, this third, on the a priori method, is the principle 
enveloping the circumstances of the other two ; and, on 
th.Q a posteriori method, is the principle evolved from the 
circumstances of the other two. In the second case, that 
of the resembling relations of four terms, when we proceed 
a priori, we assume a principle which envelopes and ac- 
counts for these relations ; and when we proceed a poste- 
riori, although we stop short, usually, when we have es- 
tablished so many circumstances of resemblance as, to 
common and general apprehension, demand an analogy to 
account for them, still the analogy itself is but the ex- 
ponent of a principle. The same holds true with respect 
to all reasoning from resemblance : the resemblance is 
taken as the exponent of a law. In order to make this 
plain, let it be remarked that in reasoning from simple re- 
semblance, — i. e. of two terms, or from analogy of three or 
four terms — there is always a comparison of certain cir- 
cumstances in one term or relation to resembling circum- 
stances in the other term or relation. Now, in the first 
term, or relation, — that is, the one from which we reason, 
— we find these certain circumstances to be connected a 
priori or a posteriori with other circumstances ; and then 
passing over to the second term or relation to the re- 
sembling circumstances there found, we infer that these 
must likewise be it p)riori or a posteriori, as the case may 
be, connected with other circumstances, like those other 



412 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

circumstances referred to in the first. But why do we in- 
fer this? The answer is obvious. Nature is uniform in 
her operations, and therefore the resembling circumstances 
in the second term or relation form an exponent of the 
same law operaJ;ing here, which is known to have produced 
those other circumstances in the first term or relation : — 
i, e. on the a priori principle of the uniformity of nature, 
as the ultimate basis of the reasoning, we assume the same 
law to envelope both terms, or both relations. 

The same is true, when, from resembling circum- 
stances, we aim to establish an analogy, or a strict re- 
semblance. "We then say, inasmuch as nature is uniform 
in her operations, these resembling circumstances can be 
accounted for only by referring them to the same law as 
governing the two terms, or relations. 

YII. Beasoning from axioms and definitions. — This 
is usually called Demonstrative Beasoning, or simply De- 
inonstration. This reasoning is, plainly d, priori ; for all 
the conclusions are wrapped up in the axioms and defini- 
tions, and are, therefore, determined by them in a neces- 
sary and absolute relation of consequents to antecedents. 
The principles here, are necessary and a priori princi- 
ples, and all the conclusions exhibit but their manifold 
unfoldings. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 413 



SECTION III. 

OF THE NATURE OF THE RELATION BETWEEN ANTECEDENTS 
AND CONSEQUENTS. • 

We have seen that all the different modes of proof are 
comprehended under those two, — the d, priori and the ci 
posteriori. The a priori is the proof of a consequent hy 
an antecedent, which involves it. The d posteriori is the 
proof of an antecedent by a consequent, which demands it 
as the condition of its own existence. But the question 
must here arise, What is the nature of that connection 
which exists between the two terms of antecedent and 
consequent ? It cannot be a mere juxtaposition in time 
or space, because this juxtaposition may be arbitrary or 
accidental, and therefore form no basis of certainty, oi 
even of probabihty. It is obvious that the connection 
must be of a nature to demand the existence of the one 
when the existence of the other is granted. Hence, let it 
be observed, that in our explication of the a priori and 
the a posteriori, we were careful to point out this connec- 
tion as a connection of antecedent and consequent, or of a 
principle in necessary relation to comprehended j)articu- 
lars, or of a condition without which the consequent could 
not have existed. But all these different forms of expres- 
sion do really refer to relations of the same nature, viz., 
cither the relation of cause and effect, or of law and phc- 
Qomcna, or of first truths and their necessary consequences 



414 THE DOCTRINE. OF EVIDENCE. 

When we attain to merely uniform sequences, as general 
facts, the uniformity we assume to he comprehended hy 
some law and necessitated hy it. Cause of course is all- 
pervading, and therefore always imphed; hut is not the 
great ohject of investigation, as has heen hefore shown.* 
The consequent, then, whether regarded as an effect, or a 
particular comprehended under law, or an inference arising 
from an axiom, is really contained in its antecedent; so 
that the affirmation of the latter comprehends the af- 
firmation of the /ormer; and the existence of the former 
proves the latter, when, hy applying the principles of 
elimination,^ or hy tracing upwards the necessary sequence, 
it is shown that the /ormer depends upon the latter. 

A condition, without which a consequent could not 
have existed, is not always an immediate antecedent ; as 
when we say of a tender plant, that it was destroyed, he- 
cause the servant carelessly left it out of doors during a 
frosty night. Here we do not assign the carelessness of 
the servant as the immediate antecedent of the destruction 
of the plant ; hut still, it was the immediate antecedent 
of the exposure of the plant ; and, had it not heen left out 
of doors, it would not have heen destroyed. In this case, 
there is a series of antecedents and consequents, all of 
which are necessary to account for the effect ; hut, instead 
of stating the whole series, we put down a remote antece- 
dent as the condition of the last effect, and form thus an 
ahhreviated form of expression for the whole. But the 
reasoning depends upon the relations we have given ahove. 

The cardinal principles involved in the foregoing, 
axiomatic ally expressed, are, 

1. " Every phenomenon must have its cause and its 
law." 

* Supra, p. 254. f Page 288. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 415 

2. " Nature is uniform in her operations." 

This uniformity is the uniformity of the action of 
causes, as regulated by wise laws : and the uniformity of 
nature, therefore, may be expressed as follows : 

" Like antecedents involve like consequents ; " and 

" Like consequents imply like antecedents ; '' * 

Or, to give it a more general expression, 

" Cause is immutably regulated in time and space ;" 
e. g. heat — gravitation — magnetism. 

3. " Whatever is predicated of the Whole is predicated 
of all the parts contained under it.'' 

Upon these three principles all the different kinds of 
proof above explained are based. 

In all the different forms of the a posteriori, we prove 
antecedents from consequents or phenomena. But, ob- 
viously, we cannot proceed in this proof, unless we assume 
that " Every phenomenon must have its cause and its 
law ; " and " That law governs uniformly." 

In the ct priori, likewise, where we prove consequents 
or phenomena by antecedents, we cannot proceed without 
assuming that "Every cause is governed by law uni- 
formly." 

* Page 301. 



416 THE DOCTEINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION IT. 

OF DEGREES OF EVIDENCE. 

The terms necessary , possible, contingent, and impoS' 
sible, refer to the nature of the connection between a 
given antecedent and consequent. The terms certain, 
probable, and presumptive, refer to our knowledge of this 
connection. 

A necessary connection between the two is one deter- 
mined by absolute law ; e. g. the connection between an 
Idea and an Axiom, as the Idea of space and the axiom 
of the three dimensions in space ; the connection between 
an axiom and consequences deduced from it ; the connec- 
tion between the law of gravitation and the phenomena of 
nature ; the connection between the premises and conclu- 
sion of a syllogism ; and so on. 

A possible connection is one which no law absolutely 
prevents ; and which might take place by an adequate 
power which we know to exist, but which, at the same 
time, may not appear probable. It is therefore a contin- 
gent connection. 

A contingent connection implies a law in relation to a 
cause which may or may not be governed by it. It is the 
opposite of a necessary connection. There is no contin- 
gency in the connection between natural causes and laws, 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 417 

and their phenomena. Contingency is found only in the 
connection between a Free Will, and motives consisting 
of Moral Laws, Reasons, and Inducements.* 

An impossible connection, is one prevented by law ; — 
e. (J. that a stone thrown into the air should remain sus- 
pended there, or that a mass of solid iron should float in 
water, or that a part should be greater than a whole, or 
that 2+2=5. 

Impossibility is of two kinds, logical and jpJiysical, 
The first is a connection which would contravene Ideas 
and Axioms, and laws founded in them. Such a connec- 
tion is an impossibility in itself, — e. g. that a part is 
greater than a whole, that there are four dimensions in 
space, or that 2 + 2= 5. A physical impossibility is the 
impossibility of any phenomena in contravention of physi- 
cal laws. While these laws exist, or remain unsuspended, 
their proper phenomena must take place. But Omnipo- 
tence may suspend or modify these laws. This of course 
is a miracle or loonder. 

The other set of terms, we have said, refers to our 
hnoiuledge of any supposed connection between an antece- 
dent and consequent. 

To an Omniscient Being there are no degrees of know- 
ledge. Such a Being sees, with the utmost clearness, the 
necessary and the contingent, the actual and the possible. 
To such a Being, all knowledge is certain. It is only to 
the knowledges which belong to beings like ourselves that 
the terms presumptive and probable can be applied ; it is 
only of such knowledges that degrees of certainty can be 
affirmed. 

There are then to us three kinds of certainty, according 

* Doctrine of the Will, p. G2. 
18* 



418 THE DOCTKINE OF EVIDENCE. 

to the nature of the connection between the terms which 
are the object of proof. 

First. Absolute cei^tainty. This is based upon the 
necessary connection between the two terms. Our know- 
ledge of Ideas and Axioms is absolutely certain, — e. g. 
time and space ; that every body is in space. So also our 
knowledge of deductions from axioms is absolutely certain, 
as in geometry, for example. Our knowledge of the "con- 
nection between the premises and conclusion of a syllogism 
is of the same nature : this is sometimes called logical 
certainty. 

Secondly. Physical certainty. This is the certainty 
which lies in the connection between established physical 
antecedents and sequent s, as exhibited in the phenomena 
of gravitation, heat, chemical affinities, mechanical forces, 
and so on. 

Now, the reason does not conceive of this connection 
as necessarily fixed with an absolute necessity, because it 
ultimately depends upon the Will of God ; and the same 
Will which ordamed it, can change, suspend, or even an- 
nihilate it. 

When, therefore, we affirm any thing to be physically 
certain, we mean that our knowledge of it is based upon 
physical, and not upon necessary relations. 

Thirdly. Moral certainty. This is the certainty which 
lies between the connection of Motive and Will. By Will, 
we mean a self-conscious, intelligent and sensitive cause, 
or a cause in a triunity with Keason and Sensitivity. It 
is in the fullest sense a cause per se; that is, it contains 
within itself proper efficiency, and determines its own di- 
rection. By Motives, we mean the reasons and induce- 
ments, in view of which the Will acts.* In general, ail 

* Doctrine of the WiU, p. 138. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 419 

activity proceeds according to rules, or laws, or reasons, 
for they have essentially the same meaning : but in mere 
material masses, the law is not contemplated by the acting 
force ; it is contemplated only by the Intelligence which 
ordained and conditioned the force. In spirit, on the con- 
trary, the acti-^dty which we call Will, is self-conscious, 
and is connected with a perception and sense of the rea- 
sons and inducements, or ends, or motives of actions. 
These motives are of two kinds : 

First. Those found in the ideas of the practical reason, 
which decides what is fit and right. These are reasons of 
supreme authority. 

Secondly. Those found in the understanding and sen- 
sitivity ; i. e., the immediately useful and expedient, and 
the gratification of the passions. These are right only 
when subordinate to the first. 

Now, these reasons and inducements are a fight to the 
Wfil, and serve to guide its activities. The human con- 
science, which is but the Keason, under its practical func- 
tion, in relation to the moral, has drawn up for the Will 
explicit rules, suited to all circumstances and relations, 
which are called ethics, or tJie rules. And so, on the other 
hand, the understanding, by which we mean the Eeason, 
under its practical function, in relation to mere utifity, has 
formed rules of prudence or expediency. The law of the 
sensitivity, taken in itself, is unique ; it is simply "To do 
whatever is most agreeable or pleasing to itself." 

These various rules the Will is not compelled or neces- 
sitated to obey. In every volition it is conscious of a 
power to do, or not to do. 

In the moral harmony and purity of the soul, the three 
kinds above named do not conflict with each other. The 
right has utifity as an ultimate and certain result. The 



420 THE DOCTKINE OF EVIDENCE. 

soul loves the right, in this state, because it is right, and 
reposes quietly in hope of the consequences. And all the 
passions find their highest gratification in obeying the law 
of the right. Hence moral certainty, as to the actions of 
moral beings, can exist only where the harmony of the 
spiritual being is preserved in a perfect, or at least para- 
mount degree : e. g. God, and good angels, and good men. 
In God, moral certainty is perfect. His dispositions are 
infinitely pure, and his Will freely determines to do right ; 
it is not compelled or necessitated, for then His infinite 
meritoriousness would cease. Moral certainty is not abso- 
lute, because Will being a power to do, or not to do, there 
is always a possibility, although it may be an infinite im- 
probability, that the Will may disobey the laws of the 
Keason. 

In the case of good angels, and good men, the moral 
certainty is such, as to be attended with no apprehension 
of a dereliction. 

With respect to such men as Joseph, Daniel, Paul, 
Howard, and Washington, we can calculate, with a very 
high and satisfactory moral certainty, of the manner in 
which they will act in any given circumstances involving 
the influence of motives. We know they will obey truth, 
justice, and mercy, — that is, the first class of motives ; 
and the second, only so far as they are authorised by the 
first. 

If the first class of motives is forsaken, then human 
conduct must be calculated according to the influence of 
the second class. 

Human character, however, is mixed and variously 
compounded. We might make a scale of an indefinite 
number of degrees, from the highest point of moral excel- 
lence to the lowest point of moral degradation, and then 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 421 

our predictions of human conduct would vary with every 
degree. 

In any particular case, where we are called upon to 
reason from the connection of motives with the will, it is 
evident we must determine the character of the individual 
as accurately as possible, in order to know the probable 
resultant of the opposite moral forces which we are likely 
to find. 

We have remarked that moral certainty exists only 
where the harmony of the moral constitution is preserved. 
Here we know the Eight will be obeyed. It may, how- 
ever, be remarked in addition to this, that moral certainty 
may be said to exist in the case of the lowest moral 
degradation, where the Right is forsaken. Here the rule 
is, " To do whatever is most agreeable," and " Whatever 
is useful in the immediate or temporal consequences.'' 
The volition, indeed, in such instances seems merged into 
a mere sense of present gratification. But, in the inter- 
mediate state, lies the wide field of probability. What 
is commonly called the hnoioledge of human nature, and 
esteemed of most importance in the affairs of human 
life, is not the knowledge of human nature as it ouglit to 
he, but as it is, in its vast variety of good and evil. We 
gain this knowledge from consciousness, from observation, 
and from history. What human nature ought to be, we 
learn from Eeason and Revelation. 

Win has already been represented as forming a triunity 
with the Reason and the Sensitivity, and in the constitu- 
tion of our being is designed to derive its rules and in- 
ducements of action from these. Acts, which are in the 
direction of neither reason nor sensitivity, must be very 
trifling acts; and therefore, although possible, we may 
conclude they are very rare. In calculating, then, future 



422 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

acts of will, we may, like the Mathematicians, drop infini- 
tesimal differences, and assume that all acts of the will 
are in the direction of the reason, or of the sensitivity, or 
of both in their harmony. Although the will is conscious 
of power to do, out of the direction of both the reason 
and the sensitivity, still in the triunity in which it exists, 
it submits itself to the general interests of the being, and 
consults the authority of conscience, or the enjoyments 
of passion. Now every individual has formed for himself 
habits and a character, more or less fixed. He is known 
to have submitted himself from day to day, and in a great 
variety of transactions, to the laws of conscience ; and 
hence we conclude, that he has formed a fixed purpose of 
doing right. He has exhibited, too, on many occasions, 
noble, generous, and pure feelings ; and hence we con- 
clude that his sensitivity, in a predominant degree, 
harmonises with conscience. Or, he is known to have 
violated the laws of the conscience from day to day, and 
in a great variety of transactions ; and hence we conclude 
that he has formed a fixed purpose of doing wrong ; and 
that his sensitivity is in conflict with the reason. 

In both cases supposed, and, in Kke manner, in all 
supposable cases, there is plainly a basis, on which, in any 
given circumstances, we may foresee and predict the voli- 
tions, and consequently the actions of men. 

There is something " that is evident, and now existent, 
with which the future existence of the contingent event 
is connected." On the one hand, these predictions exert 
no necessitating influence over the events, for they are 
entirely disconnected with the causation of the events ; 
and, on the other hand, the events need not be assumed 
as necessary, in order to become the objects of probable 
calculations. If they were necessary, in any sense, the 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 423 

calculations could no longer be merely probable ; they 
would, on the contrary, take the precision and certainty 
of the calculation of eclipses and other phenomena based 
upon necessary laws. 

But these calculations can aim only at moral certainty, 
because they are made according to the generally known 
and received determinations of will in a triunity with the 
reason and the sensitivity ; but still, a will which is known, 
also, to have the power to depart at any moment from 
the line of determination which it has established for 
itself. Thus the calculations which we make respecting 
the conduct of one man in given circumstances, based 
upon his known integrity, and the calculations which we 
make respecting another, based upon his known dishonesty, 
may alike disappoint us, through the unexpected, though 
possible dereliction of the first, and the unexpected, 
though possible reformation of the latter. 

When we reason from moral effects to moral causes, or 
from moral causes to moral effects ; as, for example, in 
testimony, where we reason from the fact of the testimony 
to the motive which led to the testimony, — we cannot 
regard the operation of causes as positive and uniform 
under the same law of necessity which aj)pertains to 
physical causes ; because, in moral causality, the free will 
is the efficient and last determiner. It is indeed true, 
that we reason here with a high degree of probability, — 
s'ith a probability sufficient to regulate wisely and har- 
aoniously the affairs of society ; but we cannot reason 
respecting human conduct as wc reason respecting the 
phenomena of the physical world, since it is possible for 
the human will to disapi:)oint calculations based upon the 
ordinary influence of motives ; e. g. The motive does not 
hold the same relation to will which fire holds to a com- 



424 THE DOCTKINE OF EVIDENCE. 

bustible substance. The fire must burn ; the "will may 
or may not determine in view of the motive. 

Hence, the reason why in common parlance prohahle 
evidence has received the name of moral evidence ; moral 
evidence being always probable — all probable evidence is 
called moral.* 

Next after certainty, we must consider prohahility. 

By the probable, we mean that which has not attained 
to certainty, but which, nevertheless, has grounds on which 
it claims to be believed. We call it probable or provable, 
because it both has proof, and is still under conditions of 
proof, that is, admits of still farther proof. 

That which is certain, has all the proof of which the 
case admits. A mathematical proposition is certain on 
the ground of necessity, and admits of no higher proof 
than that which really demonstrates its truth. The 
Divine volitions are certain on the ground of the Divine 
perfections, and admit of no higher proof than what is 
found in these perfections. The volitions of a good 
created being are certain on the ground of the purity of 
such a being, and admit of no higher proof than what 
is found in this purity. 

But when we come to a mixed being, that is, a being 
of Eeason, and of a Sensitivity corrupted totally, or in 
different degrees, then we have place not for certainty, 
but for probability. As our knowledge of the future or 
the past volitions of such a being can only be gathered 
from something now existent, this knowledge will depend 
upon our knowledge of the present relative state of his 
reason and sensitivity. But a perfect knowledge of this 
state is in no case supposable, so that, although our «,ctual 

* Review of Edwards on the Will, pp. 261-269. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 425 

knowledge of this being may be such as to afford us proof 
of what his volitions may be, yet, inasmuch as our know- 
ledge of him may be increased indefinitely by close obser- 
vation and study, so likewise will the proof be increased. 
According to the definition of probability above given, 
therefore, our knowledge of the future or past volitions of 
an imperfect being can only amount to probable know- 
ledge. 

The direction of the probabilities will be determined 
by the preponderance of the good or the bad in the mixed 
being supposed. But the state of the Eeason itself must 
be considered. If the Eeason or Conscience be in a 
highly developed state, and the convictions of the right 
consequently clear and strong, there may be probabilities 
of volitions in opposition to passion, which cannot exist 
where the Reason is undeveloped, and subject to the 
errors and prejudices of custom and superstition. The 
difference is that which is commonly known under the 
terms " Enhghtened and unenlightened conscience." 

"With a given state of the Eeason and the Sensitivity, 
the direction of the probabilities will depend also very 
much upon the correlated, or upon the opposing objects 
and circumstances.'*' 

We have spoken of Probability thus far only in refer- 
ence to human volition and actions, since here is the 
great field of probabiKty. It evidently applies to other 
subjects also : it applies wherever the connection between 
an antecedent and consequent is contingent, or appears 
to us to be so. 

We have pointed out several terms which refer to the 
nature of the connection between antecedents and conse- 

* Itcvicw ut supra, pp. 291-3. 



426 THE DOCTKINE OF EVIDENCE. 

q[ueiits, viz., necessary, consequent, possible, and impos- 
sible; and several others, which refer to our knowledge of 
that connection, viz., certain, lorobable, and presurtiptive. 

Kow these terms answer to each other. A necessary 
connection of antecedents and consequents, or of any two 
terms, is the ground of absolute certainty of knowledge. 
In the connection of physical antecedents and consequents 
there is a relative necessity, i. e., this connection is neces- 
sary while the system of nature remains unchanged ; but 
as such a change is possible by the Divine Will, the cer- 
tainty of knowledge here is called physical, and not 
absolute. 

An impossible connection involves the Idea of neces- 
sity. Hence, when a connection is seen to be impossible, 
our knowledge that it will not take place is absolutely or 
physically certain, according to the nature of the antece- 
dents and consequents connected. 

Answering to a contingent connection between antece- 
dent and consequent, we have a probable Icnoioledge. 
We have indeed spoken of a moral certainty in respect 
to the volitions of pure beings. But the nature of the 
evidence in these cases is not changed. Moral certainty 
still admits a possibility in the opposing scale ; but the 
grounds of belief are so stable and conclusive as to leave 
no room for doubt. Generically considered, moral cer- 
tainty is probable knowledge. 

Again, answering to a possible connection between 
antecedents and consequents, our knowledge is presump- 
tive. A possible connection is a contingent one, also; it 
may or it may not be. The difference between this case 
and the preceding, i. e., where a contingent connection of 
antecedents and consequents has a probable knowledge 
answering to it, is as follows : In the preceding there is 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 427 

filwaj'S a certain amount of proof for or against the con- 
nection, with at least a possibility in the opposing scale. 
Frequently the probabilities on either side are so rife, that 
a nice judgment is required in determining the prepon- 
derance. 

But where the connection is said to be merely possihUj 
there is no proof for jr against, as yet, adduced ; and then, 
according to the point of view at which we stand in rela- 
tion to it, we are said to have a presumptive knowledge 
that the connection does or does not exist. As soon as 
proof is adduced, a probability arises on one side or the 
other. 

But, while there is no p^'ohahility, to which side does 
the presumption belong? This, I have said, depends upon 
the point of view at which we stand. And this point of 
view must itself be determined on some- fit principle ; for 
it is, by no means, a matter of indifference. Where a 
question arises between two parties, it must necessarily be 
so put as to involve an affirmative and a negative ; and 
the presumj)tion will then be said to lie in favour of the 
affirmative or the negative. Now the point of view is de- 
termined : 

1. By the previous state of the question. If it has by 
old opinions or established usage been settled in the affir- 
mative or negative, then from this point must it be 
viewed. Independently of all argument, and of all in- 
herent probability, there is a presumption in favour of 
the old opinion, and the established usage. He who at- 
tacks the question is said to assume the burden of proof; 
and, unless he can bring proof to the contrary, the old de- 
cision must stand. 

2. The point of view is determined by any natural 
right which may chance to be involved in the question, 



428 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

such as the right of life, liberty, property, character, and 
freedom of opinion ] e. g. A man arraigned as a criminal 
is presumed to be innocent, until he is proved guilty. A 
man in possession of an estate is presumed to be the owner, 
until his title is invalidated by sufficient proof. Any an- 
cient institution is presumed to be well founded, until its 
principles can be shown to be false and mischievous ; or it 
can be shown, by fraud or violencCj to have supplanted a 
more ancient institution. In the latter case the burden 
of proof falls upon the more modern, and the presumption 
lies in favor of the more ancient institution. It happens, 
sometimes, that those are' called innovators, who are, in 
reahty, the advocates of what is truly ancient and vener- 
able. If they prove this to be the fact, they, of course, 
tranfer the burden of proof to where it justly belongs. 

Presumptive evidence must be distinguished from ct 
priori or antecedent probability. This last is strictly in- 
herent probability, arising from a priori or established 
principle. Any fact or proposition possesses this kind of 
probability, when it is a prohahle consequence of such a 
principle ; e. g. From the known character of an indi- 
vidual, there is an antecedent probability how he will act 
under certain circumstances. There may be a moral cer- 
tainty that he will do right ; but the circumstances may 
be such as not simply to involve a question of rectitude. 
From the knowledge which we have of the circumstances, 
in connection with the character of the individual, we 
judge that an antecedent probability exists as to the man- 
ner in which he will act. 

There is antecedent probability in favor of a Divine 
revelation, arising from the character of the Deity and the 
moral condition of man. 

In making experiments in Natural Science, there is 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 429 

often an antecedent probability of tlie results arising from 
known antecedents. 

In conclusion, we remark, that the evidence by wbich 
we gain certain knowledge of tbe connection of antecedents 
and consequents, or of any fact or proposition, is in gen- 
eral called demonstrative evidence. The terms demonstra- 
tive and demonstration are tecbnically and particularly ap- 
plied to mathematical reasoning. Moral reasoning may be 
demonstrative in respect to moral truth ; but not in re- 
spect to moral action. The evidence by which we gain 
2wohahle knowledge is called probable evidence ; the liigh- 
est degree of probability is called moral certainty. And 
the evidence by which we gain presumptive knowledge is 
called presumptive evidence. 

We shall next proceed to apply the foregoing princi- 
ples to the different kinds of evidence contained under 
the two general divisions of the ci priori and the (I pos' 
teriori. 



430 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION V 

• TESTIMONY. 

This is moral evidence, because it depends upon tlie Im- 
man will. The highest certainty, therefore, to which 
testimony can attain is moral certainty. 

Testimony, as a species of evidence, must embrace very 
extensive considerations of human nature, and of the in- 
fluence of motives. Testimony, in any given case, is a 
fact which must a posteriori be accounted for. It is ac- 
counted for by referring it to the motives which led to it. 
If it can be shown that the truth of the fact testified to, 
is the morally certain ground of the testimony, then the 
testimony proves the truth of that fact with a moral cer- 
tainty. If the truth is the only probable ground, then 
the testimony proves the probability of the fact to a de- 
gree determined by the character of the witness and the 
circumstances in which he is placed. 

But to proceed to a more particular exposition of this 
subject — 

I. Wliaf circumstances determine the truth of testimony 
loith a moral certainty ? 

1. The character of the witness : if he have all the 
qualities of a perfect moral being, then his veracity, un- 
der any circumstances, may be deemed morally certain. 

Only one degree, at least, below moral certainty is the 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 431 

veracity of sucli men as we have already referred to, viz., 
Paul, Joseph, Daniel, Washington, &c. We can hardly 
conceive of a trial so severe as to lead such men to sacri- 
fice their integrity. 

2. Sufficient opportunities for observing the fact testi- 
fied to, i. e. The fact must have been the direct and un- 
questionable object of sense or experience : " That which 
we have heard — which we have seen with our eyes — which 
we have looked upon (i. e. have steadily contemplated) 
and our hands have handled — declare we unto you." 

3. The witness must be a man of sane mind. 

The first, however, may be regarded as including the 
two last. A man of high and perfect moral character will 
not testify to facts which he has not carefully and fully 
observed : nor will he testify, if he is not conscious of 
having been in a proper state of mind at the time they 
were presented. 

II. What circiC7nstances determine the truth of testi- 
mony on grounds of mere prohahility ? 

1. The last particular mentioned under the preceding 
head is essential to all testimony ; and the probability will 
always be directly in proportion to the first two. 

2. The probability estabhshed by testimony will vary 
with the number and character of the motives under which 
the. witness testifies. 

First. If the witness has an interest in the facts to 
which he testifies, arising from pride, ambition, or the 
gratification of any desire, or the fulfilment of any selfish 
purpose which he is known to entertain, then will his 
testimony in proportion be invalidated. Still, however, 
the known character of the witness must be taken into the 
account. The same motives relatively to one man will in- 
validate testimony to a greater degree than relatively to 



432 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

another ; i. e. the motive and the character must be taken 
together, and the probability be accordingly deduced. 

Secondly. If the motives be such as on principles of 
self-gratification would lead the witness to testify contrary 
to his actual testimony, then is the testimony strong in 
proportion to the motives ; e. g. A man testifying to 
facts at the expense of reputation — or worldly possessions 
and honours — -or of life. 

III. Testimony in relation to opinion and in relation 
to fact. 

By opinion we mean a judgment of the mind, respect- 
ing a proposition as true or false. Opinion is to be dis- 
tinguished from absolute knowledge, as implying that the 
proposition which is its object, is still debatable. 

Testimony cannot establish the truth of opinions or 
judgments. Their truth can be established only on some 
necessary principle of the Intelligence. 

Testimony, as evidence, relates merely to matters of 
fact. All, therefore, that a witness can testify to, in re- 
lation to opinions, is the fact that he or some other person 
entertains such and such opinions. But the truth or 
falsity of the opinions must be determined on other 
grounds, and wholly independently of testimony. 

A man may be of the highest integrity, and of sane 
mind, and may sacrifice reputation and possessions, and 
life itself, in maintaining his opinions, without affording 
any evidence of their truth. His testimony only goes to 
establish the fact that he believes the proposition in ques- 
tion, and that he believes it ardently and firmly. 

Divine testimony is adequate to establish a truth as 
well as a fact, because God is Infinite Reason, and the 
very substance of truth. We believe, therefore, what 
God affirms, although we may be incapable of deter- 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 433 

mining the truth, independently, on the principles of our 
reason. 

The testimony of good and wise men is entitled to 
high consideration. But we do not ultimately and se- 
curely settle a point which they profess to believe, until 
we have ascertained the grounds on which they believe. 
The same principles of evidence are common to them and 
to ourselves ; if, therefore, they have believed on just 
principles, we must be capable of perceiving them. 

IV. Truth and Fact. — By fact, we mean phenomena, 
— something which we know by observation merely. 
Facts are of two kinds : 1. Facts of the Senses, or exter- 
nal observation. 2. Facts of the Consciousness, or inter- 
nal observation. 

By truth, we mean that which is arrived at by the 
pure Reason. We always assume observation as con- 
ditional to the exercise of Reason. But while observation 
supplies facts. Reason supplies the principles under which 
the facts are to be reduced. Now, whatever the Reason 
supplies, whether in intuition or in deduction, we call 
truth. From this comparison of truth and fact, it must 
still more clearly apj)ear that testimony cannot prove 
truths or doctrines. Testimony is only an attestation of 
what has been observed. Truths or doctrines can be 
proved by reasoning alone. 

V. Historical Evidence, — The leading feature of this 
species of evidence, is testimony. 

1. Where the historian relates what he has himself seen. 
This is pure testimony, and must be judged of accordingly. 

2. Where the historian relates cotemporaneous events, 
upon the testimony of others. Here, in addition to v/hat 
has been laid down under testimony, we must take into 
account : First. The prejudices and antijmthics of 

10 



434 THE DOCTKINE OF EVIDEKCE. 

country^ party, and sect. Secondly. The philosopliical 
ability of the Mstorian to investigate, compare, and de- 
duce. Thirdly. The time and attention bestowed on the 
work. 

3. Where the historian depends for his information 
upon the writings of others, and upon national monu- 
ments, records, and antiquities. Here the most various 
and lofty qualifications are requisite. First. All the 
qualities of a true witness. Secondly. Varied and pro- 
found erudition : viz. a knowledge of languages — of science 
— of arts — of government ; — great skill in antiquarian re- 
searches ; and above all, original, all-comprehensive, and 
penetrative genius, as a ]3hilosopher. Thirdly. Adequate 
materials. A history is entitled to belief in proportion as 
these particulars appear in its compilation. 

YI. Concurrent Testimony. — This must be distin- 
guished from accumulated testimony, which is a mere 
multiplication of witnesses. In concurrent testimony, on 
the contrary, although the evidence be stronger, accord- 
ing to the number of the witnesses, yet the evidence it- 
self does not lie in the qualifications of the witnesses ; but 
only in their co-ncurrence. 

Their concurrence, on supposition, cannot be accounte 
for, without granting the fact testified to ; i. e. If the fact 
did occur, then the concurrence was possible ; if the fact 
did not occur, then the concurrence was not probable, or 
possible, as the case may be. 

In the first place. It is plain that this evidence will 
be strong, in proportion to the improhahility of p)'^^'^ious 
concert. If previous concert can be shown to be im- 
possible, then the evidence occupies one of its highest 
grounds. 

But, in the stcond place ^ although the probability, or 



ii 



k 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 435 

even ^possibility, of previous concert may be disproved, it 
will still remain to be shown tliat the concurrence can. be 
accounted for only by the admission of the fact in ques- 
tion. 

Now, if the concurrence can be accounted for in any 
other way, it must be by showing, in the case of each wit- 
ness, separately, that there were motives which were ade- 
quate to lead to the given testimony, without supposing 
the reality of the fact testified to. This would of course 
invalidate the concurrence. If the existence of such mo- 
tives in the case of each witness should be shown to have 
existed, there would of course be an utter annihilation of 
the evidence : or, if the above be shown in the cases of 
only a part of the witnesses, it must tend to destroy the 
evidence. In all these cases the concurrence turns out a 
singular fortuity. Now, if in any given concurrence no 
such invalidating or destructive circumstances can be de- 
tected, then it must remain as valid evidence. 

VII. Concurrent Testimony in relation to fact and 
ojnnion.-^-Tlie principles above stated refer to concurrent 
testimony, as evidence of facts merely. 

Concurrent testimony, in relation to opinion, is mere 
concurrence of opinion. "Where this concurrence exists 
without previous concert, it affords evidence of sincerity. 
Where an opinion is thus concurred in by men of high in- 
tegrity and wisdom, it is entitled to great consideration ; 
but ultimately it must rest upon j>'^inci^IeSj as forming 
its only decisive evidence. This has been above shown in 
discussing opinion in its relation to simple testimony. 



436 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION VI. 

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 

By circumstances, we mean, as the etymology denotes, 
whatever stands around a principal. 

Thus the circumstances of an individual comprise all 
the particulars which make up his external condition. 
Thus the circumstances of an event comprise all the par- 
ticulars of time, place, action, modes, degrees, causes, and 
effects ; i. e. every thing attending upon it — accessory to 
it — or every thing maMng up a description of it. 

ISTow, circumstantial evidence in general takes place 
where we adduce the circumstances which belong to a 
principal, to prove the existence of that principal. But 
what is the connection between circumstances and a prin- 
cipal which enables us to reason from the one to the 
other ? It must be something more than mere juxtaposi- 
tion. An arbitrary and accidental connection cannot be 
the foundation of reasoning. The connection then must be 
that of necessary, or at least probable consequent to a 
stated antecedent, or the connection of phenomenon with 
cause and law : i. e. The principal being necessary to ac- 
count for the existence of circumstances, its existence is a 
posteriori proved from the circumstances. 

In calling this circumstantial evidence, however, we 
only give another name to the ordinary a posteriori rea- 
soning. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 437 

Circumstantial evidence, as a really distinct kind of 
evidence, is constituted by a concurrence of circumstances. 

The circumstantial evidence above described is a mere 
accumulation of a posteriori proof, — a bringing together 
of many effects, or consequents, to prove a common cause, 
or antecedent. But the concurrence of circumstances or 
facts is, in itself, a new and peculiar fact, independently 
of the nature of the facts taken separately. Concurrent 
testimony and concurrent circumstances are analogous. 
In both kinds, the proof lies in the necessity of account- 
ing for the concurrence. It is a phenomenon, — it must 
have a cause. 

That which as condition or cause accounts for the con- 
currence is proved by it, either with certainty, or with 
more or less probability, as the case may be. 

Circumstantial evidence possesses the highest degree 
of certainty when there is absolutely no other way of ac- 
counting for the circumstances, except by the admission 
of the principal in question. 

It possesses the highest degree oi probability when al- 
though it be possible to conceive other ways of accounting 
for the concurrence than the one adopted, still every one 
of these is far-fetched, altogether hypothetical, and having 
no known connection with any existent fact. 

Where there are several ways of accounting for the 
concurrence, and all have claims to probabiHty, we must 
of course weigh the opposite probabilities, and determine 
accordingly. 

Any given concurrence of facts cannot be set aside, as 
of no weight, except by accounting for each fact separ- 
ately, in its time, place, and relations, so as to make the 
concurrence appear altogether fortuitous. 

Eeasoning from facts, merely, and reasoning from a 



438 THE DOCTEINE OF EVIDENCE. 

concurrence of facts, since they may botli a|)pear in the 
same case, and in relation to the same facts, are apt to he 
confounded. It need hardly be remarked that it is of the 
utmost importance to discriminate between them, and to 
present them each on its own independent basis. 

The evidence admitted in a court of justice to prove 
the guilt of a prisoner, must be positive, or at least 
morally certain. Circumstantial evidence, therefore, re- 
garded either as a collection of facts, or as a concurrence 
of facts, can be admitted as decisive, only where the guilt 
of the prisoner can be taken as the only way of accounting 
for the facts, or the concurrence of facts : i. e. It is not 
enough that it is the most probable way of accounting for 
them, — it must be the only probable way. 

Where the rights of two parties are opposed, so that a 
determination necessarily involves loss to one or the other, 
as in a question respecting the title of an estate, the de- 
termination must, of course, be made according to the re- 
sult of a comparison of probabilities, if no positive evidence 
can be obtained. 

In concurrent testimony, we have a number of wit- 
nesses coming together, without previous concert, and suj)- 
porting each other's evidence. In concurrent circumstan- 
ces, we have a number of circumstances coming together 
without any previous contrivance, and supporting each 
other in relation to a principal. 

If the testimony be true, then this concurrence is what 
we might have expected. If this principal exist, then the 
concurrence of circumstances is what we might have ex- 
pected. 

In addition to this, we have assumed that unless the 
concurrence of facts can be proved to be fortuitous, by 
showing how each fact came to happen in that precise 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 439 

time, place, and relation, without requiring any connection 
between the several facts ; and that unless the concurrent 
testimony he accounted for in the motives of each witness 
separately, so as not to require the truth of their common 
statement ; and, we may add, unless it can he shown to 
he fortuitous, as in the case of concurrent circumstances, 
we are compelled to admit that antecedent or cause which 
most clearly accounts for the concurrence. But there is 
an ohjection made to this which requires attention, and 
may compel us to prove our assumption. 

It is as follows : 

"Any given phenomena brought into juxtaposition 
must of necessity assume* some order of arrangement. But 
against any particular order there are chances indefinitely 
great in number ; and as the phenomena must come into 
some order, it is plain they may come into one order as 
w^ell as into another ; and hence they may as well come 
into that regular and connected order which we call con- 
currence, as into one of utter confusion and want of con- 
nection." Says the objector, therefore, "What right have 
you to assume this concurrence as proof of the principal to 
which the facts seem to relate ? I have an equal right to 
assume the fortuity of the concurrence." 

We have here, then,, two assumptions directly oj)posed ; 
but one or the other must fall ; both cannot be true. 
Which shall stand ? The objector may say, " Please 
support your assumption." We may rejoin, Please to 
support yours. Now, we may both make the attempt, 
and may both fail in positively setthng the question. 
After all our discussions, there may appear something 
plausible on both sides. In this case, he who can adduce 
the greatest number of probabilities for his assumption, 
must win the argument. In supporting our assumption, 



440 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

we urge the fact, that at least in the great majority of 
cases where there is concurrence, there is some cause di- 
rectly and clearly producing it ; e. g. Of all the books 
ever made, we do not find that any were made by a for- 
tuitous concurrence of the letters ; of all the instruments 
and machines that have ever been constructed, we do not 
find any that were constructed by the fortuitous occur- 
rence of the materials ; and as to the phenomena of na- 
ture, we find, as our knowledge of natural philosophy and 
chemistry is extended, that laws are brought to light 
which explain them in all their multifariousness, and 
leave us little or no place of appealing to fortuitous com- 
bination ? As, then, we produce the greater number of 
instances of this kind, we claim the greater number of 
probabilities for our assumption. Indeed, tne candid ob- ■ 
jector must be constrained to admit that he finds it very 
difficult to bring a single instance where fortuitous com- 
bination explains concurrence and regularity. 

This reasoning goes to show that a concurrence must 
always have the balance of probabilities in its favor, as 
connected with some principal which unites the facts in 
the concurrence in opposition to the assumption of a for- 
tuitous concurrence. 

But here another question may arise : Whether rea- 
soning from concurrence can ever possess the highest de- 
gree of certainty of any kind, as we have appeared in the 
preceding pages to take for granted, where we say, " this 
evidence possesses the highest degree of certainty when 
there is absolutely no other way of accounting for the con- 
currence except by the admission of the principal in ques- 
tion,'' inasmuch as in every case there is a possibility of 
fortuitous concurrence ? This is a serious question, and 
involves the possibility, although not the probability, of 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 441 

every concurrence whatever, — even the creation of the 
world being fortuitous. "We may indeed comfort our- 
selves with the overwhelming probability that the world 
is the work of design ; but stiU are we prepared to 
grant the possibility, however remote, of a fortuitous 
creation ? 

We are not prepared to grant this. We think we can 
prove the impossibility of fortuitous concurrence, as well 
as explain those cases which appear to be such. 

In the first place j the axioms " Every phenomenon 
must have a cause,'' and " Every phenomenon must have 
a law,'' cannot be set aside. These are necessary princi- 
ples of the reason. But concurrence is a phenomenon, 
and, therefore, mu^t have a cause and a law. Now if by 
fortuity we mean to negate cause and law, then fortuity 
is impossible in concurrence : and thus the question is 
settled at once. In the second place^ those concurrences 
which appear fortuitous are not reaUy so ; e. g. ^ cast of 
dice : The dice have a certain position before they are 
cast ; a certain degree of projectile force is given them, 
and the result is a certain concurrence of sides. Now in 
this case there are causes definite and regular ; but be- 
cause we are unable to determine them with precision, we 
call the result fortuitous. All cases of apparent fortuity 
may be resolved in the same way. There are causes, and 
they work regularly according to their nature, but we can- 
not penetrate their action. In any case of concurrence, 
therefore, the question is not, as we have above allowed, 
out of courtesy, to the objector, between the assumption 
of cause and no cause ; but whether a certain antecedent 
accounts for the concurrence, or whether it is to be ac- 
counted for by some other. 

Now, from our knowledge of antecedents and concur- 

19* 



442 THE DOCTEINE OF EVIDENCE. 

rences, there are some concurrences wMcli we do generally 
attribute to certain antecedents, because generally con- 
nected with, them ; 6. g. The print of a man's foot in the 
sand. This we should naturally attribute to the pressure 
of an actual foot ; but still, it is possible that it might have 
been produced by the action of the waves. If produced by 
the action of the waves, it has its definite cause, and is not 
fortuitous ; but it has in this case an unusual antecedent. 
On an inhabited coast, we should affirm at once that the 
probabilities greatly preponderate in favor of a man's foot 
as the cause ; but a man in the situation of Eobinson Crusoe, 
finding such a print upon the sea-shore, might be in doubt. 
Now the only case where concurrence would afford the 
highest certainty, is, as we have above affirmed, one in 
which there is but one way of accounting for the fact — not 
in opposition to fortuity, but in negation of the possibility 
>f other causes. 



1 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 443 



SECTION YII. 

ARGUMENT FROM PROGRESSIVE APPROxiCH. 

This belongs to the a posteriori form of proof, because we 
ascend from facts to a law. If, however, the facts of the 
progressive approach, introduced on the principle of cau- 
sality, are the only elements of the proof, then we have an 
ordinary case of induction ; e. g. We put a ball in motion 
on a rough surface, and its motion soon ceases ; we put it 
in motion on a smoother surface, and the motion is pro- 
portionally prolonged ; and we find generally, that the 
time of the motion is inversely as the resistance. Hence 
we infer that if all resistance were removed, there would 
be no change in the motion ; i. e. From the uniformity of 
a given number of facts, we infer an universal uniformity 
of facts. 

But are we certain, on the mere induction, that we 
may not in actual experiment arrive at a point where the 
phenomena shall be reversed? where the resistance, 
after having been reduced to a degree lower than has ever 
yet been attained, shall suddenly be greatly augmented ? 
Kecollect we are merely deducing from known facts ; and 
the uniformity of nature on which we base our conclusion 
respecting the unknown, is a uniformity which relates to 
law in general, and not merely to the particular law which 
we assume. There may, therefore, be a change in the 
facts in the extended experiment, which shall req[uire them 



444 THE DOCTEINE OF EVIDENCE, 

all to be reduced under another law in view of higher 
points of uniformity. The suns which we before deemed 
uniform, as fixed centres, may be found uniform as re- 
volving about some higher and common centre. 

The argument from progressive approach, therefore, 
would not in itself absolutely establish the vis inertice of 
bodies ; although it might afford a high degree of proba- 
bility/*' 

An argument has been drawn in favor of Christianity, 
from the fact that in proportion as nations are enlightened, 
their religious views approximate towards Christianity. 
The argument in this case differs widely from the preced- 
ing, in respect to its subject, and is conclusive. The 
cause or principle here is the human Reason. Now, we 
conceive of this as uniform and continuous in its action ; 
i. e. as having fixed laws of action, and as inherently 
active. Let it go into action, therefore, and it will act 
in the direction of these laws, and continue to act, unless 
counteracting and modifying causes are brought in. 
Hence, as the Eeason is the faculty of perceiving truth, 
if we remove all obstructions, and give it its full play and 
development, its perceptions must be taken as truth. 
That religion, therefore, which the Reason adopts, when 
thus developed and unobstructed, must be the true 
religion. And so also we must conclude that those per- 
ceptions which follow the progressive development of 
Reason, must be perceptions approximating proportionally 
towards truth. Now, if it can be shown from the history 
of human opinions — the history of philosophy, that these 
opinions have approximated regularly towards Christianity 
with the progressive development of the Reason, then we 

* Supra, p. 231. 



■ THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 445 

have in tliis progressive approach the highest internal 
evidence of the truth of Christianity. And the evidence 
in this case is not a mere induction of facts, whose uni- 
formity enahles us, on probable grounds, to proclaim a 
general fact ; but that of a principle regularly developing 
itself, and hastening on to its certain issue. In this argu- 
ment for Christianity, we first lay down the necessary 
criterion of a true religion, viz. its correspondence with 
the Reason truly and fully developed ; and, as resulting 
from this, the progressive concentration of the human 
mind upon certain opinions, in proportion to its develop- 
ment. This forms our major premiss. Then, by histori- 
cal evidence, and the evidence derived from philosophical 
criticism, we establish the fact that Christianity is the 
point upon which the human mind, in its progressive 
development, thus concentrates. This forms our minor 
premiss. The conclusion is then inevitable. 



446 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE 



SECTION YIII. 

PROVING BY EXAMPLE. 

The point to be proved is either a principle or a particu- 
lar fact. If a principle^ then the facts which go to estab- 
lish it J are inducted, and this is nothing more than induc- 
tion, employed in the order of proof. 

If a particular fact, then the establishment of a 
principle, although not appearing in the statement, really 
intervenes in the mental process, and forms the ground of 
the conclusion, in reference to the particular fact. In 
both cases, the establishment of the general principle is 
the cardinal part of the proof It may therefore be 
termed more appropriately, — proving by Induction. This 
differs from Inductive Investigation only in the order. In 
Inductive Investigation, we begin with the facts, and 
advance to the principle. In Proof by Induction, we first 
lay down the principle, or a fact which reposes ujDon and 
presumes the principle, and then we induct the facts, or 
examples, to prove it. 

It is necessary, however, to recall in this connection 
an important distinction, which applies both to inductive 
investigation and to inductive proof. In Induction, we 
do not bring together facts promiscuously. We make a 
selection — we bring together only such facts as have some 
connection with each other. They are alike either in form, 
time, and place, or in their relations. But, why do we 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 447 

"bring only sucli facts together as are alike? I will answer 
by asking another question. Why do we bring facts 
together at all? Obviouslyj to understand or to compre- 
hend them. 

Butj if we wish merely to understand them by gene- 
ralizing them under a common name, then we must, of 
necessity, observe likeness, and, of course, difference. 
And, if we wish to comprehend them by reducing them 
under a law, then also must we observe likeness and differ- 
ence, because our idea of a law, or cause, comprehends 
uniformity, — and the uniformity of the effects must be 
regarded as an exponent of the law. 

When, therefore, we are seeking for a law by Induc- 
tion, in the order of investigation, or when we are proving 
by induction a law already laid down, we follow those 
connections of the facts wliich presume a law. 

Xow, in inductive investigation, we do not always 
succeed in finding the law. We are often compelled, at 
least for a time, to stop short with a mere generalization 
under a common name, and the announcement of a theory. 
The generalization and the theory aid. our farther inves- 
tigations, and may enable us, eventually, to find the law ; 
but in them we have not arrived at certainty. 

So also in the order of proof. The point to be proved 
may not be a law, at the conception of which we may not 
yet have arrived, but merely a general uniformity, or a 
theory. The facts which we bring together are of course 
limited, since induction, from its very nature, is never 
complete. We are compelled, therefore, to infer the uni- 
versal from the hmited. This is illogical. The inference 
must therefore be contingent. It may or may not be. 
We apply, next, to the inference, the laws of probability. 
What reason have we, in any given case, to infer an 



448 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

universal uniformity from a limited observation, — e. g, 
from the fact that the sun has risen, at regular intervals, 
for five thousand years, what reason have we to infer that 
he will always rise at the same intervals, supposing, of 
course, that we have as yet ascertained no law of the 
planetary movements ? It is because we feel assured 
that the uniformity of the facts is the exponent of some 
law, although the law be concealed ; and upon the author- 
ity of law, uniform and continuous, do we infer the uni- 
versal from the limited. The particular and limited facts 
are a condition on which a law is conceived of, and then 
the inference is imbued with the whole energy, and 
stretched to the whole compass of law. But, if the infer- 
ence thus rests upon the conception of some law, why is 
it not always characterized by certainty ? 

When the conception is not merely of some law, but 
arrives at a particular and certain law, then the inference 
is certain, — e. g. when the law of the planetary move- 
ments is ascertained, then we are physically certain that 
the sun wiU continue to rise at the same intervals. But, 
until we have ascertained the particular law, although we 
know' from the uniformity there must be a law, and 
although we may form a shrewd theory, we cannot be 
certain but that the uniformity observed is only a part of 
some other and higher uniformity, where the law really 
resides, and that this higher uniformity, in its wider cycle, 
presents the particular uniformity which we have observed 
as only one of a long succession where the facts are uni- 
form under one characteristic for a certain period, and 
then change and become uniform under another character- 
istic, and so on, throughout the whole succession ; all the 
different uniformities being held together by the law 
which penetrates and concentrates all. — e. g. Let an Intelli- 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE, 449 

gence, whose existence numbers only a few days, like the 
butterfly of the opening summer, have the term of his 
being in those beautiful months : from the regular succes- 
sion of sunshine and soft showers which he observes, he 
concludes there must be some law ; and taking the ob- 
served uniformity as the exponent of that law, he concludes 
that the whole succession of climate is made up of sun- 
shine and soft showers. While as yet he knows no par- 
ticular and certain law of the planetary movements, he 
knows not that the uniformity which he observes is only 
one of a series of uniformities, under different character- 
istics, making up the cycle of the seasons : but let him 
ascertain the law, and then he at once passes beyond the 
narrow sphere of his inductions, and comprehends the 
whole succession. 

So also, had we not ascertained the law of the plane- 
tary movements, our own observation, as well as the ob- 
servation of five thousand years, could not enable us 
certainly to conclude respecting the future movements, 
inasmuch as the whole Rve thousand years might be only 
one of a succession of uniformities, under different cha- 
racteristics, and attached to a higher system. 

You now clearly perceive the distinction at which we 
aim. The distinction between reasoning upon the basis 
of a law, or upon the basis of a mere uniformity. 

In the first, we infer, or we prove, with certainty. In 
the second, our basis is also some law, but a law unknown, 
and only theorised, and therefore our conclusions are only 
probable. 

This is a general statement. There are ap23arent ex- 
ceptions ; where a limited observation of uniformity seems 
to enable us to conclude with certainty to the future and 
universal uniformity. Indeed, there arc cases where, 



450 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

upon a single observation^ we thus conclude : e. g. the 
fusibility of a substance ; the combination of substances 
by elective affinity. 

Upon such cases we remark : 

1. The observation, although limited in the particular 
case, is supported by more extended observations in simi- 
lar or analogous cases. 

2. The cases are of such a character that all the possi- 
ble circumstances and relations that can be of any weight, 
are embraced in the observation, though limited both as 
to time and space. 

3. The cases in which a succession of uniformities is 
conceivable, and in which therefore certainty is attainable 
only by the discovery of a law, are cases where we take 
into consideration not the specific natures or powers, and 
susceptibilities of substances, but general and extended 
relations in time and space ; whereas, in these other cases, 
the specific natures or powers, and susceptibilities of sub- 
stances, are what we particularly take into consideration. 
Take the elective affinity of two substances, and apply to 
it these principles as an illustration. 1. This is supported 
by observations in numerous analogous cases. 2. All the 
circumstances of the case, of any weight, are embraced 
in our observation. No change of time or place can add 
to or take from the completeness. 3. We are considering 
only the specific natures of these substances, in no gene- 
ral relation, but simply in relation to each other. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 451 



SECTION IX. 

REASONING FROM EXPERIENCE. 

I. From the jpresent to tJie past. — Tliis, in the general 
statement, is called a posteriori. We wish, to ascertain 
the past. We take the facts of the present, and, in ac- 
counting for them, call np the X3ast. This presumes that 
the past is the cause of the present. Eegarded, how- 
ever, more closely, this form of proof presents itself as 
follows : 

1. The facts of the present are accounted for by- 
referring them to causes — causes which are also present, 
and now acting. But, causes are inherently energetic, 
and are' uniform ; hence, since they existed in the past, 
they must have produced effects hke those which we now 
witness. We thus draw the facts of the past from the 
facts of the present, not by assigning the former as the 
causes of the latter, but by referring both to common 
causes, and then analogically concluding the past from the 
present. 

Thus we may prove the physical condition of the 
ancient world ; and, taking human nature as a cause, we 
may prove its moral condition. 

2. The distinction between moral and physical causes, 
and between moral and physical certainty, must be borne 
in mind. The former brings in the consideration of free 
will, in connection with a vast variety of moral character, 



452 THE DOCTEINE OF EVIDENCE. 

and therefore gives birth to a vast variety of results, 
wliile the latter is fixed and precise. 

The physical condition of the ancient world, it is not 
difficult to determine on well known and uniform general 
principles. But, in order to determine the moral condi- 
tion with any precision, we need data from history. There 
is indeed a reciprocal action between history and general 
moral principles, in reasoning : the latter often serving to 
determine points of history otherwise doubtful ; the 
former supplying, leading, and determining facts to the 
latter. 

3. Laws have often a gradual, instead of an immediate 
development. Thus a law, in order to complete its cycle, 
may require ages. This appears in Geology and Astro- 
nomy, and in Politics and Philosophy. 

Now, if we can ascertain that given and present facts 
are a part of such a development, gradual and progressive, 
then we have at once a chain by which we can a posteriori 
ascend to the past as well as a priori descend to the 
future. 

II. From the present to the future. — Our present ex- 
perience is connected with causes. If these causes are 
known, on the uniformity of law, we predict the future. 

The distinction between moral and physical causes, 
and between moral and physical certainty above referred 
to, is of equal importance here. On laws gradually 
developing, no additional remarks are necessary. 

The above proceeds on the supposition that we have 
ascertained Laws. In many instances, however, we may 
proceed merely on an uniformity more or less extensive. 
The distinction given under Reasoning from Example 
will apply here also, viz. That when we reason upon the 
basis of mere uniformity, generally, our conclusions are 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 453 

only probable : but when we reason upon the basis of a 
law clearly ascertained, our conclusions are certain, morally 
or physically, as the case may be. 

Those instances where we reason to a past and a 
future^ uniformity upon a single experiment, or a very 
limited experience, — e. g. the fusibility of a substance — 
have already been considered, 



454 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION X. 

REASONING FROM RESEMBLANCE AND ANALOGY. 

Eesemblance is defined as agreement in certain points, 
and is thus distinguished from identity, whicli is universal 
agreement, and excludes difference. Other things being 
equal, the more numerous the points of agreement, the 
closer the resemblance. Some points, however, are more 
important than others. Agreement in a few important 
points constitutes a closer likeness than agreement in a 
multitude of unimportant or trifling points. 

Kesemblance is of two general kinds : First, Kesem- 
blance in properties. Secondly, Eesemblance in relations. 

Now, in reasonino* from resemblance, we must of course 
reason either from the resemblance of properties or of 
relations. The first is called reasoning from direct or 
simple resemblance. The second, reasoning from analogy. 

In reasoning from resemblance, there are two terms. 
In. reasoning from analogy, there are three or four terms, 
and two relations. 

I. Direct Besembla7ice. — The object in this case is to 
determine particulars of resemblance unknown to exist, 
from known particulars ; i. e. From known corresponding 
properties, to reason to others which are unknown. One 
property in a subject is seen to involve another, either 
on the ground of uniform sequence or of law. Hence we 
infer the agreement of two terms in properties, which ar' 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 455 

involved in those whicli are known to exist. The reason- 
ing is a priori, when the unknown property holds to the 
known, the relation of consequent to antecedent ; and, 
vice versa, the reasoning is a j^osferiori. 

The probability of the reasoning obviously must be 
determined by the nature of the connection between the 
known and unknown ; if it be a connection of mere stated 
uniformity, the reasoning is generally only probable ; if 
it be a connection of law, the reasoning is certain. Csesar 
and Buonaparte resemble each other in certain properties 
— ambition, &c. But ambition can be shown to involve 
the love of supreme powder, and the love of supreme power 
involves attempts to gain the supremacy, if the time and 
opportunity be auspicious : hence, Ceesar and Buonaparte 
may have the consequential points of resemblance, inas- 
much as they have the quality which involves them. 
This is a 'priori; and the conclusion morally certain. 

In arguing that the planets are inhabited, from their 
resemblance to this world, w-e proceed ct ^oosterioi^i. 
From' like provisions for social existence, we infer social 
existence. We argue here to the motive or design. This 
likewise is morally certain. 
. • II. Indirect Resemhlance, or. Analogy. 

1. Where there are two terms related to a common 
third, we may call the two relations a common relation, 
inasmuch as the common third is a cause of both, or at 
least a uniform antecedent of both. In this case, when 
the analogy is granted, and we reason from particulars of 
one relation, or of one member of the common relation 
to particulars of the other, our reasoning is probable or 
certain ; In the first place, according to the nature of the 
connection between the common third and the two 
related terms : if it be only a connection of uniform 



456 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

iequents, the reasoning is generally only probable ; if of 
Law, the reasoning is certain. 

The reasoning is probable or certain in the second 
place, according to the nature of the particulars from 
which we reason : if they are particulars necessarily com- 
prehended in the third term, the reasoning is certain : if 
they be merely circumstantial, the reasoning will be 
probable, according to the degree of uniformity. When 
the third term is merely a uniform antecedent, and the 
particulars of the relation likewise only circumstantial, 
with more or less of uniformity, we shall have the case of 
a probability of a probability. 

"When the analogy is to be proved from the resembling 
particulars, we have substantially a case of simple a 
posteriori reasoning. Each set of particulars is shown to 
demand the common third as an antecedent. The prin- 
ciples, therefore, which apply to a posteriori reasoning in 
general will apply to this case. 

2. Where there are four terms and two distinct, but 
resembling relations. 

What constitutes the analogy ? The resembling rela- 
tions? But this resemblance may be accidental. It 
must be at least a uniform resemblance, therefore, that 
constitutes the anabgy. The particulars in one relation 
must uniformly resemble the particulars in the other 
relation. But this uniformity is an exponent of some 
law. Whatever conclusion is drawn, therefore, must rest 
upon this law as certainly ascertained, or as existing only 
in theory, and accordingly will be a conclusion certain or 
probable. 

ISTow, this law must comprehend both relations, because 
it explains the uniformity of the resemblance between 
the two relations. But are not these relations themselves 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 457 

relations of antecedent and consequent^ as respects the 
two terms respectively, comprehended by some higher and 
common term ? It is even so. The two terms on either 
side of the analogy are related as antecedent and conse- 
quent ; and then their relations exhibit resemblances 
which must be referred to a higher law comprehending 
and penetrating both ; e. g. The seed of a plant, and the 
G^g of a fowl. The plant is in some sense the cause of 
the seed — and the fowl in some sense the cause of the 
Qgg. The two terms on either side have very slight direct 
resemblances. And the two relations do not resemble 
each other merely in being relations of cause and effect, 
for they resemble a multitude of relations in the same 
way. But the point to be nicely and strictly observed is, 
that these two relations have particulars of resemblance 
beyond their general agreement with each other, and with 
all other relations of cause and effect. What is this 
agreement ? It is this. The egg and the seed, besides 
being effects the one of the fowl, the other of the plant, 
contain ahke the principle of generative life. IS'ow, when 
we reason from one to the other, we reason on the basis of 
this common principle. Whatever particulars are neces- 
sarily comprehended in the action of this principle, and 
developed as such on one side of the analogy, may be con- 
cluded as likewise existing on the other side. 

If the principle be only in theory, then the reasoning 
cannot advance beyond probability. If the particulars 
have only a uniform, and not a necessary connection, to 
our perception, with the principle, the reasoning here 
likewise is only probable. If both the preceding concur 
in a given case, we have only a probability of a proba- 
bility. 

Not unfrequently in this land of analogy the great 

20 



458 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

object of the reasoning is to establish the analogy itself ; 
i. e.j Four terms being given^ and two terms respectively 
being related each to each, constituting two relations, the 
object of the reasoning is to bring these relations under a 
common principle. This may be done a priori, by show- 
ing that a principle exists which necessarily or probably 
comprehends these relations ; or, a posteriori, by show- 
ing that there are particulars of resemblance in these 
relations which probably or certainly require the principle 
to account for them. 

This analogy thus established, as we have before shown, 
becomes a general principle to these relations and forms 
the basis of deductions. We have an illustration of this 
in an argument adduced by phrenologists. 

There is an obvious connection between the governing 
and specific propensities of animals and their physical 
structure : thus carnivorous animals may be distinguished 
from graminivorous — the lion from the ox. 

There is a connection likewise between the intellect 
of man and his physical structure. His senses and his 
brain are unquestionably connected with the development 
of his intellect. 

]^ow the object of the reasoning is to estabhsh an 
analogy ; i. e., That the relations on either side are com- 
prehended by the same principle or law. This, if estab- 
lished at all, must be established either a priori or d pos- 
teriori. If a priori, then we must find some principle or 
law actually existing which comprehends these relations 
necessarily, or at least probably. Is there any such prin- 
ciple ? They are bound to show it. I cannot perceive 
any. If a posteriori, then we must find such particulars 
of resemblance in the two relations as demand necessarily, 
or at least probably, a common principle to account for 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 459 

them. Are there such particulars of resemblance ? Let 
us see. In the first relation ; i. e., between the animal 
propensities and physical structure, we perceive that the 
propensities have reference to ends which can be accom- 
plished only by a physical structure directly adapted to 
them. The thirst for blood demands the teeth and paws 
of the lion and tiger ; palpably the nature cannot be com- 
plete without these instruments. But are there any Kke 
particulars in the relation between the intellect of man 
and his senses, brain and skull, &c. ? The senses and 
brain are indeed conditional to the exercise of thought ; 
but are they the instruments of thought 1 Can it be 
shown that the senses and brain are to the intellect, what 
the teeth and paws are to the propensity for prey ? Can 
it be shown from any particulars in this relation, that any 
power of the mind requires a portion of the brain as its 
instrument for accomplishing its end, just as the beast 
palpably requires the strong jaws with all their furniture, 
and the muscular legs and paws ! 

The relation between the intellect and the brain and 
senses, contains no such particulars as the relation between 
the animal propensities and the instruments which are 
necessary to accomplish their ends. Hence we cannot infer 
that they come under the same law — ^hence we cannot 
reason from one to the other. 

A beautiful and familiar analogy, and one which aptly 
illustrates analogy consisting of four terms, is that between 
the human being at death and insect metamorphoses. 
Here are the two relations, of the human being to death, 
and of the caterpillar to its chiysalis. In the latter case 
we see the whole process, a dissolution of the caterpillar, 
and the infolded germ of a higher being reposing for a 
time within the chrysalis and there preparing for its new 



460 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

form of life, and, when the hour arrives, bursting from 
its shell a winged and gorgeous psyche, dwelling in the 
sunbeams and feeding upon the aroma of flowers. In 
like manner the human being lies down to die ; but in 
this last case we do not see the whole process, — ^we cannot 
by the microscope discover the wings of the immortal 
form infolded in the "mortal coil;'' nor do we see the 
struggling psyche after it has burst its shell. The analogy, 
therefore, does not present us many resembling circum- 
stances in the two relations compared. But, nevertheless, 
there are some points very striking. The death of the 
caterpillar is not the extinction of the organific Life 
within — that survives. And yet he who first witnessed 
this metamorphosis, when he saw the worm die, and the 
chrysalis formed, must have concluded that Nature in her 
sportive and beautiful fancy had only given the frail and 
insignificant creature a golden tomb. But when he 
looked again, he saw a bright and spirit-like creature 
struggling into a nobler life. We see thus, in Nature, an 
apparent death only the precursor of another and a 
higher forra of life. Now take the human being, with all 
his sublime capacities — capacities admitting of indefinite 
improvement — ^and with his actual conceptions of, and 
longings after immortality, and does it not seem a priori, 
a fit and reasonable thing that he should live again when 
he appears to die? And if any should object to the con- 
clusion, that all the circumstances of dissolution ought 
to lead to a contrary induction, then we may reason from 
the analogy of the butterfly, that in Nature an apparent 
death is but the process through which a new and more 
perfect form of life is produced. 

The use of the analogy here is not to prove the 
doctrine of immortality, but to answer an objection to it. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 461 

The principle whicli comprelieiids both, relations is that of 
Life, not as the product of organization, but as itself the 
organific power. To this we may add the fitness and 
harmony of the Divine design. 

The above exposition of reasoning from Kesemblance 
and Analogy, suggests the following rules for conducting 
this reasoning : 

First. Be careful to distinguish between direct resem- 
blance and th6 resemblance of relations, and between the 
analogy of three and that of four terms. 

Secondly. Distinguish between important and unim- 
portant resemblances. Those are unimportant which are 
merely accidental. Every degree of uniformity claims a 
corresponding degree of attention, because uniformity is 
an exponent of law. Those resemblances which stand di- 
rectly and unquestionably connected with law, are the 
most important. 

Thirdly. Another rule commonly given is, not to 
carry ,out our comparison of the terms or relations to too 
many resemblances. 

The resemblances evidently cannot be too numerous 
if they all be important. This rule contemplates sub- 
stantially the same point as the preceding. A comparison 
is always carried out too far when it is carried out to un- 
important points of resemblance. 



462 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 



SECTION XI. 

DEMONSTRATIVE PROOF. 

In noticing the application of the Deductive Formula/'^' I 
drew illustrations from Greometry. Geometry then is De- 
duction. But it is Demonstrative Proof also. The prin- 
ciples are the same — the process of reasoning the same. 
The only distinction lies in the order of proof and the or- 
der of investigation already noticed.f He who first con- 
structed Geometry proceeded of necessity according to the 
latter order. Now, that it is constructed, the learner pro- 
ceeds according to the former. 

Indeed, where we lay down a proposition, and then 
give the demonstration, we evidently only announce before- 
hand the conclusion at which we are to arrive ; and this 
we are enabled to do, because in a previous investigation, 
this proposition was found to be the conclusion of the very 
chain of premises, or the sorites, which we now call tJie 
demonstration. 

Demonstrative proof applies to all subjects where our 
deductions can be made from absolute principles. 

* Supra, p. 370. f Supra, p. 403. 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 463 



SECTION XII. 

CALCULATION OF PROBABILITIES AND CHANCES 

The calculation of probabilities, is generally called the 
calculation of chances, but improperly. Let us try to dis- 
tinguisb tbem. I have already defined the probable as 
implying, both, tbat a certain amount of proof has already 
been obtained for a given proposition, and tbat still more 
is required for complete certainty. The possible, in dis- 
tinction from this, exists where no proof has actually been 
obtained, but where the proposition is of such a nature as 
to admit of proof S' 

Now, a proposition, while in the state of progressive 
proof, shows probabilities on either hand. It is here that 
a calculation is required, viz. : a calculation of the oppos- 
ing probabilities, so as to determine the ratio of probabil- 
ity for the proposition in question. 

Now, on the other hand, the calculation of chances 
would be the calculation oi possibilities, or rather of pre- 
sumptions founded upon possibility. We have shown 
above,f that where a presumption is said to lie in favor 
of any proposition, there is always some principle which, 
in reality, determines it. Some natural right claims to be 
respected until positive reasons be given why it should be 
3et aside ; or the sanctions of time and usage surround 

♦ Supra, Section IV. t I^i"^- 



464 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

the disputed point, and claim to hold it, until a higher 
authority be adduced. Kow, here is something of the 
nature of probability. The fact that I am in possession 
of an estate, is proof that I am the owner, until my right 
is invalidated : and the fact of the existence of any insti- 
tution, is proof in its favor, until it be proved to have had 
its origin in fraud or violence. Presumption may there- 
fore be called the lowest degree of probability, as moral 
ertainty is sometimes called the highest degree. 

A calculation of pure possibilities, or chances, is im- 
practicable, because there are no data. In pure possibili- 
ties, all the terms are equally improbable, or without 
proof, and hence there is no calculation by which one re- 
sult may be shown to be more likely than another. For 
example, in the cast of a die there are six possibilities, 
and yet any one side is improbable, for no reason can be 
assigned why it, in particular, should come up : there in- 
deed is a reason lying in the position of the die, — the 
manner in which it is thrown — giving it just such a direc- 
tion, and such a degree of force ; but it is unascertainable. 
It may indeed be said that the probability in favor of a 
particular side is one-sixth, because there are six sides to 
the die ; but this is not true, since it is possible that the 
same side might come up successively many times. 

What is called the calculation of chances, therefore, 
is really the calculation of prohahilities, either as proba- 
bihties simply, or under that form which we have termed 
presumptions. There are always data — something given 
upon which we may base our calculations. This is amply 
illustrated in insurance upon life and property. The term 
of human life, under different climates, in different em- 
ployments, and, taking as a point of departure, different 
ages, has been made the subject of very extensive obser- 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 465 

vations, by which data have been accumulated sufficient 
to enable us to calculate the probable number of years 
still remaining to any individual, so as to affix to it a de- 
finite commercial value. The rates of insurance on houses 
and ships are determined upon data acquired in the same 
way. Here there is no chance or mere possibility, but 
tangible proof. It is true, indeed, that the results cal- 
culated, may, in particular instances, fail of being at- 
tained ; but this obviously arises from the fact, that our 
data are necessarily limited, embracing only the more gen- 
eral and striking circumstances of the risks of human life, 
by disease and accident, and of houses and ships, by fire 
and tempests. We have not, in respect to these, deter- 
mined any absolute law, nor even any stated and fixed se- 
quences, for then we should have certainty ; we have 
only arrived at certain aggregate sequences and a com- 
plexity of influences and laws, where we are liable to the 
introduction of some new influence or law which may 
change the whole state of things. And this is the reason 
why the process is called a calculation of chances, since 
men are accustomed, in common parlance, to call that 
chance which happens unexpectedly ; and we are here 
calculating particular results in opposition to possible for- 
tuities. Or, perhaps, a juster representation is, that pre- 
suming an end, we calculate the risks — in other words, 
the probabilities, that it will not take place. 

Indeed, there are just two orders in which the proof 
may proceed : First. We may consider what antecedents 
may exist in relation to a particular consequent, and which 
of them is most likely to produce it. Secondly. The con- 
sequent may be one in whose favor the presumption lies, 
60 that the burden of proof rests with him who would dis- 



20* 



466 THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 

pute it. In tliis case^ probabilities are to be arrayed 
against the consequent. 

Under tbe first order there are obviously three possible 
cases : 

1. The several possible antecedents may not differ as 
to the probability of their existence, but they may differ 
as to the probability with which each one claims to be the 
actual antecedent. In this case, the ratio to -be deter 
mined respects the immediate connection of antecedent 
and consequent. 

2. The antecedents may not differ as to the probability 
of their actual antecedence, but, as .to the probabihty of 
their existence. Here the ratio to be determined respects 
the antecedents themselves, and not their connection with 
the consequent. 

3. The antecedents may differ in both respects. In 
this case, the ratio of the probabilities will be as the pro- 
duct of the probabilities of the existence, and of the ac- 
tual antecedence of the one, to the products of the same 
probabilities of the other ; i, e. the ratio of a probability 
of a probability to a probability of a probability : e. g. sup- 
pose the probabilities of existence be as 5 : 6, and the pro- 
babilities of actual antecedence as 3 : 4, then the resultant 
probability wiU be as 5 : 8. 

Under the second order, the same cases must occur. 
This is the order of proof in insurances. The presumption 
is always in favor of life and property ; for the propaga- 
tion and sustentation of human beings, and the accumu- 
lation and preservation of property, is the fixed and pre- 
dominant order of things. He who insures them, can lose 
only by their being lost. He therefore, under the given 
circumstances, must calculate the probabilities, that ante- 
cedents exist which may occasion this loss ; and if this be 



THE DOCTRINE OF EVIDENCE. 467 

granted, or rendered probable, then be must calculate tbe 
ratio of tbe probabilities of the several antecedents. 

Tbere are cases wbicb appear at first entirely fortu- 
itous,, but wbicb afterwards are invested with probability, 
through data acquired by sheer empiricism : e. g. nothing 
appears more fortuitous than the casting of a particular 
side of a die ; and yet, by casting the die a great many 
times, it has been found that a particular side returns with 
a considerable degree of exactness, according to a certain 
ratio. 

We have not attempted, in this place, any thing like 
a full explanation of the calculation of probabilities ; for 
this would lead us into the domain of Mathematics. We 
have only aimed to state the leading principles as they 
stand connected with the Doctrine of Evidence. 



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